

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

April 21, 1986

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 222CONSULTATIONS ON U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY X

I have completed my review of the extensive reports provided to me by the Secretary of Defense and the analyses prepared by the Arms Control Support Group and the Senior Arms Control Group. I have also profited from the advice given to me by Members of Congress and by various Allied leaders. Based upon this advice and a number of National Security Planning Group discussions of this issue, I have reached some tentative judgments on how to proceed with respect to U.S. policy concerning interim restraint and near-term U.S. responses to the continuing pattern of Soviet non-compliance with existing arms control agreements. X

Before taking any final decisions, however, I would like to share my tentative judgments with key Congressional and Allied leaders and once again have the benefit of their views. Therefore, I direct that these leaders be consulted and briefed along the lines outlined below. Further, these consultations should be completed by April 25 so that I have the option of making and announcing a final decision on this matter before the upcoming Tokyo summit, if I so choose. X

1982 Decision. In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Despite my serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II agreement, I took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint on force deployments conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START. I made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup. The Soviet Union also made a policy commitment not to undercut these agreements. X

1985 Decision. In June, 1985, I reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy in light of the continuing pattern of Soviet non-compliance with its arms control commitments. I found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain and scrupulously complied with the terms of its commitments. X

UNCLASSIFIED

Declassify on: OADR

Declassified/Released on 11/27/92  
under provisions of E.O. 12256  
by S. Tiley, National Security Council~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

By contrast, I noted with regret that the Soviet Union had repeatedly violated some of its arms control obligations. My reports to the Congress over the past three years on Soviet noncompliance enumerate and document in detail our serious concerns about Soviet violations of the SALT II, and other arms control agreements, including the ABM Treaty, the SALT I Interim Agreement, and the Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The overall judgment I reached in June, 1985, was that while the Soviets had observed some provisions of existing arms control agreements, they had violated important elements of those agreements and associated political commitments. ~~44~~

In June, I noted that these are very crucial issues, for to be serious about effective arms control is to be serious about compliance. The pattern of Soviet violations increasingly affects our national security. But, perhaps even more significant than the near-term military consequences of the violations themselves, they raise fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process, concerns that, if uncorrected, undercut the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world. ~~40~~

I also noted that the United States had raised our serious concerns with the Soviet Union many times in diplomatic channels, including the US/Soviet Standing Consultative Commission. Unfortunately, despite long and repeated U.S. efforts to resolve these issues, my assessment was that the Soviet Union had neither provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective action. Instead, Soviet violations had expanded as they continued to modernize their strategic forces. Consequently, in that June assessment I was forced to conclude that the Soviet Union was not exercising the equal restraint upon which our policy had been conditioned, and that such Soviet behavior was fundamentally inimical to the future of arms control and to the security of this country and that of our allies. ~~4~~

At the same time, given our goal of reducing the size of nuclear arsenals, I made the judgment that it remained in the interest of the United States and its allies to try to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursued with renewed vigor our goal of real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals through the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. However, the U.S. cannot establish such a framework alone. It requires the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps to correct its noncompliance, resolve our other compliance concerns, and reverse or substantially reduce its unparalleled and unwarranted military build-up. While the Soviet Union had not demonstrated a willingness to move in this direction, in the interest of ensuring that every opportunity to establish the secure, stable future we seek is fully explored, I announced that I was prepared

to go the extra mile to try to establish an interim framework of true, mutual restraint. ~~X~~

To provide the Soviets the opportunity to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint which could support ongoing negotiations, I decided that the United States would continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercised comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursued arms reductions agreements in the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva. I also indicated that the Soviet Union should reverse its unparalleled and unwarranted military build-up. Further, I decided that the United States would constantly review the implications of this interim policy on the long term security interests of the United States and its allies. In doing so, we would consider Soviet actions to resolve our concerns with the pattern of Soviet noncompliance, continued growth in the strategic force structure of the Soviet Union, and Soviet seriousness in the ongoing negotiations. ~~X~~

