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U.S. APPROACH TO INF NEGOTIATIONS - II (X)

The basic US position taken at the INF negotiations in Geneva is and remains a sound one. Its essence is captured in the US proposal to eliminate the entire class of land-based LRINF missiles. This proposal remains the optimal outcome for the US, for NATO, for Europe, and, I believe, for the Soviet Union. It is a principled position which involves the most significant degree of reductions possible in the class of LRINF weapons which cause most concern to both sides. It fully meets our own, and NATO's, criteria for a genuine arms reduction agreement and it remains my hope that the Soviet Union will eventually see the wisdom of our proposal. (XU)

In the interest of exploring all possibilities, and on the basis of close consultations with our allies, I decided last March to propose an interim step towards the ultimate elimination of all LRINF land-based missiles. While actively keeping our proposal to eliminate all land-based LRINF missiles on the table, the United States formally notified the Soviet Union that the United States is prepared to enter into an interim agreement under which the United States would accept a limit at some finite, agreed number of warheads on LRINF land-based missile launchers if the Soviet Union reduces the number of warheads on its LRINF land-based missile force to an equal level on a global basis. This proposal also meets the basic criteria we have established and is in the US, NATO's and, I believe, the Soviet Union's interest. (\mathbf{X})

Both of these proposals have been translated into draft treaty texts and provided to the Soviet Union. Regrettably, the Soviet Union has not, as yet, provided a serious response to our interim proposal. They have not demonstrated, through their actions at the negotiating table, that additional initiatives on our part are the appropriate next step in the negotiations. Nor have they demonstrated any flaw in the fundamentals of the US position and in the criteria upon which it rests. The US, therefore, will not offer any new initiative altering the fundamental US position that the US seeks an agreement which meets agreed NATO criteria and which significantly reduces the number, and could lead to the ultimate total elimination of, nuclear warheads on LRINF land-based missiles. in

There should be no doubt that without an agreement which satisfies the criteria we have identified, the US will, with the cooperation of our NATO allies, deploy LRINF land-based missiles as planned. (🔀

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At the same time, during the course of the next round of INF negotiations, and with the first NATO LRINF missile deployments, it is more essential than ever that the US aggressively pursue an agreement on LRINF missiles which meets the criteria we have established for such an agreement and thus furthers both US and NATO security interests. Through the end of this year, we and our allies will have to work very closely and very diligently to be in a position to deploy NATO LRINF missiles on schedule as planned in the absence of such an arms reduction agreement. As we do so, the US must continue to work with equal vigor and in equally close cooperation with our allies on the negotiating track of the NATO 1979 dual-track decision. Finally, in doing so, we must exploit every opportunity to ensure that we are perceived as being equally committed, as we are, to both tracks.

Basic Decision. In light of this, I have decided to take the necessary steps to "flesh out" the fundamental US INF position and to do so using a step-by-step approach that unfolds over the course of the next negotiating round. This approach should include the early presentation of general statements on each of the three major areas identified by NSC discussion: the PERSHING II/GLCM mix, regional missile sub-limits and the consideration of aircraft. By carefully crafting these general statements so as to protect later US options to the maximum extent possible, and presenting them in a timely manner, the intent is to:

clarify the US INF position in these areas;

- demonstrate that we are exploring every avenue in seeking an acceptable agreement which meets the criteria we have identified, and US/NATO security requirements; and

- posture ourselves so that, should we choose to consider more detailed positions on any of these items later in the round, we face the minimum risk from the Soviet assertion that the US is introducing new material so late in the negotiations that NATO deployments must not proceed until there is sufficient time to consider the new elements.

Implementing the Step-by-step Approach. In implementing this decision, the following strategy should be applied:

- The initial US step should be the presentation of general statements made near the beginning of the round. These should protect future US negotiating options to the maximum extent possible but place clear markers on the remaining issues which we may have to develop more fully during this round.

- Work should continue on a priority basis to refine the more detailed options we may wish to consider on each of these subjects later in the round (e.g., in the October time-frame).

- During the round, the use of these more detailed positions as they are developed can be considered as needed.



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- Finally, if necessary prior to the mid-November FRG Bundestag debate, all of the elements of the US INF position set forth by that time (some more detailed by that point than others) can be pulled together into a coherent presentation of a comprehensive position that could be newly compelling to the public, but which is not, nor could be successfully characterized by the Soviets to be, a "late change" in the US position requiring that NATO deployments not proceed as scheduled until adequate time for full discussion in Geneva is provided.

The Treatment of Aircraft. The basic US position remains that we prefer to focus on the LRINF missile issue, the issue involving the destabilizing systems of most concern to both sides. However, in the interests of pursuing an agreement which meets the US criteria, we are certainly prepared to consider proposals involving aircraft that also meet these criteria. In doing so, however, we will exercise extraordinary care so as not to degrade NATO's conventional defenses or the critical contribution made to both those defenses and to the defense of other US interests by dual-capable and carrier-based aircraft. Therefore, on this subject, instructions for the US INF Delegation should be drafted to reflect the following:

- Ambassador Nitze should inform the Soviets that he is now authorized to <u>explore in general terms</u> possible limitations on LRINF aircraft which would involve equal, verifiable limits on US-Soviet LRINF aircraft only and which do not entail a degradation of NATO conventional capability.

