INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH NST NEGOTIATING ROUND (S)

The attached instructions provide guidance for the eighth round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) which began on May 5, 1987, in Geneva. They build on the proposals made during my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. (S)

Attachments
1. Overall Instructions (S)
2. START Instructions (S)
3. INF Instructions (S)
4. Defense and Space Instructions (S)

Declassified: Released on 4/11/96
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by J. Saunders, National Security Council
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR ROUND VIII OF US-SOVIET NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS (S)

REF: (A) STATE 01312; (B) PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO US NEGOTIATORS FOR DECEMBER 2-5 MEETING WITH SOVIET COUNTERPARTS; (C) STATE 336325; (D) STATE 330321; (E) STATE 291641; (F) STATE 077781

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR US DELEGATION FOR THE EIGHTH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. GUIDANCE FROM PREVIOUS ROUNDS AND SPECIAL DECEMBER MEETING REMAIN IN EFFECT EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FOR EACH OF THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS IS BEING PROVIDED SEPARATELY.

3. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES FOR ROUND VII INCLUDE:
   -- TO CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR PROMPT AND PROMISING RESPONSE TO THE US PROPOSALS IN THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS, INCLUDING OUR NEW PROPOSAL IN DEFENSE AND SPACE AND OUR PROPOSALS IN START AND INF.
   -- TO INTENSIFY THE SCHEDULE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND SEEK PROMPT NEGOTIATION OF AND AGREEMENT TO AN INF TREATY BASED ON THE US INF DRAFT TREATY TABLED IN ROUND VII.
   -- TO TABLE IN ROUND VIII A DRAFT START TREATY WHEN IT IS COMPLETED AND APPROVED, INTENSIFY THE SCHEDULE OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND SEEK PROMPT NEGOTIATION OF AND AGREEMENT TO A START TREATY BASED ON THE US DRAFT.
   -- TO CONTINUE TO PRESS US POSITIONS IN START AND DEFENSE AND SPACE, AND TO COUNTER SOVIET EFFORTS TO HOLD START NEGOTIATIONS HOSTAGE TO PROGRESS IN DEFENSE AND SPACE, NOTING THAT ACHIEVING
AGREEMENT ON A TREATY PROVIDING FOR DEEP AND RELIABLE AND EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, ALONG WITH AN AGREEMENT, SHOULD BE OUR HIGHEST ARMS CONTROL PRIORITY.

4. IN ELABORATING ON US PROPOSALS AND NEGOTIATING DRAFT TREATY TEXTS, DELEGATION SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION, CONFORMING TO THE THREE PRINCIPLES AGREED AT REYKJAVIK, ARE ADDRESSED AND AGREED CONCURRENTLY WITH PROVISIONS ON REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.

6. The delegation should continue to emphasize the need for compliance with existing Arms Control Agreements, noting obstacles placed in the path of achieving arms reductions by Soviet non-compliance. If the Soviets raise the matter of US exceeding SALT Limits, delegation should underscore that US policy decisions on the SALT I Interim Agreement and SALT II in large part resulted from Soviet noncompliance with these agreements. The delegation should stress that these agreements are behind us, both as a matter of legal obligation and as a matter of policy commitment. The US has established a policy of interim restraint in its strategic offensive weapons programs and called upon the USSR to exercise comparable restraint in its programs. Our focus, however, should be on progress in NST toward early agreement on radical and stabilizing reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union. !!
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR START NEGOTIATING GROUP-ROUND VIII

REFERENCES: (A) STATE 5357, (B) STATE 2116, (C) 86 STATE 330273, (D) 86 STATE 21021, (E) 86 STATE 13816, (F) 86 STATE 54773, (G) 86 STATE 12564, (H) 85 STATE 2812, (I) 85 STATE 162424, (J) 85 STATE 76584

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR ROUND VIII. EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW, PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED.

3. OVERALL OBJECTIVE. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP'S OBJECTIVE REMAINS AN EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE, AND STABILIZING AGREEMENT REDUCING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BY 50 PERCENT. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP'S CHIEF OBJECTIVES FOR ROUND VIII ARE:

- TO TABLE A DRAFT U.S. START TREATY WHICH IS COMPLETED AND APPROVED AND TO SEEK TO MAKE IT THE MAIN FOCUS OF THE WORK OF THE TWO SIDES IN THE START NEGOTIATIONS.

