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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II  
90744

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 249

October 29, 1986

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE CURRENT NST NEGOTIATING ROUND (S)

The attached instructions supplement existing guidance for the current round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) which began on September 18, 1986, in Geneva. They set forth in detail the proposals made to General Secretary Gorbachev during my meeting with him in Reykjavik, Iceland, and provide guidance for building on the agreements we reached there. (S)

*Ronald Reagan*

Attachments

1. Overall Instructions of October 21, 1986 (S)
2. START Instructions of October 21, 1986 (S)
3. Defense and Space Instructions of October 21, 1986 (S)
4. INF Instructions of October 22, 1986 (S)
5. Overall Instructions of October 27, 1986 (S)
6. Defense and Space Instructions of October 27, 1986 (S)

Declassified/Released on 3/19/96  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
by J. Saunders, National Security Council

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Classify on: OADR

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APPROVED OVERALL INSTRUCTIONS

OP IMMED  
DE RUEHC #0271 2950316  
O 220311Z OCT 86  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL NST GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1743  
S E C R E T STATE 330271

EXDIS, USNST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, INF, START, MO, TSPA, NST, DST  
SUBJECT: (S) ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR US/SOVIET NUCLEAR  
AND SPACE TALKS

REF: STATE 291634

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING IS ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE NT  
DELEGATION FOR ROUND VI, INCLUDING DISCUSSION IN  
OCTOBER 11-12 REYKJAVIK MEETING. WASHINGTON CONTINUES  
TO EVALUATE HOW BEST TO BUILD UPON POSITIVE

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THAT MEETING AND WILL PROVIDE  
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE SHORTLY, INCLUDING GUIDANCE ON THE  
CONCEPT OF ELIMINATING ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES  
AND ITS LINK TO OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE ABM  
TREATY. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE (REFTEL) REMAINS VALID EXCEPT  
AS MODIFIED BELOW. GUIDANCE FOR EACH OF THE THREE  
NEGOTIATING GROUPS IS BEING PROVIDED SEPT.

3. U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR THE REMAINDER OF ROUND VI  
INCLUDE:

-- TO BUILD UPON THE POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF  
REYKJAVIK BY INDUCING THE SOVIETS TO CONTINUE THE  
SERIOUSNESS AND FLEXIBILITY DISPLAYED THERE.

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-- TO PRESENT U.S. PROPOSALS FOR AMPLIFYING THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED IN REYKJAVIK, AS SET FORTH IN THE INSTRUCTIONS TO EACH NEGOTIATING GROUP.

-- TO REJECT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO MISCHARACTERIZE THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED IN REYKJAVIK.

-- TO REJECT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO HOLD PROGRESS IN ONE NEGOTIATING FORUM HOSTAGE TO PROGRESS IN ANOTHER. DELEGATION SHOULD VIGOROUSLY OBJECT TO ANY SOVIET CHARACTERIZATION THAT PROGRESS IN INF IS ONCE AGAIN LINKED TO PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS, NOTING THAT THIS CONTRADICTS SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDING REACHED DURING GENEVA SUMMIT TO SEEK A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT AND TO ACCELERATE PROGRESS IN AREAS OF COMMON GROUND.

4. SHOULD SOVIETS RAISE ISSUE OF ELIMINATION OF ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES BY 1996, AS PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT IN REYKJAVIK, DELEGATION SHOULD NOTE THAT THE FIRST STEP IN THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES MUST BE THE 50-PERCENT START REDUCTIONS AND SIGNIFICANT INF REDUCTIONS DISCUSSED IN REYKJAVIK AND THAT IT IS MORE EFFICIENT TO DISCUSS THESE STEPS FIRST. (FYI: WASHINGTON ANTICIPATES REPLACING THIS GUIDANCE WITH DETAILED GUIDANCE ON BALLISTIC MISSILE ELIMINATION BY 27 OCTOBER.)

5. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE OTHER, NON-NST ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, THE DELEGATION SHOULD RESPOND THAT THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE PURSUED IN THE APPROPRIATE FORA, NOT NST. SHOULD THE SOVIETS SPECIFICALLY LINK NUCLEAR TESTING AND PROGRESS IN NST, AS SUGGESTED BY GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV IN REYKJAVIK, DELEGATION SHOULD REPLY THAT THE

UNITED STATES EXPRESSED ITS READINESS IN REYKJAVIK TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUES AND THAT SPECIFIC SOVIET RECOMMENDATIONS SHOULD BE RAISED IN THE APPROPRIATE CHANNELS. THE DELEGATION SHOULD RESIST ANY FURTHER SOVIET EFFORTS TO DISCUSS LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE NST FORUM. SHULTZ

\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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ATTACHMENT 2

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APPROVED START INSTRUCTIONS

OP IMMED  
DE RUEHC #0273 2950318  
O 220312Z OCT 86  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL NST GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000  
S E C R E T STATE 290210

EXDIS, USSTART

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR  
TAGS: PARM, START, MCAP, NS  
SUBJECT: (S) ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR START INITIATING  
GROUP

REF: (A) STATE 291634 (B) STATE 290210

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IS ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE START

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NEGOTIATING GROUP IN ROUND I, REFLECTING DISCUSSIONS IN OCTOBER 11-12 REYKJAVIK MEETING. WASHINGTON CONTINUES TO EVALUATE HOW BEST TO BUILD UPON POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THAT MEETING AND WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE SHORTLY, INCLUDING GUIDANCE ON

TIMEFRAME FOR 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS AND ON THE CONCEPT OF ELIMINATING ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES.

3. IT IS THE U.S. UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FOLLOWING WAS AGREED AND, THEREFORE, U.S. START NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD CONFIRM THEIR ACCEPTANCE BY THE SOVIETS:

-- A 1600 CEILING ON ICBMS, SLBMS, HEAVY BOMBERS;

-- A 6000 CEILING ON WARHEADS, TO INCLUDE ICBM WARHEADS, SLBM WARHEADS, AND LONG-RANGE ALCMS.

-- ALL HEAVY BOMBERS COUNT AGAINST THE SNDV LIMIT. EACH HEAVY BOMBER CARRYING GRAVITY BOMBS OR SRAMS WOULD COUNT AS ONE WARHEAD TOWARD THE LIMIT OF 6000. EACH ALCM CARRIED BY HEAVY BOMBERS WOULD COUNT AS ONE WARHEAD. (FYI: AS PART OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE PROVISIONS, ACCOUNTING RULES FOR IMPLEMENTING THEM WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT, AND WASHINGTON INVITES DELEGATION'S VIEWS ON SUCH RULES.)

-- CONSIDERATION OF APPROPRIATE SUBLIMITS SHOULD CONTINUE.

-- HEAVY ICBMS WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED.

-- THE SIDES SHALL FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO LIMITING DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS. WHEN SUCH A SOLUTION IS FOUND, IT WILL NOT INVOLVE COUNTING LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS WITHIN THE 6000/1600 LIMITS. IN THIS REGARD, THE DELEGATION SHOULD SEEK OUT DETAILS, ESPECIALLY DETAILS RELATING TO VERIFICATION, OF THE SOVIET POSITION THAT WOULD ATTEMPT TO MEET U.S. CONCERNS.

4. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ABOVE AGREEMENT ON COUNTING GRAVITY BOMBS AND SRAMS, THE PREVIOUS U.S. PROPOSAL TO LIMIT HEAVY BOMBERS TO 150 IS REDUNDANT AND IS NO LONGER A PART OF OUR POSITION.

5. AT REYKJAVIK, THE SIDES UNDERSTOOD THAT OTHER PROVISIONS WOULD HAVE BEEN ADDED TO WHAT WAS AGREED IN ORDER TO MAKE A COMPLETE AGREEMENT. A NUMBER OF SUBLIMITS WERE DISCUSSED BUT NOT AGREED; IT WAS AGREED THE CONSIDERATION OF SUBLIMITS COULD CONTINUE. THE U.S. START NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD PROPOSE THAT THERE BE SUBLIMITS ON:

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-- BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS;

-- ICBM WARHEADS;

-- WARHEADS ON ALL PERMITTED ICBMS EXCEPT THOSE ON SILO-BASED LIGHT AND MEDIUM ICBMS WITH SIX OR FEWER WARHEADS;

-- WHILE THE PREFERRED NUMBERS FOR THESE SUBLIMITS REMAIN 4500, 3000, AND 1500 RESPECTIVELY, THE US START NEGOTIATING GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO PROPOSE SUBLIMITS OF

4800 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS, 3300 ICBM WARHEADS, AND 1650 WARHEADS ON ICBMS EXCEPT SILO-BASED LIGHT OR MEDIUM ICBMS WITH SIX OR FEWER WARHEADS. (NOTE: THIS PROPOSAL

RESULTS IN NO RPT NO SUBLIMIT ON ALCMS.)

