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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1986

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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 240

Instructions for NST Round VI

The U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms should be guided by the attached instructions during Round VI of the Nuclear and Space Talks. (U)

Declassified/Released on 3/18/96  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by J. Saunders, National Security Council

Attachment: Specific Instructions (S)  
Attachment 1: NST  
Attachment 2: NF  
Attachment 3: START  
Attachment 4: NST

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by J. Saunders, National Security Council

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REF: (A) STATE 138815; (B) STATE 012556; (C) STATE  
54772; (D) STATE 55895; (E) STATE 28817

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR U.S. DELEGATION FOR THE SIXTH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 18, 1986. GUIDANCE FOR PREVIOUS ROUNDS (REFTELS) REMAINS IN EFFECT, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FOR EACH OF THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS IS BEING PROVIDED SEPT.

3. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES FOR ROUND VI INCLUDE:

-- TO PRESENT THE NEW U.S. PROPOSALS OUTLINED IN NSD-232 AND THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR EACH OF THE THREE

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NEGOTIATING GROUPS (SECRET, EMPHASIZING, AS APPROPRIATE, THAT THEY REPRESENT A U.S. EFFORT TO SEEK OUT AREAS OF CONVERGENCE, TO RESPOND TO EXPRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS, AND TO MOVE ON OUR ULTIMATE GOAL AND, AS APPROPRIATE, TO IDENTIFY PRACTICAL NEAR-TERM STEPS TO ACHIEVE THOSE OBJECTIVES.

-- TO SEEK PROMPT AND FORTHCOMING RESPONSES TO U.S. PROPOSALS; TO MAKE CLEAR THAT, FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND PRESENTATION OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS IN GENEVA, THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO THE SOVIETS; TO ENSURE THAT DISCUSSION TAKES PLACE ON THE BASIS OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS.

-- TO COUNTER EFFECTIVELY SOVIET EFFORTS TO HOLD PROGRESS IN ONE NEGOTIATING FORUM HOSTAGE TO THE EFFORTS OF ANOTHER, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MAKING CLEAR THOSE AREAS WHERE, IN THE U.S. VIEW, SUBSTANTIVE INTER-RELATIONSHIPS EXIST. IN PARTICULAR, DELEGATION SHOULD REBUT SOVIET EFFORTS TO PORTRAY SDI AS AN OBSTACLE TO ARMS CONTROL OR TO SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME IN START WE SHOULD STRESS THAT THE MOST URGENT TASK IS SIGNIFICANT STABILIZING REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS AND THAT THE U.S. IS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS AGREED TO AT THE 1985 GENEVA SUMMIT MEETING. IF NECESSARY, WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER INITIAL REDUCTIONS OF A LESS STEEPING NATURE AS AN INTERIM STEP ON THE PATH TO THAT OBJECTIVE. IN INF, WE SHOULD CONFIRM SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE GOAL OF ELIMINATING THE ENTIRE CLASS OF LAND-BASED, BRINF MISSILES WORLDWIDE, AND TO CONFIRM SOVIET AGREEMENT TO A SEPARATE INTERIM INF AGREEMENT WITH EQUAL CEILINGS ON U.S. AND SOVIET BRINF MISSILE WARHEADS, AS WELL AS EQUAL CEILINGS ON SUCH WARHEADS IN EUROPE, WITHOUT DELAY. THE SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENTS OF THE TYPE WE ARE OFFERING IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE AREA MAKE SENSE ONLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF IMMEDIATE ACTIONS ON BOTH SIDES TO BEGIN MOVING TOWARD OUR COMMON GOAL OF THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, A PROCESS THAT MUST BEGIN WITH RADICAL AND STEEPENING REDUCTIONS IN U.S. AND SOVIET OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- IN SETTING FORTH THE ELEMENTS OF THE JULY PROPOSAL, THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT MEASURES FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION MUST BE ADDRESSED AND AGREED

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CONCURRENTLY WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON TREATY LIMITATIONS. THIS IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENEVA SUMMIT AGREEMENT. TO THAT END, GUIDANCE ON THE TREATMENT OF VERIFICATION IS INCLUDED IN THE INSTRUCTIONS TO EACH NEGOTIATING GROUP.

4. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE OTHER, NON-STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, THE DELEGATION SHOULD RESPOND THAT THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE PURSUED IN THE APPROPRIATE FORA, NOT IN INST.

