National Security Decision Directive 212 of February 10, 1986 determined that the policies of the Angolan MPLA regime and increased Soviet bloc military assistance to that government posed a threat to important political, strategic, and economic interests of the U.S. and its allies in southern Africa. NSDD 212 enumerated U.S. policy objectives in the Angolan context and established a U.S. strategy of a) continuing to negotiate with the MPLA and South Africa on Cuban troop withdrawal in the context of Namibian independence while b) applying pressure on the MPLA to negotiate seriously and to accept a negotiated settlement.

Since the approval of NSDD 212, the Angolan military conflict has stabilized. Neither the MPLA nor UNITA is in a position to achieve a military victory, despite Moscow's interjection of almost $1 billion in new Soviet military assistance in support of a continuing attempt by the Soviet Union and its MPLA client to achieve a military solution to the civil war. U.S. efforts to negotiate Cuban troop-withdrawal in the context of Namibian independence have been stalled by the unwillingness of the MPLA regime to negotiate seriously.

UNITA has made some progress in its efforts to develop broader international ties, but the MPLA remains unwilling to afford UNITA a fair share of power in the context of national reconciliation. Although Soviet/Cuban costs have risen, Moscow and Havana remain committed to the Luanda regime and to the maintenance of their presence and influence in Angola.

In light of these developments, U.S. policy has been reviewed, and it has been determined that our objectives and strategy as established by NSDD 212 remain valid:

--To seek an internationally acceptable solution to the Namibian problem based on UNSCR 435, linked to Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.

--To achieve an equitable internal settlement of the Angolan conflict that affords UNITA a fair share of power;

--To reduce and, if possible, eliminate Soviet and Soviet-proxy influence, military presence, and opportunities in Angola and southern Africa.
The two-track strategy for achieving the objectives established by NSDD 212 has also been reviewed and remains fundamentally valid. However, additional actions are warranted on both tracks to achieve U.S. policy objectives.

With regard to negotiations with the MPLA and South Africa:

--The U.S. will continue to use all available diplomatic opportunities—including direct contacts with the parties to the Angola/Namibia negotiations—to bring negotiations on Cuban troop withdrawal and Namibian independence to a successful conclusion.

--The U.S. will continue to insist on withdrawal of Cuban forces in the context of a settlement. The U.S. will also continue to insist that any initiative for Namibian independence outside the framework of UNSCR 435 meet the test of international acceptability.

--With UNITA's interests in mind, the U.S. will actively promote diplomatic initiatives, to include talks on the reopening of the Benguela Railroad, which advance the objective of national reconciliation in Angola.

With regard to pressures on the MPLA:

--The U.S. will actively seek and implement effective means of increasing pressure on the MPLA to agree to a negotiated settlement.

--A review will be conducted in order to ensure that U.S. support for UNITA is: consistent with our overall strategy; responsive to UNITA's needs; effective in raising the costs incurred by the MPLA regime and its Soviet and Cuban backers; acceptable to key African partners whose support is essential; and sustainable in Congress and with the American public.

--As a follow-up to the present interagency review, the Department of State shall convene an interagency group to consider feasible and effective means of increasing economic pressures on the MPLA regime and recommend appropriate options to me within one month. Pending completion of that review, the specific economic pressures against the MPLA government set forth in NSDD 212 will remain in force.

--The Department of State, together with other appropriate agencies, will explore means of increasing UNITA's stature within
Angola and internationally through more effective information programs. The U.S. information efforts will also seek to undermine Cuba's ability to deploy troops to Angola through specially focused radio programming broadcast to Cuba by Radio Marti and through Spanish language programs aimed at the Cuban troops deployed in Angola. To the greatest possible extent, the U.S. should seek to exacerbate differences between the MPLA and their Soviet bloc supporters and undermine Soviet/Cuban efforts to portray themselves as assisting a legitimate and embattled African government.

--Diplomatic efforts to obtain the support of our allies and other international parties in pressing the MPLA regime for a peaceful settlement and to assist UNITA in expanding its international ties will be continued and, if possible, expanded.

The Department of State will continue efforts to engage the Soviet Union in serious discussions to diminish and eventually eliminate Soviet military assistance to Angola, to advance negotiations on Cuban troop withdrawal and Namibian independence, and to promote national reconciliation between UNITA and the MPLA.

--The U.S. will continue development, security assistance, and humanitarian relief programs to assist governments friendly to the U.S. which are threatened by the Angolan conflict or strained by refugee flows from that country.