Based on the current state of arms reduction negotiations, as well as the views of my senior advisors, this NSDD sets out U.S. arms reduction positions and objectives for the May 29 - June 2, 1988 summit meeting in Moscow. This NSDD is not intended as a comprehensive statement of U.S. arms reduction policy; except where specifically noted, previous U.S. positions and previous guidance remain valid. (S)

Substantive arms reduction discussions in Moscow should focus on START, Defense and Space, Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty, and issues concerning the ABM Treaty review. In the areas of nuclear testing, chemical weapons, and conventional forces arms control, in the event unforeseen circumstances, we will limit ourselves to reviewing and recording progress made elsewhere and to signing those nuclear testing agreements negotiated in Geneva. (S)

**START (U)**

In Moscow we will seek the following:

-- We will continue to negotiate a legally binding sublimit of 3300 ICBM RVs and will discuss how to record the current Soviet intentions with regard to their program.

-- We will provide the Soviets details of our proposed verification scheme for mobile ICBMS based upon the decisions reflected in guidance issued on my behalf by the National Security Council staff on May 24, 1988. Based on Soviet receptiveness to this verification approach, I will make the decision in Moscow whether to discuss specific numerical limits on mobile ICBMs and, if so, what limits to propose.

-- If warranted by Soviet movement in other areas, I am prepared to agree to a slow testing and modernization of silo-based heavy ICBMs subject to appropriate restrictions on the modernization of such missiles (but not on other ICBM modernization) and subject to the United States having an equal right to heavy ICBMs.
Building upon the Reyjavik formula for heavy bombers carrying gravity bombs or BRAMs, we will seek to resolve additional issues concerning air-breathing weapons in a single, integrated package as follows:

-- While continuing to prefer a counting rule of 10 ALCMs per bomber, if the Soviets accept our approach to counting rule, we can accept an outcome which meets the following criteria:
  -- For the U.S., a counting rule of no more than 10 ALCMs per B-2;
  -- For existing Soviet bombers, a counting rule of no less than 6 ALCMs per BEAR-H and no less than 8 ALCMs per Blackjack;
  -- Provisions for agreeing on counting rules for future bomber types.
-- No sublimit on ALCMs or bomber weapons;
-- No restrictions on conventionally-armed cruise missiles;
-- 1000 km range cut-off for counting nuclear-armed ALCM (acceptable only if the Soviets agree to the remaining elements of our proposal);
-- Acceptance of the U.S. position on bomber and bomber weapon distinguishability and verification;
-- No constraints on ALCM inventory; and
-- Acceptance of the limited right to convert ALCM bombers to non-AAR bombers and non-ALCM bombers to conventional bomber set forth in the U.S. draft of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

-- On sea-launched cruise missiles, if the Soviets appear interested in moving from their current position to a declaratory approach, we will base such approach on reciprocal non-binding declarations of acquisition plans for all nuclear-armed SLCMs regardless of their range. If such a scheme were agreed to, the United States would declare it has no plans to acquire more than 1500 nuclear-armed SLCMs.

-- We will continue the expanded data exchange begun in Geneva. (8)

In implementing these decisions, our priorities should be:

-- **First priority.** Resolving issues related to the joint summit statement, separate START statements required.

-- **Second priority.** Seeking Soviet agreement to the ALCM position set forth above.

-- **Third priority.** Setting forth additional details of the U.S. approach to mobile ICBM verification.
Fourth priority. Continuing the expanded data exchange. (S)

Soviet ABM Treaty Non-compliance and the ABM Treaty Review (U)

We will reaffirm in Moscow our long-standing concern with Soviet failure to comply with and to correct past violations of the ABM Treaty. We will make it clear that we will not sign any strategic arms agreements, either in START or in Defense and Space, while the issue of the illegal Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar remains unresolved, and that we consider the only appropriate resolution to be dismantlement or destruction of the radar. (S)

The third five-year review of the ABM Treaty must be conducted by October, 1988. We will not attempt to conduct the review in Moscow on the margins of the summit, nor will we plan on delaying it past October. Within those parameters, interagency consideration of options for the timing and forum of the review should be expedited. Taking into account developments during discussions in Moscow, especially with regard to Krasnoyarsk, I would like to be able to decide the U.S. position on the timing and forum of such a review as soon as possible following the Moscow summit. (S)