The attached instructions provide guidance for the tenth round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), which begins on July 12, 1988, in Geneva. They include the agreements reached during my June 1988 meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow. (S)

Attachments
1. Overall Instructions (S)
2. START Instructions (S)
3. Defense and Space Instructions (S)
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE FOLLOWING IS OVERALL GUIDANCE FOR THE U.S. NST DELEGATION FOR ROUND X WHICH BEGINS ON DECEMBER 2, 1988. GUIDANCE FROM PREVIOUS ROUNDS REMAINS IN EFFECT EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FOR THE START AND THE DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATING GROUPS IS PROVIDED IN REFTELS.

3. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES FOR ROUND X INCLUDE:

-- TO BUILD ON THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED DURING THE MAY 29-JUNE 1, 1988 SUMMIT IN MOSCOW.

-- TO CONCLUDE BY THE LATEST POSSIBLE DATE THE TREATY ON REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CONSISTENT WITH U.S. PRINCIPLES THAT WE SEEK ONLY EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE AND STABILIZING REDUCTIONS.

-- TO PREPARE THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT FOR SEPARATE AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE ABM TREATY BUILD ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT DATED DECEMBER 10, 1987 AND TO CONTINUE WORK ON ITS ASSOCIATED PROTOCOL.

-- TO CONTINUE TO RESIST SOVIET ATTEMPT TO PRODUCE A KEY PROVISIONS OR FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR EITHER START OR DST.

-- TO CONTINUE TO COUNTER SOVIET EFFORTS TO HOLD START NEGOTIATIONS HOSTAGE TO PROGRESS IN DEFENSE AND SPACE.

-- TO REAFFIRM OUR LONGSTANDING CONCERN WITH SOVIET FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH AND TO CORRECT SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE ABM TREATY.

-- TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE WILL NOT CONCLUDE ANY STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENTS, EITHER IN START OR DEFENSE AND SPACE, WHILE THE ISSUE OF THE ILLEGAL SOVIET KRASNOYARSK RADD REMAINS UNRESOLVED, AND THAT WE CONSIDER THE ONLY APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION TO BE DISMANTLEMENT OF THE RADD.
FROM: SECSTATE, WASHDC
TO: NST GENEVA

NST/START

SUBJECT: START: GUIDANCE FOR ROUND X

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.


3. DELEGATION SHOULD REAFFIRM OUR LONG-STANDING CONCERN WITH SOVIET FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH AND TO CORRECT SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE ABM TREATY. DELEGATION SHOULD FURTHER MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE USG WILL NOT CONSIDER ANY STRATEGIC AGREEMENTS, EITHER IN START OR IN DEFENSE AND SPACE, WHILE THE ISSUE OF THE ILLEGAL SOVIET KRASNOYARSK RADAR REMAINS UNRESOLVED, AND THAT WE CONSIDER THE ONLY APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION TO BE DISMANTLEMENT OF THE RADAR.

4. SECTION I BELOW CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE NST PORTION OF THE MOSCOW SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT (MSJS) AND ADDITIONAL RELATED INSTRUCTIONS. SECTION II CONTAINS THE TEXT OF THE "ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND ON ALCMS" PAPER AND ADDITIONAL RELATED INSTRUCTIONS. SECTION III CONTAINS THE "ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND ON MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION" PAPER AND ADDITIONAL RELATED INSTRUCTIONS. US JCL LANGUAGE ON MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION WITH APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS IS BEING TRANSMITTED SEPARATELY. SECTION IV CONTAINS OTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

BEGIN TEXT:

NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS

-1. THE TWO LEADERS NOTED THAT A JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF A TREATY ON REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS HAS BEEN ELABORATED. THROUGH THIS PROCESS, THE SIDES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO RECORD IN THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT EXTENSIVE AND SIGNIFICANT AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND ALSO TO DETAIL POSITIONS ON REMAINING AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT. WHILE IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL WORK IS REQUIRED BEFORE THIS TREATY IS READY FOR SIGNATURE, MANY KEY PROVISIONS ARE RECORDED IN THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT AND ARE CONSIDERED TO BE AGREED, SUBJECT TO THE COMPLETION AND RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY.

-2. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT A TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE SIDES HAVE CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE A SEPARATE AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE ARM TREATY BUILDING ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT DATED DECEMBER 10, 1987. PROGRESS WAS NOTED IN PREPARING THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF AN ASSOCIATED PROTOCOL IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE PROTOCOL, THE SIDES HAVE AGREED IN PARTICULAR TO USE THE NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS FOR TRANSMISSION OF RELEVANT INFORMATION. THE LEADERS DIRECTED THEIR NEGOTIATORS TO PREPARE THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF A SEPARATE AGREEMENT AND TO CONTINUE WORK ON ITS ASSOCIATED PROTOCOL.

-3. THE JOINT DRAFT TREATY ON REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS REFLECTS THE EARLIER UNDERSTANDING ON ESTABLISHING CEILINGS OF NO MORE THAN 1600 STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND 6000 WARHEADS AS WELL AS AGREEMENT ON SUBCEILINGS OF 4900 ON THE AGGREGATE OF ICBM AND SLBM WARHEADS AND 1540 WARHEADS ON 154 STRATEGIC MISSILES.

-4. THE DRAFT TREATY ALSO RECORDS THE SIDES' AGREEMENT THAT AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTIONS THE AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S ICBMS AND SLBMS WILL BE REDUCED TO A LEVEL APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT BELOW THE EXISTING LEVEL AND THIS LEVEL WILL NOT BE EXCEEDED.

-5. DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS THE TWO SIDES HAVE ALSO ACHIEVED
UNDERSTANDING THAT IN FUTURE WORK ON THE TREATY THEY WILL ACT ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ON DEPLOYED ICBMS AND SLBMS OF EXISTING TYPES THE COUNTING RULE WILL INCLUDE THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS REFERRED TO IN THE JOINT STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 10, 1987, AND THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS WHICH WILL BE ATTRIBUTED TO EACH NEW TYPE OF BALLISTIC MISSILE WILL BE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION.

-6. IN ADDITION, THE SIDES AGREED ON A COUNTING RULE FOR HEAVY BOMBER ARMAMENTS, ACCORDING TO WHICH HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED ONLY FOR NUCLEAR GRAavity BOMBS AND HYDROPHYSM WILL COUNT AS ONE DELIVERY VEHICLE AGAINST THE 1600 LIMIT AND ONE WARHEAD AGAINST THE 6000 LIMIT.

-7. THE DELEGATIONS HAVE ALSO PREPARED JOINT DRAFT TEXTS OF AN INSPECTION PROTOCOL, A CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION PROTOCOL, AND A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON DATA, WHICH ARE INTEGRAL PARTS OF THE TREATY. THESE DOCUMENTS BUILD ON THE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS OF THE INF TREATY, EXTENDING AND ELABORATING THEM AS NECESSARY TO MEET THE MORE DEMANDING REQUIREMENTS OF START. THE START VERIFICATION MEASURES WILL, AT A MINIMUM, INCLUDE:

A. DATA EXCHANGES, TO INCLUDE DECLARATIONS AND APPROPRIATE NOTIFICATIONS ON THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS LIMITED BY START, INCLUDING LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES FOR PRODUCTION, FINAL ASSEMBLY, STORAGE, TESTING, REPAIR, TRAINING, DEPLOYMENT, CONVERSION, AND ELIMINATION OF SUCH SYSTEMS. SUCH DECLARATIONS WILL BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE SIDES BEFORE THE TREATY IS SIGNED AND UPDATED PERIODICALLY.

B. BASELINE INSPECTIONS TO VERIFY THE ACCURACY OF THESE DECLARATIONS.

C. ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS NECESSARY TO MEET THE AGREED LIMITS.

D. CONTINUOUS ON-SITE MONITORING OF THE PERIMETER AND PORTALS OF CRITICAL PRODUCTION FACILITIES TO CONFIRM THE OUTPUT OF WEAPONS TO BE LIMITED.

E. SHORT-NOTICE ON-SITE INSPECTION OF:

(I) DECLARED LOCATIONS DURING THE PROCESS OF REDUCING TO AGREED LIMITS;

(II) LOCATIONS WHERE SYSTEMS COVERED BY THIS TREATY REMAIN AFTER ACHIEVING THE AGREED LIMITS; AND

(III) LOCATIONS WHERE SUCH SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN LOCATED (FORMERLY DECLARED FACILITIES).

F. SHORT-NOTICE INSPECTION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED UPON PROCEDURES, OF LOCATIONS WHERE EITHER SIDE CONSIDERS CONVERT DEPLOYMENT, PRODUCTION, STORAGE OR REPAIR OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS
OFFENSIVE ARMS COULD BE OCCURRING.

G. PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF CONCEALMENT OR OTHER ACTIVITIES WHICH IMPede VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. SUCH PROVISIONS WOULD INCLUDE A BAN ON TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION AND WOULD ALLOW FOR FULL ACCESS TO ALL TELEMETRIC INFORMATION BROADCAST DURING MISSILE FLIGHT.

H. PROCEDURES THAT ENABLE VERIFICATION OF THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES OF EACH SPECIFIC TYPE, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION.

I. ENHANCED OBSERVATION OF ACTIVITIES RELATED TO REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THESE WOULD INCLUDE OPEN DISPLAYS OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS AT MISSILE BASES, BOMBER BASES, AND SUBMARINE PORTS AT LOCATIONS AND TIMES CHOSEN BY THE INSPECTING PARTY.

-8. THE TWO SIDES HAVE ALSO BEGUN TO EXCHANGE DATA ON THEIR STRATEGIC FORCES.

-9. DURING THE COURSE OF THIS MEETING IN MOSCOW, THE EXCHANGES ON START RESULTED IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL COMMON GROUND, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREAS OF ALCMS AND THE ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP AND AGREE ON POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION MOBILE ICBMS. THE DETAILS OF THIS ADDITIONAL COMMON GROUND HAVE BEEN RECORDED IN DOCUMENTS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE SIDES. THE DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA WILL RECORD THESE GAINS IN THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE START TREATY.

-10. THE SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF LIMITING LONG-RANGE, NUCLEAR-ARMED ALCMS.

-11. RONALD REAGAN AND M.S. GORBACHEV EXPRESSED THEIR JOINT CONFIDENCE THAT THE EXTENSIVE WORK DONE PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR CONCLUDING THE TREATY ON REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WILL PROMOTE STRATEGIC STABILITY AND STRENGTHEN SECURITY NOT ONLY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE USSR AND THE USA, BUT OF ALL MANKIND.


END TEXT.

B. ADDITIONAL RELATED INSTRUCTIONS:

SECRET
(1) IT IS THE U.S. POSITION THAT THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 1 ABOVE DOES NOT PRECLUDE MODIFICATIONS TO CURRENTLY "AGREED" POSITIONS IN THE JDTS. BOTH SIDES HAVE ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT "NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL EVERYTHING IS AGREED."

(2) REGARDING RV COUNTING FOR FUTURE TYPES REFERRED TO IN PARA 5 ABOVE, IT IS THE U.S. POSITION THAT "SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION" REFERS TO THE CURRENT START TREATY. NO OPTION IS PRECLUDED BY THE JOINT STATEMENT LANGUAGE. THE U.S. POSITION ON THIS ISSUE IS CURRENTLY UNDER REVIEW AND WILL BE PROVIDED WHEN AVAILABLE.

SECTION II - ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND ON ALCMS

A. THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF THE "ELEMENTS ON COMMON GROUND ON ALCMS" AGREED AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. AS NOTED IN THE MSJS, THE GROUP SHOULD INCORPORATE THIS MATERIAL, AS APPROPRIATE, INTO THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT.

BEGIN TEXT:

ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND ON ALCMS

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(1) ALL CURRENTLY EXISTING LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILE WILL BE CONSIDERED TO BE NUCLEAR-ARMED.

(2) FUTURE CONVENTIONALLY ARMED LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES WILL BE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM NUCLEAR-ARMED LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES.

(3) HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR-ARMED LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES WILL BE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM OTHER HEAVY BOMBERS.

(4) ANY LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILE WHICH HAS BEEN TESTED AND DEPLOYED WITH A NUCLEAR VARIANT -- INCLUDING ALL EXISTING SUCH MISSILES -- MAY BE CARRIED ONLY BY A HEAVY BOMBER EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR-ARMED LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES.

(5) NUCLEAR-ARMED LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES WILL NOT BE LOCATED AT Bases FOR HEAVY BOMBERS NOT EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR-ARMED LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES.

(6) THE SIDES WILL BASE AT SEPARATE LOCATIONS THEIR HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR-ARMED LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES AND THEIR HEAVY BOMBERS NOT EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR-ARMED LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES, AS WELL AS HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NON-NUCLEAR ARMS.

(7) VISITS OF EACH SUCH CATEGORY OF HEAVY BOMBERS TO AIRBASES OF ANOTHER CATEGORY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION.

SECRET
(8) FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS CONVERTED TO TANKER AIRCRAFT, JAMMING AIRCRAFT OR RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT MAY BE BASED AT BASES OF HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR BOTH NUCLEAR-ARMED AND CONVENTIONALLY ARMED LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES.

(9) HEAVY BOMBERS NOT EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR-ARMED LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES, I.E., THOSE EQUIPPED ONLY FOR NUCLEAR GRAVITY BOMBS AND SRAMS, WILL COUNT AS ONE DELIVERY VEHICLE AGAINST THE 1600 LIMIT AND ONE WARHEAD AGAINST THE 6000 LIMIT.

(10) HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR-ARMED LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES WILL COUNT AS ONE DELIVERY VEHICLE AGAINST THE 1600 LIMIT AND AN AGREED NUMBER OF WARHEADS AGAINST THE 6000 LIMIT.

(11) THE NUMBER OF ALCMS COUNTED IN START WILL BE THE SUM OF THE NUMBERS DETERMINED BY MULTIPLYING THE NUMBER OF HEAVY BOMBERS OF EACH TYPE EQUIPPED TO CARRY NUCLEAR-ARMED LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES BY THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ATTRIBUTED TO THAT TYPE.

(12) THE SIDES MAY CONVERT, THROUGH AGREED PROCEDURES, HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR-ARMED LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES TO HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED ONLY FOR NUCLEAR GRAVITY BOMBS AND SRAMS, AS WELL AS TO HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NON-NUCLEAR ARMS.

(13) THE SIDES MAY CONVERT A LIMITED NUMBER OF NUCLEAR-ARMED HEAVY BOMBERS, USING AGREED PROCEDURES, TO RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, JAMMING AIRCRAFT OR TANKER AIRCRAFT. THESE AIRCRAFT WILL NOT COUNT AGAINST THE 1600 OR 6000 LIMITS.

END TEXT.

B. THE GROUP SHOULD ALSO INCORPORATE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL RELATED U.S. POSITIONS INTO THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT.

(1) THE GROUP SHOULD TABLE THE FOLLOWING DEFINITION.

"THE TERM 'FORMER HEAVY BOMBER' MEANS A HEAVY BOMBER THAT HAS BEEN CONVERTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES IN THE PROTOCOL ON CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION SO THAT IT IS NO LONGER EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS.

FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS WOULD INCLUDE HEAVY BOMBERS CONVERTED FOR NON-NUCLEAR ARMS, OR ONLY OR CONVERTED TO BE RECONNAISSANCE, JAMMING OR TANKER AIRCRAFT.

(2) THE LIMIT ON FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS WOULD BE A SINGLE AGGREGATE LIMIT, SPECIFIED IN THE C OR E PROTOCOL, REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL MISSION OF THE AIRCRAFT. REGARDING PARA 12 OF THE "ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND ON ALCMS" APP. THE U.S.
POSITION IS THAT THERE WOULD BE A LIMIT ON FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS (REGARDLESS OF MISSION) IN THE TREATY, BUT THEY WOULD NOT COUNT TOWARD EITHER THE 1600 OR 6000 AGGREGATES.

(3) THE US POSITION REMAINS THAT FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS CAN BE CREATED ONLY BY CONVERTING HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR GRAVITY BOMBS AND SHORT-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES IAW THE C OR E PROTOCOL. HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS CAN BE CONVERTED INTO HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR GRAVITY BOMBS AND SRAMS, WHICH CAN BE SUBSEQUENTLY CONVERTED INTO FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS. FYI: THE U.S. POSITION ON SEQUENTIAL CONVERSION IS UNDER REVIEW. THE KEY QUESTION TO MAKE IS THAT HEAVY BOMBER EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS WHICH IS CONVERTED TO A FORMER HEAVY BOMBER MUST HAVE ITS ALCM CAPABILITY REMOVED AS PART OF THE REMOVAL OF THE AIRCRAFT'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. BEING CONSIDERED IN THE REVIEW IS AIRCRAFT CONVERSION FROM A HEAVY BOMBER EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS TO A FORMER HEAVY BOMBER IN ONE STEP CALLING FOR ONLY ONE INSPECTION AFTER THE ENTIRE PROCESS IS COMPLETED. END FYI.

(4) REGARDING PARAS 6 AND 12 OF THE "ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND ON ALCMS" PAPER, THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NON-NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS MEANS THOSE EQUIPPED ONLY FOR NON-NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS. IT IS PERMISSIBLE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS TO CARRY NON-NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS INCLUDING FUTURE, DISTINGUISHABLE, CONVENTIONALLY-ARMED LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES, BUT THEY WOULD NOT BE TREATED, IN SUCH CASES, AS FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS.

