

September 18, 986

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 240

Instructions for NST and VI

The U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms should be guided by the attached instructions during Round VI of the Nuclear and Space Talks. (U)



Declassific Released on 3/15/96
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by J. Saundern National Security Council

Attachment:

Specie Latrictions

Attachment 2: NF

Attachment 3: TART

Attachment : T

UN SECRET FOR DE OADR





Declassified Released on 3/8/96 under provisions of E.C. 12958 by J. Saunders, National Security Council

REF: (A) STATE 138815; (B) STATE 01256; (C) STAT 54772; (D) STATE 55895; (E) STATE 28813

- 1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR U.S. DELEGATION FOR THE SIXTH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 18, 1986. GUIDANCE FOR PREVIOUS ROUNDS (REFTELS) REMAINS IN EFFECT, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FOR EACH OF THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS IS BEING PROVIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 1986.
- 3. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF ROUND VI INCLUDE.

-- TO PRESENT THE NEW AS. P OPOSALS OUT INED I NSID-232 AND THE INSTRUCT NS FOR EACH OF THE THREE



UNCLASSIFIED

MOPRESHED

NEGOTIATING GROUPS (SELES, EMPHAIZING, AS APPROPRIATE, THAT THE REPRESENT A .S. EFFORT TO SEEK OUT AREAS OF CONVERGINCE, TO RESPOND TO EXPRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS, AND TO BE OF OUT ULTIMATE CAL AND AS APPROPRIATE, TO IDENTIFY PRICTICAL EAR TERM STEPS OF ACHIEVE THOSE OBJECTIVE.

-- TO SEEK PROMPT AND F RTH OMING RESPONSES TO U.S. PROPOSALS; TO MAKE CLEAR THET, FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND PRESENTATION OF HE U.S. PROSALS IN GENEVA, THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO DVIETS; TO ENSURE THAT DISCUSSION TAKES PLACE ON THE BASIS OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS.

PROGRESS IN ONE NEGOTIATING FORUM HOSTAGE TO THE EFFORTS OF ANOTHER, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MAKING CLEAR THOSE AREAS WHERE, IN THE U.S. VIEW, SUBSTANTIVE INTER-RELATIONSHIPS EXIST. IN PARTICULAR, DELECATION SHOULD REBUT SOVIET EFFORTS TO POTRAY SDI AS AT OBSTAGE TO ARMS CONTROL OR TO SIGNIF ON TREDUCT ONS. AT THE SAME TIME IN START WE SHOULD THE SS THAT HE MAKE RECONTROL OR TO SIGNIF ON TREDUCT ONS. AT THE SAME IS SIGNIFICANT STABILITING EDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARE AND HAT THE U.S. IS FIR LY COMMITTED TO 50 PER ENTERED CTIONS GRED TO AT THE 1985 GENEVA SUMMIT MEETING IF ECESSAR, WARE PEP PARED TO CONSIDER INITIAL REDUCT DNS OF A LESS EEPING ATURE AS AN INTERIM STEP ON THE LATH TO THAT OBJ CTIVE. IN NF, WE SHOULD CONFIRM SOVIET AGE EMENT TO THE GOAL OF ELIMINATING THE ENTIRE CLAST OF LAND RASED, HRINF MISSILES WORLDWIDE, AND TO ONFIRM SO ET AGREEM IT TO A SEPARATE INTERIM INFAGE TO WITH EQUAL CEILINGS ON U.S. AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILE WARHEADS, AS WELL AS EQUAL CEILINGS ON SUCH WARHEADS IN EUROPE, WITHOUT DELAY. THE SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENTS OF THE TYPE WE ARE OFFERING IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE AREA MAKE SENSE ONLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF IMMEDIATE ACTIONS ON BOTH SIDES TO BEGIN MOVING TOWARD OUR COMMON GOAL OF THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, A PROCESS THAT MUST BEGIN WITH RADICAL AND STALLED NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- IN SETTING FORTH THE ELEMENTS OF HE ULY PROPOSIT, THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE C EAR THE MI SURES FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION ST E ADDRESSE AND AGEED






UNCLASSIFIED

CONCURRENTLY WITH NEGOTATIONS ON TREATY LIMITATIONS.
THIS IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH HE GENE A SEMMIT AGREEMENT.
TO THAT END, GUIDAN ON THE TREATMENT OF VERIFICATION
IS INCLUDED IN THE NET UCT ONS TO LACE NEGOTIATING
GROUP.

- 4. IF THE SOVIETS RAIS OF ER, NON NST ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, THE DELEGATION HOU D RESPOND THE SE ISSUES SHOULD BE PURSUED IN THE AP ROPRIATE FORA, NOT IN NST.
- THE DELEGATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPIRED THE NEED FOR COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, NOTING THE OBSTACLES PLACED IN THE PATH OF ACHIEVING ARMS REDUCTIONS BY SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE. IT SHOULD UNDERSCORE THAT U.S. POLICY DECISIONS ON THE SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT AND SALT II IN LARGE PART RESULTED THE DELEGATIONS SHOULD FROM SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE. STRESS THAT THESE AGREEMENTS ARE BEHIND US, BOTH AS A MATTER OF LEGAL OBLIGATION AND AS A MATTER POLICY COMMITMENT. HOWEVER, THE S. HAS MAD A STANDING OFFER FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUMBER OF M. THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON PROGRESS IN NS TOWARD EARLY AGREMEN RADICAL AND STABILIZEG RED CTIONS N TE OFFEN IVE BOT UNITED STA ES AND TH NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF HE SOVIET UNION. !!