- Having done so, the US Delegation should invite the Soviets to offer their views concerning how such a limitation could be crafted within the parameters of the stated US criteria.


- The US Delegation should, to the extent possible, limit discussion to LRINF aircraft, and should deflect discussion of other dual-capable and carrier-based aircraft.

- Pending the completion of additional work in Washington, the US Delegation should not offer any additional proposals on the treatment of aircraft without first obtaining authorization from Washington.

The Senior Arms Control Policy Group will develop <u>contingency US</u> proposals on the aircraft issue for use if needed.

- The Policy Group should use as a baseline a global, equal limit on F-111, BADGER and BLINDER aircraft at or above planned US levels. Such a contingency proposal should be refined to minimize its risks to the US if adopted. If better alternatives to this proposal are subsequently generated, these should also be developed in detail.





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- This tasking does not imply that I have decided to make a more detailed proposal on aircraft during this round.

<u>Regional Missile Sub-limits</u>. On the subject of regional missile sub-limits, I have decided that we should adopt the following formulation as the first step on this issue. In the context of an agreement involving equal, global limits on LRINF missiles, the US is prepared to consider not offsetting the entire Soviet global LRINF missile deployment by US deployments of LRINF missiles in Europe.

- To implement this, the instructions to the US INF Delegation should reflect that in the context of a discussion of equal, global limits on LRINF missiles, Ambassador Nitze is authorized to explore in general terms Soviet views on alternative means of implementing this commitment. In doing so, he should consider the additional work which will be ongoing in Washington and keep open US negotiating options under study.

The Senior Arms Control Policy Group should continue to refine a specific, more detailed US proposal on the regional missile sub-limit issue. At the same time, we must avoid the perception of a separate Asian balance. The baseline alternative that the Policy Group should focus upon should be the offer of a US commitment not to deploy in Europe more than a certain proportion of the global level of LRINF missile warheads permitted under any agreement, with the right to deploy LRINF missiles elsewhere to an equal global ceiling.

- The Policy Group should also continue to consider the merits and risks of a possible contingency proposal for equal European subceilings within equal global ceilings.

PERSHING II/GLCM Mix. The PERSHING II system offers a much needed, time-urgent, hard-target kill capability. Any reduction of the 108 PERSHING IIs to maintain a fixed ratio would reduce NATO's ability to hold at risk time-urgent targets at longer range. Clearly, the PERSHING II system cannot be eliminated, short of Soviet acceptance of the zero/zero outcome. At the same time, we should be prepared to assure both the Soviets and our allies alike that in the context of an acceptable agreement entailing significant reductions, we would consider reducing the planned PERSHING II deployment in an appropriate manner.

One proposal suggested has been to keep the current ratio (approximately one PERSHING II missile to every four GLCMs) under an agreed, limited deployment. This could reassure all concerned that PERSHING II would be reduced under such an agreement, and thus could be seen as a substantive move in the eyes of the Soviets. However, there are a number of concerns surrounding such a proposal that require additional study.

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On the PERSHING II/GLCM mix issue, I have decided that the initial step the US should take is the presentation of the following position. In the context of an agreement involving significant reductions from current Soviet and planned NATO deployment levels, the US is prepared to distribute the reductions to be made from planned levels of forces between both the PERSHING II ballistic missile and the GLCM deployments in an appropriate manner.

In support of this position, the Senior Arms Control Policy Group should examine the mixes that would result at various alternative aggregate levels involving reductions in both systems and resulting from the application of the criteria that PERSHING II and GLCM must be deployed in organizationally efficient units.

- This work should determine if a commitment to maintain roughly the currently planned PERSHING II/GLCM deployment ratio makes sense in light of the mixes generated when consideration is given to organizationally efficient units.

- It should also explore in more detail and on a priority basis the advantages and disadvantages of using the concept of ballistic missile to cruise missile ratios to encourage a shift away from ballistic systems to slow-flying systems.

- This study should also review the implications of such a proposal for both deployment and negotiations.

Verification. Final preparation of verification annexes as appropriate to support the draft US INF treaties should be completed on a priority basis so that these annexes can be tabled in Geneva as early as possible during the next round.

Other Work. Work should proceed to identify the preferred US missile warhead number associated with the US interim proposal against the contingency that we may wish to table a proposal including such a number during this round.

Suspenses for Tasked Work. The additional study tasked by this NSDD should be completed as comprehensively and as rapidly as possible in order to support the strategy outlined in applying a step-by-step approach. The Senior Arms Control Policy Group will provide a status report on September 30 on all work tasked in association with this NSDD and not completed by that date.

Previous Guidance. This NSDD supplements NSDD-86 and other guidance previously issued on the US INF position.

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