INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH NST NEGOTIATING ROUND

The attached instructions provide guidance for the seventh round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) which begins on January 15, 1987, in Geneva. They provide guidance for the Negotiating Group to use in building on the proposals made during my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. (S)

Attachments
1. Overall Instructions (S)
2. START Instructions (S)
3. INF Instructions (S)
4. Defense and Space Instructions (S)

Declassified/Released on 7/27/92
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by J. Saunders, National Security Council
E.O. 12356:

TAGS:

SUBJECT: {S} OVERALL INSTRUCTIONS FOR ROUND VII OF US/soviet nuclear and space arms talks

REF: {A} PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO US NEGOTIATORS FOR DECEMBER 2-5 MEETING WITH SOVIET COUNCIL ; {B} STATE 336325 ; {C} STATE 330271 ; {D} STATE 291634

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR US DELEGATION FOR THE SEVENTH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION BEGINNING ON JANUARY 15, 1987. GUIDANCE FROM PREVIOUS ROUNDS AND SPECIAL DECEMBER MEETING REMAIN IN EFFECT, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FOR EACH OF THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS IS BEING PROVIDED SEPARATELY.

3. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES FOR ROUND VII INCLUDE:

- CONTINUE TO SEEK PROMPT AND FORTHRIGHT SOVIET RESPONSES TO NEEDFUL PROPOSALS AS SET FORTH IN APPLICABLE INSTRUCTIONS FOR US DELEGATION AND EACH OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUPS AND PRESENTED IN ROUND VI AND AT
DECEMBER LIMITED COMPOSITION MEETINGS: U.S. DELEGATION SHOULD EMPHASIZE, AS APPROPRIATE, THAT OUR PROPOSALS REPRESENT US EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH AREAS OF CONVERGENCE AND REACH AGREEMENT BASED ON REYKJAVIK, TO RESPOND TO EXPRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS, TO LAY OUT OUR ULTIMATE GOAL AND TO IDENTIFY PRACTICAL EARLY-TERM STEPS TO ACHIEVE THOSE OBJECTIVES.

--CONTINUE TO SEEK AGREEMENT TO THE TEXT OF DOCUMENTS REFLECTED IN THE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS FOR ROUND VII.

--REJECT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO HOLD PROGRESS IN ONE NEGOTIATING FORUM HOSTAGE TO PROGRESS IN ANOTHER, WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, MAKING CLEAR THOSE AREAS WHERE, IN THE US VIEW, SUBSTANTIVE INTERRELATIONSHIPS EXIST. IN PARTICULAR, DELEGATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO REBUT SOVIET EFFORTS TO MISCHARACTERIZE THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED AT REYKJAVIK, TO LINK PROGRESS IN INF TO PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS, OR TO PORTRAY SUCH AS AN OBSTACLE TO ARMS CONTROL.

--IN COUNTERING POSSIBLE SOVIET ALLEGATIONS THAT THE US AGREED TO ELIMINATE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN TEN YEARS AND SOVIET INSISTENCE ON REDUCTION OF THIS ISSUE AS A THRESHOLD MATTER, POINT OUT THAT ACHIEVING 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN START AND SIGNIFICANT INF REDUCTIONS AS AGREED IN REYKJAVIK ARE VITAL FIRST STEPS IN A PROCESS LEADING TO THE ELIMINATION OF OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES AND FIRE AREAS WHERE CONSIDERABLE COMMON GROUND EXISTS, BUT, THUS, SHOULD BE FOCUS OF CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS.

4. IN ELABORATING ON US PROPOSALS, DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT MEASURES FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION CONFORMING TO THE THREE PRINCIPLES AGREED AT REYKJAVIK MUST BE ADDRESSED AND AGREED CONCURRENTLY WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.

