THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 14, 1988

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 319

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS INDOCHINA (U)

BACKGROUND

Vietnamese public pledges to withdraw from Cambodia; increased recognition by the Peoples Republic of China that measures need to be taken to ensure that the Khmer Rouge do not return to power in Cambodia; the increased dialogue and negotiations in the region and internationally concerning Cambodia; and accelerated progress on United States bilateral humanitarian issues with Vietnam provide increased opportunities for the United States to exercise its influence to achieve an acceptable political settlement in Cambodia and contribute to long-term stability in Southeast Asia. (8)

Due to these conditions, a more active United States posture to influence events is now warranted. Therefore, based on the national security study on policy towards Indochina dated October 27, 1988, which was tasked through NSSD 1-88, I approve of the actions below in order to maintain the pressure on Vietnam to withdraw its forces, increase our support for a democratic alternative in Cambodia, and tailor our positive gestures towards Vietnam based upon progress towards a Cambodian settlement and/or progress on POW/MIA and other humanitarian issues. (8)

APPROVED RECOMMENDATIONS

-- Intensify our consultations with ASEAN on the Cambodian conflict and establish a more regular framework for collective discussions. (8)

-- Continue our economic isolation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) while discouraging others from increased trade with Vietnam. Coordinate with ASEAN to carry the same message to countries seeking increased economic contacts with Vietnam, such as Japan, South Korea and France. (8)

-- Work with ASEAN to refine our position on Vietnam's participation in negotiations aimed at achieving an acceptable Cambodian settlement and a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and to put the burden more clearly on Vietnam for the lack of movement toward a settlement. (8)
--- Increase our public support for Prince Sihanouk and his diplomatic efforts. (C)

--- Seek every opportunity forcefully and publicly to reaffirm our abhorrence of the Khmer Rouge and our opposition to its return to power. (C)

--- Oppose any return of the Pol Pot leadership group while accepting that elements of the Khmer Rouge forces may have to be a part of a Cambodian settlement. Our focus should be to formulate and implement effective measures to prevent their return to power or their attempts to intimidate the Cambodian people. (S)

--- Intensify our discussions with ASEAN and the Chinese concerning measures which need to be implemented as part of a settlement to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power. (S)

--- Continue to emphasize publicly that we are prepared to consider normalization of diplomatic relations with Vietnam in the context of a Cambodian settlement. If warranted by future developments, we should raise with ASEAN the advisability of our discussing directly with the Vietnamese our position on normalization and its positive implications for them. We should remain open to discussions with Hanoi if desired by ASEAN or warranted by progress toward a Cambodian settlement. (C)

--- At an appropriate time, we should consider a limited broadening of exceptions to the 25-mile travel limit for the SRV Mission to the United Nations. (C)

--- When warranted by progress in our humanitarian dialogue with Vietnam, we should permit SRV officials directly responsible for humanitarian cooperation with the United States to visit Washington for discussions of clearly-defined humanitarian issues. (C)

--- In response to sound, concrete Vietnamese cooperation on prisoner of war/missing in action and/or other United States Government humanitarian interests, we should reiterate our proposal to establish a technical office in Vietnam to handle POW/MIA, former reeducation camp detainees and refugee issues. (S)

--- Publicly and more widely support efforts by the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to assist the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), especially those which reflect our main concerns -- programs under the auspices of the UN's High Commissioner for Refugees and Fund for Drug Abuse Control, and humanitarian projects tied to crash site excavations. (C)
-- Encourage increased bilateral assistance by third countries to Laos. (C)

-- Offer small but visible contributions to UN agencies, such as UNFDAC and UNHCR, as well as NGOs involved in assistance to Laos. (C)

-- Seek congressional support for a small bilateral assistance program in Laos. (C)

-- Continue to work through the International Committee of the Red Cross and others as appropriate to effect the return of remains of Americans from Cambodia while avoiding direct negotiations that would allow politicization of the POW/MIA issue in the region. (C)

-- Discuss with ASEAN the adequacy of the assistance, in type and quality, provided to the Khmer noncommunist resistance in the context of our efforts to strengthen its political viability. (S)