

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
 OA/Box: Box 4
 File Folder: SDI 03/17/1987 [Strategic Defense Initiative,
 03/09/1987 – 03/17/1987]

Archivist: kdb
 FOIA ID: F1997-066/6, D. Cohen
 Date: 08/10/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. proposal	re SDI, 1p R 3/17/06 F97-066/6 #156	3/17/87	B1
2. memo (8707304)	George Shultz to Reagan, 1p R 2/26/08 F97-066/6 #157	3/17/87	B1
3. memo	Max Kampelman to H. Baker and Frank Carlucci re Congress and SDI negotiations, 2p R 2/26/08 F97-066/6 #158	3/13/87	B1
4. memo	E. L. Rowny to Carlucci re SDI, 2p R 2/26/08 F97-066/6 #159	3/9/87	B1
5. report	re tomorrow's National Security Planning Group meeting, 1p R 3/17/06 F97-066/6 #160	n.d.	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

18/3

Sen BAKER,

YOU WANTED
THIS BACK,

Colin

March 17, 1987

SDI CONGRESSIONAL COMPROMISE

1. An agreement be concluded in writing that involved the leadership (especially the Majority leaders of both the Senate and House), plus a sufficient portion of the ranking majority and minority members of the Arms Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations and Budget Committees, and selected individual members of both the Senate and the House (including Quayle, Wilson, Wallop, Kemp and Courter) to ensure that the Congressional parties to such an agreement could deliver on the commitments made by them.
2. The Congressional parties to the agreement would commit:
 - a. To assist blocking any action which attempts to legislate the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty for the remainder of calendar year 1987 (through December 31, 1987).
 - b. To support the establishment of a special Congressional group or other appropriate mechanism to study the issue of the Treaty's interpretation with the results not to be released until the end of the agreed period.
 - c. To support prompt (i.e., by May 15, 1987) and favorable action on the \$500M SDI supplemental request for FY87 (including the necessary priority on heavy space-lift capability included in that request).
 - d. To support the full \$5.2B in DoD funds requested for SDI in the FY88 budget (and \$6.2B for FY89 in the context of a two-year budget activity).
 - e. To support the full DOE budget request associated with the SDI program for the corresponding years.
3. The Administration would commit:
 - a. Not to restructure the SDI program before the end of calendar year 1987 (through December 31, 1987).

-- During this period, the Administration would be permitted by Congress to take actions necessary to keep options open which would allow the Administration to move promptly to the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty after that date. These actions could include committing funds to be used for necessary planning and preliminary fabrication of test devices. However, no tests which would require the broad interpretation would be conducted during this period.
 - b. To drop the requirement for "dual ratification" of the TTBT/PNET treaties provided that an appropriate reservation containing additional verification criteria for implementing ratification could be crafted and agreed to by the Administration.
4. The Administration would not agree to any action involving SALT or ASAT as a part of this agreement.

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S/S 8707304

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1987

BY Ch. NARADATE 2/26/08
NLR #97-0166/b #157

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *GPS*

1. Ecuador. President Febres Cordero of Ecuador is delighted that George Bush will visit him in Quito on Sunday. He has invited his political opponents to sit down with the Vice President, a wise move which will reinforce the vitally necessary political truce in Ecuador. George will probably be able to confirm our plans to fund construction of bridges along the highway to the area most affected by the earthquakes. DOD believes US army reservists can probably join Ecuadorean troops on the road construction. George may also be able to offer about \$18 million in commodity assistance and increased development funds. Unfortunately, we may be unable to offer much in the way of balance of payments support. Febres Cordero and his free market economic team now face a financing gap in 1987 of at least \$500 million. Ecuador will have to cut imports sharply and seek extensive new loans from commercial banks and international financial institutions. *(S)*

2. Testimony Before HFAC. I have been taking every opportunity to drive home to the Congress the devastating effects of recent cuts in the Administration's foreign affairs budget. Tuesday, when I spoke to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on State Department operations, I pointed out that even a funding freeze at FY 87 levels would mean we would have to cut deeply into our base to pay over \$100 million in mandatory wage and pension increases and exchange-rate losses. Since all State Department operations at home and at over 250 posts abroad cost only four-tenths of one percent of the federal budget, even small cuts in our budget become mortal wounds. I told the subcommittee that, faced with a funding freeze or more cuts, I might have to haul down the flag at up to 50 of America's overseas diplomatic posts. *(ET)*