UNCLASSIFIED

AND HOUSE



SYSTEM II 90638 Attachment 2

Declassified/Released on 3/18/76
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by J. Saunders, National Security Council



REF: (A) STATE 138683; (B) STATE 054775; (C) STATE 012553

- 1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. THERE FOLLOWS GUIDANCE TO THE INF GROUP FOR ROUND VI OF THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE US POSITION ON INF REMAINS EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BY THESE STRUCTION

BASIC APPROACH

3. INF GROUP SHOULD STATE ONFIRM OVI T AGREE ENT TO THE GOAL OF ELIMINATING TEEFIRE CLASS F US AN

Declassify on: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED

IN PROTEIN

SOVIET LRINF MISSILE AND TO CONFIRM SOVIET AGREEMENT TO A SEPARATE INTERIM IF OREF ENT WITH EQUAL US AND SOVIET LRINF WARHEADS IN EUROPE IN HE CONT XT IF EQUAL US/SOVIET GLOBAL LRINF W. RHE D LIMIT, A DISCUSSED T EXPERTS MEETINGS IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTO

- 4. THE INF GROUP SHOULD STATE THAT THE US BELIEVE AS AGREEMENT LEADING TO THE BLIEF INATION OF US AS LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILE SISTEMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD ND SOVIET WOULD BE THE BEST OUTCOME. HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF THE NOVEMBER 1985 SUMMIT COMMITMENT TO PURSUE THE IDEA OF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT, AN INTERIM APPROACH ON A GLOBAL BASIS MAY PROVE TO BE THE MOST PROMISING WAY TO ACHIEVE EARLY REDUCTIONS. THE US SEEKS AN AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING EQUAL GLOBAL CEILINGS ON US AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILE WARHEADS IT IS IMPORTANT THAT REDUCTIONS BEGIN WITHOUT DELAY. IMMEDIATELY AND THAT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS VEVED WITHIN AN AGREED PERIOD OF ME. INF COUP SHOULD SEEK SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE BEENTS OF INF ACREEME T CONSISTENT WITH THESE RE JIRI MENTS. HE OTIMING AT, BY A DATE CER AIN, SOON A TER GROUP SHOULD ALSO MAKE LEAR THAT THE US THAT THE SIDES AGREE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF JCH NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT GOAL OF EL MINATION OF ALL US AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILES ON GLOBAL BASIS.
- AGREEMENT, DELEGATION SHOULD TATE THAT THE US IS STEKING A FRESH START, BUILDING OF THE SUMMER'S ET INGS AND IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE NSISTENT WITH THE WELL-KNOWN CRITERIA FOR AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT, ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN AN EFFORT TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES. THE US HOPES THAT THE OUTCOME OF THIS PROCESS WILL BE A SET OF AGREED ELEMENTS THAT WILL GUIDE CONCRETE TREATY DRAFTING.
- 6. EQUAL GLORAL WARHEAD LIMITS FOR US AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILE SYSTES WOULD REPRESENT THE BASIC BILLION FOR AN INTERIM SOCIETION. WITHIN HIS FRAMEWORK, THE US IS PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE IN EDITATING SPECIFIC WARR AD LEVELS AND IN ADDRESSING THEI SOVIET CNC ANS.







- 7. THE SOVIETS HAVE SUGGESTED AN EQUAL CEILING F 100 LRINF MISSILE WARHEAD EULOPE. IF GROUP SHOULD INDICATE THAT THIS CEILING IN EUROPE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES ONLY IF THE SOVERT USION AGES TO REDUCE AND LIMIT CONCURRE TLY THEIR DAINF USSEE WARHEADS OUTSIDE OF EUROPE TO 100 OR ESS. (FII: REDUCTIONS OF SS-20S IN A IA O A LEVEL CCEPTABL TO THE US ARE AN ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR AN INC. MENT. US DELEGATION SHOULD NOT PERMIT EQUAL CEILINGS IN EUROPE AND ASIA TO BECOME A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONATE REDUCTIONS. END FYI.)
- 8. AS PART OF AN ACCEPTABLE INF AGREEMENT SUCH AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 7 ABOVE, THE INF GROUP SHOULD REITERATE US WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE MIX BETWEEN ITS GLCMS AND PERSHING IIS IN EUROPE AND REDUCE LEVELS OF GLCMS AND PERSHING IIS IN EUROPE IN AN APPROPRIATE ANNEX, UT THAT IT IS NOT PREPARED TO RESTREE US LRINE DEPLOYMENT. IN EUROPE TO GLCMS ONLY.
- 9. THE USSR HAS SUGGESTED THE TOTHE USE ENTITLED TO DEPLOY IN THE CONTINE TAL UNITED STATES (XCLUDIN: ALASKA), A NUMBER OF ADE ADS ON LRIN MI SILES EQUAL TO THE NUMBER OF SOVIET WASH ADS ON LRIN MI SILES DEPLOYED IN ASIA. THE INF GROUP SOUL STATE HAT AS PAIT OF AN ACCEPTABLE INF AGREEMENT UCH AS DESCRIBED IN PAA 7 THE US IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT IN A PROACH UDER WITH THE US RIGHT TO DEPLOY OUTSIDE OF EUROPE A NUMBER OF WARF ADS ON LRINF MISSILES EQUAL TO TOTAL BER OF SOVE WARF ADS ON LRINF MISSILES DEPLOYED OUTSIDE OF EUROPE WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO US TERRITORY (INCLUDING ALASKA), IF THE SOVIET LEVELS IN EUROPE AND OUTSIDE EUROPE ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THE US, AND IF SOVIET LRINF DEPLOYMENTS ARE RESTRICTED TO SOVIET TERRITORY. IN MAKING THIS POINT, THE US NEGOTIATOR SHOULD NOTE THAT THE RESTRICTION ON US DEPLOYMENTS HAS A MORE ADVERSE AFFECT ON US SECURITY THAN THE SOVIET LIMIT HAS ON SOVIET SECURITY.
- 10. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE TY DUESTION DEPLOYMEN OF US LRINF MISSILES IN ALASE, THE US IN NEGOTION OF MAINTAIN RETURN FOR OVIE WILLIN NESS NOT TO DEPLOY SOVIET LRINF MISSILES IT ASIA AST OF 10 DEGREES EAST LONGITUDE, THE US WOULD BE PRE ARED TO FOR GO ITS RIGHT TO DEPLOY US LRINF MISSILE IN ALASKA.







