

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files  
**OA/Box:** Box 2  
**File Folder:** FRG Germany [Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Genscher]

**Archivist:** kdb  
**FOIA ID:** F1997-066/6, D. Cohen  
**Date:** 08/04/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1. memo (7297)</del>	<del>Frank Carlucci to Chief of Staff re 10/9/88 meeting with Foreign Minister Genscher, 1p</del> R 5/24/11 F-97-066/6 #7	<del>10/8/87</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>2. talking points</del>	<del>for meeting with Genscher, 1p</del> R " " " #8	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>3. proposal</del>	<del>for President; w/handwritten notes, 2p</del> R " " " #9	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>4. attachment</del>	<del>attachment to item 3, 1p</del> R " " " #10	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Agg on 7297

October 8, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM:

FRANK C. CARLUCCI 

SUBJECT:

Our Meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on Friday, October 9, 10:15 AM

FRG Foreign Minister Genscher is on one of his whirlwind visits to the United States. He arrived from Germany on Thursday afternoon, and after he sees us Friday morning, he will fly off to Minnesota for a dinner speech and a return flight to Bonn over the weekend.

Foreign Minister Genscher will have met with Secretary Shultz on Thursday afternoon. His session with us on Friday will be his only other substantive meeting in Washington.

Recent public opinion polls suggest that the Foreign Minister is the most popular political figure in West Germany. His poll ratings are far stronger than Chancellor Kohl's or any one's in the Social Democratic Party.

Genscher's small Free Democratic Party (FDP) has done extremely well in recent state elections, and has emerged as the key force in shaping FRG economic and foreign policy.

Genscher was an early supporter of NATO's double-track decision and favors the double global zero INF agreement we are fashioning with the Soviets. Genscher wants further arms reductions in the area of chemical and conventional weapons and early negotiations to reduce short-range (battlefield) nuclear weapons in Germany. The Foreign Minister would like the West to respond more positively to Gorbachev's reform efforts. He would also favor a new round of detente and more Western economic aid to Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, Genscher is perhaps more skeptical of our Persian Gulf and Iran-Iraq policies than any other leader in Western Europe. Though he would not admit it, he is responsible for the pro-Iranian spin on most FRG actions in the UN, and West Germany's pro-Syrian and anti-Iraqi tilt.

Genscher will clearly want to talk to us about East-West matters and the outlook for arms control and a USSR Summit over the next 60 days. He can be expected to try to steer clear of conversation about the Persian Gulf or the Middle East.

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NLRR F97-0666#7  
BY RW NARA DATE 5/24/11



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Add on  
7297

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH  
HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER

- We are working as hard as we can in Geneva with the Soviets on completing an INF treaty text. The work is far from finished.
- We expect a Summit date will be set when Secretary Shultz is in Moscow. It's hard to estimate what the date will be (and in any case we're relaxed) because we assume the Soviets won't want a Summit without signing an INF agreement and because we do not know when an INF agreement will be ready to sign.
- We share German views that the changes in the USSR under Gorbachev are of great potential importance. We need to watch internal developments closely. It is deeds and not words that count, and so far, we see little evidence of a change in Soviet foreign policy around the world.
- One test is how the Soviets act in the Persian Gulf and with respect to international efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war. A second test is whether they will be willing to get out of Afghanistan, without leaving behind a puppet regime.
- We are grateful for the FRG decision to move naval forces into the Mediterranean, a move we view as an important contribution to Western efforts in the Persian Gulf. If the West can continue to stand together, the Iranians cannot help but see that they are isolated in the international community. Such a realization, in turn, is our best hope of inducing them eventually to accept a UN sponsored cease-fire resolution.


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BY RW NARA DNE 5/24/01

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Add On 7297



United States

Senator Howard Baker  
Frank Carlucci  
Ambassador Richard Burt  
Nelson Ledsky

Germany

Hans-Dietrich Genscher  
Karl Paschke  
Michael Jansen  
Hans Von Plotz  
Mrs. Perry Notbohm (Interpreter)

SECRET

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Mr. President:

This is the plan George and I discussed with you, modified slightly by the NDR. We are trying to keep it on close hold until the NDR announces it.

Frank

SECRET/SENSITIVE

RETURN TO NICARAGUA: NDR PLAN

HHB  
This is in  
the P. Cook

The Nicaraguan Resistance has decided that they should try to return to Nicaragua to pressure the Sandinistas to negotiate a cease fire with them.

-- Three Resistance Director (most likely Calero, Ferrey, Chomorro) will travel to Managua accompanied by top aides of the other three members (Robelo, Cesar, Sanchez), representatives of the private sector and labor from the Resistance Assembly and members of the Resistance Cease-Fire Commission.

-- They will try to get US Congressmen and Latin and Central American and other prominent individuals to fly on the plane to Managua with them.

-- They will request that the Central American democracies provide protection for them when they are there.

-- The specific purposes of their trip would be:

-- To show their support for the Guatemala Agreements by taking a large risk on behalf of national reconciliation.

-- To demonstrate their seriousness about negotiating a cease fire.

-- To take the initiative away from the Sandinistas and pressure them.

The following will have to be consulted in order for the plan to be implemented successfully:

-- Central American Democracies: to offer protection

-- Internal Opposition: to support initiative.

(Cerezo's Christian Democratic Party is hosting a conference on internal oppositions early next week which will be attended by major internal opposition figures. Calero will be there to speak with them about this initiative)

-- Church: The Resistance would use Cardinal Obando y Bravo as mediator. He is currently in Rome and would have to be approached to secure his agreement to play this role.

-- Congress: To agree to accompany the Resistance and to agree to have the funding legislation sent formally to the Hill before they leave for Managua.

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NLRR F97-066/le #9

BY RW NARA DATE 5/24/11

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NEGOTIATIONS: In order to gain support for this initiative from the Congress and the Central American democracies, we would announce our willingness to enter into regional discussions, including the Sandinistas, on security issues.



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TIMETABLE

October

9 PRG on date to introduce legislation

10-11 NDR sees Arias, briefs Bermudez

12 NDR sees Azcona

12-13 NDR approaches Internal Opposition in Guatemala  
NDR sees Cerezo

14 NDR sees Duarte in Washington; talks to  
Congressment

15-16 Busby travel to see Arias, Azcona, Cerezo to  
support initiative & discuss US role in regional  
security negotiations

17 Busby, Friers, Tillman meet with NDR in Miami

20 NDR announces initiative (probably from  
Guatemala)

22-23 Administration send Funding Request to Hill

25 Return to Managua

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NLRR 997-01616 #10  
BY RW NARA DATE 5/24/11