-- THE AFOREMENTIONED SUBLIMITS ARE THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR IMPLEMENTING THE SOVIET OFFER IN REYKJAVIK THAT HEAVY ICBMS BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. THE U.S. SIDE ANTICIPATES THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WILL REDUCE HEAVY ICBMS SIGNIFICANTLY (E.G., BY ROUGHLY HALF) IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER.

-- ALL OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE 50-PERCENT U.S. START PROPOSAL REMAIN THE SAME (E.G., THE BAN ON MOBILE ICBMS AND THE 50-PERCENT LIMITATION IN BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT).

6. THE OCTOBER 15 SOVIET BINARY STATEMENT CITED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN TOTAL SNDVS AND WEAPONS AS WELL AS IN EACH CATEGORY OF STRATEGIC SYSTEM (I.E., ICBMS, SLBMs, AND HEAVY BOMBS) WHICH WAS PRESENTED IN REYKJAVIK AND REJECTED BY THE U.S.. SHOULD THIS FORMULATION BE TABLED IN GENEVA, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD REJECT THE PROPOSAL AS FOLLOWS:

-- IN REYKJAVIK THE SIDES AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, SPECIFICALLY TO 1600 SNDVS AND 6000 WARHEADS APPROPRIATELY APPLIED. CERTAIN OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INITIAL SOVIET FORMULATION PROPOSED IN REYKJAVIK WERE DETERMINED BY THE U.S. AT THE TIME TO RESULT IN AN INEQUITABLE OUTCOME AND THEREFORE WERE REJECTED. THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS BUILDS ON THOSE ELEMENTS MUTUALLY AGREED AT REYKJAVIK AND PROVIDES FOR AN AGREED EQUITABLE OUTCOME.

7. EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION IS ESSENTIAL TO BOTH SIDES. AS AGREED AT GENEVA LAST YEAR, VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED CONCURRENTLY WITH REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS. THE TWO SIDES SHOULD SEEK TO APPLY PROGRESS MADE IN INF WITH RESPECT TO VERIFICATION PRINCIPLES (SEE INF INSURANCE, PARA 4) TO THE

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NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

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8. EXCEPT AS MODIFIED ABOVE, PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED.

9. PARAGRAPH 9A CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE INITIAL SOVIET PROPOSAL MADE IN REYNOLDS VIK THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 11. PARAGRAPH 9B CONTAINS THE LANGUAGE AGREED TO BY THE U.S.-SOVIET EXPERTS GROUP DURING THE EARLY MORNING OF 12 OCTOBER. BOTH ARE PROVIDED ONLY FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUP.

-- A. INITIAL SOVIET PROPOSAL, AM OCTOBER 11. ON STRATEGIC ARMS. AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE BY FIFTY PERCENT

THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE USSR AND THE USA TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE HISTORICALLY FORMED DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE STRUCTURES OF THE PARTIES' STRATEGIC FORCES. WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, REDUCTIONS SHALL APPLY TO ALL TYPES OF OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC ARMS, INCLUDING HEAVY MISSILES. A SOLUTION SHALL ALSO BE FOUND WITH REGARD TO LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES.

ON ALL MATTERS RELATING TO THE PROBLEM OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THE PARTIES WILL NEGOTIATE HAVING REGARD FOR THEIR MUTUAL INTERESTS AND CONCERNS AND DISPLAYING A POLITICAL WILL TO REACH AGREEMENT.