5. THE DELEGATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, NOTING THE OBSTACLES PLACED IN THE PATH OF ACHIEVING ARMS REDUCTIONS BY SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE. IT SHOULD UNDERSCORE THAT U.S. POLICY DECISIONS ON THE SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT AND SALT II IN LARGE PART RESULTED FROM SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE. THE DELEGATIONS SHOULD STRESS THAT THESE AGREEMENTS ARE BEHIND US, BOTH AS A MATTER OF LEGAL OBLIGATION AND AS A MATTER OF POLICY COMMITMENT. HOWEVER, THE U.S. HAS MADE A STANDING OFFER FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON PROGRESS TOWARD EARLY AGREEMENT ON RADICAL AND STABILIZING REDUCTIONS IN THE OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. !!

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Attachment 2

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by J. Saunders, National Security Council

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REF: (A) STATE 138683; (B) STATE 054775; (C) STATE  
012553

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THERE FOLLOWS GUIDANCE TO THE INF GROUP FOR ROUND VI  
OF THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE  
CONCERNING THE US POSITION ON INF REMAINS UNCHANGED,  
EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BY THESE INSTRUCTIONS.

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BASIC APPROACH  
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3. INF GROUP SHOULD STRIVE TO CONFIRM SOVIET AGREEMENT TO  
THE GOAL OF ELIMINATING THE ENTIRE CLASS OF US AND

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SOVIET LRINF MISSILE AND TO CONFIRM SOVIET AGREEMENT TO A SEPARATE INTERIM INF AGREEMENT WITH EQUAL US AND SOVIET LRINF WARHEADS IN EUROPE IN THE CONTEXT OF EQUAL US/SOVIET GLOBAL LRINF WARHEAD LIMITS, AS DISCUSSED AT EXPERTS MEETINGS IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON.

4. THE INF GROUP SHOULD STATE THAT THE US BELIEVES AN AGREEMENT LEADING TO THE ELIMINATION OF ALL US AND SOVIET LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILE SYSTEMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WOULD BE THE BEST OUTCOME. HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF THE NOVEMBER 1985 SUMMIT COMMITMENT TO PURSUE THE IDEA OF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT, AN INTERIM APPROACH ON A GLOBAL BASIS MAY PROVE TO BE THE MOST PROMISING WAY TO ACHIEVE EARLY REDUCTIONS. THE US SEEKS AN AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING EQUAL GLOBAL CEILINGS ON US AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILE WARHEADS WITHOUT DELAY. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT REDUCTIONS BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AND THAT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS BE ACHIEVED WITHIN AN AGREED PERIOD OF TIME. INF GROUP SHOULD SEEK SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE ELEMENTS OF AN INF AGREEMENT CONSISTENT WITH THESE REQUIREMENTS. THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD ALSO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE US WOULD ENVISION THAT THE SIDES AGREE THAT BY A DATE CERTAIN, SOON AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, THEY WOULD BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT THE GOAL OF ELIMINATION OF ALL US AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILES ON A GLOBAL BASIS.

5. IN EXPLAINING THE US APPROACH TO AN INTERIM AGREEMENT, DELEGATION SHOULD STATE THAT THE US IS SEEKING A FRESH START, BUILDING ON THIS SUMMER'S EXPERTS MEETINGS AND IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE, CONSISTENT WITH ITS WELL-KNOWN CRITERIA FOR AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT, ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN AN EFFORT TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES. THE US HOPES THAT THE OUTCOME OF THIS PROCESS WILL BE A SET OF AGREED ELEMENTS THAT WILL GUIDE CONCRETE TREATY DRAFTING.

6. EQUAL GLOBAL WARHEAD LIMITS FOR US AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILE SYSTEMS WOULD REPRESENT THE BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR AN INTERIM SOLUTION. WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, THE US IS PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE IN NEGOTIATING SPECIFIC WARHEAD LEVELS AND IN ADDRESSING OTHER SOVIET CONCERNS.

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7. THE SOVIETS HAVE SUGGESTED AN EQUAL CEILING OF 100 LRINF MISSILE WARHEADS IN EUROPE. INF GROUP SHOULD INDICATE THAT THIS CEILING IN EUROPE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES ONLY IF THE SOVIET UNION AGREES TO REDUCE AND LIMIT CONCURRENTLY THEIR LRINF MISSILE WARHEADS OUTSIDE OF EUROPE TO 100 OR LESS. (FYI: REDUCTIONS OF SS-20S IN ASIA TO A LEVEL ACCEPTABLE TO THE US ARE AN ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR AN INF AGREEMENT. US DELEGATION SHOULD NOT PERMIT EQUAL CEILINGS IN EUROPE AND ASIA TO BECOME A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONATE REDUCTIONS. END FYI.)

8. AS PART OF AN ACCEPTABLE INF AGREEMENT SUCH AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 7 ABOVE, THE INF GROUP SHOULD REITERATE US WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE MIX BETWEEN ITS GLCMS AND PERSHING IIS IN EUROPE AND REDUCE LEVELS OF GLCMS AND PERSHING IIS IN EUROPE IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER, BUT THAT IT IS NOT PREPARED TO RESTRICT US LRINF DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE TO GLCMS ONLY.