5. IF SOVIETS RAISE OTHER, NON-NST ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, DELEGATION SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE PURSUED IN THE APPROPRIATE FORA, NOT IN IT. IF SOVIETS SPECIFICALLY LINK NUCLEAR TESTING AND NST, DELEGATION SHOULD RESPOND PER PARA 5 OF REC.
6. THE DELEGATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, NOTING OBSTACLES PLACE IN THE PATH OF ACHIEVING ARMS REDUCTIONS BY SOME NONCOMPLIANCE. THE SOVIETS RAISE MATTER OF US EXCEEDING SALT LIMITS. DELEGATION SHOULD UNDERSCORE THAT US POLICY DECISIONS ON THE SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT AND SALT II IN LARGE PART RESULTED FROM SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THESE AGREEMENTS. THE DELEGATION SHOULD STRESS THAT THESE AGREEMENTS ARE BEHIND US, BOTH AS A MATTER OF LEGAL OBLIGATION AND AS A MATTER OF POLICY COMMITMENT. THE US HAS MADE A STANDING OFFER OF ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. OUR FOCUS, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE ON PROGRESS IN NST TOWARD EARLY AGREEMENT ON RADICAL AND STABILIZING REDUCTIONS IN THE OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.
SUBJECT: [S] INSTRUCTIONS FOR START NEGOTIATING GROUP

REFERENCES: {A} 86 STATE 33023; {B} 86 STATE 25830; {C} 86 STATE 138816; {D} 86 STATE 57773; {E} 86 STATE 2554; {F} 85 STATE 288129; {G} 85 STATE 162424; {H} 85 STATE 72684

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR ROUND VII. EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW, PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED.

3. OVERALL OBJECTIVE. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP'S OBJECTIVE REMAINS AN EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE, AND STABILIZING AGREEMENT DEEPLY REDUCING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP'S CHIEF OBJECTIVE FOR ROUND VII IS TO SEEK AGREEMENT TO A BASIC FRAMEWORK, INCLUDING NUMERICAL SUBLIMITS. TO AID THAT PROCESS, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT IN ROUND VII TO KEY ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT FOR REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AS DETAILED BELOW, BASED ON THE AREAS MUTUALLY AGREED TO DURING THE REYKJAVIK MEETING AND THE ADDITIONAL U.S. ELEMENTS TABLED DURING ROUND VI.
4. **KEY ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT.** The negotiating group is authorized to table early in round 11 the following U.S. proposal for key elements of an agreement.

**BEGIN TEXT OF KEY ELEMENTS:**

**KEY ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT FOR REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS**

**REDUCTIONS**

The sides shall reduce their strategic offensive arms as follows:

**1600 SNV/COMPOSITION OF FORCES**

-- The sides shall reduce the aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and heavy bombers to a level not to exceed 1600. There shall be constraints on non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs.

**6000 WARHEADS**

-- The sides shall reduce the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and heavy bombers to a level not to exceed 6000. For the purposes of counting warheads pursuant to this limit, each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs or short-range attack missiles shall count as one warhead and each long-range ALCM carried by a heavy bomber shall count as one warhead.

**SUBLIMITS**

-- There shall be sublimits not to exceed 4800 ballistic missile warheads, 3300 ICBM warheads, and 1650 warheads on permitted ICBMs, except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads.

**MOBILE ICBMS**

-- Mobile ICBMs shall be banned.

**THROW-WEIGHT REDUCTIONS**

-- Strategic ballistic missile throw-weight shall be reduced by 50 percent from the highest of the two sides'
LEVELS. THIS THRU-WEIGHT REDUCTION SHALL BE CODIFIED THROUGH DIRECT OR INDIRECT LIMITS.

VERIFICATION

-- THE SIDES IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATING A TREATY TO CODIFY THE ABOVE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS SHALL CONCURRENTLY NEGOTIATE MEASURES WHICH PERMIT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED. SPECIFIC VERIFICATION MEASURES SHALL INCLUDE ALONG ALIA:

1. AN EXCHANGE OF COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE DATA, BOTH PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS AND THEREAFTER;
2. ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF ELIMINATION DOWN TO AGREED LEVELS;
3. EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF THE REMAINING INVENTORIES AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION, AND;
4. NON-INTERFERENCE WITH ARM AND OTHER AGREED MEASURES.

SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS

-- THESE REDUCTIONS WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN A PHASED MANNER AND COMPLETED BY THE END OF 1986.

SLCMS

-- THE SIDES SHALL FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF LIMITING DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE, NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS. WHEN SUCH A SOLUTION IS FOUND, IT WILL NOT INVOLVE COUNTING LONG-RANGE, NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS WITHIN THE 6000 WARHEAD AND 1600 SNDV LIMITS.

END TEXT OF KEY ELEMENTS.


7. HEAVY ICBM MODERNIZATION. ON THE QUESTION OF HEAVY ICBM MODERNIZATION, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY REITERATE THAT THE U.S. POSITION IS THAT THE SITES SHALL ESTABLISH CONSTRAINTS THAT BAN THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, FLIGHT-TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF NEW OR MODERNIZED VERSIONS OF HEAVY ICBMS AS WELL AS PROHIBIT PRODUCTION AND ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENTS OF EXISTING TYPES OF HEAVY ICBMS.
B. STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS IN SECOND FIVE YEARS. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE THIS ISSUE OF THE U.S. DEFENSE AND SPACE PROPOSAL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES BY 1994, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD STATE THAT THE START GROUP SHOULD GIVE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO THE NECESSARY FIRST STEP IN A PROCESS LEADING TO THE ELIMINATION OF OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES -- THAT IS, THE REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO 6000 WARHEADS ON 1600 SNJ>VS IN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS WHICH IS AN AREA WHERE CONSIDERABLE COMMON GROUND EXISTS.

9. MOBILE ICBMS. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD AVOID DISCUSSING RECENT U.S. DECISIONS CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. LAND-BASED MISSILE FORCES EXCEPT TO STATE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT STILL PROPOSES A BAN ON MOBILE ICBMS DUE TO VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES AND THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH DIFFICULTIES. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS OUR WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN TO THEIR PROPOSALS ON MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION WHILE NOTING THAT THEIR PROPOSALS TO DATE HAVE BEEN INADEQUATE. UNTIL AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS IS REACHED AND IMPLEMENTED, THE U.S. IS FREE TO DEPLOY AND DEPLOY ICBMS IN MOBILE BASING MODES.


-- AN EXCHANGE OF COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE DATA BOTH PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS AND THEREAFTER;
-- ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF ELIMINATION DOWN TO AGREED LEVELS (NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD PROBE FOR RATIONALE FOR THE EXCLUSION OF THIS ELEMENT FROM THE SOVIET NOVEMBER 7 PROPOSALS);
-- EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF REMAINING INVESTIGATORS AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION;
-- INTERFERENCE WITH AGREED MEASURES OR WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION WILL BE PROHIBITED, AS WILL CONCEALMENT MEASURES WHICH IMPEDICI VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT.
-- THE ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRY ON SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WILL BE ACHIEVED; AND,
- ON BOARD ENGINEERING TEST MEASUREMENTS SHALL BE MADE,
AND ALL SUCH MEASUREMENTS SHALL BE BROADCAST USING
UNENCRYPTED TELEMETRY, DURING EACH TEST FLIGHT OR
TRAINING FLIGHT OF AN ICBM OR SLBM. YY
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP, ROUND VII

REF: (A) 86 STATE 331883, (B) 86 STATE 336325, (C) 86 STATE 290224, (D) 86 STATE 138683, (E) 86 STATE 054775, (F) 86 STATE 012553, (G) 86 STATE 059027, (H) 86 NST GENEVA 10560 {INF 954}, (I) PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE LIMITED COMPOSITION MEETINGS 2-5 DEC 1986.

1. SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THERE FOLLOWS GUIDANCE TO THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP FOR ROUND VII OF THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS. PREVIOUS

Declassified/Released on 3/22/96
under provisions of E.O. 12358
by J. Saunders, National Security Council

ATTACHMENT 3

UNCLASSIFIED
GUIDANCE ON INF REMAINS UNCHANGED EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BY THESE INSTRUCTIONS.

3. AS BEGUN DURING THE LIMITED COMPOSITION MEETINGS IN DECEMBER 1986, DELEGATION SHOULD ATTACH TO DOCUMENT JOINTLY WITH THE SIDE AREAS OF THE CHART ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE AREAS OF THE CHART ON THE RUSSIAN GROUND BASED ON THE REYKJAVIK OCTOBER 11-12 MEETING AND THE RESULTING GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REFS A AND B AND I. DELEGATION SHOULD ALSO IDENTIFY CURRENT AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT INCLUDING BOTH LONG-STANDING ISSUES AND AREAS WHERE SOVIET POSITION NOW VARIES FROM WHAT WE UNDERSTOOD HAD BEEN AGREED IN REYKJAVIK. THE GOAL OF THIS EFFORT SHOULD BE TO IDENTIFY CLEARLY THOSE ELEMENTS OF A FUTURE INF AGREEMENT ON WHICH THERE IS CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THE SIDES AND THOSE REMAINING UNSOLVED ISSUES REQUIRING FURTHER CONSIDERATION.

4. ADDITIONALLY, DELEGATION SHOULD PRESS FOR SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN INF NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDING LINKAGE AND THE U.S. RIGHT TO GLOBAL EQUALITY. IN INF MISSILES. IN ADDITION, DELEGATION SHOULD PRESS SOVIETS TO ABANDON APPARENT NEW AREAS OF DIFFERENCE RAISED IN SOVIET PRESENTATION OF THEIR PROPOSAL ON NOVEMBER 7 AND ELABORATION OF IT DURING THE LIMITED COMPOSITION MEETINGS AND HENCE TO ACCEPT CONSISTENT WITH THE RESULTS AT REYKJAVIK, A SINGLE AGREEMENT FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF U.S. AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILES IN EUROPE AND THE SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTION TO 100 U.S. AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILE WARHEADS OUTSIDE OF EUROPE; GLOBAL VICE EUROPEAN ONLY CONSTRAINTS ON LRINF MISSILES; AND THE NEED FOR A VERIFICATION SYSTEM WHICH INCLUDES ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF THE PROCESS OF DISMANTLEMENT, DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT INCLUDED IN THEIR REVIEW OF AGREED VERIFICATION ELEMENTS. WHEN PRESSING SOVIETS ON THESE ISSUES, DELEGATION SHOULD NOTE SOVIET MOVEMENT FROM PREVIOUS ACCEPTABLE POSITIONS ON WHICH THE SOVIETS SHOULD NOT EXPECT U.S. CONCESSIONS FOR RETURNING.

5. IN SUPPORT OF THE BASIC APPROACH AND OBJECTIVES DESCRIBED IN REF A, A GUIDANCE, WASHINGTON IS PREPARING A DRAFT INF TREATY TEXT WHICH, THE COMPLETED AND APPROVED, SHOULD BE TAILED WHEN THE DELEGATION DEEMS IT APPROPRIATE.

6. ON THE SRINF QUESTION POSED BY DELEGATION IN REF H, DELEGATION SHOULD Sustain CURRENT APPROACH ON SRINF, THAT

7. ON SCHEDULE OF REDUCTION, DELEGATION SHOULD PROPOSE THAT REDUCTIONS BE DIVIDED INTO THREE PERIODS THE EXACT TIMING OF WHICH CAN BE AGREED CLOSER TO THE DATE OF TREATY SIGNATURE. DELEGATION SHOULD PROPOSE THAT PERMITTED LEVEL OF U.S. AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILE WARHEADS BE EQUAL AT THE END OF EACH PERIOD OF REDUCTIONS.