WOLASSIELE

- 11. AS A RESULT OF THE IMITS IN PARAS AND 9 BOV, BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WOUL BE LIMITED TO AN EQUAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS OF LRINF ISSILES ON A GLOBAL BASIS. CONSISTENT WITH PARAS THROUGH 9 ABOVE, THE INF GROUP MAY PROPOSE, AS IN INCOME. AN EQUAL GLOBAL CEILING OF 100 TARHEADS OF LRINF MISSILES.
- 12. BOTH SIDES AGREE ON THE NEED FOR CONSTRUITS ON SRINF MISSILES. THE INF GROUP SHOULD INSIST THAT APPROPRIATE CONSTRUINTS ON THESE SYSTEMS MUST BE ESTABLISHED CONCURRENTLY WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CEILINGS ON LRINF MISSILES AND NOTE THAT THE US IS WILLING TO CONSIDER ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF SUCH SYSTEMS FOLLOWING ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.
- 13. THE INF GROUP SHOULD STATE THAT SUCLAN INTERIOR AGREEMENT SHOULD REMAIN IN A FECT UNTIL SUPERSEDED Y A LATER AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR FURTHER REDUCTION, LEADING TOWARD THE AGREED GOAL OF THE TOTAL ILIMITATION OF LAINF SYSTEMS.
- 14. ON THE TRANSFER INE MISSILI SY TEMS TO OTHER COUNTRIES, IF RAISED BY T.E.S. VIETS, DELIGATION HOULD STATE THAT THE US WILL NO AL ER ITS STALISHED POLICY OF COOPERATION WITH ITS A LIE. AT T.E.SA.T.E., TERE ARE NO CURRENT PLANS TO TANS ER LRINF MISSILE SYST MS TO ANY OTHER STATE.

US DRAFT TREATY

- 15. FYI. IN SUPPORT OF THE BASIC APPROACH AND OBJECTIVES DESCRIBED ABOVE, WASHINGTON IS PREPARING A DRAFT INTERIM INF TREATY (SEPTEL) WITH THE AIM OF TABLING IT AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE IN THE ROUND.
- 16. IN PRESENTING THE ABOUT PPROACH, THE US DELEGATION SHOULD PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:
- --THE US RIGHT TO RELO ATE US LRINF M SSI ES PERM TTE UNDER THE AGREEMENT EU DPE AS DECI ED Y THE U AN ITS NATO ALLIES:



IN SPORE TO THE

-- THE US RIGHT TO CONVERT PERSHING I MESSILES EDUCED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE ACREMENT TO PERSHING IB MISSILES: AND,


-- THE US RIGHT TO MATCH OVIET SHORT R RANGE OF EUROPE ND ON A OBAL BASIS AS APPROPRIATE.

PROCEDURES

17. INF GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET DELEGATION ON PROCEDURES FOR FORMING TREATY DRAFTING AND VERIFICATION WORKING GROUPS. AMBASSADOR GLITMAN SHOULD WORK OUT THESE PROCEDURES, BEARING IN MIND NEED TO ADDRESS VERIFICATION CONCUR NTLY WITH SCUSSION OF OTHER TREATY PROVISIONS. A US DRAFT TREATY, WHILE INCORPORATES VERIFICATION ME SURES IN THE REAL TEXT ITSELF AND INCLUDES A DITAIL DIMOU AD PLOTOCOLS DEALING WITH VERIFICATION, WILL ILLU TRATE TO THE SOVIET UNION THE CLOSE INTERRELATIONS IP HICH THE US ENVISAGES BETWEEN REDUCTION AND LETATION OBLIGATIONS AND MEAURES FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

VERIFICATION


18. THE US SHOULD CONTINUE TO ELABORATE ON ITS VERIFICATION POSITION DRAWING ON THE RESPONSES TO THE DELEGATION QUESTIONS TRANSMITTED BY SEPTEL AND ON OTHER MATERIALS TO BE PROVIDED.!!



