NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 11

MUNITIONS/TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

1. The case-by-case consideration of requests by the People's Republic of China for munitions/technology transfers should be conducted on the basis of the following general principles:

   -- U.S. munitions/technology transfers to China should minimize the national security risks in special mission areas of nuclear weapons or their delivery systems, anti-submarine warfare capabilities, electronic warfare capabilities, or intelligence-gathering capabilities.

   -- U.S. munitions/technology transfers should not contribute significantly to improvements in Chinese offensive and power-projection capabilities.

   -- For requests which would enhance China's conventional defensive capabilities, the U.S. will be willing to consider the transfer of weapons, components, technical assistance and weapons production technology (including some coproduction/licensed production where sensitive technologies are not involved).

   -- For requests which fall into less clearly defensive categories, the U.S. will look first to the selective transfer of components and technical assistance rather than the transfer of complete weapons systems or their production technology.

   -- U.S. classified military information will be disclosed in accordance with the criteria and procedures established by the National Disclosure Policy (NDP-1).

2. In implementing these general guidelines, the existing mechanism and process established for munitions/technology transfers will be applied by the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and any other concerned organization that a specific case may warrant. Consultations should be undertaken as appropriate with key Congressional leaders and with Allies and friends during the process of review.

Review on September 23, 2001
Extended by RVallen
Reason: NSC 1.13 (f) UNCLASSIFIED