

March 18, 1987

Dear Mr. Doreian:

Thank you for your kind message. I appreciate your warm words of support and confidence.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff to the President

Mr. Raymond W. Doreian
533 Stenwyck Circle
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

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RAYMOND W. DOREIAN

March 3, 1987

533 STENWYCK CIRCLE
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(215) 265-6016

Senator Howard Baker, Chief of Staff
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20006


Dear Senator Baker,

Thank you very much for "taking the reins" as Chief of Staff for Mr. Reagan. As "an American by choice" - former foreign national - I also believe this to be an "historic presidency".

In fact, it was following "my campaign" for Mr. Reagan's election in 1980 that I became determined to be an American citizen. Again, please accept my sincerest thanks for accepting this new responsibility. Would that I could, I would be a patriot in yours, or our President Reagan's footsteps. I consider it a great honor to have even the privilege of expressing myself to you on this matter.

Thank you.

Respectfully,



Raymond W. Doreian

RWD/cal

P.S. I have enclosed a copy of a recent letter to Senator Heinz which you may find interesting.



February 9, 1987

Raymond W. Doreian
533 Stenwyck Circle
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Senator John Heinz
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Heinz:

Thank you for your most welcome response to my December 30, 1986 letter.

In response to your request pertaining to SDI, I am glad to mention the following:

- SDI is a "martialling point" - one which provides for contemporary debate relating to technology, the economy and the common defense. I believe this is healthy since the proposal's critics use these very issues in attempting to align the American public opinion (and the world's) against SDI. (c.f. "the Space Debates" of the 1960's) we do well to review our commitment to progress honestly and as openly as is prudently possible, and proceed for the common good.

- SDI provides us, the United States of America, to focus on a single "international" issue and demonstrate our willingness to provide the leadership with the necessary commitment of resources to establish "western democracy" as the leading system of world government - for the people and by the people - via the representative republic form that we enjoy.

Also, I have attached a copy of a recent article appearing in the February 2, 1987 issue of "Defense News". I believe this article provides additional insight to the value of SDI.

Finally, while recognizing the need to provide help for the indigent, assistance to the poor to escape the cycle, and an "absolute" directive/direction relating to the increasing strains being placed on all of us via a health-care burden crisis of unacceptable social blights, particularly AIDS and out-of-wedlock pregnancy - read "promiscuous sexual activities/irresponsible fathering" - these arguments are not contrary to SDI and its potential for achievable worldwide (social) benefit. LIFE!


February 9, 1987

Raymond W. Doreian
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In very fact, our failure to provide both moral and responsible leadership in the social, economic and defense arenas for the whole world will be of no value if the world's stability is challenged at every turn by a thrust from one quarter or another.

In this constitution year, 1987, let us resolve to determine a national agenda for communication to the world - one of morally responsible leadership - with the desire for the benefits of our system of government to flow peacefully to all men in all lands.

Respectfully, yours sincerely,



Raymond W. Doreian

RWD/cal

cc: Mr. Lawrence A. Coughlin, M.C.

COMMENTARY

OPINION • LETTERS

INSIDE VIEW

Consider What SDI Might Accomplish

If America Does Not Pursue Project, No One Will Ever Know

By COLIN S. GRAY

In the 1960s the U.S. government made a virtue of necessity when it decided to elevate the contemporary military incapacity to protect the homeland to the status of a high principle of statecraft. Vulnerability, we were told, is not only inevitable, it is desirable. Stability, would prosper if societies were unambiguously vulnerable and weapons were unambiguously invulnerable.

Mutual vulnerability of societies was held to provide an existential deterrence. Acceptance of such vulnerability would be the key to the negotiability of arms control regimes and the minimization of incentives to race after the illusion of military advantage in the nuclear arms competition. If unacceptable damage is identified with some "magic fraction" of society destroyed, the size and quality of a strategic arsenal can be determined with reference to the finite number of targets, the character of those targets, the reliability and readiness of weapons and the scale of attrition that might be suffered as a consequence of offensive or defensive counterforce on the part of the enemy.

The logic of mutual assured vulnerability is almost elegant in its simplicity. The arms race is driven, allegedly, by the hope for counterforce success and anxiety over the counterforce potential of the enemy. Both very accurate strategic offensive weapons, and strategic defensive weapons intended to protect society are destabilizing, because they could threaten the effectiveness of the deterrent of the enemy.

In the heat of debate it is sometimes forgotten that (mutual) assured destruction is not and has never been the nuclear strategy of the United States. Indeed, unless you see some merit in a Carthaginian peace, assured destruction is not a concept of strategy at all. Strategy is the guidance of military power for the goals set by policy. It is difficult to conceive of any U.S. policy purpose that could be served by killing tens of millions of Soviet citizens. But assured destruction is an awesome and awful possibility.

Colin S. Gray is president of the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, Va., and is the author of many books on military strategy.

For all the doctrinal refinement of U.S. and NATO nuclear strategy over the past 15 years, the keystone in the arch of deterrence remains the common sense proposition that events could escape rational strategic control and produce a nuclear holocaust — so be exceedingly careful. The following needs to be said about nuclear strategy and vulnerable societies:

■ First, while the prospect of a nuclear holocaust is in principle profoundy deterring, in practice the prospect of a bilateral — even a general — holocaust, is even more self-deterring.

■ Second, heavy reliance upon nuclear threats in one's strategy is far more debilitating politically for a democracy than for a dictatorship.

■ Third, even very unlikely events can occur. A nuclear-heavy strategy would be prone to fail us. It is indeed essential that our strategy should raise very healthy anxieties in Moscow.