SYSTEM II 90638 Attachment 3

400

Declassified/Released on 2/18/94 under provisions of E.O. 12958 by J. Saunders, National Security Council



- 1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE ROUND BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 18. EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW, PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED.
- 3. OVERALL OBJECTIVE. THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP IS TO GET THE SOVIET UP JOIN THE UNITED STATES IN MOVING AND EXPEDITIONS OF ABILIZIN AGREPMENT TREDUCE STRATEGIC OFFENS E AMS AND N LING WE


SECRETARY ON: OADR

SECRET D

GROUNDWORK FOR THE NEXT SUM IT MEET NG ATER THIS TEAR. THE UNITED STATES SERS MUT ALLY ACCEPT BLE AGREEMENTS IN ALL THREE NEGOTY THE GROUPS AND BELIEVES THAT PROGRESS IN ONE GROUPS OUL NOT BE HELD HOSTAGE TO THE RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES IN THE OTHER ROUPS. AT HE SAME TIME, THE UNITED SATE BELIEVES THAT THE MOST URGENT TASK IS SIGNIFIC NT EDUCTION IN THE EGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS, IN MANNER WICH ENHANCE STABILITY, AND AN INTER MARREMENT ON NF. THE U.S. DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT LIMITATIONS ON DEFENDED OF ANY TYPE SHOULD BE A PRECONDITION FOR LIMITATIONS ON OFFENSIVE ARMS.

- 4. ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES IS TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, A GOAL POSSIBLE ONLY IN A WORLD WHERE THE THREAT POSED BY NON-NUCLEAR FORCES HAS BEEN RADICALLY REDUCED, REGIONAL CONFLICTS GREATLY DIMINISHED, AND RELATIONS TOWNER THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVI UNION, RATCALLY IN PROVED. A MAJOR MILESTONE IN THE A H TO THE LIMINATION FALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS THE LIMINATION FALL TERM, EFFORTS SHOULD FOCUS IN ACHIE ING DEEP REJUCT ONS WHICH ENHANCE START ITY BY EDUCING THE THREAT FADISARMING FIRST STRUCK PARTICULARL BY ICBMS. FYITHE NEGOTIATING GROUP MY DAW UPON NSD -232 AS APPROPRIATE. END FYI.
- PREFERRED APPROACH. THE U.S. NE TIATING GROU VITED STATE REMAINS HE I SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT FIRMLY COMMITTED TO SEEK THE I TE IMPLEMENT PRINCIPLE OF A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION AS CALLED FOR IN THE NOVEMBER 21 JOINT STATEMENT. SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD BE IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR AND IS THE OUTCOME PREFERRED BY THE UNITED STATES. REDUCTIONS WOULD MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO STRATEGIC STABILITY AND BE AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD A LONG-TERM PROGRAM FOR ELIMINATING NUCLEAR ARMS. PREVIOUS U.S. PROPOSALS REMAIN ON THE TABLE AND THE UNLESS PREPARED TO SHOW FLEXIBIL AND CONT JUE TO WO HTIW





WHILL GEOREAL U



THE SOVIET UNION TO ACHIEVE 50 PERCENT EDUCTIONS, APPROPRIATELY APPLIED. IN HAT RECEND THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP COUL FL SH OUT IND LOUST, AS APPROPRIATE, THE U.S. A OPC AL FOR 50 ECENT FEDUCTIONS IN PARALLEL WITH THE FI ST TEP DESCRIBED BELOW.

- 6. ELABORATION OF 50 PROPOSAL. N. NJUN TION WITH THE PRESENTATION OF THE FIRST STEP BELOW, AS APPROPRIATE, THE U.S. N. GOT ATING GROUND AUTHORIZED TO EXPAND UPON ITS PROPOSAL FOR 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS AS FOLLOWS:
- -- PROPOSE AN SNDV CEILING OF 1600 AS BELOW.
- --PROPOSE ONE-WAY FREEDOM-TO-MIX OF 6000 BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS AND LONG-RANGE ALCMS, 4500 BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS, 3000 ICBM RVS.
- --PROPOSE AN ADDITIONAL IC: RV SUBCELING UNDER WHICH NO MORE THAN A TOTAL OF C RVS COURS BE DEPLOYED ON ALL PERMITTED ICBMS EXCEPT HOSE ON SILO ASSELLED T AND MEDIUM ICBMS WITH SIX R FE ER RVS.

ALL OTHER ELEMENTS F TE 5 PERCEN U. START PRO OSAL REMAIN THE SAME.