As an integral part of the implementation of this policy, I announced that we would take those steps required to assure the national security of the United States and our allies made necessary by Soviet noncompliance. Appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are also called for to make it perfectly clear to Moscow that violations of arms control arrangements entail real costs. Therefore, I stated clearly that the United States would develop appropriate and proportionate responses and it would take those actions necessary in response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, uncorrected Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements. ~~X~~

Finally, I decided that, to provide adequate time for the Soviet Union to demonstrate by its action a commitment to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the U.S. would deactivate and disassemble, according to agreed procedures, an existing older POSEIDON submarine as the seventh U.S. Ohio-class submarine put to sea in August, 1985. However, I directed that the U.S. keep open all future programmatic options for handling such milestones as they occur. I made it clear that, as these later milestones are reached, I would assess the overall situation and make a final determination of the U.S. course of action on a case-by-case basis in light of the overall situation and Soviet actions in meeting the conditions cited above. ~~X~~

The 8th TRIDENT. On May 20, the eighth TRIDENT submarine will begin sea trials. As called for by our policy, I have assessed our options with respect to that milestone. I have considered both Soviet behavior since my June, 1985, decision and U.S. and Allied security interests in light of both that behavior and our programmatic options. ~~X~~

UNCLASSIFIED

With respect to the criteria that I established for gauging Soviet movement to join us in establishing a truly mutual framework of interim restraint, (i.e., correction of Soviet noncompliance, reversal of the Soviet military build-up, and effort to move forward in negotiations), the situation is not encouraging. ~~XX~~

While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in some areas of U.S. concern, for example with respect to the production rate of BACKFIRE bombers, there has been no real progress in meeting U.S. concerns in those areas of most obvious and direct Soviet non-compliance. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. The deployment of the SS-25, a forbidden second new ICBM type, continues apace. The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing. ~~XX~~

We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force improvement program. In fact, we have recently observed the Soviets' attempt to launch what probably is another new follow-on heavy ballistic missile. The test failed in an accident that destroyed the missile and its silo -- but certainly the program associated with this missile will continue. ~~XX~~

Finally, after a hopeful meeting in Geneva, we have yet to see the Soviets follow-up in negotiations on the commitment made in the Joint Statement issued by General Secretary Gorbachev and myself to seek common ground, especially through the principle of 50% reductions appropriately applied and through an INF agreement. ~~XX~~

In light of these circumstances, it is my judgment that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate by deed its readiness to join us in a framework of mutual interim restraint. At the same time, as we consider options associated with the milestone next month of the sea trials of the eighth TRIDENT, we must also look at the programmatic options available to the U.S. and judge these in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and Allied security. ~~XX~~

When I issued guidance on U.S. policy in June 10, 1985, the military plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near-term for altering its planning is modest at best, and our military planning will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions. This shadow lengthens and darkens with each reduction made in the funds available for our defense. Operating under such a shadow, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face, makes it essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources. ~~XX~~

SECRET  
UNCLASSIFIED~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

We had long planned to retire two older POSEIDON submarines when the NEVADA, the eighth TRIDENT submarine entered sea trials. It is my judgment that military and economic realities argue that the common sense path to pursue at this milestone is to retire and dismantle these submarines, according to agreed procedures, as planned at this particular milestone. ~~XX~~

In the near-term, I believe the most essential response to the continued pattern of Soviet non-compliance with its commitments remains the full implementation of our carefully planned strategic modernization program. My decision to retire these two older POSEIDON submarines is fully in accordance with that program. Under any set of assumptions, our modernization program is, and will always be, designed to guarantee that our nation always has modern forces in sufficient quantities to underwrite our security and that of our allies -- nothing more and nothing less. This goal ensures that the appropriate, best and proper use is made of our national resources. It also attests to the fact that we do not seek to retain nuclear forces for their own sake, but only if they clearly contribute in a direct way to our national security and that of our allies. This is the heart of my judgment that, at this particular milestone, the proper course with respect to these two older POSEIDON submarines is to retire them in the manner planned. ~~XX~~

