National Security Decision
Directive Number

US INITIATIVE TO BAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

After consultations with the National Security Council, I have decided that the United States Government shall put forward in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) before it recesses April 28 a draft treaty for a comprehensive, worldwide ban on chemical weapons (CW). Concurrently, the US Delegation shall propose to the Soviet Union complementary bilateral discussions, less formal than those conducted in 1977-80, to work out special bilateral arrangements to enhance the chances of Soviet compliance with a multilateral treaty. Before signing a multilateral CW treaty, implementation of verification procedures, and agreement between the US and the USSR on the accuracy and completeness of the required declarations of stockpiles and facilities is essential.

Verification of a chemical weapons ban remains a challenging task requiring that we develop, present and negotiate the most effective monitoring and enforcement packages possible. This must be a continuing process. To achieve a chemical weapons ban that would advance the national security interests of the United States, we will have to take the lead in promoting bold, sound verification procedures. For that reason, I have decided that we should be willing to take the initiative by proposing an anywhere-anytime challenge inspection regime for all military or government owned or controlled facilities. The purpose of this measure is to enhance deterrence by creating a greater risk that violations will be detected and exposed, and in the event of a violation to provide the evidence necessary for an appropriate response. To implement such a provision will require the development of security measures which minimize risk to sensitive facilities not related to chemical weapons. Agreement on such an approach could prove to be a major step in both arms control and confidence-building.

Every effort must be made to prevent and deter the development, despite a CW ban, of a covert weapons capability and to insure that the threat from any such violation is minimized by maintaining a strong overall U.S. and alliance defense posture and by developing necessary countermeasures or responses to violations of all kinds. Sustaining a strong deterrent and safeguards regime is important both before and after conclusion of an agreement.
To enhance the prospects for successful negotiation, the United States will continue to pursue as a high priority the current program for modernizing the US short and long range chemical weapon retaliatory capability. Until the threat posed by chemical weapons is effectively eliminated by treaty, the United States must maintain a modern and credible deterrent. The importance of such a deterrent and of seeking the most effective possible verification and enforcement provisions has been illustrated by the use in several parts of the world of prohibited chemical and biological weapons. An integral part of our effort to rid the world effectively of this threat must include the continued condemnation of the use of chemical weapons wherever such use occurs. We must continue to seek to strengthen international procedures for investigating suspected use of chemical or toxin weapons.

Success in our endeavor will require close consultation and coordination with the Congress, with our allies, and with other nations and organizations. An active public diplomacy effort should be implemented to explain and gain support for our proposed CW treaty and for the continued modernization program.

To implement this directive, the Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Arms Control Interdepartmental Group (IG) shall:

(1) Prepare a draft treaty for presentation to allies for consultation.

(2) Develop and begin implementation of a comprehensive strategy for public diplomacy, allied consultation, and congressional cooperation designed to strengthen our chances for successful negotiation of a CW treaty which promotes the security interests of the United States and its allies.

(3) Develop as an ongoing process a program to further improve the verifiability of the proposed prohibition on chemical weapons under negotiation.

(4) Develop a program of measures and safeguards, military and diplomatic, designed to achieve an environment wherein the risks associated with the possible existence of a covert CW capability, and the incentive to create one, are reduced to the lowest possible level.
(5) Develop a program to insure that appropriate security measures are examined which could minimize risk to sensitive non-CW related facilities in the face of possible challenge inspections on short notice.

(6) Examine whether or not limitations on chemical defense equipment, training, forces, etc. would enhance or detract from our security in an arms control regime banning chemical weapons.

(7) Develop a strategy which makes clear the importance of our CW modernization program to deterrence and to our negotiations and insures continuation of that program until such time as these weapons are effectively banned.