- TO CONTINUE TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES NECESSARY FOR A START TREATY INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, NUMERICAL SUBLIMTS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS.

- TO INTENSIFY THE SCHEDULE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO PROTECT OPTIONS TO CONCLUDE A START TREATY WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR.

5. SUBLIMITS AND RELATED ISSUES. THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP
SHOULD STRESS THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF SUBSTANTIVE SOVIET
MOVEMENT ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEAD SUBLIMITS. THE GROUP
SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT MEANINGFUL SUBLIMITS ARE ESSENTIAL AND
THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO DEMONSTRATE FLEXI-
BILITY ON RELATED START ISSUES AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS REMAIN
UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE SUBLIMITS ALONG THE LINES PROPOSED BY THE
U.S. AND AS PREVIOUSLY TABLED BY THE SOVIET UNION. NEGOTIATOR
SHOULD STATE THAT THE U.S. HAS MADE SPECIFIC SUBLIMIT PROPOSALS
AND THAT IT IS UP TO THE SOVIET SIDE TO RESPOND. THE GROUP
SHOULD CATEGORICALLY REJECT ANY SUGGESTIONS THAT THE U.S. AGREED
AT REYKJAVIK TO DROP SUBLIMITS AND SHOULD ALSO REJECT ANY ATTEMPT
TO WALK BACK THE BOMBER COUNTING RULE AGREED AT REYKJAVIK AND
RECORDED IN THE JWD.

6. REDUCTION SCHEDULE. IN ORDER TO EASE SOVIET CONCERNS
PERTAINING TO RESTRUCTURING OF SOVIET FORCES, NEGOTIATOR SHOULD
STATE THAT THE U.S. PROPOSES A REDUCTION SCHEDULE OF SEVEN YEARS
AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY INSTEAD OF REDUCTIONS BEING
COMPLETED BY THE END OF 1981, AS PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED.

7. MOBILE ICBMS. THE U.S. POSITION ON MOBILE ICBMS (AS STATED
IN REF B) REMAINS UNCHANGED.

8. VERIFICATION. THE NEGOTIATOR SHOULD STATE THAT VERIFICATION
PROVISIONS REMAIN A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE U.S. START PROPOSAL.

9. THROW-WEIGHT REDUCTION. THE U.S. CONTINUES TO SEEK A 50
PERCENT REDUCTION OF SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT. THE
NEGOTIATOR SHOULD STATE THAT THE U.S. PROPOSES THAT THERE BE A
TREATY REQUIREMENT FOR A DIRECT 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN SOVIET
BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT TO A LEVEL SPECIFIED IN THE MOU OF
A START TREATY. IN ADDITION, THE START TREATY WOULD CONTAIN A
COMMITMENT THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD EXCEED THAT LEVEL DURING THE
LIFE OF THE TREATY. IF TACTICALLY NECESSARY, THE NEGOTIATOR MAY
INDICATE THAT THE U.S. PREFERENCES SUCH DIRECT LIMITS, BUT DOES NOT
RULE OUT INDIRECT LIMITS IF THEY CAN REDUCE SOVIET BALLISTIC
MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT BY 50 PERCENT AND MAINTAIN IT AT (OR BELOW)
THAT LEVEL.
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP, - 
ROUND VIII
REFERENCES: 
(A) STATE 5520 (B) STATE 71756 (C) NST GENEVA 3616 
(D) NST GENEVA 3639

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. GUIDANCE FOLLOWS FOR THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP FOR 
ROUND VIII. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE ON INF REMAINS UNCHANGED 
EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BY THESE INSTRUCTIONS.

3. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE FOR THIS ROUND IS TO SEEK SOVIET 
AGREEMENT TO BEGIN SUBSTANTIVE JOINT DRAFTING OF AN INF 
TREATY. THE U.S. TREATY TEXT REFS A AND B CONTAIN THE 
SUBSTANCE OF THE U.S. POSITION AND SHOULD BE USED AS THE 
U.S. PROPOSAL FOR DRAFTING. SOVIET TABLING OF DETAILED INF TREATY TEXT INCLUDING VERIFICATION SPECIFICS, OR THEIR READINESS TO ENGAGE ON THE SUBSTANCE 
OF THE US DRAFT TEXT WILL BE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET 
SERIOUSNESS THIS ROUND.

