Narcotics and National Security  (U)

Purpose. To identify the impact of the international narcotics trade upon U.S. national security, and to direct specific actions to increase the effectiveness of U.S. counter-narcotics efforts to enhance our national security. (C)

Background. The expanding scope of global narcotics trafficking has created a situation which today adds another significant dimension to the law enforcement and public health aspects of this international problem and threatens the national security of the United States. (C)

While the domestic effects of drugs are a serious societal problem for the United States and require the continued aggressive pursuit of law enforcement, health care, and demand reduction programs, the national security threat posed by the drug trade is particularly serious outside U.S. borders. Of primary concern are those nations with a flourishing narcotics industry, where a combination of international criminal trafficking organizations, rural insurgents, and urban terrorists can undermine the stability of the local government; corrupt efforts to curb drug crop production, processing, and distribution; and distort public perception of the narcotics issue in such a way that it becomes part of an anti-U.S. or anti-Western debate. (S)

While these problems are endemic to most nations plagued by narcotics, their effects are particularly insidious for the democratic states of the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, the expansion of narcotics activity creates a regional, as well as a country specific, problem. (C)

A recent National Intelligence Estimate, "The International Drug Trade: Implications for U.S. Security" (NIE 1/8-85) examines the dangers from drug trafficking and highlights the following points: (S)
The narcotics trade threatens the integrity of democratic governments by corrupting political and judicial institutions. The effect on U.S. interests from such a situation can range from a regime unwilling or unable to cooperate with counter-narcotics programs to a government that is unable to control key areas of its territory and elements of its own judiciary, military, or economy. (S)

In key drug-producing nations, trafficking organizations have used control of local media to influence public attitudes and impede the ability of local governments to cooperate with U.S. counter-narcotics programs. (S)

Narcotics activity is inevitably accompanied by a rising rate of violence. This includes crimes by and upon those seeking to buy drugs, against innocent bystanders, between competing trafficking networks, and violence against public officials associated with narcotics control, including U.S. personnel. (S)

In many countries, the same networks used to smuggle drugs are also employed to bring in illegal weapons. (S)

Some insurgent groups finance their activities through taxing drug activities, providing protection to local criminal traffickers, or growing their own drug crops. Access to money available from narcotics can have a major impact on the capability of the insurgent forces. (S)

Some terrorist groups have been linked to drug smuggling primarily to finance their activities. The profits from even one consignment of narcotics could provide small terrorist cells with substantial operating capital. (S)

Several sovereign states -- Cuba, Nicaragua, and Bulgaria, for example -- have supported or condoned international drug trafficking for financial or political reasons. (S)

Policy. The international drug trade threatens the national security of the United States by potentially destabilizing democratic allies. It is therefore the policy of the United States, in cooperation with other nations, to halt the production and flow of illicit narcotics, reduce the ability of insurgent and terrorist groups to use drug trafficking to support their activities, and strengthen the ability of individual governments to confront and defeat this threat. (C)
Implementation. To implement this policy, the departments and agencies of the United States should perform the following: (U)

-- The Secretary of State and the Administrator of AID should ensure that narcotics control objectives are fully integrated into foreign assistance planning efforts. The planning process should include consideration of programs designed to assist foreign governments achieve effective control objectives and should be guided by the principles of controlling crop production and targeting trafficking at the source and in transit. Proposed assistance should be linked to a foreign government's willingness to develop and implement effective narcotics control programs. (S)

-- The Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, in conjunction with the Secretary of State, should develop and implement any necessary modifications to applicable statutes, regulations, procedures, and guidelines to enable U.S. military forces to support counter-narcotics efforts more actively, consistent with the maintenance of force readiness and training. U.S. military activities in support of counter-narcotics efforts should include, but are not limited to: (S)

- assistance to other U.S. government agencies in the planning and execution of large counter-narcotics operations. (S)
- collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. (S)
- participation in coordinated interdiction programs. (S)
- small-scale combined exercises to enhance planning, intelligence, mobility, and communications. (S)
- training to assist foreign military forces in planning and conducting counter-narcotics operations. (S)
- technical and materiel support to enhance the ability of a foreign government to combat drug production and trafficking. (S)

-- The Vice President and the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense and the Attorney General should strengthen international support for counter-narcotics initiatives by raising this issue in high level discussions with
counterparts in producer and trafficker nations as appropriate. They should also raise narcotics as an international security issue with U.S. allies, urging these nations to increase their assistance and cooperation and encouraging them to also raise the issue as a high priority in their own relations with producer and trafficking states. (S)

-- The Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General and other relevant agencies and acting in accordance with E.O. 12333, should enhance, where appropriate, support of the drug enforcement effort targeted against international drug traffickers, particularly those with known or suspected ties to terrorist or insurgent groups. Such enhanced effort shall be in accordance with applicable Presidential Findings and the National Security Act of 1947. (S)

-- The Director of Central Intelligence, in conjunction with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Treasury, should ensure that existing provisions of E.O. 12333 and related implementing procedures which permit the collection and dissemination of information on U.S. persons concerning the foreign aspects of international narcotics activities to appropriate law enforcement agencies are fully and expeditiously adhered to. (S)

-- The Director of Central Intelligence should ensure that the intelligence community gives special emphasis to collecting, assessing, and disseminating foreign intelligence on all aspects of the international illicit drug trade. In pursuit of this goal, the intelligence community shall continue its efforts to target specific drug source and transit regions for in-depth analysis of the links between drug trafficking organizations, insurgent groups, and terrorists. (S)

-- The Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Director, USIA and the Administrator of AID, should assist in developing drug abuse prevention and education programs within drug producing, transit and consumer nations. Public diplomacy aspects of these efforts shall be reviewed as appropriate by the International Information Committee and the International Political Committee. (S)
The U.S. Chief of Mission should assure the necessary coordination of all assistance, intelligence and interdiction activities of U.S. government agencies toward specific countries as a priority responsibility. The Chief of Mission should periodically report his efforts to bring the full range of U.S. resources to bear to engage the cooperation of producer and transit countries. (S)

The Secretary of Defense, as Executive Agent for Communications Security (in accordance with E.O. 12333 and NSDD-145) and the National Communications System (in accordance with E.O. 12472 and NSDD-97), should coordinate with appropriate agencies and departments to ensure that a secure and interoperable interagency telecommunications capability is available for drug-related operations and intelligence collection and dissemination in support of interdiction and other counter-narcotics activities. Existing national communications system (NCS) assets, U.S. Government-owned and leased, will be used to the maximum extent possible. (S)

The Attorney General, as Chairman of the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, shall submit a report to the President by September 30, 1986 giving the status of plans and accomplishments for all actions directed herein. (C)

Ronald Reagan