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WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 44

July 10, 1982

U.S. APPROACH TO START NEGOTIATIONS - III

This Decision Directive supplements NSDD-33 and NSDD-36. It provides additional guidance on the U.S. approach to START.

Indirect Limits on Throw-weight

The following additional indirect limits on throw-weight are approved for inclusion in the U.S. position for proposal in the first phase of negotiations:

- A limit on the combined total number of deployed heavy and medium ICBMs. At the level of 850 total deployed ballistic missiles, this would result in a limit on the total number of deployed heavy and medium ICBMs of 210.
- A sub-limit on the number of heavy missiles permitted. This proposal would limit the Soviets to proportionally no more heavy missiles in their force structure at reduced levels than exists today. At the level of 850 total deployed ballistic missiles, this would result in a limit of 110 deployed heavy missiles.
- A ban on new heavy missiles.

A ban on all heavy missiles is approved for inclusion in the U.S. position for proposal in the second phase of negotiations.

Other Collateral Constraints

The following additional collateral constraints are also approved for inclusion in the U.S. position for proposal in the first phase of negotiations:

- A limit on the weight of reentry vehicles (RVs) on new missile systems of approximately 200 kilograms.
- A limit on the number of RVs that can be tested or deployed on classes of missiles to 10 RVs on ICBMs and 14 RVs on SLBMs. The U.S. START Delegation is authorized to "grandfather" the number of RVs associated with the SS-18.
- Agreed rules governing the phasing of reductions to establish equal intermediate ceilings at agreed intervals.

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Review on July 10, 2002

Classified & extended by W.P. Clark

Reason: NSC 1.13(c)

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Constraining ICBM Force Reconstitution

The U.S. START Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that we intend in the negotiations to deal with the problems posed by non-deployed missiles. The Delegation should point out that non-deployed missiles have the potential to augment the strategic capability provided by deployed missiles. Pending further guidance, the Delegation can use discretion to discuss the problems noted above (e.g., reconstitution, refire, rapid reload, and breakout). However, the Delegation should not discuss specific proposals for resolving these problems, or take actions which could prejudice U.S. options for dealing with these problems, without specific additional guidance.

Additional Work

The START Interdepartmental Group will provide for NSC review by July 23 its recommendations with respect to constraining Soviet ICBM force reconstitution and addressing the problems posed by non-deployed missiles.

Ronald Reagan