3. USSR--Shevardnadze Visit to East Asia and Pacific. As part of Soviet efforts to build their claim to a major role in East Asia, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze just visited Australia, Indonesia, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Shevardnadze stressed Soviet determination to play a part in guaranteeing any Cambodian settlement, which he suggested was now possible. Our friends in the region are skeptical about Soviet willingness to help in Cambodia and say the next move is up to Hanoi. The Vietnamese repeated publicly for Shevardnadze their old recipe for Cambodia, calling for talks between Vietnam, Laos, and the Cambodian regime on the one hand, and the ASEAN countries on the other. This idea is not acceptable to the ASEANS. Shevardnadze expressed support for nuclear free zones in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia and for elimination of foreign military bases (alluding to our facilities in the Philippines). Shevardnadze was not a notable success. He tried to suggest new Soviet flexibility but was unable to follow up with specifics. *(ET)*

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 13, 1987

MEMORANDUM

TO: White House Chief of Staff
The Honorable Howard Baker

National Security Adviser
The Honorable Frank Carlucci

FROM: Ambassador Max M. Kampelman *for MMK*

SUBJECT: The Congress and SDI Negotiations

The decision that we speak with one voice on this issue and that the voice should be your joint voice is a good one. I will move out of the picture except to the extent that you invite me or where you feel I can be of assistance.

Since returning from Geneva a week ago, I have met with a number of Members of Congress, including a lunch today with Tom Foley, the new head of the House Observer Group. Let me summarize my impressions and recommendations.

We must, of course, talk to, and deal with, the leadership. The Arms Control Observer Groups in both Houses could be a good instrument for these exchanges. It will be more difficult to work out an arrangement with the House than with the Senate. Jim Wright is not an easy person to work with and is increasingly partisan. He is also responsive to the growing "leftist" strength among the House Democrats. He can, however, be reached by arguments outlining the clear national security implications of a given course of action and when he can overcome his suspicions that the White House is seeking partisan advantage. Tom Foley reports that the House leadership, including the whip organization, is currently negative about the "deal" idea, particularly after Sam Nunn's speech. They have ABM and SDI amendments in the works, and believe they have the votes. Many are raring to go. However, Foley believes the current negativism can be overcome with a vigorous effort. The Republican leadership, knowing the realities of the voting balance, would welcome a peaceful resolution of the issue, even if it is only in the form of a temporary truce.

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NLR 197-000/12 #158

BY OK NARA DATE 2/26/08

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-2-

The Senate Democrats are also not enthusiastic about a "deal," but are pragmatic and want very much to support the Geneva negotiating process. Bob Byrd and Sam Nunn are sour because of the TTBT ratification difficulties, which they see as a credibility problem for the Administration. On the other hand, Alan Cranston, who has influence with the liberals, would like to support and strengthen the prospects for the Geneva negotiations.

On the Senate Republican side, the leadership would like to know what the White House wants. Malcolm Wallop, Pete Wilson and their associates are hostile and suspicious that SDI may be on the block. They have not had an explanation of the "deal," nor has the case for the "deal" been presented to them.

It is my opinion that a truce through the end of the year or March 31, 1988 at the outside, is feasible. Those who want to attack the Administration on ABM and SDI might be willing to forego that effort for a short period, but not for too long. Those who want to push for the "broad" interpretation can also wait, if it is not for too long.

The funding levels talked about in the papers prepared for the President are, in my opinion, not realistic. We should be clear on this point, even though it may reduce the attraction of the "deal" for us. It will not be difficult to achieve the same level of appropriation for next year as for the current fiscal year, with a small increase to reflect inflation. The Senate might be willing to stretch that sum to four billion dollars, plus DOE funding, but it will be difficult to get that figure in the House. We must, however, keep pushing to get the number up. We can make the argument that we want an increase in appropriations in order to strengthen our negotiating posture with the Soviets, but that will not carry us as high as the figures mentioned in our White House working papers.

In view of the fact that the appropriations cycle has begun, I do not see any virtue in postponing the beginning of a serious exploration with the leadership. On the other hand, Howard, you are the expert in that field.

I believe, finally, that our first step -- even without arriving at a final deal -- should be to reach a truce until after the Secretary of State's visit to Moscow on April 13-16.

