INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ARMS REDUCTIONS DISCUSSIONS
AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT (December 8-10, 1987) (S)

Introduction. The purpose of this NSDD is to provide guidance on the arms reductions aspects of the December 1987 U.S.-U.S.S.R. summit in Washington. It should be used to guide both the general discussions with the Soviet team on these matters and the development of those portions of any "agreed statement" which may result from the summit which apply to the arms reductions area. (C)

Recording Agreement and Instructions to Negotiators. The Soviet Union has made it clear that it views an agreement on new "instructions to negotiators" on the START and Defense & Space areas as one of its principal goals for this summit. I share this goal, but only as a tool to further efforts to achieve equitable and verifiable treaties in both the START and Defense & Space areas. In determining the results of the summit in general, and any agreed instructions to negotiators in particular, we must avoid conveying the impression that we have made politically binding, quasi-legal agreements sort of treaties in these areas which could impose fact constraints on the United States while not providing legally binding, effectively verifiable restraints on the Soviet Union. To avoid the perception we have joined in such an agreement, any recording of agreed instructions to negotiators or any other arms control statement should be part of a single summit joint statement, not a separate stand-alone document. (S)

We must also not allow the Soviets to believe that material previously agreed and omitted from the summit statement is somehow no longer agreed, or that failure to list an area of disagreement implies we have acquiesced to the Soviet position. To this end, we should refer to existing joint documents (especially the START Joint Draft Treaty) to reaffirm their status. In doing so, we should ensure all associated documents (protocols, etc.) are appropriately referenced. (C)

Since there is no draft Defense and Space Treaty, we should avoid the implication that Defense and Space is subsumed in START, thereby acquiescing to Soviet linkage. Thus, our objective with respect to Defense and Space should be instruction to negotiators to begin work on a draft Defense and Space Treaty. (C)
START. The U.S. team should initially seek to frame the START portion of any agreed statement along the following lines:

"The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50% reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty and related documents during the next meeting of Heads of State in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the Joint Draft Treaty text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the Joint Draft Treaty Text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50% reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the Joint Draft START Treaty text worked out in Geneva including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1600 nuclear offensive delivery systems, 6000 warheads, 1500 warheads on 14 heavy missiles; the agreed bomber-counting rule; and in agreement that the reductions will result in a 50% reduction in Soviet ballistic missile throwweight when well thereafter not to in reased. As priority tasks, they should focus on the following crucial issues:

(a) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. These are to include a ceiling of 4800 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total, and a further sub-ceiling of 3300 on the number of ICBM warheads.

(b) The counting rules governing the number of long-range (i.e. with a range over 1500 kilometers), nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. With respect to B-1, B-52, BEAR-H and BLACKJACK bombers equipped for long-range, nuclear-armed LCMs, this number shall be six per bomber. Other heavy bombers which are not equipped for such cruise missiles, including BACKFIRE, shall be counted in accordance with the bomber counting rule agreed at Reykjavik. There shall be agreed rules governing how many ALCMs shall be attributed to future heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear-armed ALCMs.
(c) The counting rule with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The number of warheads attributable to each type of United States ballistic missile shall be:

- PEACEMAKER (MX): 10
- MINUTEMAN III: 13
- MINUTEMAN II: 10
- TRIDENT I: 8
- TRIDENT II: 8
- POSEIDON: 10

The number of warheads attributable to each type of Soviet ballistic missile shall be:

[TO BE PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET SIDE]

These numbers shall be subject to verification by on-site inspection. There shall be agreed rules governing how warheads shall be attributed to future types of ballistic missiles covered by START.

(d) Building upon the provisions of the INF Treaty, the measures by which the provisions of the START Treaty can be verified will, at a minimum, include:

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the Treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force.

2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the Treaty.

3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to conform to the agreed limits.

4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities.

5. Short-notice on-site inspection of:
   (i) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;
   (ii) locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain after conforming to the agreed limits; and
   (iii) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).
6. The right to short notice, on-site inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of START systems would be occurring.

7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include ban on telemetry-encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information being sent during missile flight.

8. Measures designed to enhance observation of START-related activities by national technical means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party." (S)

Ballistic Missile Warhead Sublimit and Counting Rule Issue.
The Soviet Union has indicated that it may be prepared to consider a sublimit on ballistic missile warheads. However, it has further indicated that rather than the sublimit on ballistic missile warheads of 1000 which we seek, it would prefer to raise that sublimit to 500 or 510. Before we can consider accepting such a proposal, it is essential that we have a clear agreement with the Soviet side concerning:

-- an acceptable definition to be applied to air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) in START (i.e., that only nuclear-armed ALCMs with a range in excess of 1500 kilometers would be included in the Treaty's limit);

-- the counting rules applied to such ALCMs; and

-- the counting rules that will be applied to the warheads on existing types of ballistic missiles covered by the START Treaty. (S)

Should the Soviet Union be prepared to accept (1) a definition of ALCMs to be covered by START as only nuclear-armed ALCMs of a range greater than 1500 kilometers, (2) a counting rule for such ALCMs generally along the line specified in item (b) above, and (3) the counting rule for the warheads on existing types of ballistic missiles as specified in item (c) above, I am prepared to consider additional flexibility with respect to the U.S. position on these sublimits as yet not agreed. (TS)