8. IN PRESENTING THE ABOVE APPROACH, DELEGATION SHOULD

-- PROTECT THE U.S. RIGHT TO REDUCE LRINF SYSTEMS IN EXCESS OF EUROPEAN LIMITS BY RELOCATION TO THE U.S.

-- PROTECT U.S. RIGHT TO CONVERT PERSHING II MISSILES REDUCED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT TO PERSHING II MISSILES,

-- INSIST ON THE U.S. RIGHT TO CEILINGS EQUAL TO SOVIET SHORTER RANGE INF MISSILES ON A GLOBAL BASIS,

-- STATE THAT AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT SHOULD REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL SUPERSEDED BY A LATER AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR FURTHER REDUCTIONS TOWARDS THE AGREED GOAL OF THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF LRINF MISSILES.

-- CONTINUE TO CALL FOR ALL-ON-Negotiations FOR REDUCTIONS IN SRINF MISSILES TO BEGIN ON A HIGH PRIORITY BASIS, AT LEAST WITHIN SIX MONTHS AFTER AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT IS REACHED. SHOULD THE SOVIETS RAISE QUESTIONS ON NEGOTIATING FORUM FOR SHORTER RANGE INF MISSILES IN THIS REGARD, DELEGATION SHOULD NOTE THAT AT THIS TIME IT IS THE U.S. OPINION THAT THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP MAY PROVIDE THE MOST LOGICAL FORUM.

-- CONTINUE TO PRESS THE FULL VERIFICATION PROVISION CONTAINED IN REF G AND SUBSEQUENT GUIDANCE.
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR ROUND VI NEGOTIATING GROUP

REFERENCES: {A} as ST 2646 {B} as ST 262423 {C} as ST 291847
{D} as ST 291909 {E} as ST 305735 \(\ldots\) {K} as ST 320131
{L} as ST 330272 \(\ldots\) {M} as ST 336324

NSC MEMO TO THE US NEGOTIATORS TO THE NST, DECEMBER 1982

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE U.S. DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP FOR ROUND VI, BEGINNING JANUARY 1, 1983.

The previous directive on defense and space negotiations except as modified below remains in effect. For the negotiations with the Soviet counterparts, the previous directive on defense and space negotiations for round VIII remains in effect.

REFERENCES: {A} as ST 2646 {B} as ST 262423 {C} as ST 291847
{D} as ST 291909 {E} as ST 305735 \(\ldots\) {K} as ST 320131
{L} as ST 330272 \(\ldots\) {M} as ST 336324
3. OVERALL OBJECTIVE AND APPROACH. BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED TO ACCELERATE ST NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. ACCORDINGLY, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD REVIEW WITH THE SOVIETS THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. APPROACH TO DEFENSE AND SPACE ISSUES, WITH THE PURPOSES OF REALIZING U.S. OBJECTIVES AND DENYING ANY CONFLICTING SOVIET GOALS. PRIMARY U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP IN ROUND VI ARE:

-- TO CONTINUE TO REVIEW AND DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIETS, AS APPROPRIATE, THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S JULY DEFENSE AND SPACE PROPOSAL AND THE ELEMENTS FOR AN AGREEMENT WHICH WE PROPOSED IN REYKJAVIK AS AN ALTERNATIVE, BOTH OF WHICH REMAIN ON THE TABLE.

-- TO CONTINUE TO FOCUS THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE U.S. PROPOSALS AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. AGENDA (E.G., THE HIGHEST U.S. PRIORITIES ARE: TO ACHIEVE RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE FORCES, TO AVOID CONSTRAINTS BEYOND THOSE EXISTING UNDER THE ABM TREATY, TO STOP SOVIET EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY REGIME, TO DISCUSS HOW TO IMPROVE STABILITY THROUGH A POSSIBLE JOINTLY MANAGED TRANSITION TO GREATER RELIANCE ON STRATEGIC DEFENSES IN COMBINATION WITH FURTHER RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND TO FACILITATE DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC DEFENSES AT SOME FUTURE TIME).