-- B. EXPERTS GROUP AGREED LANGUAGE, EARLY AM OCTOBER

12. ON STRATEGIC ARMS. AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO REDUCE BY FIFTY PERCENT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO AN EQUAL NUMBER OF ICBMS, SLBMS AND HEAVY BOMBERS (APPROXIMATELY 1600) AND WARHEADS (NOT MORE THAN 6000), TAKING INTO ACCOUNT HISTORICALLY FORMED DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE STRUCTURES OF THE PARTIES' STRATEGIC FORCES. WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, REDUCTIONS SHALL APPLY TO ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, INCLUDING A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF HEAVY MISSILES. A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION SHALL ALSO BE FOUND TO LIMITING DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR-ARMED SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES.

ON ALL MATTERS RELATING TO THE PROBLEM OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THE PARTIES WILL NEGOTIATE HAVING REGARD FOR THEIR MUTUAL INTERESTS AND CONCERNS, AND DISPLAYING A POLITICAL WILL TO REACH AGREEMENT. T2  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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**APPROVED DEFENSE AND SPACE INSTRUCTIONS**

OP IMMED  
DE RUEHC #0272 295031  
O 220311Z OCT 86  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL NST GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000  
S E C R E T STATE 330222

EXDIS, USDST

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR  
TAGS: PARM, MCAF, TSPA, NST, DST  
SUBJECT: (S) ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR DEFENSE AND SPACE  
NEGOTIATING GROUP

REF: (A) STATE 291909; (B) STATE 29566

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE DEFENSE AND  
SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP FOR ROUND VI, BASED ON US  
PROPOSALS MADE TO THE SOVIET UNION IN ICELAND MEETING

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BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV ON OCTOBER 11-12. THIS GUIDANCE IS IN ADDITION TO, AND DOES NOT REPLACE GUIDANCE FOR, D&S NEGOTIATING GROUP OF REFTELS (A) AND (B) AND PREVIOUS ROUNDS EXCEPT AS SPECIFICALLY NOTED BELOW.

3. THE EXISTING US PROPOSAL AS CONTAINED IN PREVIOUS GUIDANCE AND IN THE PRESIDENT'S JULY 25 LETTER TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV REMAINS ON THE TABLE.

4. PARAGRAPH (4A) CONTAINS THE INITIAL SOVIET PROPOSAL MADE IN REYKJAVIK ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE DISCUSSIONS. PARAGRAPH (4B) PROVIDES THE TEXT OF THE FIRST US ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV IN REYKJAVIK ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE SECOND DAY OF DISCUSSIONS. PARAGRAPH (4C) PROVIDES THE TEXT OF THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL MADE THAT SAME AFTERNOON. PARAGRAPH (4D) PROVIDES THE TEXT OF THE SECOND AND LAST US ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL MADE IN WRITING BY THE PRESIDENT. THESE ARE PROVIDED FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUP.

A. SOVIET PROPOSAL, AUGUST 11. FOR THE PURPOSE OF STRENGTHENING THE REGIME OF THE 1972 TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS, WHICH IS OF UNLIMITED DURATION, AN UNDERSTANDING SHALL BE REACHED THAT THE USSR AND THE USA UNDERTAKE NOT TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THAT TREATY FOR A PERIOD OF TEN YEARS, AND TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH ALL ITS PROVISIONS THROUGHOUT THAT PERIOD. TESTING IN SPACE OF ALL MISSILE-DEFENSE SPACE ELEMENTS SHALL BE PROHIBITED EXCEPT FOR RESEARCH AND TESTING CARRIED OUT IN LABORATORIES. THIS WOULD NOT ENTAIL A BAN ON THE TESTING OF SUCH FIXED LAND-BASED SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS AS ARE ALLOWED UNDER THE ABM TREATY. SUBSEQUENTLY, WITHIN SEVERAL YEARS, THE PARTIES SHALL NEGOTIATE FURTHER MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS IN THIS AREA. THE PARTIES DEEM IT APPROPRIATE TO UNDERTAKE ADDITIONAL EFFORTS WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS BANNING ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS.