With respect to the ALCM counting rule, if needed, and in the context of reaching an agreement on the general approach outlined in (b) above, I am prepared to increase the number of ALCMs attributed to each bomber to 8 in order to reach agreement on this critical point. (M)
Mobile ICBMs. Should the Soviet side agree to the approach on START counting rules and sublimits outlined above, and given acceptable progress towards the U.S. position in the Defense & Space area, I would be prepared to add to the "agreed statement" the following paragraph covering mobile ICBMs:

"(e) Development of additional provisions that would provide for effective verification of mobile ICBMs, including restrictions on their deployment areas and provisions for assuring the distinguishability of mobile missiles, with agreement on an inspection protocol incorporating such provisions for effectively verifying the number of mobile ICBMs, an agreed number of such land-mobile ICBMs can be permitted within limits provided by the agreement." (TS)

Heavy ICBM Modernization. Should the Soviets meet the conditions outlined for the inclusion of the paragraph on mobile missiles indicated above, I would also be prepared to add to the "agreed statement's" treatment of START the following paragraph covering the issue of the modernization of heavy ICBMs:

"(f) Based on agreement to the foregoing, the President noted that the United States is prepared to permit the continued testing and modernization of heavy ICBMs." (TS)

Treatment of SLCM. No provisions are included for addressing sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) in the "agreed statement." When the Soviets raise the issue of SLCM limits, the United States should seek Soviet views on how such limits could be verified. The U.S. side can acknowledge that the concept of an exchange of notifications on planned SLCM deployments outside of and in addition to the 6000 warhead and 1600 delivery system limits provided for in the current Joint Draft START Treaty text was discussed at Reykjavik. However, the U.S. side should not actively pursue this outcome at this time. (TS)

Treatment of BACKFIRE. The U.S. position remains that the BACKFIRE bomber should be included within the main START Treaty limits. I may be prepared to consider alternative positions on the BACKFIRE issue, but only in the context of the resolution of all other major treaty issues (including a resolution of the SLCM issue on terms acceptable to the U.S.) and only, in the context of Soviet agreement that the Soviet Union provide appropriate assurances that the number of BACKFIRE bombers will not be increased above the current levels, that such bombers will not be given the capability to carry long-range air-launched cruise missiles, that such bombers are not and will not be equipped for in-flight refueling, and their crews are not and will not be trained for in-flight refueling. No indication of a change in the U.S. position on BACKFIRE should be given to the Soviet Union at this time. (TS)
DEFENSE & SPACE. The U.S. team should initially seek to frame the Defense & Space portion of any agreed statement along the following lines:

"The President and the General Secretary also discussed the status of negotiations relating to defense and space issues. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to expedite work on a Joint Draft Treaty Text in a new separate treaty which could enter into force at the same time as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms. They also agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva further to identify areas of agreement and disagreement in the Joint Draft Treaty Text and then to accelerate work toward resolution of the areas of disagreement." (S)

Further Elements. Should the Soviet side press for the inclusion of additional "instructions" in the Defense & Space area, the U.S. side should pursue the inclusion of the following language in the agreed statement:

"In pursuing a Joint Draft Treaty Text, the negotiators should build upon the following elements:

(a) there will be a period of time during which both sides would commit not to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty;

(b) after that period of time, both sides would be free to deploy defenses not currently permitted by the Treaty after giving 12 months notice of an intent to deploy and without further reference to the ABM Treaty;

(c) during the non-deployment period, both sides have the right to pursue their strategic defense programs, conducting research, development and testing, including testing in space, as required; and

(d) to enhance strategic stability, provide predictability, and ensure confidence that prohibited deployments are not being undertaken during the non-deployment period, the sides meet regularly:

1. to exchange programmatic data and briefings on each side's strategic defense programs; and,

2. to facilitate mutual observation of strategic defense tests and visits to strategic defense research facilities. (S)
Conduct During the Non-deployment Period. The U.S. proposal would be that both sides have the right to conduct their programs, including testing as needed, during the period. The focus of the commitment would be on non-deployment. The U.S. side should make it clear that, under any agreement, the United States intends to exercise fully these rights. The United States will be prepared to explain in Geneva what it means by the term "deployment" and how the Soviet Union can be assured that no "deployment" of defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty occurred. (S)

In the context of the discussions, no attempt will be made to negotiate or commit to negotiate in the future with the Soviet Union:

a. what is meant by the "broad" or "narrow" interpretation of the ABM Treaty;

b. what would be permitted or prohibited during the non-deployment period; or

c. what is meant by "testing" "vice deployment." (TS)

Length of the Period. The key issue to determining the length of the period of non-deployment is agreement on what will be permitted during the period and on clear terms to deploy defenses not permitted by the ABM Treaty thereafter. If the Soviet Union were to agree to the basic U.S. proposal, the U.S. could agree to extend the period of non-deployment through the tenth anniversary of the Reykjavik meeting (i.e., October 11, 1996). (TS)

COMPLIANCE & KRASNOYARSK. U.S. policy remains that instances of Soviet non-compliance with existing treaties must be corrected, and that the method of correcting the violation caused by the Krasnoyarsk radar is the dismantlement of this illegal radar. In the context of the discussions, the U.S. side should make this policy clear to its Soviet counterparts. To that effect, the U.S. side should pursue Soviet agreement on the inclusion in the "agreed statement" of the following language:

"To support their efforts to negotiate new agreements, the sides agree that construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, which has been halted by the Soviet side, will not be resumed and that the radar will be dismantled in a verifiable manner." (S)

I am not prepared to accept measures short of dismantlement. Inclusion of a Soviet commitment to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar is not, however, a precondition for agreement to the other positions set forth in this SDD. (S)