Additional Steps. On the other hand, last June I announced that the U.S. would take appropriate and proportionate actions when needed. It is my view that certain additional steps are now warranted by the lack of Soviet movement up to this point. ~~XX~~

First, our highest priority remains the full implementation of the U.S. strategic modernization program, to underwrite our deterrence today, and the pursuit of the SDI research program to provide better alternatives in the future. The U.S. strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles, was called for by the Scowcroft Commission and is fully supported by our military leadership. This program was very carefully crafted by our best defense planners. It is the foundation for all future U.S. options and provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. It is absolutely critical that this program not be permitted to erode. That would be the worst way to respond to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance, would increase the risk to our security and that of our allies, would undercut our ability to negotiate the reductions in existing arsenals that we seek, and thus, send precisely the wrong signal to the Soviet leadership. ~~XX~~

Secondly, Soviet actions to continue the accelerated development of their ICBM force are of great concern. Last June, I cited the Soviet Union's flight-testing and deployment of the SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under the SALT II agreement, as a clear and irreversible violation. I

UNCLASSIFIED

noted that since the noncompliance associated with the development of this missile cannot, at this point, be corrected by the Soviet Union, the United States, therefore, reserved the right to respond appropriately. At that time, I also noted that the U.S. small ICBM program was particularly relevant in this regard. Given the events that have occurred since last June, including the deployment of over 75 SS-25 mobile ICBMs, I intend to call upon the Congress to join with me in restoring bi-partisan support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of our own ICBM program. ~~OK~~

The program we require should include the full deployment of the PEACEKEEPER ICBM. The PEACEKEEPER is fully permitted by existing arms control agreements. Furthermore, it was originally designed specifically to meet U.S. security needs under these agreements. It simply makes both good military and economic sense to fully exploit the great technical success that we have had with this missile. But, our program must also look beyond the PEACEKEEPER and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future. Our small ICBM program makes a significant contribution not only in this regard, but also as an appropriate and proportionate U.S. response to the irreversible Soviet violation associated with their SS-25 mobile missile. ~~OK~~

To ensure that I have a more robust range of options as I approach future milestones, I intend to direct the Department of Defense to provide to me by November, 1986, an assessment of the best options for carrying out such a comprehensive ICBM program. In doing so, and in light of continued Soviet ICBM development, this assessment should address options to:

- exploit more fully the success of the PEACEKEEPER program to include recommendations on the basing of the next 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles;

- accelerate, if I so choose, the current small ICBM in roughly its current configuration;

- institute an alternative program focused on a MIRVed mobile MINUTEMAN-like ICBM; and,

- consider programs which build upon the PEACEKEEPER deployment but also include in an appropriate mix with the PEACEKEEPER deployments either a small, single warhead mobile ICBM with a relatively early initial operational capability or MIRVed mobile MINUTEMAN-like ICBM which could be deployed with a later initial operational capability, or both. ~~OK~~

Finally, I also intend to direct the Secretary of Defense to take the steps necessary, working with the Congress, to reallocate funds currently in the Defense budget to permit us to accelerate the production of the Advanced Cruise Missile. I

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

would not, at this time, direct any increase in the total program procurement, but rather establish a more efficient production rate that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future. ~~XX~~

Implications for the Future. In addressing U.S. deployment milestones as they occur on a case-by-case basis, we must look primarily to the future rather than the past. In implementing the judgments that I have just outlined, we should fully recognize that, while our policy remains under constant review, we will face the next programmatic milestone near the end of this year as the 131st U.S. heavy bomber is modified for cruise missile carriage. ~~XX~~

