PFIAB WORLDWIDE EVALUATION OF THE PROCEDURES AND
PRACTICES BY WHICH OUR FOREIGN MISSIONS PROTECT
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND FACILITIES

With the recent discovery of further security problems in the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow and in other foreign missions, it is essential
that we conduct a comprehensive survey of the security and counter­intelligence policies, procedures and practices that are currently
being employed to protect classified information and facilities.
The conduct of diplomacy and intelligence activities essential to
our national security can only be carried out in a working environ­
ment that is protected from invasive activities on the part of
hostile intelligence services.

I therefore direct, consistent with the provisions of Executive
Order 12537, that my Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board immedi­
ately develop recommendations regarding the process and policies
by which our foreign missions protect classified information and
facilities. The Board should coordinate its activities with the
designated elements of the National Security Council Staff.
During this process, the Board shall be afforded the opportunity
to review on a timely and cooperative basis the product of the
interagency working group established by the NSPG of March 27,
1987, and provide me with such timely advice concerning the
findings of these activities as the Board deems appropriate.

This review should include recommendations relating to selection,
training, management, discipline and command line relationships
among personnel and organizations assigned to protect the security
of our foreign missions. Of particular interest is an analysis
and evaluation of the current relationship between the Defense and
State Departments as it relates to the protection of classified
information and facilities in our foreign missions. Recommenda­
tions to improve the effectiveness of the guard force, security
procedures and technical security systems on a worldwide basis are
required on an urgent basis. The Board should also conduct a
review of all available information to determine the suitability
of our new Embassy in Moscow as a secure environment in which to
conduct classified activity, and provide me with their findings
and recommendations within 90 days.

I further direct that the heads of departments and agencies
involved with counterintelligence or security in support of our
worldwide foreign mission operations provide the Chairman of the
PFIAB such prompt information and support as necessary to imple-
ment this directive.

The Board should submit its initial report and recommendations to
me by July 13, 1987.