4. IN ORDER TO HAVE AMDENDMENTS OF THE VERIFICATION 
POSITION ON THE TABLE AS EARLY IN THE ROUND IS POSSIBLE, 
THE DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON DATA AND THE 
PROTOCOL ON DESTRUCTION, MENTLEMENT AND CONVERSION 
WILL BE PROVIDED SEPTEL WHEN APPROVED, AND SHOULD BE 
TABLED AT A TIME THE DELEGATION DEEMS APPROPRIATE. THE 
PROTOCOL ON INSPECTION WILL NOT BE COMPLETED AND SET TO 
DELEGATION FOR TABLING AS SOON AS AVAILABLE.

5. WHEN PRESS THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT THE SUBSTANCE OF 
U.S. POSITION AS CONTAINED IN DRAFT TREATY TEXT, 
DELEGATION SHOULD INFORM THE SOVIETS THAT THEIR 
WILLINGNESS TO RETURN TO AREAS OF CONVERGENCE, FROM 
WHICH THEY PREVIOUSLY DEPARTED, WILL NOT RESULT IN U.S. 
CONCESSIONS.

6. IN MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS MADE ONE POINT PROPOSAL, SEPARATE 
SRINF NEGOTIATIONS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON GLOBAL EQUALITY 
AND THE ELIMINATION OF SRINF SYSTEMS AT LEAST IN EUROPE. 
THEY APPEAR TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF AN 
OBLIGATION CONTAINED IN AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT TO 
NEGOTIATE SRINF LIMITATIONS. THEY HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED 
THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD INCLUDE SS-20 ARMS AND 
SS-23S, WOULD COVER THE RANGE BAND BETWEEN 500 AND 1000 
KM, AND WOULD BE ON A GLOBAL BASIS. WASHINGTON IS 
CURRENTLY EXAMINING THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. THE DELEGATION 
SHOULD CONFIRM THE ABOVE OUTLINE OF THE SOVIET PAPER 
AND SEEK FURTHER DETAILS ON THE SOVIET SRINF POSITION. 
THE DELEGATION SHOULD NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL IF IT NOT 
ADEQUATELY MEET THE CRITERION SET FORTH BY THE US WITH
7. IN RESPONSE TO DELEGATION REQUESTS FOR GUIDANCE IN REF C, DELEGATION IS AUTHORIZED TO STATE THAT PROCEDURES FOR PERMITTED CONVERSION WILL BE SPECIFIED IN THE DD AND C PROTOCOL.

8. GUIDANCE ON TECHNICAL AND EDITORIAL POINTS RAISED IN REF D IN DRAFT TREATY TEXT WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY.
SUBJECT: Instructions for Defense and Space Negotiating Group for Round VII

REFERENCES: (A) 87 State 013191; (B) 87 State 036410;
(C) 87 State 082514; (D) 95 State 312028

1. SECRET - Entire text.

2. The following guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms for Round VIII, beginning May 5, 1987. Except as modified below, guidance for Defense and Space Negotiating Group for the previous rounds remain in effect.

3. Overall Objectives and Approach: The principal U.S. goal in the Defense and Space area remains the preservation of the option to deploy, if we choose to do so, advanced strategic defenses which meet our criteria in a safe and stabilizing manner as soon as possible, preferably in a cooperative transition to greater reliance on defenses. The negotiating group should continue to review with the Soviets the basic elements of the U.S. approach to defense and space issues, with the purposes of preserving U.S. objectives and denying any conflicting Soviet goals that may U.S. objectives for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group in Round VIII are:

--- To present formally the new U.S. proposal in Defense and Space as presented by Secretary Shultz in his meeting in Moscow April 13-16 and outlined in paragraphs five through seven below. Negotiating Group should emphasize as appropriate, that new proposal represents a continued U.S. effort to respond to Soviet concerns and to identify practical near-term steps to achieving agreements compatible with our longer-term goals. Negotiating Group should note that previous U.S. package proposals remain on the table but that the Soviets have rejected them.

--- To continue to focus the negotiations on the highest U.S. priorities: To facilitate deployment of effective strategic defenses as soon as possible should a decision for such deployment is made; to achieve broad, deep, equitable and effective verifiable reduction in strategic offensive arms; to avoid constraints beyond those existing under the ABM Treaty, to stop and to reverse Soviet evasion of the ABM Treaty regime; to discuss how to improve stability through a possible jointly managed transition to greater reliance on strategic defenses in combination with reductions in offensive ballistic missiles.