9. THE USSR HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE US BE ENTITLED TO DEPLOY IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (EXCLUDING ALASKA), A NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON LRINF MISSILES EQUAL TO THE NUMBER OF SOVIET WARHEADS ON LRINF MISSILES DEPLOYED IN ASIA. THE INF GROUP SHOULD STATE THAT AS PART OF AN ACCEPTABLE INF AGREEMENT SUCH AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 7, THE US IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN APPROACH UNDER WHICH THE US RIGHT TO DEPLOY OUTSIDE OF EUROPE A NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON LRINF MISSILES EQUAL TO THE NUMBER OF SOVIET WARHEADS ON LRINF MISSILES DEPLOYED OUTSIDE OF EUROPE WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO US TERRITORY (INCLUDING ALASKA), IF THE SOVIET LEVELS IN EUROPE AND OUTSIDE EUROPE ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THE US, AND IF SOVIET LRINF DEPLOYMENTS ARE RESTRICTED TO SOVIET TERRITORY. IN MAKING THIS POINT, THE US NEGOTIATOR SHOULD NOTE THAT THE RESTRICTION ON US DEPLOYMENTS HAS A MORE ADVERSE AFFECT ON US SECURITY THAN THE SOVIET LIMIT HAS ON SOVIET SECURITY.

10. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE THE QUESTION OF DEPLOYMENT OF US LRINF MISSILES IN ALASKA, THE US INF NEGOTIATOR MAY STATE THAT IN RETURN FOR SOVIET WILLINGNESS NOT TO DEPLOY SOVIET LRINF MISSILES IN ASIA EAST OF 10 DEGREES EAST LONGITUDE, THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO FOREGO ITS RIGHT TO DEPLOY US LRINF MISSILES IN ALASKA.

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11. AS A RESULT OF THE LIMITS IN PARAS 8 AND 9 ABOVE, BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE LIMITED TO AN EQUAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS OF LRINF MISSILES ON A GLOBAL BASIS. CONSISTENT WITH PARAS 8 THROUGH 9 ABOVE, THE INF GROUP MAY PROPOSE, AS AN INTERIM STEP, AN EQUAL GLOBAL CEILING OF 200 WARHEADS OF LRINF MISSILES.

12. BOTH SIDES AGREE ON THE NEED FOR CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF MISSILES. THE INF GROUP SHOULD INSIST THAT APPROPRIATE CONSTRAINTS ON THESE SYSTEMS MUST BE ESTABLISHED CONCURRENTLY WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CEILINGS ON LRINF MISSILES AND NOTE THAT THE US IS WILLING TO CONSIDER ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF SUCH SYSTEMS FOLLOWING ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

13. THE INF GROUP SHOULD STATE THAT SUCH AN INTERIM AGREEMENT SHOULD REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL SUPERSEDED BY A LATER AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR FURTHER REDUCTION LEADING TOWARD THE AGREED GOAL OF THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF LRINF SYSTEMS.

14. ON THE TRANSFER OF LRINF MISSILE SYSTEMS TO OTHER COUNTRIES, IF RAISED BY THE SOVIETS, DELEGATION SHOULD STATE THAT THE US WILL NOT ALTER ITS ESTABLISHED POLICY OF COOPERATION WITH ITS ALLIES. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE ARE NO CURRENT PLANS TO TRANSFER LRINF MISSILE SYSTEMS TO ANY OTHER STATE.

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US DRAFT TREATY  
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15. FYI. IN SUPPORT OF THE BASIC APPROACH AND OBJECTIVES DESCRIBED ABOVE, WASHINGTON IS PREPARING A DRAFT INTERIM INF TREATY (SEPTTEL) WITH THE AIM OF TABLING IT AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE IN THE ROUND.

16. IN PRESENTING THE ABOVE APPROACH, THE US DELEGATION SHOULD PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

--THE US RIGHT TO RELOCATE US LRINF MISSILES PERMITTED UNDER THE AGREEMENT IN EUROPE AS DECIDED BY THE US AND ITS NATO ALLIES:

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--THE US RIGHT TO CONVERT PERSHING II MISSILES REDUCED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT TO PERSHING I B MISSILES: AND,

--THE US RIGHT TO MATCH SOVIET SHORTER RANGE INF (SRINF) MISSILES IN RANGE OF EUROPE AND ON A GLOBAL BASIS AS APPROPRIATE.