(5) REGARDING PARA 8 OF THE "ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND ON ALCMS" PAPER, FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS WHICH ARE RECONNAISSANCE, TANKER OR JAMMING AIRCRAFT MAY BE BASED AT BASES FOR HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS AS WELL AS AT BASES FOR HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED ONLY FOR NUCLEAR GRAVITY BOMBS AND SHORT-RANGE, AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES. FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS WHICH ARE EQUIPPED TO CARRY NON-NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS ONLY WOULD BE BASED SEPARATELY FROM HEAVY BOMBERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR ALCMSALTHOUGH THEY COULD BE CO-LOCATED WITH FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS WHICH ARE CONVERTED TO BE RECONNAISSANCE, JAMMING OR TANKER AIRCRAFT, THROUGH AGREED PROCEDURES THAT PRECLUDE THEIR USE AS BOMBERS.

THIS AREA WILL BE ACCELERATED IF THE SOVIET SIDE SHOWS A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH TO NUCLEAR-ARMED ALCM ATTRIBUTION. IF THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES, AS NOTED ABOVE, ALCM ATTRIBUTION NUMBERS FOR ITS HEAVY BOMBERS, THE NEGOTIATOR MAY, AT his DISCRETION, ACCEPT AN OUTCOME WHICH MEETS THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA:

-- FOR THE US, A COUNTING RULE OF NO MORE THAN 10 ALCM PER B52;
-- FOR EXISTING SOVIET BOMBERS, A COUNTING RULE OF NO LESS THAN 6 ALCM PER BEAR H AND 3 ALCM PER BLACKJACK.

IN ADDITION, THE GROUP SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT PROVISIONS ON ALCM COUNTING RULES FOR FUTURE HEAVY BOMBER THAT MUST BE AGREED; THE GROUP SHOULD ADD APPROPRIATE PLACEHOLDER LANGUAGE TO THE JD T.

(7) LIMITS ON ALCM INVENTORIES ARE INAPPROPRIATE AND WOULD CREATE UNACCEPTABLE VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES. THE GROUP SHOULD POINT OUT THAT, WITH THE COUNTING RULE AGREED IN PARA II OF THE "ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND ON ALCMS" PAPER, INVENTORY CONSTRAINTS ON ALCMS ARE IRRELEVANT IN A START TREATY. THE US WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY SUBLIMIT ON ALCMS OR HEAVY BOMBER WEAPONS NOR RESTRICTIONS ON CONVENTIONALLY ARMED AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES.


(9) REGARDING INSPECTIONS AT HEAVY BOMBER BASES, THE GROUP SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT UNDER A START TREATY THE SIDES WOULD BE PERMITTED TO CONDUCT ON-SITE INSPECTIONS ONLY AT BASES FOR HEAVY BOMBERS OF A TYPE FROM WHICH ALCMS HAVE BEEN TESTED, BUT WHICH ARE NOT CURRENTLY DECLARED TO BE SO EQUIPPED.

(10) REGARDING DISTINGUISHABILITY RULES, THE GROUP SHOULD SEEK TO HAVE THE SOVIET SIDE EXPLAIN HOW ITS PROPOSAL FOR FUNCTIONALLY RELATED OBSERVABLE DIFFERENCES, BOTH FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES, COULD BE IMPLEMENTED.

(11) THE GROUP SHOULD TACKLE THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS:

"THE TERM 'HEAVY BOMBER EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS' MEANS A HEAVY BOMBER THAT IS EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS AND THAT MAY ADDITIONALLY BE EQUIPPED FOR OTHER ARMAMENTS."

"THE TERM 'HEAVY BOMBER NOT EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS' MEANS A HEAVY BOMBER THAT IS EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND THAT MAY ADDITIONALLY BE EQUIPPED FOR NON-NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, BUT IS NOT EQUIPPED TO CARRY ALCMS."

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
SECTION III - ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND ON MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION

A. THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF THE "ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND ON MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION" AGREED AT THE HOLLOW SUMMIT.

BEGIN TEXT:

ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND ON MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION

1. CONVERSION OF SLBMS INTO MOBILE ICBMS WOULD BE PROHIBITED.

2. FOR ROAD-MOBILE ICBMS, THE REGIME WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE MISSILES AND THEIR LAUNCHERS WOULD BE CONFINED TO RESTRICTED AREAS SPECIFIED IN THE MOU. A RESTRICTED AREA WOULD BE LIMITED IN SIZE TO AN AGREED AREA. EACH RESTRICTED AREA WOULD CONTAIN A LIMITED NUMBER OF MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS.

(B) WITHIN EACH RESTRICTED AREA, THE NUMBER OF STRUCTURES UNIQUE TO MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS WOULD BE LIMITED TO NO MORE THAN THE NUMBER OF MISSILES ON LAUNCHERS SPECIFIED FOR THAT RESTRICTED AREA IN THE MOU. THESE STRUCTURES WOULD BE DESCRIBED IN THE MOU.

(C) EACH SIDE WOULD BE REQUIRED, AT THE REQUEST OF THE OTHER, TO CARRY OUT MEASURES AT THE RESTRICTED AREAS TO ENHANCE OBSERVATION BY NPTM. SUCH MEASURES WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED NO MORE THAN AN AGREED NUMBER OF TIMES EACH YEAR.

(D) MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO DEPART RESTRICTED AREAS FOR NORTH MOVEMENTS, E.G., MOVEMENTS FOR TRAINING, MAINTENANCE AND TESTING. SUCH MOVEMENTS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND WOULD INVOLVE NO MORE THAN AN AGREED PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL MOBILE ICBM FORCE AT ANY ONE TIME.

(E) DISPERSAL OF MOBILE ICBMS AND LAUNCHERS FROM THE RESTRICTED AREAS WOULD BE PERMITTED. SUCH DISPERSALS WOULD BE OF TWO TYPES:

(1) EXERCISE DISPERSALS, WHICH WOULD BE LIMITED IN DURATION AND FREQUENCY.

(2) OPERATIONAL DISPERSALS, WHICH WOULD BE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PURPOSES. THERE WOULD BE NO CONSTRAINTS ON DURATION AND FREQUENCY OF OPERATIONAL DISPERSALS, BUT IN PRACTICE, THEY SHOULD OCCUR ONLY RARELY.
(F) Notification of a dispersal would be provided within an agreed number of hours after the dispersal began and notification of return would be provided within an agreed number of hours after the dispersal ended. All dispersals would be assumed to be exercise dispersals unless the dispersing party notified otherwise.

(G) When a force was one day from the mandated end of an exercise dispersal, the dispersing side would have the option of returning it to its base or notifying that an operational dispersal was in progress. Upon such notification, the dispersing side would be required to state the reason for the operational dispersal.

(H) Upon return of a dispersed force to restricted areas, the other side would have the right to designate a percentage of the total deployed road-mobile ICBM force for enhanced NTM measures and/or on-site inspection.

(1) NTM enhancing measures would involve either moving launchers halfway out of their structures or opening the roofs of the structures, at the discretion of the inspected side.

(2) Post-dispersal OSI would be additional to those inspections conducted under the quota for short-notice OSI.

(I) Non-deployed ICBMs or types that had been deployed in road-mobile launchers and road-mobile launchers that did not contain ICBMs, would be restricted to facilities listed in the MOU or in transit between permitted facilities.

(J) The non-deployed ICBMs would be limited in number and, except for an agreed number of missiles, would have to be stored at least an agreed distance from any restricted area and from any facility at which road-mobile ICBM launchers were stored.

(K) There would be a limit on the number of road-mobile training launchers; these training launchers could not be capable of launching ICBMs and would have to be distinguishable from commercial road-mobile vehicles and from road-mobile ICBM launchers by NTM.

3. For rail-mobile ICBMs, the regime would be as follows:

(A) The missiles and their launchers would be confined to a limited number of rail garrisons, specified in the MOU. Each rail garrison would contain a limited number of missiles and launchers.

(B) Within each garrison, the number of unique shelters for trains would be limited to no more than the number of trains specified for that garrison in the MOU. No shelter would be capable of holding more cars than the number on a standard train.
(C) EACH GARRISON WOULD HAVE NO MORE THAN A SPECIFIED NUMBER OF RAIL ENTRANCE/EXITS.

(D) MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO DEPART RAIL GARRISONS FOR ROUTINE MOVEMENTS AND DISPERSALS, SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS COMPARABLE TO THOSE FOR DEPARTURE OF ROAD-MOBILE ICBMS FOR RESTRICTED AREAS.