But it is no less essential that our strategy be one which an American president, soberly and responsibly, would judge it to be in the U.S. interest actually to implement. Those who criticize the idea of an offense-defense balance in our strategy should not be permitted to escape facing up to the alternative. At the present time it is U.S. policy that we do not rule out the first use of nuclear weapons. The only theory that we have, extant, for the limitation of damage to North America, is the hope that the Soviets would exercise a great measure of self-restraint in the weight and kind of their nuclear targeting. I suspect that a restrained counter-military reply by the Soviet Union to a relatively small-scale U.S. nuclear initiative against their homeland most likely would entail a strike back by several thousands of nuclear weapons.

■ Fourth, it is one thing to accept the total vulnerability of one's society, if there is no practical choice; it is quite another to choose to perpetuate that condition, as the inexorable consequence of failing to support a research effort to see if strategic defenses that could provide a useful level of protection are achievable. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a moral imperative; the prospects for affordable technical success seem to be high enough that no responsible administration should do other than pay the formidable research and development entry price so the policy debate can pro-



DRAWING BY MARGARET KING

gress. The SDI could lead to a deterrence that is superior to that which we know today in its robustness under pressure. SDI may not, in fact, lead to weapon products that could accomplish these desirable ends. But if we do not pursue it we can never know.

■ Fifth, President Reagan has stated on many occasions that the United States does not seek unilateral advantage through the development of new strategic defenses. It is my belief that unless the Soviets judge that they will be placed at a considerable military, hence political, disadvantage, they will not negotiate seriously with respect to a partially cooperative defensive transition. Furthermore, I find the admittedly distant prospect of a U.S. advantage in strategic forces to be attractive. In fact, if an unmistakable U.S. advantage could be regained in strategic forces, it would pump some new vitality back into the idea of deliberate and controlled escalation that is central to NATO strategy.

Critics of SDI have not been slow to notice that at different times senior members of the administration have emphasized different missions for strategic defense. It seems to me that we should deploy strategically useful defenses when we are able to do so, even though we anticipate being able to deploy far more useful defenses in later years. It is extremely important that Soviet designers and planners of offensive forces should face an open-ended SDI threat to all of the purposes to which they might apply their missiles and aircraft. Similarly, it is critical to the scale of the potential success of the SDI that Soviet weapon designers should not know in the 1980s or 1990s that they can rely on a free ride in boost-phase or early mid-course.

While keeping an open mind on the possibility that one day multilayered defenses (including air defenses) may be able to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. society to the condition perhaps of the mid-1950s, which is to say a condition where catastrophic but far from terminal damage should be expected, the nearer-term benefits of SDI for deterrence should be analyzed on their merits and not treated as in-

dicating any lack of commitment to long-term goals.

There is little sense in debating whether 20 or 30 years from now the instruments for long-range nuclear bombardment will have gone the way of the horse cavalry. Only time well spent can provide the answer. It is far more useful to consider what SDI might accomplish in this century to defeat Soviet military strategy and hence provide some major near-term gains for deterrence.

New missile and augmented air defense deployments could, if we seize the opportunity, make the difference between NATO holding in Europe and NATO not holding in Europe. Long before we could place an impenetrable, thoroughly reliable lid over the Soviet Union and its missile submarines at sea, we could drastically reduce the expected military returns from strikes against NATO's infrastructure in Europe and the logistic train back to the United States. The most substantial and potentially deterring assets of the Western alliance are placed at a severe discount by NATO's persisting overreliance upon hopefully controlled and probably early nuclear escalation.

Strictly speaking, strategic defense is strategy neutral. We could seek to confine it to roles entirely supportive of existing military policy — increasing Soviet military uncertainties at the margin, though still usefully, but not asking ourselves whether strategic defense perhaps could alter the very terms of deterrence. Given the enormous economic and political strengths of the Western alliance, I suggest that we should endeavor in the near term to develop active defenses that would enable us to relegate all nuclear weapons to counterdeterrent roles; and in the long term to build very formidable physical barriers against offensive nuclear action, so that if we misread Soviet determination or capacity for folly, there would be very sharp limits to the worst that they could do.

It seems that a great deal of the anti-SDI case amounts to a rush of grossly premature judgment by people who have learned their lines and are operating wholly in an adversarial mode. There is nothing technically outrageous about the idea of strategic defense — after all it is 42 years since the German V-2 rockets flew in 1944.

Finally, in all the nonsense that has been written about a possible "grand compromise" in arms control, there has been scarcely any recognition of the fact that we have already been down the grand compromise path — it was called SALT I. I am still waiting for critics of SDI to propose interesting schemes for the radical reduction of Soviet air defenses.

Continuous Air Attacks Drop Bomb on Iranian Morale

MIDDLETON, from Page 19

steadily improving air and ground defenses. The Iranians have neither.

Let me pass on some information received recently from a highly reliable Iranian source.

Isfahan, one of Iran's leading cities, is being bombed three

to four times a day from midnight to early morning by formations of from three to six Iraqi aircraft, which drop 10 to 15 bombs on industrial and residential areas. The local government keeps the number of casualties secret, but bombing on this scale of a city without shel-

ters is likely to kill and wound many and leave hundreds of others homeless.

The air defense appears to be weak and, on some raids, nonexistent. The people of Isfahan do not hear any interceptor aircraft or surface-to-air missiles engaging their attackers. The

only opposition appears to come from some anti-aircraft guns stationed at a barracks in the city.

It would be foolish to believe that air attacks of this kind and others directed almost nightly at Teheran, Tabriz and other cities, can win the war for Iraq. But wars are also lost by breaks in civilian morale. Intelligence

sources finally agree that the recent heavy losses to the Iranian army in its drive on Basra have shaken popular support for the war.

Continue such attacks and continue the bombing and you raise questions even among the most loyal of the utility of a war which cannot be won without further heavy sacrifice.