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PROCEDURES  
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17. INF GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET DELEGATION ON PROCEDURES FOR FORMING TREATY DRAFTING AND VERIFICATION WORKING GROUPS. AMBASSADOR GLITMAN SHOULD WORK OUT THESE PROCEDURES, BEARING IN MIND THE NEED TO ADDRESS VERIFICATION CONCURRENTLY WITH DISCUSSION OF OTHER TREATY PROVISIONS. THE US DRAFT TREATY, WHICH INCORPORATES VERIFICATION MEASURES IN THE TREATY TEXT ITSELF AND INCLUDES A DETAILED MOU AND PROTOCOLS DEALING WITH VERIFICATION, WILL ILLUSTRATE THE SOVIET UNION THE CLOSE INTERRELATIONSHIP WHICH THE US ENVISAGES BETWEEN REDUCTION AND VERIFICATION OBLIGATIONS AND MEASURES FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

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VERIFICATION  
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18. THE US SHOULD CONTINUE TO ELABORATE ON ITS VERIFICATION POSITION DRAWING ON THE RESPONSES TO THE DELEGATION QUESTIONS TRANSMITTED BY SEPTTEL AND ON OTHER MATERIALS TO BE PROVIDED.!!

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Attachment 3

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1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE ROUND BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 18. EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW, PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED.

3. OVERALL OBJECTIVE. THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP IS TO GET THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN THE UNITED STATES IN MOVING AHEAD EXPEDITIOUSLY ON AN EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE, AND STABILIZING AGREEMENT TO REDUCE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND IN LAYING THE

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GROUNDWORK FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT MEETING LATER THIS YEAR. THE UNITED STATES SEEKS MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS IN ALL THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS AND BELIEVES THAT PROGRESS IN ONE GROUP SHOULD NOT BE HELD HOSTAGE TO THE RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES IN THE OTHER GROUPS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE MOST URGENT TASK IS SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS, IN A MANNER WHICH ENHANCES STABILITY, AND AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON SALT. THE U.S. DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT LIMITATIONS ON DEFENSES OF ANY TYPE SHOULD BE A PRECONDITION FOR LIMITATIONS ON OFFENSIVE ARMS.

4. ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES IS TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, A GOAL POSSIBLE ONLY IN A WORLD WHERE THE THREAT POSED BY NON-NUCLEAR FORCES HAS BEEN RADICALLY REDUCED, REGIONAL CONFLICTS GREATLY DIMINISHED, AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, RADICALLY IMPROVED. A MAJOR MILESTONE IN THE PATH TO THE ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS THE ELIMINATION OF THE THREAT POSED BY STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES. THUS, IN THE NEAR TERM, EFFORTS SHOULD FOCUS ON ACHIEVING DEEP REDUCTIONS WHICH ENHANCE STABILITY BY REDUCING THE THREAT OF A DISARMING FIRST STRIKE, PARTICULARLY BY ICBMS. FYI THE NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY DRAW UPON NSD-232 AS APPROPRIATE. END FYI.

5. PREFERRED APPROACH. THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO SEEK THE IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION AS CALLED FOR IN THE NOVEMBER 21 JOINT STATEMENT. SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD BE IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR AND IS THE OUTCOME PREFERRED BY THE UNITED STATES. SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO STRATEGIC STABILITY AND BE AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD A LONG-TERM PROGRAM FOR ELIMINATING NUCLEAR ARMS. PREVIOUS U.S. PROPOSALS REMAIN ON THE TABLE AND THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY AND CONTINUE TO WORK WITH

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THE SOVIET UNION TO ACHIEVE 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS, APPROPRIATELY APPLIED. IN THAT REGARD, THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP WOULD FLASH OUT AND ADJUST, AS APPROPRIATE, THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN PARALLEL WITH THE FIRST STEP DESCRIBED BELOW.

6. ELABORATION OF 50 PERCENT PROPOSAL. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PRESENTATION OF THE FIRST STEP BELOW, AS APPROPRIATE, THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO EXPAND UPON ITS PROPOSAL FOR 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

--PROPOSE AN SNDV CEILING OF 1600 AS BELOW.

--PROPOSE ONE-WAY FREEDOM-TO-MIX OF 6000 BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS AND LONG-RANGE ALCMS, 4500 BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS, 3000 ICBM RVS.

--PROPOSE AN ADDITIONAL ICBM RV SUBCATEGORY UNDER WHICH NO MORE THAN A TOTAL OF 200 RVS COULD BE DEPLOYED ON ALL PERMITTED ICBMS EXCEPT THOSE ON SILO BASE LIGHT AND MEDIUM ICBMS WITH SIX OR FEWER RVS.

ALL OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE 50 PERCENT U.S. START PROPOSAL REMAIN THE SAME.