- 7. FIRST STEP TOWARD 5 PE CENT RE UCT ONS. IN VIEW OF THE EVIDENT RELUCTANCE F T 2 SOVIE UNIT TO GREET TO EQUITABLE AND STABILIZING REDUCTIONS OF 50 PERCENT AT THIS TIME, DESPITE THE UMM T AGREEMEN TO THIS FECT, THE UNITED STATES IS PREDUCTIONS OF A LESS SWEEPING NATURE AS AN INITIAL STEP. SUCH INITIAL REDUCTIONS COULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR FEATURES:
- --EACH SIDE COULD HAVE 1600 SNDVS: IF THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE U.S. APPROACH TO DIFFERENTIATION AMONG STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARHEADS AT THE LEVELS PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES, THE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE SOVET APPROACH OF FREEDO TO-MIX AMONG STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DAT VERY VEHI LES AT THE EVEL PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET ATOM
- --IF THE SOVIET SIDE EXPRESS S CONCERN THAT THE APPROACH WOULD CREE OF ORT NITIES FOR LARGER DEPLOYMENTS OF GRAVIT MBS AND SREES IS TAN THE PREVIOUS



SIN BIFFE





U.S. PROPOSAL, THE J.S. VEGOTIATING FROUP MAY STATE THAT THE UNITED SATES COULD ACCEPT A MUTUAL SUBCEILING OF 350 HE TY HOMBERS. THES, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE OVERAL SHOW LIMIT, SUCH A SUBCEILING WOULD PROVIDE A FURTHER, NDIRECT LIMIT ON HAVY BOMBER WEAPONS, WHICH ARE NOT DIRECT CONST AIN D.

-- EACH SIDE COULD DEF OY P TO 750 BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS AND LONG-RANGE AL WS WITHIN THE TOTAL THE FOLLOWING SUBCEILINGS WOULD APPLY:

- 5500 BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS,
- 3300 ICBM RVS.
- NO MORE THAN A TOTAL OF 1650 RVS ON ALL PERMITTED ICBMS EXCEPT SILO-BASED LIGHT AND MEDIUM ICBMS WITH SIX RVS EACH OR LESS.

FYI: THE INCLUSION OF A ECOND ICBM SULT IS
DESIGNED TO PROMOTE THE JECTIVE OF ENCOURAGE G THE
EVOLUTION OF MORE STALE FORCE STRUCTURES.
PARTICULARLY TOWARD WER LEVELS F FROTTO ATIO. AND
BREAKOUT POTENTIAL A BOT SIDES. EN FYI

--THE U.S. NEGOT TIN GR UP SHOULD STRESS TEAT U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF A L. OF 500 TOT L B LLISTIC MIS ILE RVS AND LONG-RANGE AL MS S CONTI GEN UPON SOVIE ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. PR POS D LIMIT AN SUBLILITS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WAR EAD AND THE W-W CHT.

--THE U.S. NEGOTIATIN GR UP SHOULD FATE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS PROBLED A COMPLETE BALLA MOBILE ICBMS BECAUSE OF THE EXTREME DIFFICULTIES IN VERIFICATION AND STABILITY CONCERNS. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD INFORM THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SERIOUS CHALLENGES THAT MOBILE ICBM SYSTEMS POSE HAVE BEEN MET BY SOVIET IDEAS PRESENTED THUS FAR. THEREFORE, IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT MOBILE ICBMS, THE DELEGATION SHOULD STATE THAT THEY SHOULD BE BANNED. HOW TO WILL LISTEN TO ANY SERIOUS SO ET PROPOST & TO ADDRESS OUR VERIFICATION AND STABLE TO CONCERN

--SOVIET BALLISTIC ASSILL THROW-EIGHT MUST E REDUCED TO 50 PERCHT ITS CURRENT LEVIL. THE SOVET SIDE MUST ACCEPT PECTIC BLIGAT ONS IN AN AFREE ENT





SECRET

THAT WOULD CODIFY REDUCTION OF 50 PERCENT. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP MY POINT OUT THAT THE U.S. REMAINS FLEXIBLE AS TO THE TETHOD A OPTED TO REDUCE SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE THRW WEL HT BY TO PERCENT -- EITHER A DIRECT LIMIT AT THAT LE EL, INDIRECT LIMITS OR SOME OTHER REASONABLE, EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIALE APPROACE.

--IF THE SOVIET SIDE CO TIN ES TO PRESS THE ISSUF OF SLCMS, THE U.S. NEGOTIA INC GROUP SHOW STATE. HAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT DELIEVE THAT RESOLUTION OF THE SLCM ISSUE IS NECESSARY FOR A START AGREEMENT INVOLVING PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS OF 50 PERCENT OR LESS. IN THE EVENT THAT THE USSR WERE ABLE TO PROPOSE MEASURES WHICH THE U.S. FOUND TO BE STABILIZING, EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE, THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF A SEPARATE TREATMENT OF SLCMS.

OF SO-CALLED FBS, THE U. . EGOTIATI & GROUP SHOUD NOTE THAT SYSTEMS OF THESE FINGE AND CALABIL ILS ARE OT ADDRESSED IN THIS NEGLIATI N. THE U.S NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY INDICATE THAT, HO EVER, WITH EGARD ID THE ISSUE OF NON-STRATE IC LYST MS, THE U.S DESIRE NO MORE FORCES THAN ARE NECESTY TO OFFSET THE THREAT OSE TO THE UNITED STATES AND IS A LIES. LEALY, THE UNITED STATES HAS ALWAYS EXERCISED RESTRAIT AD URGE: THE SOVIET UNION TO SHOW COLPAR BLE RESTRAIN

--REDUCTIONS WOULD TAKE PLAZE OVER A ROLOD OF FEARS ACCORDING TO AN AGREED LLE. IN ADD. BOTH SIDES WOULD RECOMMIT THEMSELVES TO THE GOAL OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS AND SPECIFY A REASONABLE TIME PERIOD FOR ACHIEVING SUCH REDUCTIONS.

--THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT AN AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL SUPERCEDED BY A LATER AGREEMENT CONTAINING FURTHER REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATE HOWEVER, FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE PPROPRIATE URATION UST AWAIT AGREEMENT ON THE BALL PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT.



W. Endre

--THE NEGOTIATOR SHOULD INDICATE TO HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART THAT CONCRETE R SULTS I GE EVA WILL PRIVIDE THE FOUNDATION FOR A PRODUCTIVE SUM IT ISCUSSION O NST ISSUES. HE SHOULD URGE THE SOVIET IDE TO RESEND POSITIVELY AND EXPEDITIOUSLE TO THE NEW U.S. IN TIA IVE.

8. VERIFICATION. IN PLESS TING THE U.S. APP CACH'S TO REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC DFF ISIVE ARE. THE NEGOT ATING GROUP SHOULD STRESS TO BE DVIET SIDE WAT THE S BELIEVES THAT, DURING THE NEGOTIATION OF HART AGREEMENT, EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED WILL BE AGREED UPON CONCURRENTLY. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD STRESS THAT GENERAL SOVIET ASSURANCES THAT VERIFICATION WILL NOT BE A PROBLEM ARE NOT ADEQUATE, AND THAT VERIFICATION PROVISIONS MUST BE NEGOTIATED CAREFULLY AND PRECISELY.

--AS AN EXAMPLE, THE GROUP SHOULD NOTE THAT NORDER TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH LIMITS ON STRATE IC SYSTEMS, NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF MAIL OF PERATIVE ME TURES, INCLUDING VARIOUS FORMS OF MAIL OF PERATIVE ME TURES, INCLUDING VARIOUS FORMS OF MAIL OF THE VERIFICATION REGION WOULD BE USED IN MEETING THE VERIFICATION REGION WOULD INCLUDE, UT NOT E LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS: PRIVISIONS FOR THE USE OF, AND NON-INTERPREDED WITH, TM; DATA EX HANDE, UPDATED PERIODICALLY, ON STATEGIC YSTEMS, FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT, AND THEIL LOCATIONS OF TEST AND THEIL LOCATIONS OF TEST AND THE USE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION AND CONVERS ON PROCEDURES AND THE USE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION (MONITOR).

9. RESPONSE TO SOVIET JUNE 11 PROPOSAL. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE U.S. HAS GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IN FORMULATING ITS RESPONSE. IT SHOULD NOTE THAT, IN ADDITION TO SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS, THERE REMAIN A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF UNACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY ELABORATE ALONG THE WING LINES.





MAN ABORBET LO

--WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE SOVIET SIDE POSITION OF LINKING ITS INTERIM OPTION OF ITS POPOSALS REPORTED TO THE BM TREATY. MOREOVER, TO NOT UE TO LIE THE ITEM CLINKING PROGRESS IN SECRETATING GROUP TO PLOGRESS IN ANOTHER.

--WE WELCOME SOVIET RETERN O THE EXTLUSION U.S NONSTRATEGIC SYSTEMS FROM HE IMITS ON NOVS AND WE PONS
PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET JUDGIN START. OWEVER HE ARE
DISAPPOINTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUES TO PROPOSE
THAT THOSE SYSTEMS BE LIMITED IN A START AGREEMENT
(E.G., IN THE FORM OF A U.S. COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE
THE NUMBER OF SUCH SYSTEMS WITHIN RANGE OF SOVIET
TERRITORY). THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD CONSTRAIN U.S.
SYSTEMS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF U.S. ALLIES WITHOUT
CONSTRAINING SOVIET SYSTEMS OF COMPARABLE CAPABILITY
THAT THREATEN THOSE ALLIES. THIS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.

--WE WELCOME SOVIET WILLING ESS TO PER IT CERTAL LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES. JÓ VER, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THIS STEP ON LONG-RANGE ALC S, WE CONOT ACCEST DI SCT LIMITS ON OTHER BOMBER WEAP NS. ON SLC S, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS PUT FORWARD A PROPE SAL WHILE WILL CONTROL TE THE CENTRAL NEGOTIC TON AN WHICH OES NOT LEN IT ELF TO EFFECTIVE VERIFICE N (SPECIALLY I VIEW COTH DIFFICULTIES OF VERIFYING TO ABSENCE OF SLCMS NOT SURFACE SHIPS AND ON SULMAR NES NOT AUTIORIZED TO CARY THEM, AND PROBLEMS OF VERIFIED RANGES.

--WE QUESTION THE SOVIE RATIONALE FOR PAISING WEAPONS TOTAL TO 8000, ALLY THE ARGUMENT THAT THIS IS JUSTIFIED BY THE EXCLUSION OF U.S. NON-STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD STRONGLY PREFER TO WORK NOW TOWARD AN AGREEMENT TO CODIFY 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK ON AN INTERIM FIRST STEP TOWARD THAT OBJECTIVE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO RAISE THE NUMBERS AS MUCH AS THE SOVIET SIDE HAS PROPOSED IN ORDER TO TAKE A FIRST STEP.