The Senate Observers have asked me to meet with them on Monday at 4:00 p.m.

cc: Secretary of State Shultz

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Howard Baker,
but you are the expert
seems to me Ed
has a point in para. 3.

Dear Frank
P.S. We are
planning an NSPG.
March 9, 1987

Please note especially the
final paragraph of my comments.

I think it's essential that
the President hear, at an NSPG
meeting, the first-hand views
of his experts and close
advisors.

Warm regards,
Ed Romney



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NLRR 197-000/6 #159

United States Department of State

BY CU NARADATE 2/26/08 Washington, D.C. 20520

March 9, 1987

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Frank C. Carlucci - Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

FROM: E. L. Rowny 

SUBJECT: SDI Congressional Compromise

Let me preface my comments on the "SDI compromise" by saying that we are giving the wrong signal to the Soviets at the wrong time. For six years the President has said that he would not use SDI as a bargaining chip. And here we are, utilizing it as an internal bargaining chip. Accordingly, this is the first step in killing the SDI program. To minimize the damage inflicted on SDI, I submit the following:

The going in position is too weak. It should only commit us to sticking to the restrictive interpretation for the remainder of FY 87 (until 1 October 87). The going in position for the supplemental, i.e. the 5.2B in DOD funds for FY 88, the full DOE budget request, and priority for heavy space lift capability are okay.

The bottom line for sticking with restrictive interpretation should be CY 87. Aside from the comments in the first paragraph, Max Kampelman has indicated that all he needs for negotiating purposes is the restrictive interpretation for the balance of this year. Moreover, time is of the essence for the SDI program. If allowed to slip until March of 1988, it embroils the issue in the Presidential campaign and puts the nail in the coffin of the SDI program.

The bottom line for the funds should be at the 500 M supplemental for FY 87, a minimum of 4.5B in DOD for FY 88 and a minimum of 6B for FY 89 in the context of a two-year budget. In other words, the bottom line for funds is as outlined in the paper.

I would like to make three additional comments:

1) It is essential that this agreement be concluded in writing and that the Majority Leaders of both the Senate and House be included.

2) We should drop the notion of studying (even within the Executive Branch) the feasibility of discussions on permitted/

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DECL:OADR

prohibited activities with the Soviet Union. The discussions Max Kampelman has been having with Vorontsov go far enough. To go further is a dangerous, slippery slope.

3) In addition to the leadership being brought in on the compromise it is essential that certain key conservatives be made full partners to the deal. I have in mind Senators Quayle, Wilson and Wallop and Congressmen Kemp and Courter. We must recognize that there is a great deal of support for the President's SDI program among the US public. Many more senators will support the SDI program if they feel that those who have been behind the President all along have not been cut out of the process of reaching a compromise. It would be counterproductive if the signal got abroad that the liberals who are opposed to the SDI program have cut a deal with an overly cautious Administration.

Finally, I strongly urge that an NSPG meeting be called at the earliest opportunity so that the President can get first-hand views from his experts and close advisors.

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OBJECTIVES. The objectives we should seek from tomorrow's NSPG are the following:

1. To freeze all "free-lancing" by members of the Administration on an SDI deal.
2. To get firm control over this situation so that if further action is taken, the White House calls the timing and the terms.
3. To do the above while avoiding any stories of "disarray" within the Administration.

TACTICS. The tactics we have chosen are to:

1. Use a paper to establish where we agree/disagree, and to highlight that while some elements of a "deal" may sound acceptable in certain quarters of the Administration, they are opposed in others. Therefore, "free-lancing" involves unacceptable risks.
2. Use the NSPG to make it clear that any action in this area requires the approval of the President.
3. Use the NSPG to freeze the situation (pending further Presidential guidance), thus bringing the ball firmly back into the White House court.

MEETING OUTCOME. The outcome of the meeting that we seek from this meeting is to freeze the situation and regain control in the White House. To do this, the meeting should end on the note that the President is considering his options and, pending further guidance:

1. Members of the Administration are directed not to initiate contacts with the Hill on the subject of such a deal until the President has studied the various views heard, thought through the issue, and explicitly authorizes any such action.
2. If approached by members of Congress, members of the Administration should not engage in speculation about such a deal, especially substantive discussion which could foreclose the President's options: both
 - (a) as to whether he will or will not authorize such a deal at the appropriate time; and
 - (b) as to the substance of such a deal.

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLS F97-0666#160
BY WJ NARA, DATE 3/17/06