B. FIRST US PROPOSAL, SEPTEMBER 12. BOTH SIDES WOULD AGREE TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING, WHICH IS PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY, FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS THROUGH 1991, DURING WHICH TIME A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS WOULD BE ACHIEVED. THIS BEING DONE, BOTH SIDES WOULD CONTINUE THE PACE OF REDUCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ALL REMAINING OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH THE GOAL OF THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES BY THE END OF THE SECOND FIVE YEAR PERIOD. AS LONG AS THESE REDUCTIONS CONTINUE AT THE APPROPRIATE PACE, THE SAME RESTRICTIONS WILL CONTINUE TO APPLY. AT THE END OF TEN

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YEAR PERIOD, WITH ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES ELIMINATED, EITHER SIDE WOULD BE FREE TO DEPLOY DEFENSES.

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C. SOVIET PROPOSAL. PM OCTOBER 12. THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD UNDERTAKE FOR TEN YEARS NOT TO EXERCISE THEIR EXISTING RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY, WHICH IS OF UNLIMITED DURATION, AND DURING THAT PERIOD STRICTLY TO OBSERVE ALL ITS PROVISIONS. THE TESTING IN SPACE OF ALL SPACE COMPONENTS OF MISSILE

DEFENSE IS PROHIBITED, BUT RESEARCH AND TESTING CONDUCTED IN LABORATORIES. WITHIN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS

OF THE TEN-YEAR PERIOD (AND THUS THROUGH 1991), THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE TWO SIDES SHALL BE REDUCED BY 50 PERCENT. DURING THE FOLLOWING FIVE YEARS OF THAT PERIOD, THE REMAINING 50 PERCENT OF THE TWO SIDES' STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SHALL BE REDUCED. THUS BY THE END OF 1996, THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE BEEN TOTALLY ELIMINATED.

D. SECOND US PROPOSAL. PM OCTOBER 12. THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES UNDERTAKE FOR TEN YEARS NOT TO EXERCISE THEIR EXISTING RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY, WHICH IS OF UNLIMITED DURATION, AND DURING THAT PERIOD STRICTLY TO OBSERVE ALL ITS PROVISIONS. THE CONTINUING RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING, WHICH ARE PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY. WITHIN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF THE TEN-YEAR PERIOD (AND THUS THROUGH 1991), THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE TWO SIDES SHALL BE REDUCED BY 50 PERCENT. DURING THE FOLLOWING FIVE YEARS OF THAT PERIOD, ALL REMAINING OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE TWO SIDES SHALL BE REDUCED. THUS BY THE END OF 1996, ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE BEEN TOTALLY ELIMINATED. AT THE END OF THE TEN-YEAR PERIOD, EITHER SIDE COULD DEPLOY DEFENSES IF IT SO CHOSE UNLESS THE PARTIES AGREE OTHERWISE.

5. GUIDANCE ON THE US PROPOSALS MADE AT REYKJAVIK IS UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON, INCLUDING ADDITIONAL ANALYTICAL WORK. IN THE INTERIM, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD AVOID DISCUSSION OF THE SPECIFICS OF EITHER OF THE US PROPOSALS.

6. IF QUESTIONED ABOUT THE US PROPOSALS MADE IN REYKJAVIK, THE US NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD RESPOND THAT THE US INTENDS TO BUILD UPON THE POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE REYKJAVIK MEETING, AND THAT THE US WILL BE MAKING A PROPOSAL IN GENEVA BASED ON THESE ACCOMPLISHMENTS SHORTLY. IT WAS ASKED WHETHER THE

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ADDITIONAL COMMITMENTS SUGGESTED IN THE PROPOSALS  
DISCUSSED IN REYKJAVIK DEPEND UPON OTHER CONDITIONS, THE  
NEGOTIATING GROUP WOULD NOTE THAT IN REYKJAVIK IT WAS  
CLEAR BY THE TERMS OF THE PROPOSALS MADE THAT THE  
ADDITIONAL COMMITMENTS INCLUDED IN THE PROPOSALS TABLED  
BY THE US WERE STRICTLY CONDITIONED ON THE TWO SIDES'  
REACHING A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT NOW ON A

SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS RESULTING IN 50 PERCENT  
REDUCTIONS IN THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCE BOTH  
SIDES TO EQUAL LEVELS BY 1991 AND TOTAL ELIMINATION OF  
THE OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF BOTH SIDES BY 1996. SHULTZ  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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ATTACHMENT 4