7. FIRST STEP TOWARD 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS. IN VIEW OF THE EVIDENT RELUCTANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO AGREE TO EQUITABLE AND STABILIZING REDUCTIONS OF 50 PERCENT AT THIS TIME, DESPITE THE SUMMIT AGREEMENT TO THIS EFFECT, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER REDUCTIONS OF A LESS SWEEPING NATURE AS AN INITIAL STEP. SUCH INITIAL REDUCTIONS COULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR FEATURES:

--EACH SIDE COULD HAVE 1600 SNDVS: IF THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE U.S. APPROACH TO DIFFERENTIATION AMONG STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARHEADS AT THE LEVELS PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES, THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE SOVIET APPROACH OF FREEDOM-TO-MIX AMONG STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES AT THE LEVEL PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

--IF THE SOVIET SIDE EXPRESSES CONCERN THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR LARGER DEPLOYMENTS OF GRAVITY BOMBS AND SRAMS THAN THE PREVIOUS

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U.S. PROPOSAL, THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY STATE THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD ACCEPT A MUTUAL SUBCEILING OF 3500 HEAVY BOMBERS. THUS, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE OVERALL SNOW LIMIT, SUCH A SUBCEILING WOULD PROVIDE A FURTHER, INDIRECT LIMIT ON HEAVY BOMBER WEAPONS, WHICH ARE NOT DIRECTLY CONSTRAINED.

--EACH SIDE COULD DEPLOY UP TO 7500 BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS AND LONG-RANGE ALMS WITHIN THE TOTAL OF THE FOLLOWING SUBCEILINGS WOULD APPLY:

- 5500 BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS,
- 3300 ICBM RVS,
- NO MORE THAN A TOTAL OF 1650 RVS ON ALL PERMITTED ICBMS EXCEPT SILO-BASED LIGHT AND MEDIUM ICBMS WITH SIX RVS EACH OR LESS.

FYI: THE INCLUSION OF A SECOND ICBM SUBCEILING IS DESIGNED TO PROMOTE THE OBJECTIVE OF ENCOURAGING THE EVOLUTION OF MORE STABLE FORCE STRUCTURES, PARTICULARLY TOWARD LOWER LEVELS OF FRAGMENTATION AND BREAKOUT POTENTIAL ON BOTH SIDES. EN FYI

--THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD STRESS THAT U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF A LIMIT OF 5000 TOTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS AND LONG-RANGE ALMS IS CONTINGENT UPON SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. PROPOSED LIMITS AND SUBLIMITS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEAD AND THROW-WEIGHT.

--THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD STATE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED A COMPLETE BAN ON MOBILE ICBMS BECAUSE OF THE EXTREME DIFFICULTIES IN VERIFICATION AND STABILITY CONCERNS. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD INFORM THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SERIOUS CHALLENGES THAT MOBILE ICBM SYSTEMS POSE HAVE BEEN MET BY SOVIET IDEAS PRESENTED THUS FAR. THEREFORE, IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT MOBILE ICBMS, THE DELEGATION SHOULD STATE THAT THEY SHOULD BE BANNED. HOWEVER, WE WILL LISTEN TO ANY SERIOUS SOVIET PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS OUR VERIFICATION AND STABILITY CONCERNS.

--SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT MUST BE REDUCED TO 50 PERCENT ITS CURRENT LEVEL. THE SOVIET SIDE MUST ACCEPT SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS IN AN AGREEMENT

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THAT WOULD CODIFY REDUCTIONS OF 50 PERCENT. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY POINT OUT THAT THE U.S. REMAINS FLEXIBLE AS TO THE METHOD ADOPTED TO REDUCE SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE THROWWEIGHT BY 50 PERCENT-- EITHER A DIRECT LIMIT AT THAT LEVEL, INDIRECT LIMITS OR SOME OTHER REASONABLE, EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE APPROACH.

--IF THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUES TO PRESS THE ISSUE OF SLCMS, THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD STATE THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT RESOLUTION OF THE SLCM ISSUE IS NECESSARY FOR A START AGREEMENT INVOLVING PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS OF 50 PERCENT OR LESS. IN THE EVENT THAT THE USSR WERE ABLE TO PROPOSE MEASURES WHICH THE U.S. FOUND TO BE STABILIZING, EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE, THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF A SEPARATE TREATMENT OF SLCMS.

--IF THE SOVIET SIDE RAISES THE ISSUE OF TAKING ACCOUNT OF SO-CALLED FBS, THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD NOTE THAT SYSTEMS OF THESE RANGE AND CAPABILITIES ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THIS NEGOTIATION. THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY INDICATE THAT, HOWEVER, WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF NON-STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, THE U.S. DESIRES NO MORE FORCES THAN ARE NECESSARY TO OFFSET THE THREAT POSED TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. CLEARLY, THE UNITED STATES HAS ALWAYS EXERCISED RESTRAINT AND URGES THE SOVIET UNION TO SHOW COMPARABLE RESTRAINT.

--REDUCTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE OVER A PERIOD OF 5 YEARS ACCORDING TO AN AGREED SCHEDULE. IN ADDITION, BOTH SIDES WOULD RECOMMIT THEMSELVES TO THE GOAL OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS AND SPECIFY A REASONABLE TIME PERIOD FOR ACHIEVING SUCH REDUCTIONS.

--THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT AN AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL SUPERCEDED BY A LATER AGREEMENT CONTAINING FURTHER REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS. HOWEVER, FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE DURATION MUST AWAIT AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT.

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--THE NEGOTIATOR SHOULD INDICATE TO HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART THAT CONCRETE RESULTS IN GENEVA WILL PROVIDE THE FOUNDATION FOR A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT DISCUSSION OF INST ISSUES. HE SHOULD URGE THE SOVIET SIDE TO RESPOND POSITIVELY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY TO THE NEW U.S. INITIATIVE.

8. VERIFICATION. IN PRESENTING THE U.S. APPROACHES TO REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD STRESS TO THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT, DURING THE NEGOTIATION OF A START AGREEMENT, EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED WILL BE AGREED UPON CONCURRENTLY. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD STRESS THAT GENERAL SOVIET ASSURANCES THAT VERIFICATION WILL NOT BE A PROBLEM ARE NOT ADEQUATE, AND THAT VERIFICATION PROVISIONS MUST BE NEGOTIATED CAREFULLY AND PRECISELY.

--AS AN EXAMPLE, THE GROUP SHOULD NOTE THAT IN ORDER TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH LIMITS ON STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM) AND COOPERATIVE MEASURES, INCLUDING VARIOUS FORMS OF ON-SITE INSPECTION/MONITORING WOULD BE USED IN MEETING THE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. OUR VERIFICATION REGIME WOULD INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS: PROVISIONS FOR THE USE OF, AND NON-INTERFERENCE WITH, NTM; DATA EXCHANGE, UPDATED PERIODICALLY, ON STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT, AND THEIR LOCATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS; NOTIFICATIONS OF TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHES; SPECIALIZED DISMANTLING, DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION PROCEDURES; AND THE USE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION/MONITORING TO SUPPLEMENT NTM.

9. RESPONSE TO SOVIET JUNE 11 PROPOSAL. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE U.S. HAS GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IN FORMULATING ITS RESPONSE. IT SHOULD NOTE THAT, IN ADDITION TO SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS, THERE REMAIN A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF UNACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY ELABORATE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES.

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--WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE SOVIET SIDE'S POSITION ON LINKING ITS INTERIM OPTION TO ITS PROPOSALS RELATED TO THE ABM TREATY. MOREOVER, WE CONTINUE TO REJECT THE IDEA OF LINKING PROGRESS IN ONE NEGOTIATING GROUP TO PROGRESS IN ANOTHER.

--WE WELCOME SOVIET RETURN TO THE EXCLUSION OF U.S. NON-STRATEGIC SYSTEMS FROM THE LIMITS ON INDVS AND WEAPONS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE IN START. HOWEVER, WE ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUES TO PROPOSE THAT THOSE SYSTEMS BE LIMITED IN A START AGREEMENT (E.G., IN THE FORM OF A U.S. COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF SUCH SYSTEMS WITHIN RANGE OF SOVIET TERRITORY). THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD CONSTRAIN U.S. SYSTEMS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF U.S. ALLIES WITHOUT CONSTRAINING SOVIET SYSTEMS OF COMPARABLE CAPABILITY THAT THREATEN THOSE ALLIES. THIS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.

--WE WELCOME SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO PERMIT CERTAIN LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES. HOWEVER, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THIS STEP ON LONG-RANGE ALCMS, WE CANNOT ACCEPT DIRECT LIMITS ON OTHER BOMBER WEAPONS. ON SLCBS, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS PUT FORWARD A PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD COMPLICATE THE CENTRAL NEGOTIATION AND WHICH DOES NOT LEND ITSELF TO EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION (SPECIALY IN VIEW OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF VERIFYING THE ABSENCE OF SLCMS ON SURFACE SHIPS AND ON SUBMARINES NOT AUTHORIZED TO CARRY THEM, AND PROBLEMS OF VERIFYING RANGE).

--WE QUESTION THE SOVIET RATIONALE FOR RAISING ITS WEAPONS TOTAL TO 8000, ESPECIALLY THE ARGUMENT THAT THIS IS JUSTIFIED BY THE EXCLUSION OF U.S. NON-STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD STRONGLY PREFER TO WORK NOW TOWARD AN AGREEMENT TO CODIFY 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK ON AN INTERIM FIRST STEP TOWARD THAT OBJECTIVE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO RAISE THE NUMBERS AS MUCH AS THE SOVIET SIDE HAS PROPOSED IN ORDER TO TAKE A FIRST STEP.