--- While maintaining the principal focus of the negotiations on the U.S. proposals and U.S. agenda to respond to Soviet proposals, as they relate to the work of the Defense and Space
Negotiating Group and its interrelationships with other areas, by continuing to criticize, question and probe them in accordance with the guidance below and previous instructions, by pointing to ways in which the U.S. proposals respond to Soviet concerns, and by encouraging the Soviets to simplify their approach and to accept instead an approach that would only entail limitations under the condition the U.S. has proposed, on deployment rates, than additional limitations on research, development and testing.

4. The new U.S. proposal, not a JWP, should be the principal focus of the Defense and Space Negotiation in Round VIII. Insofar as the Soviets have described the JWP as a "Statement of Principles," we do not wish to pursue such a drifting exercise and instead wish to pursue a treaty along the lines of the new U.S. proposal. If the Soviets suggest continuing work on the JWP, the Negotiating Group should tell the Soviets that the JWP has served its purpose by highlighting the differences between the sides and that since the Foreign Ministers' meeting had already taken place in Moscow, the United States sees little further value in a JWP. However, at the Negotiator's discretion, the Negotiating Group may engage in preparing a JWP, as a means of expediting progress toward a Treaty, reflecting the new U.S. Proposal as outlined below.

5. New U.S. Proposal: In presenting the new proposal, Negotiating Group should point out that, because the Soviet Union rejected the U.S. proposal to eliminate offensive ballistic missiles by the end of 1996, the United States has formulated a new Defense and Space proposal. This new proposal is associated with our START proposal to accomplish 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms in seven years after the START Treaty enters into force. This new Defense and Space proposal incorporates the following provisions:

a. Non-Withdrawal. Both parties would commit through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy operational defensive systems whose unilateral deployment presently is not permitted under the ABM Treaty, provided certain other conditions are met (START reductions proceed to 50 percent as-scheduled in accordance with the START Treaty).

b. Freedom to Deploy. After 1994, either side can deploy defensive systems if its choosing, as per the terms of this agreement and without further reference to the ABM Treaty, unless mutually agreed otherwise.

c. ABM Treaty Restrictions. If either side exercises its rights under the conditions of this new agreement to deploy defensive systems of its choosing, any remaining restrictions of both parties associated with the ABM Treaty will be considered terminated, unless mutually agreed otherwise.
d. Withdrawal/Termination. The U.S. rejects a blanket non-withdrawal commitment. Nothing above alters the sovereign rights of the sides under customary international law, including the right to withdraw were a side to decide that extraordinary event related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Each side must maintain its right to terminate (in case of a material breach) or withdraw (in case a side decided its supreme interests were jeopardized).

e. Failure to Meet START Reductions. Any failure to meet the reductions schedule associated with the START Treaty would represent grounds for either side to terminate this agreement and all related commitments associated with the ABM Treaty.

f. Entry into Force. This agreement will be documented in the form of a treaty which will not enter into force before the associated treaty covering 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive forces enters into force.

6. In presenting this proposal, the Negotiating Group should make clear that (1) such a commitment would not alter our ability to withdraw from the treaty in response to a material breach or because of supreme national interest, and (2) we will continue to insist that the Soviets address their violation of the ABM Treaty.

7. In addition, we have stated Soviet concerns with being able to predict the course of future research, the Defense and Space Negotiating Group should propose a "predictability package." In addition to our previous Open Laboratories proposal and our proposal for Reciprocal Observation of Testing, this package might include a formal annual exchange of programmatic data. It is intended that such a predictability package not entail any additional restrictions on United States programs beyond those indicated above. FYI: Negotiating Group should emphasize the Open Laboratories Initiative pending receipt of interagency papers on the other two portions of the predictability package. End FYI.

8. If the Soviets propose the sides develop a "Statement of Principles" for the START and Defense and Space fora, the Defense and Space Negotiating Group should respond that the U.S. is not interested in pursuing a "Statement of Principles" or framework agreement. Rather, the sides should work toward treaties in their respective working groups.

9. NST Relationship with Other Fora: The relationship between the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) and the NST Defense and Space Negotiating Group with the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) is defined in Instructions for SCC XIX (Ref tel D).

10. If the Soviets propose that the sides agree on a specific list of systems and devices banned from launching into space under the ABM Treaty, the Negotiating Group should say that
such an approach is not necessary because the ABM Treaty specifies the sides' obligations in this regard.