APPROVED INF INSTRUCTIONS

OP IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #1883 2961347  
O 231335Z OCT 86 ZFFA  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL NST GENEVA T IMMEDIATE OOC ACT IMMEDIATE  
SECRET STATE 3318 3

EXDIS US INFDEL GENEVA

CORRECTED COPY (PARA 5 SUB PARA 5 LINE 1 MISSING)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, NST, INF

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP

A) STATE 290224 (B) STATE 12553

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1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP IN ROUND VI, REFLECTING DISCUSSIONS IN OCTOBER 11-12 REYKJAVIK MEETING. WASHINGTON CONTINUES TO

EVALUATE HOW BEST TO BUILD UPON POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THAT MEETING AND WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE SHORTLY, INCLUDING GUIDANCE ON THE CONCEPT OF ELIMINATING ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE (REF A) REMAINS VALID EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW

3. AGREED APPROACH. BASED ON REYKJAVIK DISCUSSION, THE U.S. IS READY TO ACCEPT--AND WE UNDERSTAND THE SOVIETS CAN ACCEPT--AN LRINF CEILING OF 100 WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE, MADE UP OF ZERO WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE IN EUROPE AND 100 WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE OUTSIDE OF EUROPE IN SOVIET ASIA ON THE SOVIET SIDE, AND IN THE U.S. ON THE U.S. SIDE. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD CONFIRM SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THIS APPROACH.

4. THE U.S. BELIEVES--AND UNDERSTANDS THAT THE SOVIETS ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE--THAT IN ANY INF AGREEMENT THERE SHOULD BE SPECIFIC VERIFICATION MEASURES WHICH INCLUDE: (1) A COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE EXCHANGE OF DATA, BOTH PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS AND THEREAFTER; (2) ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF ELIMINATION DOWN TO AGREED LEVELS; AND (3) EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF THE REMAINING INF INVENTORIES AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE ON THE SPECIFICS OF INF VERIFICATION CONTINUES TO APPLY.

5. ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS. REYKJAVIK, THE U.S. UNDERSTOOD THAT OTHER PROVISIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDED TO WHAT WAS AGREED IN ORDER TO MAKE A COMPLETE AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE U.S. PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING:

- -- REDUCTIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE APPROACH IN PARA 3 WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A PHASED MANNER TO BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO THE END OF 1991.

- -- PREVIOUS GUIDANCE ON THE WESTERN BOUNDARIES OF SOVIET ASIA (REF B) CONTINUES TO APPLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE APPROACH IN PARA 3

- -- THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT TO RESTRICT THE 10 RESIDUAL SOVIET WARHEADS ON 33 SS-20 MISSILES ALLOWED UNDER PARA 3 ABOVE TO KANSK OR BARNAUL, PREFERABLY KANSK. IN PURSUING THIS EFFORT, HOWEVER, GROUP MAY NOT OFFER RECIPROCAL U.S. LIMITATIONS INVOLVING NON-DEPLOYMENT IN ALASKA. PREVIOUS CONTINGENCY AUTHORIZATION TO USE ALASKAN-NON-DEPLOYMENT (PARA 10, REF A) IS WITHDRAWN.

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- -- AN INF AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE AS WELL GLOBAL CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF MISSILES AS PREVIOUSLY TABLED (REF. B) NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS IN SRINF MISSILES WILL BEGIN WITHIN SIX MONTHS AFTER AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT IS REACHED.

- -- THE U.S. CONTINUES TO REQUIRE THAT ANY INTERIM INF AGREEMENT BE OF INDEFINITE DURATION, UNTIL REPLACED BY AN AGREEMENT ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS; NEGOTIATIONS ON

SUCH A FURTHER AGREEMENT WOULD BE PROVIDED FOR AS PART OF ANY INTERIM AGREEMENT.

6. THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD STRESS THAT THE U.S. PROCEEDS ON THE PREMISE THAT AN INF AGREEMENT CAN BE

NEGOTIATED, CONCLUDED AND IMPLEMENTED SEPARATELY FROM DEFENSE AND SPACE AND START ISSUES AND THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT ACCEPT ANY CONTRARY PREMISE FOR PROCEEDING TOWARD AN INF AGREEMENT.