--THE SOVIET PROPOSAL CONTINUES TO DIFFERENTIATE INADEQUATELY AMONG VARIOUS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE

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SUBCEILING OF 4800 WOULD NEITHER REQUIRE A SUFFICIENT REDUCTION IN SOVIET ICBM WARHEADS NOR MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE SHARE OF SOVIET WEAPONS EMPLOYED ON ICBMS. MOREOVER, THE SOVIET FRAMEWORK WOULD NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING ADDITIONAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS ON BALLISTIC MISSILES.

--REGARDING THE SOVIET SUGGESTION IN EXPERTS MEETING OF A SUBLIMIT ON STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS OF 80-85 PERCENT OF THE LIMIT ON TOTAL CHARGES, THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD STATE THAT, IN U.S. VIEW, THE LEVEL OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS PERMITTED BY SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE FAR TOO HIGH AND THAT THE SIDES SHOULD INSTEAD AGREE ON A SPECIFIC MAXIMUM NUMBER OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS TO BE PERMITTED. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD PROBE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO LIMIT STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS TO LEVELS PROPOSED BY U.S.

--THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL DOES NOT EVEN ADDRESS THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF THROW-WEIGHT. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET SIDE MAINTAINS THAT ITS PROPOSAL FOR 50% REDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT IN A 50% PERCENT CUT IN SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT, IT HAS NOT INDICATED WHAT LEVEL OF REDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT FROM ITS INTERIM PROPOSAL. NOR HAS IT PROPOSED ANY SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR CODIFYING THOSE REDUCTIONS. FURTHERMORE, UNDER THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THE REDUCTION IN THROW-WEIGHT MIGHT BE VERY LIMITED.

--THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD PLACE EMPHASIS ON THE FACT THAT THERE IS A GROSS INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE SOVIET POSITION ON MISSILE AND BOMBER DEFENSES. SOVIET AIR DEFENSES DWARF THOSE OF THE U.S. AND ARE CONSTANTLY EXPANDING.

--THE SOVIETS SAY THEY ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT ANY LIMITS ON BOMBER DEFENSES, BUT THEY PROPOSE COUNTING BOMBER WEAPONS ON THE SAME BASIS AS MISSILE WEAPONS. YET, THE SOVIETS CLAIM THAT WE CANNOT REDUCE MISSILE WEAPONS WITHOUT PROHIBITING ON MISSILE DEFENSES.

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--THE U.S. DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT LIMITATIONS ON DEFENSES OF ANY TYPE SHOULD BE A PRECONDITION FOR LIMITATIONS ON OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE FIRST REDUCTIONS SHOULD INVOLVE SYSTEMS THAT ARE MOST STABILIZING -- BALLISTIC MISSILES, PARTICULARLY CBMs.

10. OUTSTANDING ISSUES AS THEY ARE RESOLVED BY THE INTERAGENCY GROUP, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP WILL BE PROVIDED GUIDANCE ON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

- BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEAD COUNTING
- MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS
- LONG-RANGE ALCM RANGE AND PAYLOAD
- LONG-RANGE ALCM COUNTING
- TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION
- THROW-WEIGHT DEFINITION
- MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION. !!

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Attachment 4

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Declassified/Released on 3/18/96  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by J. Saunders, National Security Council

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1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS FOR ROUND VI, BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 18, 1986. EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW, GUIDANCE FOR DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP FOR PREVIOUS ROUNDS (REFTELS) REMAINS IN EFFECT.

3. OVERALL APPROACH. PRIMARY US OBJECTIVES FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP IN ROUND VI ARE

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(A) TO PRESENT TO THE SOVIETS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S JULY PROPOSAL IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE AREA;

(B) TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FOCUS ON THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE US AGENDA, (E.G., ELABORATING THE ROLE OF EFFECTIVE DEFENSES IN PROVIDING A MORE STABLE OFFENSE/DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP AND A POSSIBLE TRANSITION TOWARD A MORE DEFENSE-BASED DETERRENCE POSTURE, SHOULD DEFENSES PROVE FEASIBLE, REVERSING THE POSITION OF THE ABM TREATY REGIME AND BRINGING THE SOVIETS INTO COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY; AND EXPLAINING HOW THE US OPEN LABORATORIES INITIATIVE CAN ADDRESS BOTH US AND SOVIET CONCERNS); AND

(C) WHILE MAINTAINING THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE US PROPOSAL AND US AGENDA, TO RESPOND TO SOVIET PURSUIT OF THEIR PROPOSALS, AS THEY RELATE TO THE WORK OF THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP AND ITS INTERRELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER AREAS, BY CONTINUING TO CRITICIZE, QUESTION AND PROBE THEM, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH SIX BELOW AND PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS, AND BY POINTING TO WAYS IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL RESPONDS TO SOVIET CONCERNS. IN DOING SO, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE HIGHEST US PRIORITY IS IN ACHIEVING THE RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE FORCES THAT WERE THE UNFULFILLED BUT INTENDED RESULT OF THE SALT I PROCESS.