(E) TRAINS WITH MISSILES AND THEIR LAUNCHERS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO VARY FROM THEIR STANDARD CONFIGURATION DURING NOTIFIED TRANSIT TO DECLARED MAINTENANCE AND TESTING FACILITIES, AND DURING ROUTINE MOVEMENT OR TRAINING, PROVIDED THAT SUCH VARIATIONS WERE REPORTED UPON COMPLETION OF THE MOVEMENT.

(F) THERE WOULD BE NO RESTRICTION ON THE CONFIGURATION OF TRAINS DURING DISPERSALS.

(G) NON-DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS, RESUPPLY VEHICLES AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS WOULD BE LIMITED IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO THAT FOR THE COMPARABLE ROAD-MOBILE ITEMS.

4. THE SIDES WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO IMPLEMENT CONTINUOUS PERIMETER PORTAL MONITORING AT AGREED PRODUCTION FACILITIES.

END TEXT.

B. THERE FOLLOW ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS RELATED TO THE U.S. POSITION ON VERIFICATION OF ICBMS DEPLOYED IN A MOBILE MODE.

(1) THE GROUP SHOULD PRACTICE, AS INSTRUCTED IN THE MSJS, THE REVISED TREATY LANGUAGE ON MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION, BEING PROVIDED SEPTEL, MAKING CLEAR, AS THE U.S. SIDE DID DURING THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, THAT THE U.S. POSITION REQUIRING THAT MOBILE ICBMS SHOULD BE BANNED. IF THE SIDES CAN ACHIEVE ON SPECIFIC MEASURES FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF LIMITS ON MOBILE ICBMS -- SOME OF WHICH ARE CONTAINED IN THE "ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND ON MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION" PAPER -- THE U.S. COULD CONSIDER PERMITTING A STRICTLY LIMITED NUMBER OF SUCH SYSTEMS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE NEGOTIATOR SHOULD SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATE SEPARATELY JOINT TEXT ON MOBILE ICBMS, WHICH COULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE JDT IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON A VERIFICATION REGIME FOR MOBILE ICBMS.

(2) AS PART OF THE U.S. VERIFICATION REGIME FOR MOBILE ICBMS, DEPLOYMENT OF LIQUID PROPULSANT MOBILE ICBMS WOULD BE PROHIBITED. NEITHER SIDE HAS SUCH SYSTEMS, AND THEIR INTRODUCTION WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY COMPLICATE THE VERIFICATION REGIME FOR ICBMS DEPLOYED IN THIS MODE.

(3) AS PART OF THE U.S. VERIFICATION REGIME FOR MOBILE ICBMS, THE GROUP SHOULD PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING DEFINITION:
"The term 'dispersal' means the situation in which more than (blank) percent of all deployed ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs are located outside of restricted deployment areas or in which more than (blank) percent of all deployed ICBMs for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs are located outside of garrisons."

(4) For ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs, movements for training may be to locations or facilities specified in the MOU, such as a training facility, or to locations not specified in the MOU. Movements for maintenance and testing would be only to facilities or locations specified in the MOU.

(5) Regarding operational dispersals, the U.S. side should emphasize that such dispersals would be made only rarely and would be in response to the most serious circumstances which must be specified in the appropriate notification. Frequent or prolonged operational dispersals of mobile ICBMs would raise serious questions regarding the deploying side's intentions and challenge the very basis of the START treaty.

(6) The size of the restricted deployment area would be 25 square kilometers.

(7) A side could possess no more than an agreed percentage of its road-mobile launchers that would be considered as operational spares, not containing deployed ICBMs; such launchers would be located no less than an agreed distance from any restricted deployment area and from any facility at which ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs are stored.

(8) Dedicated mobile resupply vehicles for ICBMs on road-mobile launchers of ICBMs would be prohibited. The group should table the following definition:

"The term 'resupply vehicle' means a self-propelled, road-mobile vehicle that is used to transport ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs reloading road-mobile launchers of ICBMs."

The group should revise the U.S.-proposed definition for "missile resupply railcar" as follows:

"The term 'ballistic missile resupply railcar' means a railcar that is used to transport ICBMs for the purpose of reloading rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs."

(9) Although the U.S. does not yet have a specific number to table for the size of a rail-mobile ICBM garrison, such garrisons would be small.

(10) In addition to these provisions, the sides would have the right to implement perimeter portal monitoring, at a minimum, at all facilities producing solid rocket motor stages as large as or larger than the smallest accountable stage of a treaty-limited mobile ICBM."
SECTION IV - OTHER INSTRUCTIONS

A. THE GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE EXPANDED DATA EXCHANGE DRAWING ON PREVIOUS GUIDANCE. THE GROUP SHOULD INDICATE THAT FUTURE EXCHANGES OF DATA ON TREATY-LIMITED ARMS SHOULD DRAW ON FORMATS AGREED IN THE MOU. THE U.S. POSITION ON INCLUSION OF DATA ON ARMS IS CLEAR; HOWEVER, REGARDING THE EXCHANGE OF DATA ON ARMS THE U.S. HAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE TECHNICAL DATA ON SLCMS), THE GROUP SHOULD INDICATE THAT WASHINGTON WILL PROVIDE SUCH DATA ON EXCHANGE ONCE THE SOVIETS AGREE TO DROP SLCM INVENTORY LIMITS.

B. HEAVY ICBMS: THE NEGOTIATOR SHOULD RECOMMEND TO WASHINGTON WHEN IN HIS JUDGMENT SOVIET MOVEMENT IN OTHER AREAS JUSTIFIES HIS INDICATING TO THE SOVIETS THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF PERMITTING SOME TESTING AND LIMITED MODERNIZATION OF SOVIET HEAVY ICBMS IF THE SOVIET SIDE WERE TO AGREE TO PERMIT THE U.S. SIDE AN EQUAL RIGHT TO HEAVY ICBMS.

C. SLCMS:

(1) THE SOVIET-PROPOSED SLCM VERIFICATION REGIME WOULD NOT ALLOW A SIDE RELIABLY TO DETECT AND COUNT NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS; IT WOULD CAUSE UNACCEPTABLE INTERFERENCE WITH OPERATIONS AND UNACCEPTABLE EXPOSURE OF SENSITIVE FACILITIES TO INTRUSIVE INSPECTION.

(2) THE ONLY SOLUTION THE U.S. SIDE CAN ENVISION AT THIS TIME REMAINS A NON-BINDING DECLARATION OF PLANS FOR NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS.

(3) IF THE SIDES CAN RESOLVE THIS ISSUE ON THE BASIS OF A DECLARATORY APPROACH, THE U.S. WOULD MAKE A STATEMENT THAT IT PLANS TO ACQUIRE NO MORE THAN A SPECIFIED NUMBER OF NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS. THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD MAKE A COMPARABLE STATEMENT. BOTH SIDES WOULD RESERVE THE RIGHT TO CHANGE THESE PLANS.

SECRET
(4) IF THE SOVIETS INDICATE THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS NUMBERS IN THE CONTEXT OF A DECLARATORY APPROACH, THE NEGOTIATOR MAY, AT HIS DISCRETION, DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS:

- (A) IN ORDER TO SIMPLIFY THIS SCHEME AND TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE DIFFERENT FORCES OF EACH SIDE AS WELL AS THE GEOGRAPHIC ASYMMETRIES FACING BOTH SIDES, THE U.S. PROPOSES TO APPLY THIS DECLARATORY APPROACH TO ALL NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS OF ALL RANGES.

- (B) THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS THE U.S. ENVISIONS DECLARING IS 1500.

D. MISSILE TENDERS AND OSI AT SSBN PORT FACILITIES:

THE GROUP SHOULD INCORPORATE THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL IN THE JDT MAKING APPROPRIATE CONFORMING CHANGES.

(1) ARTICLE VII, ADD THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH:

MISSILE TENDERS AND STORAGE CRANES SHALL BE CONSIDERED TO CONTAIN THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF NON-DEPLOYED SUBMIS THEY ARE CAPABLE OF CONTAINING, AS DECLARED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OR IN SUBSEQUENT DATA UPDATES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE X.

(2) ARTICLE X, ADD THE FOLLOWING TO THE END OF THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 5(C):

"...EXCEPT FOR THE TRANSIT OF NON-DEPLOYED SUBMIS CONTAINED IN MISSILES TENDERS."

(3) ARTICLE X, ADD THE FOLLOWING AFTER THE END OF PARAGRAPH 5(C):

NOTIFICATION, NO MORE THAN 48 HOURS AFTER THE END OF EACH (BLANK) DAY PERIOD, OF THE LOCATION OF MISSILE TENDERS, WHEN SUCH MISSILE TENDERS ARE NOT AT THE LOCATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OR IN SUBSEQUENT DATA UPDATES PURSUANT TO THIS ARTICLE OF THE TREATY. THIS NOTIFICATION SHALL INCLUDE THE LOCATION FOR EACH SUCH MISSILE TENDER AT APPROXIMATELY (BLANK) DAY INTERVALS DURING THE TRANSIT PERIOD, INCLUDING THE DATE AND TIME AT SUCH LOCATION.

(4) INSPECTION PROTOCOL, SECTION IX, PARAGRAPH 1:

WITHIN ONE HOUR AFTER THE TIME OF SPECIFICATION OF AN INSPECTION SITE NOTIFIED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV OF THIS PROTOCOL, THE INSPECTING PARTY SHALL IMPLEMENT PRE-INSPECTION MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS AT THE INSPECTION SITE WHICH SHALL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL THE INSPECTION TEAM COMPLETES ITS PRE-INSPECTION ACTIVITIES AND BEGINS THE INSPECTION OF THE SITE. THE FOLLOWING LIMITATIONS SHALL APPLY...
- (A) FOR ICBM SITES AND SLBM SITES OTHER THAN BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE PORT FACILITIES, (PROCEDURES TO BE PROVIDED).

- (B) FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE PORT FACILITIES, DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME THAT PRE-INSPECTION MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS ARE IN EFFECT, ACCOUNTABLE STAGES OF NON-DEPLOYED SLBMS, THE LAUNCH CANISTERS AND SHIPPING CONTAINERS FOR SUCH MISSILES, AND VEHICLES LARGE ENOUGH TO CONTAIN THE SMALLEST ACCOUNTABLE STAGE OF A NON-DEPLOYED SLBM OF THE INSPECTED PARTY SHALL NOT BE REMOVED FROM THE INSPECTION SITE.

- (C) FOR HEAVY BOMBER BASES, (PROCEDURES TO BE PROVIDED).

(5) INSPECTION PROTOCOL, SECTION IX, PARAGRAPH 6:

FOR INSPECTIONS AT BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE PORT FACILITIES, THE INSPECTION TEAM SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO INSPECT THE SITE, INCLUDING SHROUDED OR ENVIRONMENTALLY PROTECTED OBJECTS, AND THE INTERIORS OF UNDERGROUND AND ABOVE-GROUND STRUCTURES, CONTAINERS, AND VEHICLES WHOSE DIMENSIONS ARE EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN THE DIMENSIONS SPECIFIED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OR SUBSEQUENT DATA UPDATES FOR THE SMALLEST ACCOUNTABLE STAGE OF ANY SLBM OF THE INSPECTED PARTY. SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:

- (A) THE PROCEDURES SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPH 5 (A) THROUGH (H) OF THIS SECTION SHALL APPLY.

- (B) THE INSPECTION TEAM SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED ON OR WITHIN SUBMARINES, SURFACE SHIPS, MISSILE TENDERS, OR STORAGE CRANES LOCATED AT THE INSPECTION SITE.

- (C) NOTWITHSTANDING PARAGRAPH 6 (B) OF THIS SECTION, THE INSPECTING PARTY SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO INSPECT, AS PART OF AN INSPECTION AT A BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE PORT FACILITY CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY, ONE MISSILE TENDER OF EACH TYPE OF MISSILE TENDER OF THE INSPECTED PARTY, AS SPECIFIED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OR SUBSEQUENT DATA UPDATES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE X, THAT DOES NOT CONTAIN SLBMS IN VERTICAL TUBES COVERED BY HATCHES VISIBLE TO NTM. IN ADDITION, IF A NEW TYPE OF MISSILE TENDER THAT contains SLBMs IN HORIZONTAL TUBES IS SUBSEQUENTLY DECLARED IN DATA UPDATES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE X OF THE TREATY, THE INSPECTING PARTY SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO INSPECT ONE MISSILE TENDER OF SUCH TYPE IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN INSPECTION CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY.

E. SPACE LAUNCH VESSELS, SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES:

THE GROUP SHOULD INCORPORATE THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL INTO THE JDfat Making Appropriate Conforming Changes:
(1) CHANGE THE DEFINITION OF "SPACE LAUNCH CENTER" TO:

"THE TERM 'SPACE LAUNCH FACILITY' MEANS A FACILITY FROM WHICH OBJECTS ARE DELIVERED INTO THE UPPER ATMOSPHERE OR SPACE USING ICBMS OR SLBMS CONVERTED FOR SUCH PURPOSES.

(2) DELETE THE DEFINITION FOR "SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE."

(3) IN ARTICLE VI, DELETE PARAGRAPHS ON SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES, SPACE LAUNCH CENTERS, AND LAUNCHERS FOR SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES (TREATY PAGES 30 AND 31, PARA 1 (U)) AND REPLACE WITH THE FOLLOWING (APPROXIMATING CONFORMING CHANGES):

EACH PARTY SHALL BE PERMITTED TO USE ICBMS AND SLBMS AS VEHICLES FOR DELIVERING OBJECTS INTO THE UPPER ATMOSPHERE OR SPACE. ALL SUCH ICBMS AND SLBMS SHALL BE CONSIDERED TO BE EITHER DEPLOYED OR NON-DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES IN ACCORDANCE WITH AND SUBJECT TO THE RESPECTIVE PROVISIONS OF THIS TREATY ON DEPLOYED AND NON-DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES, EXCEPT THAT EACH PARTY MAY POSSESS (BLANK) ICBMS AND SLBMS TO BE USED AS VEHICLES FOR DELIVERING OBJECTS INTO THE UPPER ATMOSPHERE OR SPACE THAT SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE EITHER DEPLOYED OR NON-DEPLOYED ICBMS OR SLBMS IF:

-(A) SUCH ICBMS AND SLBMS HAVE BEEN CONVERTED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VIII OF THIS TREATY AND THE PROTOCOL ON CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION.

-(B) SUCH ICBMS AND SLBMS ARE LOCATED AT DESIGNATED SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES, STORAGE FACILITIES FOR ICBMS AND SLBMS CONVERTED TO VEHICLES FOR DELIVERING OBJECTS INTO THE UPPER ATMOSPHERE OR SPACE, OR CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION FACILITIES WHERE SUCH ICBMS AND SLBMS ARE CONVERTED AS SPECIFIED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OR SUBSEQUENT DATA UPDATES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE X, OR IN TRANSIT BETWEEN SUCH FACILITIES.

THE NUMBER OF SUCH DESIGNATED SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES OF EACH PARTY AT WHICH SUCH CONVERTED ICBMS AND SLBMS ARE LOCATED SHALL NOT EXCEED (BLANK), UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED. EACH PARTY SHALL LIMIT THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS AT SUCH SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES WHICH HAVE CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED SUCH CONVERTED ICBMS AND SLBMS TO (BLANK), UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED.

(4) IN THE C OR E PROTOCOL, SECTION VI, THE GROUP SHOULD MODIFY THE TEXT SO THAT EACH USE OF THE PHRASE "SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES" IS REPLACED BY THE PHRASE "ICBMS AND SLBMS CONVERTED TO VEHICLES FOR DELIVERING OBJECTS INTO THE UPPER ATMOSPHERE OR SPACE" (REMOVING REDUNDANCIES WHERE APPROPRIATE). MOU ANNEX F SHOULD BE RETAINED AS "LAUNCH FACILITIES AND STORAGE FACILITIES WHERE CONVERTED ICBMS AND SLBMS ARE LOCATED."
THE TERM 'STORAGE FACILITY FOR CONVERTED ICBMS AND SLBMS' MEANS A FACILITY OTHER THAN A SPACE LAUNCH FACILITY, WHERE ICBMS AND SLBMS CONVERTED FOR DELIVERY OF OBJECTS INTO THE UPPER ATMOSPHERE OR SPACE ARE STORED.

(6) THE INTENT BEHIND THE ABOVE CHANGES IS TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE U.S. SEeks TO CONTROL ICBMS AND SLBMS CONVERTED TO SPACE LAUNCH PURPOSES AND TO SPECIFY THE NUMBER OF SUCH CONVERTED MISSILES AND THEIR LOCATIONS, BUT NOT TO CONTROL OR REPORT ON SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES IN GENERAL.

F. CHANGES IN THE TREATY TEXT:

(1) IN ARTICLE II, ADD TO THE DEFINITION OF A "BALLISTIC MISSILE ASSEMBLY FACILITY" THAT SUCH A FACILITY IS ALSO OUTSIDE OF TEST RANGES.

(2) IN THE ARTICLE II DEFINITION FOR A HEAVY BOMBER, THE U.S. WOULD LIKE TO RETAIN THE OPTION TO DESIGNATE INDIVIDUAL BOMBERS AS HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR AVIATION. SINCE THE SOVIET-PROPOSED SUB PARAGRAPH (B) WOULD PERMIT THIS OPTION, THE GROUP SHOULD EMERGED IT CRITERION AND DELETE "HEAVY" IN ARTICLE V, FIRST SENTENCE, FIRST SUBPARAGRAPH OF PAGE 22, WHILE MAINTAINING THE U.S. RANGE THRESHOLD OF 1500 KM. ACCEPTANCE OF THE MODIFIED SOVIET-PROPOSED CRITERION (B) WOULD PERMIT THE U.S. TO DROP ITS PROPOSED CRITERION (D).

(3) THE GROUP SHOULD DECRATE A DEFINITION OF "WARHEAD" FOR WASHINGTON CLEARANCE AND SUBSEQUENT TABLES.

(4) IN ARTICLE V, PAGE 19, ADD THE PHRASE "AND SUBSEQUENT DATA UPDATES" AFTER "MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING," AS APPROPRIATE, HERE AND THROUGHOUT THE JDT TEXTS.

(5) IN ARTICLE V, PAGE 23, CHANGE THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE THIRD PARAGRAPH TO READ: "EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO HAVE UNDERGROUND FACILITIES ACCESSIBLE TO WATERBORNE VESSELS VIA ADITS TO ADJACENT WATERS.

(6) IN ARTICLE VI, PAGE 2, U.S. PARAGRAPH 1, CHANGE "TWO NON-DEPLOYED ICBMS" TO "TWO NON-DEPLOYED ICBMS OF EACH TYPE OF ICBM AT EACH ICBM.

(7) IN ARTICLE VI, PAGE 2, U.S. PARAGRAPH 1, CHANGE FIRST SENTENCE TO PERMIT LOCATION OF MISSILE REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT AT TEST RANGES AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES FOR SUCH EQUIPMENT.

(8) IN ARTICLE VI, PAGE 2, U.S. PARAGRAPH 1, MODIFY AS FOLLOWS: "...INTO OR OUT OF A FACILITY AT WHICH...THE AUTHORIZED PORTAL SPECIFIED..."
(9) In Article VII, page 34, first paragraph, the U.S. currently has placeholder language regarding accountability of ICBMs or SLBMs removed from their launchers. The group should replace the current placeholder language drawing on the following regarding ICBM accountability (appropriate conforming and tracking fixes should be incorporated). Since there is no limit on the number of non-deployed SLBMs in an SSBN port facility, there is no problem with accountability of SLBMs temporarily removed from their launchers and, thus, is no need to refer to SLBMs in this provision.

If a deployed ICBM is removed from a silo launcher, an ICBM at that launcher deployment area and outside of a silo launcher may be counted as a deployed ICBM associated with that silo launcher if the following conditions are met:
- (A) the removal is notified within 24 hours;
- (B) the silo launcher remains empty; and
- (C) the launcher is made subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI, Para 3.

(10) In Article VII, page 35, second paragraph, delete wherever they appear the words: "or container."

(11) In Article VII, page 35, add to the list of existing Soviet SLBMs the SS-N-5.

(12) In Article VII, page 38, U.S. Subparagraph G, the group should modify language to make clear that heavy bombers equipped for ALCMS count as ten warheads toward the 6,000 aggregate limit. Similarly, in subparagraph H, on page 40, the group should modify the language to make clear that a heavy bomber not equipped for ALCMS will count as one warhead toward the 6,000 aggregate limit.

(13) In Article X, Para 5, replace Subparagraph (A) with the following (making appropriate conforming changes):

PLACEHOLDER LANGUAGE CONCERNING NOTIFICATIONS FOR FUTURE SYSTEMS.

(14) In Article X, Para 5(C), insert the word "ACCOUNTABLE" in front of "ICBM and SLBM stages."

(15) In Article X, Paragraph 5 (D), the group should delete this language, add placeholder language referring to the launch notification agreement signed at the Moscow summit, add placeholder language on additional provisions that may be agreed, and conform Section VII, Para 2 of the C or E protocol. Language should be forwarded to Washington prior to tabling with Soviet.
(16) IN ARTICLE XI, PARAGRAPH 2, CONSISTENT WITH THE U.S. POSITION IN THE PROTOCOL ON INSPECTION, THE GROUP SHOULD BRACKET "30 DAYS" AS SOVIET-PROPOSED LANGUAGE AND INSERT A BLANK AS U.S. LANGUAGE.

(17) IN ARTICLE XI, PARAGRAPH 6, PAGE 6, THE GROUP SHOULD REPLACE "COINCIDENTLY WITH" LANGUAGE EQUIVALENT TO "AT THE SAME TIME AND PLACE."


G. CHANGES IN THE CURRENT PROTOCOL:

(1) IN SECTION I, PARAGRAPH 2, THE GROUP SHOULD OFFER TO UNBRACKET SUBPARAGRAPH (A) IN EXCHANGE FOR SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF U.S.-PROPOSED LANGUAGE IN PARAGRAPHS (A)(1) AND (II) OF SECTION I.

(2) A RESOLUTION OF THE PROPOSAL SUGGESTED IN SECTION IV, PARA G(1) ABOVE, WOULD ALSO RESOLVE U.S. CONCERNS REGARDING PERMITTING EXPLOSIVE DEMOLITION DESCRIBED IN SECTION I, PARAGRAPH 5. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE GROUP MAY PERMIT EXPLOSIVE DEMOLITION OF BOTH SOLID AND LIQUID PROPELLANT BALLISTIC MISSILES.

(3) SECTION I, PARAGRAPH 7, THE GROUP SHOULD OFFER TO ACCEPT SOVIET-PROPOSED LANGUAGE FOR PARAGRAPH 7, CONDITIONAL ON SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. LANGUAGE IN PARAGRAPH 6 THAT PROVIDES FOR JOINT CONFIRMATION THAT THE INSPECTION TEAM HAS OBSERVED COMPLETION OF THE ELIMINATION PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN THAT SECTION. SIMILARLY, THE GROUP SHOULD OFFER TO DROP "CERTIFICATION" LANGUAGE ELSEWHERE IN THE C E PROTOCOL (SECTION III, PARA 5(D)), SECTION V, PARA 1; SECTION VI, PARA 4) WITH SIMILAR CONDITIONS. ALSO MAKE TRACKING FIX TO INSPECTION PROTOCOL, SECTION XI, PARA

(4) SECTION II, THE GROUP SHOULD ADD A PROVISION PROVIDING THAT, WHEN ALL SILOS OF ICBM LAUNCHER GROUP -- AS SPECIFIED IN THE MOST RECENT UPDATE ARE ELIMINATED, ANY SILOS USED AS LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITIES LOCATED IN THAT LAUNCHER GROUP MUST ALSO BE ELIMINATED. HOWEVER, IF A SIDE DOES NOT ELIMINATE ALL THE SILO LAUNCHERS SECRET
IN A LAUNCHER GROUP, IT SHOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO ELIMINATE ANY SILOS USED AS LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITIES WITHIN THAT LAUNCHER GROUP.

(5) IN SECTION III, PARAGRAPH 2, THE GROUP SHOULD PROPOSE "FROM THE SECURED AREA AROUND THE LAUNCHER" INSTEAD OF "LAUNCH SITES."

(6) IN SECTION II, PARAGRAPH 7 PROPOSE "80 DAYS" AS THE TIME PERIOD FOR SILO ELIMINATION.

(7) IN SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 4, SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING FOR CURRENT U.S. PLACEHOLDER LANGUAGE (MAKING APPROPRIATE CONFORMING CHANGES):

"4. A BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE SHALL REMAIN VISIBLE TO NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE ELIMINATION PROCESS. ELIMINATION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS SUBJECT TO THE TREATY AND SPECIFIED IN THE MOU SHALL BE ACCOMPLISHED USING THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:
- (A) DISASSEMBLY AND ELIMINATION OF THE BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE WITH ITS SLBM LAUNCHERS, OR;
- (B) REMOVAL AND ELIMINATION OF SECTION OF THE BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE. AFTER THE REMOVED SECTION OR THE BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE MAY BE REJOINED PROVIDING THE SUBMARINE IS RETAINED IN A NON-SEAGOING STATUS. WHEN IN NON-SEAGOING STATUS, THE SUBMARINE'S DIVING PLANES WILL HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THE TOP OF THE BOW, THE SUBMARINE'S SAIL AND ALL EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN THE SAIL WILL HAVE BEEN REMOVED TO A LEVEL NO GREATER THAN TWO METERS ABOVE THE LEVEL OF THE EXISTING DECK, AND THAT PORTION OF THE SUBMARINE'S RUDDER SECTION PROJECTING ABOVE THE WATER LINE WILL HAVE BEEN REMOVED. THE SUBMARINE RETAINED IN A NON-SEAGOING STATUS MAY BE TRANSPORTED AT SEA BY TOWING OR THE SURFACE. THE LOCATION OF DISASSEMBLED BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES MUST BE SPECIFIED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OR SUBSEQUENT DATA UPDATES, AND THE HULL SHALL REMAIN VISIBLE AT ALL TIMES TO NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS UNTIL EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF THE SUBMARINE."

(8) SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 7, MODIFY U.S.-PROPOSED LANGUAGE TO READ: "OR IF A BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE IS TO BE OTHERWISE MODIFIED OR OVERHAULED."

(9) SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 8, DELETE THE FIRST U.S.-PROPOSED "DEPLOYED" BUT RETAIN THE SECOND "DEPLOYED." IN THE LAST SENTENCE (U.S. PROPOSED LANGUAGE), CHANGE "HAVE" TO "HAS".

(10) SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 9, CHANGE IN U.S.-PROPOSED "(BLANK) BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES" TO "(BLANK) SLBM LAUNCHERS" AND CHANGE "BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES" TO "SLBM LAUNCHERS" IN LINE 5 OF THAT PARAGRAPH.
(11) SECTION V, PARAGRAPHS 8-10, THE GROUP SHOULD REDRAFT TO MAKE CONSISTENT WITH THE U.S. POSITION NOTED ABOVE IN SECTION II.

(12) SECTION VI, PARAGRAPH 4, SAME AS FOR SECTION I, PARAGRAPH 7.

(13) SECTION VI, ADD NEW PARAGRAPH 5 TO THE EFFECT THAT ICBMS AND SLBMS CONVERTED TO VEHICLES FOR DELIVERING OBJECTS INTO THE UPPER ATMOSPHERE OR SPACE SHALL BE REMOVED FROM ACCOUNTABILITY BY REASON OF LAUNCH OR STATIC TESTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURES IN SECTION IV OF THE C OR E PROTOCOL; SUCH SYSTEMS, IF UNUSED, MAY ALTERNATIVELY BE REMOVED FROM ACCOUNTABILITY BY USE OF THE PROCEDURES IN SECTION I OF THE C OR E PROTOCOL.

(14) SECTION VIII, PARAGRAPHS 4(D) AND 5, GROUP SHOULD ADD LANGUAGE INDICATING THE LOCATION, TYPE AND DATE OF ELIMINATION WILL BE SPECIFIED IN THE MOU OR SUBSEQUENT DATA UPDATES.

H. CHANGES TO THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL:

(1) SECTION I, DRAFT FOR WASHINGTON REVIEW, DEFINITION OF THE TERM "VEHICLE" THAT INCLUDES ONLY ROAD, RAIL OR OTHER GROUND-MOBILE CONVEYANCES AND EXCLUDES AIRBORNE AND WATER-BORNE MEANS OF TRANSPORT.

(2) SECTION I, PARAGRAPH 4 (AND ALSO SECTION IX, SOVIET PARAGRAPH 4 AND SECTION XI, PARAGRAPH 6, SOVIET WORD "ENTIRE"): U.S. CONCERN THAT SITE DIAGRAMS APPENDED TO MOU OR SUBSEQUENT DATA UPDATES WILL DESCRIBE THE BOUNDARIES OF EACH "INSPECTION SITE" AND, WITHIN THESE BOUNDARIES, THE ENTIRE AREA IS SUBJECT TO INSPECTION AS SPECIFIED BY (AND WITH ONLY THE SPECIFIC EXCEPTIONS LISTED IN) THE SPECIFIC PROCEDURES REGULATING EACH TYPE OF INSPECTION. SITE DIAGRAMS WOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR NEW FACILITIES DECLARED AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE X, PARA 4 NOTIFICATIONS.

(3) SECTION I, PARAS 18-19: DELETE THE TERM "ON-SITE REPRESENTATIVE" AND INCLUDE ITS FUNCTIONS IN THE TERM "IN-COUNTRY ESCORT," MAKING CONFORMING CHANGES THROUGHOUT THE PROTOCOL.

(4) SECTION III, PARA 3: BASIS FOR OBJECTION TO INSPECTORS, AIRCREW MEMBERS, OR IN THE CASE OF SUBSEQUENT DETERMINATION, MONITORS OR MONITORING SUPPORT PERSONNEL SHOULD INCLUDE "CONVICTION" VICE "SENTENCED" IN A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING.

(5) SECTION V, PARA (SOVIET PROPOSAL) DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE COUNTERPROPOSAL TO THIS SOVIET TEXT THAT ACCEPTS ITS MAIN THEME WHILE REMOVING REFERENCES TO OTHER COUNTRIES Basing COUNTRIES.
(6) SECTION V, PARA 7: IN THE LAST SENTENCE, DELETE "OR BEFORE."

(7) SECTION VI, PARA. 3: REDRAFT AS FOLLOWS: "IN DISCHARGING THEIR FUNCTIONS, INSPECTORS SHALL GIVE DIRECTIONS TO OR MAKE REQUESTS OF PERSONNEL OF THE INSPECTED PARTY ONLY THROUGH THE IN-COUNTRY ESCORT. SHALL NOT INTERFERE UNNECESSARILY WITH ONGOING ACTIVITIES AT THE INSPECTION SITE AND SHALL AVOID UNNECESSARILY HAMPERING OR DELAYING THE OPERATION OF A FACILITY OR TAKING ACTIONS AFFECTING ITS SAFE OPERATION."

THE REQUIREMENT ON INSPECTED SIDE TO MAKE ESCORT OFFICER CONTINUOUSLY AVAILABLE SHOULD BE ADDED HERE OR ELSEWHERE IN THIS SECTION.

(8) SECTION IX: INSERT, BEFORE "MISSILE(S)" "BALLISTIC" WHEREVER APPROPRIATE.

(9) SECTION XI, PARAGRAPH 3: REVISE LIST OF ITEMS (AND ALSO LIST IN ARTICLE VIII, PARA (4) TO CONFORM TO ARTICLE X, PARAGRAPH 5 (E).

(10) SECTION XII, PARAGRAPH 7: CHANGE SPECIFY AND INSPECT ANOTHER MISSILE" TO "SPECIFY ANOTHER MISSILE FOR INSPECTION."

(11) SECTION XII, PARAGRAPH 8: CHANGE "COMPLETE ITS INSPECTION" TO "COMPLETE ITS OBSERVATION."

(12) SECTION XII, PARAGRAPH 9(A): CHANGE "SITE OF" TO "LAUNCHER FOR."

(13) SECTION XII, PARAGRAPH 9(C): CHANGE "OR AT A DESIGNATED FACILITY" TO "OR AT ANOTHER LOCATION SPECIFIED BY THE INSPECTED PARTY. IF THE INSPECTION IS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED AT SUCH A LOCATION SPECIFIED BY THE INSPECTED PARTY,..."

(14) SECTION XVI, PARA. 9: ADD AN EXPLICIT PROVISION BANNING RAIL EXITS OTHER THAN THE DESIGNATED PORTAL.

I. CHANGES TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING:

(1) IN SECTION I, THE GROUP SHOULD TABLE THE FOLLOWING PROPOSED DEFINITIONS:

"THE TERM 'LAUNCH-ASSOCIATED SUPPORT VEHICLE' MEANS A SELF-PROPELLED ROLL-MOBILE VEHICLE (OR BE PROVIDED)."

"THE TERM 'LAUNCH-ASSOCIATED RAILCAR' MEANS TO BE PROVIDED)."

"THE TERM 'MISSILE TRANSPORTER' MEANS A VEHICLE WHICH IS SPECIFICALLY CONFIGURED TO TRANSPORT ICBMS, SLBMS OR STAGES OF ICBMS OR SLBMS."
"THE TERM 'PROPELLANT VEHICLE' MEANS A VEHICLE SPECIFICALLY CONFIGURED TO CONTAIN AND TRANSPORT PROPELLANT FOR AN ICBM OR SLBM."

(2) IN SECTION I, THE GROUP SHOULD REVISE THE DEFINITION FOR A HEAVY BOMBER BASE AS FOLLOWS:

"THE TERM 'HEAVY BOMBER BASE' MEANS A FACILITY AT WHICH HEAVY BOMBERS ARE BASED AND SUPPORTED."

(3) IN SECTION I, PAR. 17 THE GROUP SHOULD ADD "LAUNCH CANISTER" TO THE DEFINITION OF CORRESPONDING SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AND MAKE CONFORMING CHANGES IN ANNEXES B AND C.

(4) IN ANNEX B, UNDER CORRESPONDING, ASSOCIATED SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FOR SLBMS, CHANGE "TRANSPORTER" TO "MISSILE TRANSPORTER."

(5) IN ANNEXES B AND C, UNDER BALLISTIC MISSILE TEST RANGES, PROVIDE FOR LISTING SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF TEST LAUNCHERS AND NUMBER OF TRAINING LAUNCHERS.