7. PARAGRAPH 7A CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE INITIAL SOVIET INF PROPOSAL MADE IN REKJAVIK THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 11. PARAGRAPH 7B CONTAINS THE U.S. COUNTERPROPOSAL TABLED AT THE U.S.-SOVIET EXPERTS GROUP MEETING DURING THE EARLY MORNING OF 12 OCTOBER. THERE WAS NO FINAL AGREEMENT TO THIS LANGUAGE. BOTH AS OF LANGUAGE ARE PROVIDED FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUP ONLY.

A. SOVIET PROPOSAL, AM OCTOBER 11. ON MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES. AN AGREEMENT ON THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF SOVIET AND U.S. MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE. THE NUCLEAR POTENTIALS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE NOT TO BE AFFECTED OR TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. NEGOTIATIONS SHALL BE INITIATED ON THE PARTIES' MISSILES WITH RANGES BELOW 1,000 KILOMETERS.

SEPARATELY, AND AS EARLY AS PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE, NEGOTIATIONS SHALL BE INITIATED ON SOVIET AND U.S. MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS IN ASIA.

B. U.S. LANGUAGE TABLED AT EXPERTS GROUP, PM OCTOBER 11. THE SIDES AGREE:

-- THAT SINCE THERE DOES NOT YET EXIST AGREEMENT ON THE PROPER TREATMENT OF INF MISSILE SYSTEMS IN ASIA, THE RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE SHALL BE FOUND ON A PRIORITY BASIS.

THERE WILL BE LIMITS AND CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF MISSILES TO THE CURRENT SOVIET LEVEL, WHICH WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CAPABILITIES OF THESE SYSTEMS AND REFLECT EQUALITY BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION.

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-- THERE WILL BE SPECIFIC VERIFICATION MEASURES WHICH INCLUDE: (1) A COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE EXCHANGE OF DATA, BOTH PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS AND THEREAFTER; (2) ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF DESTRUCTION DOWN TO AGREED LEVELS; AND (3) EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF THE REMAINING LAUNCH INVENTORIES AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION.

-- U.S. AND SOVIET INFILTRABLE MISSILE SYSTEMS WILL REMAIN SUBJECT TO AND CONSTRAINED BY THIS AGREEMENT UNTIL THE SIDES NEGOTIATE FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THESE

SYSTEMS. SHULTZ  
\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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SYSTEM II  
90744  
ATTACHMENT 5

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR NST DELEGATION  
TAGS: PARM, NST  
REFS: (A) STATE 33027 (B) STATE 29163

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. REFTEL A PROVIDED INITIAL POST-REYKJAVIK GUIDANCE FOR THE NST DELEGATION FOR ROUND VI, REFLECTING DISCUSSIONS IN OCTOBER 11-12 REYKJAVIK MEETING. THIS CABLE PROVIDES ADDITIONAL CONTINGENCY GUIDANCE ON RELATIONSHIP OF SNF TO THE CONCEPT OF ELIMINATING ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE (REFS A AND B) REMAINS VALID EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW. GUIDANCE FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP IS BEING PROVIDED SEPTEL. THERE WILL BE NO ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR START AND INF NEGOTIATING GROUPS THIS ROUND.

3. THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES, OF WHATEVER RANGE, INVOLVES SNF SYSTEMS OF RANGES LESS THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS. DISCUSSION OF SUCH SYSTEMS MAY REQUIRE AGREEMENT ON AN APPROPRIATE NEGOTIATING FORUM. ONLY THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF ELIMINATING ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES SHOULD BE INTRODUCED THIS ROUND. SHOULD THE SOVIETS RAISE QUESTIONS OF NEGOTIATING FORUM FOR SNF MISSILES IN THIS REGARD, DELEGATION SHOULD NOTE THAT AT THIS TIME IT IS THE U.S. OPINION THAT THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY PROVIDE THE MOST LOGICAL FORUM.

4. ONCE DELEGATION HAS REVIEWED THESE INSTRUCTIONS AND SUPPORTING INSTRUCTIONS TO INDIVIDUAL NEGOTIATING GROUPS, WASHINGTON WOULD WELCOME DELEGATION'S VIEWS ON APPROPRIATE ENDING DATE FOR CURRENT NEGOTIATING ROUND.