4. PRESIDENT'S JULY PROPOSAL. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHALL PRESENT, DURING THE COURSE OF THE ROUND, THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN HIS LETTER TO GORBACHEV AS IT RELATES TO THE WORK OF THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP, DRAWING FROM NSDD 232.

THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATOR, AT HIS DISCRETION, MAY DETERMINE THE TIMING AND PACE OF SUCH PRESENTATION, IN LIGHT OF ANY FORMAL RESPONSE FROM GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV TO THE PRESIDENT AS WELL AS ANY STATEMENTS BY THE SOVIET NST DELEGATION REGARDING THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL.

5. SOVIET QUESTIONS ON THE JULY PROPOSAL. THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATOR IS ALSO AUTHORIZED, AND MAY AUTHORIZE MEMBERS OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUP, TO DRAW FROM

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ADDITIONAL NSC GUIDANCE ON THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL, AT HIS DISCRETION, TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THE US POSITION. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO RESPOND TO OTHER SOVIET QUESTIONS ON THE PROPOSAL, AS APPROPRIATE. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO DRAW FROM INTERAGENCY PAPERS THAT ADDRESS QUESTIONS THE SOVIETS MIGHT ASK ABOUT THE PROPOSAL. (NOTE: THE INTERAGENCY IS PREPARING SEVERAL PAPERS, INCLUDING A Q'S AND A'S PAPER; A PAPER ON TRANSITION ISSUES; A PAPER ON MUTUALLY AGREED PROCEDURES FOR OBSERVING TESTING IN THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL; A PAPER ON US IDEAS REGARDING SPACE-BASED WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION; AND A PAPER ON SHARING THE BENEFITS OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE.)

6. SOVIET PROPOSALS OF MAY AND JUNE. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD ATTEMPT TO KEEP THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE US PROPOSALS AND THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE US AGENDA, BUT SHOULD ALSO RESPOND, AS APPROPRIATE, TO SOVIET PURSUIT OF THEIR MAY/JUNE PROPOSALS BY POINTING TO WAYS IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ADDRESSES THEIR CONCERNS. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY DRAW UPON DEFENSE AND SPACE I. PAPER, AS APPROPRIATE, TO DISCUSS THESE AND RELATED QUESTIONS ONCE THESE PAPERS ARE APPROVED AND RELEASED FOR DELEGATION USE. (NOTE: THE IGM APPROVED PAPERS ON DESCRIPTION OF SOVIET DEFENSE AND SPACE PROPOSALS OF MAY 29 AND JUNE 3, LINKAGE OF SOVIET DEFENSE AND SPACE PROPOSALS TO START AND INF AND EFFECT ON SDI OF THE MAY AND JUNE 1986 SOVIET PROPOSALS).

WHILE WE WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH SOVIET EFFORTS TO THE CONTRARY, IT IS NOT IN THE US INTEREST TO ACCEPT ANY CHANGES IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABM TREATY, WHICH ALTER THAT WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN NEGOTIATED AND AGREED. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD COUNTER AND REJECT SOVIET ATTEMPTS INDIRECTLY TO AMEND THE ABM TREATY AND TO NARROW THAT WHICH IS PERMITTED BY THE TREATY. IN RESPONDING TO SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE THEIR PROPOSED DEFINITIONS, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE KEY DEFINITIONS WERE UNDERSTOOD BY THE ABM TREATY NEGOTIATORS IN 1972. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE US WILL NOT ACCEPT ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING BEYOND THOSE ESTABLISHED BY THE TREATY.

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7. JOINTLY-MANAGED TRANSITION. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO STATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S JULY PROPOSAL PROVIDES A CONCRETE FRAMEWORK FOR AGREEMENT ON THE TERMS FOR A JOINTLY MANAGED TRANSITION TO INCREASED RELIANCE ON STRATEGIC DEFENSES. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD FOCUS ON THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IN THIS CONTEXT, ILLUSTRATING ITS CONSISTENCY AND CONTINUITY WITH PAST US PROPOSALS.

8. VERIFICATION. IN SETTING FORTH THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD NOTE THAT, AS IS THE CASE WITH OTHER US PROPOSALS, EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS WILL HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED CONCURRENTLY WITH OTHER SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS. !!

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