-- WHILE MAINTAINING THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE U.S. PROPOSALS AND U.S. AGENDA, TO RESPOND TO SOVIET PROPOSALS AS THEY RELATE TO THE WORK OF THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUP AND ITS INTERRELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER AREAS, BY CONTINUING TO CRITICIZE, QUESTION, AND PROBE THEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDANCE BELOW AND PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS, AND BY POINTING TO WAYS IN WHICH THE U.S. PROPOSALS RESPOND TO SOVIET CONCERNS.

4. SPECIFIC APPROACH. NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXPLAIN THE MERITS OF SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE UNITED STATES, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN ROUND VI. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD SEEK TO CLARIFY AND CRITICIZE AS APPROPRIATE THE SOVIET PROPOSALS TABLED IN ROUND VI.
-- The negotiating group is authorized to draw from previous instruction, additional NSC guidance, and approved defense and space papers, to the extent necessary to explain the U.S. position and proposals and in response to Soviet questions.

-- In particular, in elaborating the U.S. proposal for elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles as a condition for meeting the Soviet demand for a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty through 1996, the negotiating group is authorized to draw from reference N as modified below:

1. The sides shall undertake through 1996 (1) not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration (the desire or intent of a party to develop, test, or deploy advanced strategic defenses shall in and of itself constitute a basis for withdrawal), and (2) to reduce offensive arms according to the schedule of reductions outlined below. This undertaking and the provisions below would be incorporated into a defense and space agreement recorded in a new treaty.

2. During the period through 1996, the sides shall strictly observe all provisions of the ABM Treaty while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the treaty.

3. The schedule of reductions to be completed during the period through 1996 is as follows:

   a. Through 1993, the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by fifty percent as specified in a separate start agreement to be negotiated now. The defense and space agreement shall not enter into force before the entry into force of the start agreement.

   b. By the end of 1995, all of the remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the United States shall be eliminated.

4. The U.S. is not to exercise its existing right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty does not extend for a ten-year period beginning when an agreement takes effect; rather the offer extends through 1996. At the end of 1996, either side shall be free to deploy advanced strategic defenses if it so chooses, unless the sides agree otherwise.
(5). The Defense and Space Treaty, in which the undertakings will be recorded will terminate, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, in either party:

- A. Does not comply with the agreement providing for reductions in strategic offensive arms agreed for the period through 1992 achieving fifty percent reductions as specified in a separate START agreement.

- B. Does not comply with the agreed provisions for reductions leading to the total elimination by the end of 1996 of all offensive ballistic missiles.

(6). The conditions specified in paragraph 5 would be in addition to the standard rights of a party to withdraw from an agreement such as in the event of material breach of the agreement by the other party or should the party judge its supreme national interests to be jeopardized.

(7). The sides in the course of negotiating a D/S treaty shall concurrently negotiate measures which permit effective verification of compliance with the obligations assumed. Specific verification measures shall include nonintrusive reference with AND other agreed means of verification, including effective monitoring of inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection, comprehensive and accurate data exchange.

(8). Within the context of the reductions and limitations above, the sides shall negotiate other appropriate restraints.

5. The negotiating group should attempt to clarify the areas of agreement and disagreement. In seeking such clarification, the negotiating group should keep in mind that, as noted in reference f, "it is not in the U.S. interest to accept any changes in the understanding of key terms and definitions associated with the ABM treaty which alter the one which has already been negotiated and agreed." The negotiating group should counter and reject Soviet attempts incorrectly to amend the ABM treaty and to narrow that which is permitted by the treaty. In resonding to Soviet attempts to promote their proposed definitions, the negotiating group should continue to make clear that the key definitions were understood by the ABM treaty negotiators in 1972. The
NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE U.S. WILL
NOT ACCEPT ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING BEYOND THOSE ESTABLISHED BY THE
TREATY.

6. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS
TO SIMPLIFY THEIR APPROACH AND TO ACCEPT INSTEAD AN
APPROACH THAT WOULD ONLY ENTAIL LIMITATIONS, UNDER THE
CONDITIONS THE U.S. HAS PROPOSED, ON DEPLOYMENT RATHER
THAN ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT,
AND TESTING.

7. FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND REFERENCE, FOLLOWING IS
TEXT OF REF N: BEGIN TEXT
"DIRECTIVE ON DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS."

"{1} THE SIDES SHALL UNDERTAKE FOR TEN YEARS {1} NOT TO
EXERCISE THEIR EXISTING RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM
TREATY, WHICH IS OF UNLIMITED DURATION, AND {2} TO
REDUCE OFFENSIVE ARMS ACCORDING TO THE SCHEDULE OF
REDUCTIONS OUTLINED BELOW. THIS UNDERTAKING AND THE
PROVISIONS BELOW WOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO A DEFENSE
AND SPACE AGREEMENT RECORDED IN A NEW TREATY.

{2} DURING THE TEN YEAR PERIOD THE SIDES SHALL
STRICLY OBSERVE ALL PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY WHILE
CONTINUING RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING, WHICH ARE
PERMITTED BY THE TREATY.

{3} THE SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS TO BE COMPLETED DURING
THE TEN YEAR PERIOD AS FOLLOWS:

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE TWO SIDES SHALL BE
REDUCED BY FIFTY PERCENT, AS SPECIFIED IN A SEPARATE
START AGREEMENT TO BE NEGOTIATED NOW. THE DEFENSE AND
SPACE AGREEMENT SHALL NOT ENTER INTO FORCE BEFORE THE
ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE START AGREEMENT.

- B. DURING THE FOLLOWING FIVE YEARS, THROUGH 1996,
THE REMAINING OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC Missiles OF THE USSR
AND THE UNITED STATES SHALL BE ELIMINATED.

- C. THUS, BY THE END OF 1996 ALL OFFENSIVE
BALLISTIC Missiles OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES
WILL HAVE BEEN ALL ELIMINATED.
{4} AT THE END OF THIS TEN YEAR PERIOD, EITHER SIDE SHALL BE FREE TO DEPLOY ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES IF IT SO Chooses UNLESS THE SIDES AGREE OTHERWISE.

{5} THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TREATY IN WHICH THE UNDERTAKINGS WILL BE RECORDED WILL TERMINATE, UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED BY THE PARTIES, IF EITHER PARTY:

- A. DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AIRCRAFT AGREED FOR THE PERIOD THROUGH 1993, ACHIEVING FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTIONS BY THE END OF 1991; OR

- B. DOES NOT Comply WITH THE AGREED PROVISIONS FOR REDUCTIONS LEADING TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION BY THE END OF 1996 OF ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES.

{6} THE CONDITIONS SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPH 5 WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO THE STANDARD RIGHTS OF A PARTY TO WITHDRAW FROM AN AGREEMENT SUCH AS IN THE EVENT OF MATERIAL BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE OTHER PARTY OR SHOULD THE PARTY JUDGE ITS SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS TO BE JEOPARDIZED. THE DESIRE OF EITHER PARTY TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY ADVANCED SYSTEMS OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE AN EXTRAORDINARY EVENT JEOPARDIZING ITS SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST.

{7} THE SIDES IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATING A TREATY TO CODIFY THE ABOVE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS SHALL CONCURRENTLY NEGOTIATE MEASURES WHICH PERMIT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS ASSUMED. SPECIFIC VERIFICATION MEASURES SHALL INCLUDE:

- {A} A COMPREHENSIVE AND ACCURATE EXCHANGE OF DATA, BOTH PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS AND THEREAFTER;

- {B} ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF ELIMINATION DOWN TO AGREED LEVELS; AND

- {C} EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF THE REMAINING INVENTORIES AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION.

{8} WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ABOVE, THE SIDES SHALL NEGOTIATE OTHER APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS." END