By that late-1986 milestone, the Soviet Union will have had about one and one-half years to demonstrate by deeds its desire to join us in establishing a truly mutual framework of interim restraint. Also, under current U.S. plans, we will not have an older POSEIDON readily available due for scheduled retirement at that particular time. The conditions that are associated with this milestone in late 1986 will be significantly different than those faced as the NEVADA begins sea trials. ~~XX~~

When we approach the conversion of the 131st U.S. heavy bomber to cruise missile carriage, near the end of this year, under the SALT II limit of 1320 total MIRVed delivery systems, the U.S. would either have to halt the conversion of U.S. heavy bombers or to take extraordinary action to begin dismantlement of one of our MINUTEMAN III ICBM silos; or one of our cruise-missile carrying heavy bombers; or yet another POSEIDON submarine. Some of these alternatives may be unavailable or involve the loss of badly needed military capabilities. In short, significantly increased military costs will come directly to bear at that point. ~~XX~~

The United States has exercised considerable restraint in the face of Soviet behavior. It should be recognized clearly, by all concerned, that I can not prudently continue dismantling U.S. systems if the criteria, which I outlined in June, 1985, are not met before the milestone associated with the conversion of the 131st U.S. heavy bomber to cruise missile carriage is reached. I state this as a simple fact, not as an ultimatum. Acknowledging it directly now is necessary to ensure that none miss the implications of the actions I am prepared to take as the NEVADA enters sea trials. It also provides both strong military and political incentives to the Soviet Union to join us in establishing the interim framework of truly mutual restraint that remains our preferred course. ~~XX~~

Conclusions. The United States has been exercising, and will continue to exercise, greater restraint than the Soviet Union in modernizing its nuclear deterrent. However, we will take those actions needed to provide sufficient, modern forces to

underwrite our security and that of our allies. ~~XX~~

In June, 1985, I committed to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing a mutual framework of interim restraint. It is my judgment that, in light of the circumstances I have described, we should undertake the immediate responses outlined above. The end of the "extra mile" is now in view if the Soviet Union does not take the positive steps required. We must, together with our friends and allies, face this reality and call upon the Soviet Union to take the necessary, positive steps now. ~~XX~~

Closing Observation. I closed my June, 1985, decision document with the following paragraph.

"I firmly believe that if we are to put the arms reduction process on a firm, lasting foundation, our focus must remain on making best use of the promise provided by the currently ongoing negotiations in Geneva. The policy outlined above involving the establishment of an interim framework for truly mutual restraint and proportionate U.S. response to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance is specifically designed to go the extra mile in giving the Soviet Union the opportunity to join us in this endeavor. My hope is that if the Soviets will do so, we will jointly be able to make progress in framing equitable and verifiable agreements involving real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals through the ongoing Geneva negotiations. Such an achievement would not only provide the best and most permanent constraint on the growth of nuclear arsenals, but it would begin the process of reducing the size of these arsenals." ~~XX~~

Time has not altered the basic truth of this statement. Even if the Soviet Union does choose to join with us in establishing such a framework of truly mutual restraint, as I hope that they do, this is at best an interim step. It is not a substitute for an agreement on deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, my highest priority. ~~XX~~

It remains my hope the Soviet Union will take the necessary steps to give substance to the agreement I reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to negotiate 50 percent reductions in nuclear arms, appropriately applied, and an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear arms. If the Soviets take those steps, together we can achieve greater stability and a safer world. ~~XX~~

An Afterword on Encryption. My guidance on the content of consultation is contained in the paragraphs above. This guidance does not include any discussion of the issue of encryption. I have reviewed the recommendations made by the Senior Arms Control

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

9

UNCLASSIFIED

Group on this issue, and I approve those recommendations. ~~TOP~~

The U.S. will continue to press the Soviets to resolve our legitimate concerns and to cease their encryption practices which impede U.S. verification of compliance. However, we will not discuss the option of the encryption of U.S. ballistic systems as a programmatic response to Soviet non-compliance in this area.

~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED