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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 8, 1988

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 314

THE NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND SITUATION MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM (NSI&SMS) (C)

This directive updates policy and guidelines for sustaining and improving the nation's crisis management capability in support of the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the interagency community. It builds on the technical progress achieved since signature of NSDD 95 in May 1983, and codifies the oversight, coordination, and procedural dimensions of a National Security Information and Situation Management System (NSI&SMS), consistent with the responsibilities assigned to Executive departments and agencies under current law and Presidential directives, and the NSC structure and process approved in NSDD 266 and NSDD 276. This directive supersedes NSDD 95. (S)

Background

NSDD 95 established a framework for national-level crisis management and for making critical technical and procedural enhancements to associated department and agency operations centers. This framework was termed the Crisis Information and Management System (CIMS) and was designed to sustain effective and uninterrupted crisis management by providing a means of recording and disseminating adequate and timely intelligence, information, analyses, and policy options in a form usable by top-level decision makers. This system was to include rigorous mechanisms for accessing, preserving and archiving historical data and associated decisions. It was also intended to ensure a coordinated flow of information from the White House and other CIMS operations centers to Continuity of Government (COG) elements to support, if required, an orderly, constitutional devolution of responsibilities in conditions of extreme crisis.

Implementation of NSDD 95, in conjunction with associated department and agency technical upgrades, significantly improved the nation's ability to respond to crises. The CHOSUN project, now referred to as the Secure Video Teleconferencing System (SVTS), created a Secure, multi-media telecommunications system for exchanging information. The ungent focus of CIMS was on communications and coordination among principals in crises up through the prospect of nuclear attack. NSDD 95 has

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now established a foundation for Eurther improving and codifying interagency coordination procedures. In addition, the opportunity to build on the existing SVTS infrastructure applies not only at the working levels of crisis operations but also across a spectrum of daily activities during peacetime.

A National Security Information and Situation Management System (NSI&SMS) is required to reap fully the broader benefits of the new technology and facilities that were introduced initially for top-level crisis management alone. This directive codifies a process incorporating improvements made to date and addresses the requirements for effective interagency coordination in the future. The principles and longer-term objectives of the NSI&SMS are outlined below.

Policy Principles

The NSI&SMS is an interagency network of people, facilities, equipment, information resources, plans, policies and procedures designed to provide for: (1) support to nationallevel decision makers in monitoring national security situations and in considering, implementing, or reporting on any U.S. response; and (2) a rapid and continuous flow of information regarding mational security situations across a spectrum from peacetime activity through reconstitution following nuclear attacks (8)

The purpose of the NSISSMS is to continue supporting the national leadership with the best and most timely information possible, ensuring that the policy and decision making process will not be impaired by a Tack of information, procedures for coordination, or secure communications and data transmission capabilities. To the maximum possible extent, the interagency process used to support decision-making during crisis situations shall involve the same trained personnel, reliable equipment, and familiar procedures approved for use on a daily basis. This principle applies to periods of international tension or crisis and, to the extent possible, to domestic emergencies, such as natural disasters, terrorism, or technological hazards, that may affect national security interests. (2)

Those responsible for operating, improving and modernizing the NSI&SMS shall seek to ensure interoperability among the family of Continuity of Government (COG) programs, the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS), National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) plans, the National System for Emergency Coordination (NSEC) concept as it may be implemented, and other key programs. In this sense, interoperability requires extensive interagency coordination to provide for essential

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elements of information, procedures, interactive systems, and other components necessary to support effectively national-level decision making. (78)

The continuous, effective operation of the NSI&SMS is crucial and requires each agency's understanding of its individual role in the interagency process. Enhancing the integration of existing operations and intelligence centers shall be achieved through measured improvements that have been identified as user requirements through the interagency process. Executive departments and agencies will budget for procure, install, operate, and maintain compatible equipment and capabilities, and share appropriately the cost of system improvements that may be required to sustain acceptable levels of integration within the NSI&SMS. (S)

Implementation

Leadership and oversight of the NSI&SMS shall be provided by the NSC through the Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG), chaired by the NSC's Deputy Executive Secretary for Situation Support. The CMWG shall further develop the NSI&SMS and strengthen interagency capabilities and procedures for the collection, coordination, transmission, and dissemination of information in support of the President and the NSC interagency process. (9)

The CMWG will report to the Policy Review Group (PRG). The PRG, as outlined in NSDD 276, is the senior sub-Cabinet level interagency group which is chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The PRG's primary responsibility is to review and make recommendations concerning national security policy developed through the day-to-day functioning of the interagency process. PRG recommendations are submitted for consideration of the National Security Planning Group or the National Security Council, as appropriate. As the subject matter may dictate, appropriate representatives from the Executive Office of the President and other departments and agencies shall be included in meetings of the PRG.

The CMWG shall meet regularly. The CMWG chair shall establish a Steering Group to assist in developing and monitoring the CMWG agenda. The Steering Group shall be primarily comprised of senior representatives of Executive departments and agencies who regularly report to members of the PRG. Appropriate CMWG Steering Group members, in support of their PRG principals, shall meet at the outset of, or during, a situation when necessary to ensure effective information management and coordination among operations and intelligence centers.

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The CMWG shall be the principal interagency working group for coordination and consideration of national security policy recommendations concerning the integration and interoperability of COG programs. (75)

The CMWG shall:

- Oversee formulation of policy recommendations relating to the NSI&SMS to ensure a system responsive to national needs; (S)
- Ensure that the national security-related emergency responsibilities assigned to individual departments and agencies under existing law, Presidential directive, executive order, and federal response plans are mutually compatible, and that appropriate procedures for interagency coordination are available and widely understood; (2)
- Ensure technical and operational capabilities are maintained and developed consistent with NSI&SMS objectives;
- Ensure effective use of resources expended in establishing, operating, and modernizing the NSI&SMS; promoting interagency equipment compatibility; and recommending to the ERG priorities for those improvements that will enhance interagency information flow; (G)
- Ensure integration of the NSIASMS with COG, NCCS, NSEP, and other interagency coordination systems related to national security, without compromising the integrity of compartmented information; (TS)
- Ensure that the NSI&SMS supports the Director of Central Intelligence in monitoring and transmitting information on the world situation in the context of operational requirements for early warning; (28)
- Identify for key departments and agencies the essential elements of information required by the President during periods of extreme crisis, and ensure the capability to coordinate the flow of this information at the appropriate time among the White House, Washington-area operations and intelligence centers, and COG elements; (75)
- Ensure that interoperable equipment and compatible procedures are established among relevant departments and agencies to support the COG effort; and (T8)





- Provide for regular exercising and testing of the NSIESMS.

CMWG membership shall include representatives from Executive departments and agencies with responsibility relating to the national response to international incidents or domestic emergencies potentially affecting the national security of the United States. The CMWG may establish other subgroups as required. To the extent possible, the CMWG shall use already existing interagency committees to facilitate coordination and resolution of issues.

Situation management at the national level requires close coordination and cooperation among Executive departments and agencies. As the supporting system, the NSI&SMS can only remain responsive to national situation management needs if the community actively participates and interacts in the evolution of this critical situation management system. Accordingly, each participating Executive department and agency shall:

- Designate a member to serve on the CMWG;
- Participate in exercises to improve and maintain the proficiency of situation management personnel and evaluate the responsiveness of the NSI&SMS; and
- Budget for procure, manage, operate, and maintain equipment in its facilities in a manner consistent with NSACSMS objectives and procedures.

The Department of Defense, because of its close and continuing involvement with projects that comprise the infrastructure of the NSI&SMS, shall continue to act as the Executive Agent for:

- Architecture and systems engineering support, technical analyses, and preparation of cost estimates in response to CMWG-validated NSI&SMS requirements;
- Development of an NSI&SMS Master Plan to maintain an affordable and modern NSI&SMS focused on fully exploiting the capabilities of current equipment, and ensuring compatibility and interoperability among all NSI&SMS nodes and COG systems;
- Program management of SVTS, including: engineering, procurement, installation, configuration management, software control, and logistical support; assistance in developing and refining SVTS user procedures for CMWG review; and recommending cost-effective modifications to the current SWTS in response to requirements indentified by the CMWG;

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- Security procedures and practices associated with the NSICSMS and its elements, to ensure consistency with overall security requirements as may be determined by the CMWG; and
- Provision of resources and technical support to NSI&SMS elements in the white House complex.

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