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90744  
ATTACHMENT 6

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE  
NEGOTIATING GROUP  
TAGS: PARM, MCAP, TSP, DST  
REF: (A) STATE 29190; (B) STATE 93566 (C) STATE 330272

1. SECRET -- ENCL RE EXT

2. FOLLOWING IS ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP FOR ROUND VI. IT SUPPLEMENTS THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN REF C. THIS GUIDANCE IS IN ADDITION TO, AND DOES NOT REPLACE GUIDANCE FOR US NEGOTIATING GROUP OF REFTELS (A), (B) AND (C) EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW. THERE WILL BE NO ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR START AND END NEGOTIATING THIS ROUND.

3. IN ADDITION TO THE EXISTING PROPOSAL IN THE PRESIDENT'S JULY 25 LETTER TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV, WHICH REMAINS ON THE TABLE, THE US NEGOTIATING GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO PRESENT THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS FOR AN AGREEMENT WHICH WE PROPOSED IN REYKJAVIK AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE PRESIDENT'S JULY PROPOSAL.

-- THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD UNDERTAKE FOR TEN YEARS NOT TO EXERCISE THEIR EXISTING RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY, WHICH IS OF UNLIMITED DURATION, AND DURING THAT PERIOD STRICTLY TO OBSERVE ALL ITS PROVISIONS WHILE CONTINUING RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING, WHICH ARE PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY.

-- WITHIN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF THE TEN-YEAR PERIOD (AND THUS THROUGH 1991), THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE TWO SIDES SHALL BE REDUCED BY 50 PERCENT.

-- DURING THE FOLLOWING FIVE YEARS OF THAT PERIOD, THE REMAINING OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE TWO SIDES SHALL BE ELIMINATED.

-- THUS, BY THE END OF 1996, ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE BEEN TOTALLY ELIMINATED, AND EITHER SIDE COULD DEPLOY ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES IF IT SO CHOSE, UNLESS THE PARTIES AGREE OTHERWISE.

4. THE ABOVE UNDERTAKINGS WOULD BE RECORDED IN A NEW TREATY.

5. IN PRESENTING THE ABOVE PROPOSAL, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE ABOVE COMMITMENT WOULD BE STRICTLY CONDITIONED ON THE TWO SIDES' REACHING A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT NOW, AS PART OF A NEW TREATY, ON A SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS RESULTING IN 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES OF BOTH SIDES TO EQUAL LEVELS BY 1991 AND TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THE OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF BOTH SIDES BY 1996.

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6. WHEN PRESENTING THE POSITION DESCRIBED IN PARA 3-5, THE US NEGOTIATOR SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IN NOT EXERCISING ITS RIGHTS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY, NEITHER SIDE WOULD BE FORFEITING ITS RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FOR REASONS OF ITS SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST, OR TO RESPOND TO A MATERIAL BREACH OR OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES RECOGNIZED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. HE SHOULD INDICATE THAT:

-- A BLANKET COMMITMENT TO WAIVE ALL RIGHTS OF WITHDRAWAL IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.

-- THE US IS PREPARED TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS THROUGH A MORE LIMITED COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW FOR THE PURPOSES OF DEPLOYING ADVANCED DEFENSES.

-- NEW CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED AND AGREED AS PART OF THE PROPOSED TREATY DESCRIBED IN PARA 4 AND 5 ABOVE. WE WOULD EXPECT SUCH CONDITIONS TO INCLUDE A MATERIAL BREACH OF THAT TREATY OR LINKED AGREEMENTS (E.G., FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THE SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS PROVIDED IN AN ASSOCIATED START TREATY).

-- IF THE SOVIETS HAVE OTHER CONCERNS WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEM.

7. IF THE SOVIETS QUESTION THE USE OF THE LANGUAGE IN THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL (I.E., "UNDERTAKES FOR TEN YEARS NOT TO EXERCISE THEIR EXISTING RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY") THE NEGOTIATOR SHOULD NOT THAT THE PRESIDENT ANTICIPATED OUR FINDING A SOLUTION WITH RESPECT TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PHRASE LOG THAT ACCEPTABLY ACCOMMODATED BOTH US AND SOVIET CONCERNS.

*Ronald Reagan*

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