-- THE SOVIET PROPOSAL CON INTES TO DIFFERENTIATE INADEQUATELY AMONG VARIOS NICLEAR WINDOW. TE





SECRET

SUBCEILING OF 4800 WELD NE THER REQUIP A SUFFICIENT REDUCTION IN SOVIET ICEM WA HEADS I OR I KE A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE SHAR OF OVE T WEAPONS I PLOYED ON I BMS. MOREOVER, THE SOVIET A MEW RK WOULD NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYIN ALL STRATE IC TEAPONS ON BALLISTIC MISSILES.

--REGARDING THE SOVIET UGG STION IN EXPERTS MEETING OF A SUBLIMIT ON STRATEGIC BAD ISTIC MISS TO WARHE SOF 80-85 PERCENT OF THE LIMIT ON TOTAL CHARGE. THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD STATE THAT, IN U.S. VIEW, THE LEVEL OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS PERMITTED BY SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE FAR TOO HIGH AND THAT THE SIDES SHOULD INSTEAD AGREE ON A SPECIFIC MAXIMUM NUMBER OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS TO BE PERMITTED. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD PROBE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO LIMIT STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS TO LEVELS PROPOSED BY U.S.

--THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSA I ES NOT E EN ADDRU CRITICAL ISSUE OF THROW WEI HT. ALL LOUG THE SIDE MAINTAINS THAT IS PRO OSAL FO 50 REDU EN ADDRESS 50 REDUC WOULD RESULT IN A 50 PERCEN MISSILE THROW-WEIC , I HA CUT IN SOVET BALE STINOT IN ICA ED WHAT LEV LEV L OF FRO ITS IN REDUCTIONS WOULD REA ERI PROPOSIL. NOR HAS IT PROPOSED ANY SPE IFI PROVISIONS FOR CONFYING THOSE REDUCTIONS. FURT ERM RE, UND R TE SOVI PROPOSAL THE REDUCTION N T ROW-WEI IT MESHT LIMITED.

--THE U.S. NEGOTIATING SHOULD PLACE SIS ON THE FACT THAT THERE IS A GROSS INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE SOVIET POSITION ON MISSILE AND BOMBER DEFENSES. SOVIET AIR DEFENSES DWARF THOSE OF THE U.S. AND ARE CONSTANTLY EXPANDING.

--THE SOVIETS SAY THEY ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT ANY LIMITS ON BOMBER DEFENSES, BUT THEY PROPOSE COUNTING BOMBER WEAPONS ON THE SAME PASIS AS MISSISSIPPONS. YET, THE SOVIETS CLAIM THAT WE CANNOT LDUCE MISSISSIPPONS WEAPONS WITHOUT PROHIBITING ON MISSISSIPPONSES.








SHORET

--THE U.S. DOES NOT P LIEVE THAT LI ITATIONS OF DEFENSES OF ANY TYPE SHOULD LA PRE ONDITIO FOR LIMITATIONS ON OFFENSIVE ARMS. TO FET EDUCTIONS STOULD INVOLVE SYSTEMS THAT ARE MOST STATILIZING -- ALLISTE: MISSILES, PARTICULARLY CBM.

10. OUTSTANDING ISSUES A THEY ARE RESULTED BY HE INTERAGENCY GROUP, THE EGO LATING GROUP WILL BE PROVIDED GUIDANCE ON THE FO LOWING ISSUES:

- -- BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEAD COUNTING
- -- MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS
- --LONG-RANGE ALCM RANGE AND PAYLOAD
- -- LONG-RANGE ALCM COUNTING
- -- TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION
- -- THROW-WEIGHT DEFINITION
- -- MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION. !!



4


SECRE





SYSTEM II 90638 Attachment 4

under provisions of E.O. 12958
by J. Saunders, National Security Council



- 1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS FOR ROUND VI, BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 18, 1986. EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW, GUIDANCE FOR DESCRIPTIONS ON SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP FOR PREVIOUS ROUNDS (EFTELS) SMAINS IN EFFECT.
- 3. OVERALL APPROACH. PRIMARY US OF ECTIVES FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NE STIATING GROUP IN 1 DUND VI ARE

SECRET DECLESSIFY On: OADR



INCLASON ILV



- (A) TO PRESENT TO THE SOVIETS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S JULY PROOSAL IN THE DEENS, AND SPICE AREA;
- (B) TO CONTINUE TO MAKE IN POCUS OF THE OTHER LEMENTS OF THE US AGENDA, (E.G. ELA ORATING THE ROLE OF EFFECTIVE DEFENSES IN PLOVIE ING A MORE STABLE OFFENSE/DEFENSE RELATION HIL AND A PESIBLE ANSILION TOWARD A MORE DEFENSE-BASED ETERRENCE POSTURE, SOULD DEFENSES PROVE FEASIBLE DEFENSING THE OSION THE ABM TREATY REGIME AND BRINGING THE SOVIETS INTO COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY; AND EXPLAINING HOW THE US OPEN LABORATORIES INITIATIVE CAN ADDRESS BOTH US AND SOVIET CONCERNS); AND
- (C) WHILE MAINTAINING THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE US PROPOSAL AND US AGENDA, TO RESPOND TO SOVIET PURSUIT OF THEIR PROPOSALS, AS THEY RELATE TO THE WORK OF THE DEPENSE AND SPACE OCTIATING GROUP AND ITS INTERRELATION HIPS WITH THER AREAS BY CONTINUING TO CRITICIZE, UF TION AND PROBE THEM, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAM SI BELOW AND PROBE THEM, IN PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ESPOND TO SOVIET CONCERNS. WITH PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ESPOND TO SOVIET CONCERNS. WITH PROPOSAL ESPOND TO SOVIET CONCERNS. WITH DOING SO, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE HALL TU PRIORITY IS IN ACCIEVING THE RADICAL REDUCTIONS I OF ENSIVE CORCES THAT VERY THE UNFULFILLED BUT INTENDED RESILT OF THE SILT I BOCESS.
- 4. PRESIDENT'S JULY PRO OSA. THE N COTIATING GRUP SHALL PRESENT, DURING THE CORSE OF THE ROUND. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL CONTINUED IN HIS LETTERS OF THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP, DRAWING FROM NSDD 232.

THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATOR, AT HIS DISCRETION, MAY DETERMINE THE TIMING AND PACE OF SUCH PRESENTATION, IN LIGHT OF ANY FORMAL RESPONSE FROM GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV TO THE PRESIDENT AS WELL AS ANY STATEMENTS BY THE SOVIET NST DELEGATION REPARDING THE DESIDENT'S PROPOSAL.

5. SOVIET QUESTIONS ON HE JLY PROPSAL THE DEFE SE AND SPACE NEGOTIATOR I ALSO AUTHORI ED, AND MAY AUTHORIZE MEMBERS OF HE NEG TIATING GROP, TO D'AW ROM





SECRET

ADDITIONAL NSC GUIDANCE ON THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL, AT HIS DISCRETION, TO HE EXTENT NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THE US POSITION. THE TGO ATT G GROUL IS AUTHORISED TO RESPOND TO OTHER SOVE QUESTIONS OF THE PROPOSAL, AS APPROPRIATE. THE NEGOT ATT G GROUL IS LUTHORISED TO DRAW FROM INTERAGENCY E PER THAT A DRES QUESTION THE SOVIETS MIGHT ASK ABOUT THE PROPOSAL (NOTHER INTERAGENCY IS PREPARIN SE ERAL PAPIES, INCLUDIN A Q'S AND A'S PAPER; A PAPER N. T. ANSITION A SUES; A APER ON MUTUALLY AGREED PROCEDURES FOR OBSERVING TOTALING IN THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL; A PAPER ON US IDEAS REGARDING SPACE-BASED WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION; AND A PAPER ON SHARING THE BENEFITS OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE.)

6. SOVIET PROPOSALS OF MAY AND JUNE. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD ATTEMPT TO KEEP THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE US PROPOSALS AND THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE US AGENDA, BUT SHOULD ALSO RESPOND APPROPRIATE, TO SOVIET PUP IT OF THEM MAY/JUN. PROPOSALS BY POINTING TO A S IN WHILE THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ADDRESSES THEM CC CERNS. THE GOLATIN GROUP MAY DRAW UPON DEENSE AND SPACE I PAPER, A APPROPRIATE, TO DISCUSS THE E AND ELATED QUESTIONS ONCE THESE PAPERS ARE ALROYD A D RELEATED OR DELETATION USE. (NOTE: THE IG W. APP OVED PAPERS ON DESCRIPTION OF SOVIET DEFENSE AND SACE PROPOSALS OF MAY 29 AND JUNE 3, LINKAGE OF SOVIET DE ENSIAND SPICE ROPOSALS TO START AND INF AND EFFECTOR SDI OF THE FIX AND JUNE 1986 SOVIET PROPOSALS).


WHILE WE WILL HAVE TO D TH SOVIET E TO THE CONTRARY, IT IS NOT IN THE US INTEREST TO ACCEPT ANY CHANGES IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABM TREATY, WHICH ALTER THAT WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN NEGOTIATED AND AGREED. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD COUNTER AND REJECT SOVIET ATTEMPTS INDIRECTLY TO AMEND THE ABM TREATY AND TO NARROW THAT WHICH IS PERMITTED BY THE TREATY. RESPONDING TO SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE PROPOSED DEFINITIONS, THE NEGOTIATUM GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE KEY P F NITIONS Y RE UNDERSTOOD THE ABM TREATY NEGOTIATY AS IN 1972. THE LEGOTATING GROUP SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE US VILL OT ACC PT ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON RESEARCH, DEVILOPMENT AND TESTING BEYOND THO EST BLEHED BY THE TREATY.







- 7. JOINTLY-MANAGED TRANSITION. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO STATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S JULY PROPOSAL PROVIDES A CONCRETE TRAMEWORK FOR AGREEMENT ON THE TERMS FOR A JOINTLY MANAGED TRANSITION TO INCREASED RELIANCE ON STRATEGIC EFFE SES. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SIOUED FOCUS ON THE PRESIDEN'S PROPOSAL IN THIS CONTEXT, ILLUSTRATING IN INSISTENCY AND CONTINUITY WITH PAST US PROPOSAL.
- 8. VERIFICATION. IN SETTING FORTH THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD NOTE THAT, AS IS THE CASE WITH OTHER US PROPOSALS, EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS WILL HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED CONCURRENTLY WITH OTHER SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS. !!



SECRET