(6) IN ANNEX B UNDER S ILO-LAUNCHED ICBMS, PAGE 30, DELETE THE ENTIRE ENTRY FOR 'S ILO I CBMs LAUNCHERS BEING ELIMINATED' SINCE THIS DATA WOULD BE PROVIDED IN ARTICLES X NOTIFICATIONS PROVIDED AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE.

(7) CONSISTENT WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS ON FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS IN SECTION II OF THIS TABLE, THE GROUP SHOULD MERGE ANNEX H (FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS) INTO ANNEX D. SEPARATE LISTINGS SHOULD BE INCLUDED FOR FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS WHICH CARRY ONLY NON-NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND FOR THOSE CONVERTED TO BE TANKIE, JAMMER AND RECCE AIRCRAFT.
SUBJECT: Instructions for Defense and Space Negotiating Group for Round X

REFERENCES: (A) State 608937
(B) State 51675

1. Secret - Entire text.

2. The following guidance for the U.S. Defense and Space Negotiating Group to the negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms for Round X, beginning July 12, 1988. Except as modified below, previous guidance remains in effect.

3. Primary U.S. objectives for the Defense and Space negotiating group in Round X are to preserve the gains of previous rounds and:

   -- To prepare the joint draft text of a separate Defense and Space Treaty, building on the Washington Summit Joint Statement, which will have the same legal status as the START Treaty, and to continue work on the Treaty's joint draft protocol. The negotiating group should reaffirm the protocol as an integral part of the treaty and reinforce the linkage between the two documents.

   -- To clarify the meaning of the Washington Summit Joint Statement in the basic agreement and protocol. Toward that end, the negotiating group should preserve the right to deploy advanced strategic defenses at the end of the nonwithdrawal period agreed to at the Washington Summit. This should be done by seeking Soviet agreement to explicit U.S.-proposed language on the deployment of defenses in the Defense and Space Treaty, which protects the sides' freedom to decide their course of action at the end of the nonwithdrawal period, unless agreed otherwise.

   -- To maintain the U.S. position that the nonwithdrawal commitment to the ABM Treaty must be maintained in scope to preserve supreme interest and other standard international law withdrawal and termination rights. The negotiating group should refer to
para 6 of Round IX instructions (ref tel A) for an explanation of these rights.

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To continue to develop the joint staff text of the protocol on predictability and confidence-building measures.

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To make it clear that we will not conclude any strategic arms agreements, either in START or in Defense and Space, while the issue of the illegal Soviet Krasnovarsk radar remains unresolved, and that we consider the only appropriate resolution to be dismantlement of the radar.

4. The negotiators, at their discretion, are authorized to raise with the Soviets the U.S. compromise on termination rights proposed at the Moscow Summit. Under the compromise, the United States would eliminate its proposed provision relating to termination rights in the event there is a failure to reduce strategic offensive arms according to the START Treaty in return for elimination of the Soviet-proposed provision in the START JDT that is its mirror image.

5. The negotiating group may draw on the following talking points:

- We have proposed that the sides agree not to object on the basis of the ABM Treaty to each other's space-based sensors and their activities.

- This is because of the growing importance to both sides of our satellite sensor systems and the increasing difficulty of distinguishing between those systems that are and which are not addressed by the ABM Treaty.

- Space-based sensors, including those for warning and attack assessment, are indispensable to assuring stability and security for both sides; neither side would want to limit their modernization, improvement, testing and deployment.

- But trying to allow such systems while limiting space-based sensors addressed by the ABM Treaty would pose an unsolvable verification problem for the two categories simply could not be distinguished. These difficulties are much more severe than in the case of fixed, land-based sensors.

- The idea is that neither Party will object, on the basis of the ABM Treaty, to the development, testing or deployment by the
other Party of any space-based sensor. Each Party may develop, test and deploy space-based sensors without restriction.

-- If asked by the Soviets about the definition of a space-based sensor, the negotiating group should use the following definition:

- A sensor detects and responds to a signal or stimulus and acquires data, regardless of how the data acquired are processed or how the information derived from the processing is used. Its functioning may depend upon illumination from microwave generators, lasers, particle beam accelerators, or other illuminators. Data processing does not affect the status of a sensor. If an ABM interceptor missile or a component of an ABM system based on other physical principles and capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile, incorporates a sensor, then it will be governed by the applicable provisions of the ABM Treaty.

6. The Negotiators should seek Soviet agreement to our proposal that the sides agree not to object to each other's space-based sensors, drawing on the following language:
Neither Party shall object, on the basis of the ABM Treaty, to the development, testing or deployment by the other Party of any space-based sensor. Accordingly, each Party may develop, test and deploy space-based sensors without restriction.

The Negotiator should stress that the U.S. believes the sides could reach agreement on this proposal separately from resolution of other outstanding issues in DST. The U.S. is flexible on how agreement in this matter would be recorded.

7. The following Qs&As replace those approved for use by the Delegation in ref tel 8. The Delegation is authorized to use these Qs&As in presenting the U.S. sensor proposal.

-- Q1. Does this mean the United States proposes to amend the ABM Treaty?

-- A1. If agreed to, this proposal would have the legal effect of an amendment to the ABM Treaty. However, we believe there is flexibility in how such an amendment could be recorded.

-- Q2. What sensors are included in your proposal?

-- A2. All space-based sensors, regardless of capability or sensing technology, are included in our proposal except those incorporated in an ABM intercept or missile or a component of an ABM system based on other physical principles and capable of substituting for an ABM intercept or missile. (FYI: There is no agreed basis with the Soviets for understanding what is meant by a space-based system capable of substituting for an ABM radar.)

-- Q3. Why is the U.S. proposal cast only in terms of space-based systems? What about fixed, land-based sensors?

-- A3. The combination of location, orientation and capabilities of fixed, land-based sensors are not so ambiguous as those for space-based sensors, making it somewhat easier to discern their full capabilities and missions. On the other hand, the full capabilities and missions of space-based sensors are very difficult, and becoming increasingly more difficult, to determine.

-- Q4. Why should all ABM-capable sensors not continue to be limited, as under the ABM Treaty?
Second, the full capabilities and missions of space-based sensors are very difficult, and becoming increasingly more difficult, to deter.

Third, both sides also have an interest in averting disputes on sensors that could hinder efforts to strengthen the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship.

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Q5. Can sensors be placed into any orbit in space?
A5. Yes.

Q6. What does the U.S. mean in its definition by "applicable provisions of the ABM Treaty?"
A6. If an ABM intercepter missile or a component of an ABM system based on such principles and capable of substituting for an ABM intercepter missile, incorporates a sensor, then it will be governed by the provisions of the ABM Treaty applicable to such an ABM intercepter missile or to a component capable of substituting for such a missile.

Q7. Does the U.S. envision providing advance notification and details on a sensor before it is launched into space?
A7. No.

Q8. Does the U.S. envision permitting inspections of satellite payloads before they are launched into space, to verify that they are indeed sensors?
A8. No. On-site inspections are not part of the ABM Treaty verification regime envisioned in this one. OSI is clearly an unacceptable solution. Such inspections could compromise the integrity of space-based capabilities vital to each side's security. Furthermore, a visual examination of the satellite
sensors. If a side wanted to raise a question, it could do so in an appropriate forum.

-- Q19. As defined, the function of the sensor may depend on illumination from various active signal sources or "other illuminators." What are "other illuminators?"

-- A19. "Other illuminators" include all other types of emitters that provide energy to the target object which is in turn reflected to the associated sensor.

-- Q20. For sensors whose function depends upon some illuminator, is that illuminator considered part of the sensor?

-- A20. The functioning of some sensor may depend upon illumination from microwave generators, lasers, particle beam accelerators, or other illuminators. In this case, the illuminator would be considered part of the overall sensor system.

-- Q21. How does the sensor "respond" to the detected stimulus? Does this mean the actual process of detection and data generation from the received stimulus or does it mean the initiation of a direct response to counter the illuminating object?

-- A21. After detecting a signal or stimulus, a sensor responds by converting this input to a useful format for subsequent use. Data processing, which is not restricted by the ABM Treaty, could be included in the response of a space-based sensor. Such data processing could also be used to improve sensor system performance by focusing the sensor on targeted target objects.

-- Q22. How does the sensor "acquire data?" Does this mean the detection of signals or stimuli and the near-instantaneous but subsequent conversion of these inputs into data in the filters or preprocessors?

-- A22. A sensor "acquires data" through its sensing element. There are no restrictions on data processing, wherever located.

-- Q23. What are the specific provisions of the ABM Treaty that apply to space-based sensors included in the U.S. proposal?

-- A23. While the proposal is intended to remove space-based sensors from the restrictions of the ABM Treaty as a whole, the Treaty provisions affected would be Articles V and VI(a), and Agreed Statement D, among others.