System II 90946



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON November 22, 1982

National Security Decision Directive Number 69

THE M-X PROGRAM (U)

Development of the M-X missile will be completed on a priority basis. Sufficient missiles and associated ground support equipment will be produced to support an operational deployment of 100 missiles. These 100 missiles will be deployed in an array of 100 closely spaced, superhardened silos located at or near Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming. The initial deployment will be designed with the growth possibility of deceptive measures in mind, and with the clear recognition that in the future we may have to deploy a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system. The initial operational capability (IOC) of the M-X missile in this closely spaced basing plan will be achieved in 1986 with full operational capability (FOC) by 1989. (\$)

In this connection, the following guidance is provided:

A. The addition of superhardened silos beyond the 100 authorized above appears to be a very promising growth option available to respond to Soviet adaptive threats to M-X deployed in closely based silos. Therefore, the development and acquisition program will provide for a continuing silo growth option, if needed, after completion of the first 100 silos. The system design will include a transporter/emplacer for movement of the missile between silos. Such a T/E shall not, however, be capable of launching the M-X missile from its canister.

B. Current R&D on BMD will be continued with funding to support a high priority program aimed at providing:
(1) another growth option for M-X as needed to offset Soviet adaptive threats to M-X and thus providing additional methods of increasing M-X survivability;
(2) improved methods for defeating Soviet attempts to "pin" M-X missiles deployed in closely spaced arrays;
(3) a hedge against Soviet breakout of the ABM Treaty; and
(4) information necessary to evaluate Soviet BMD activity. The Department of Defense will provide a report on its progress in developing BMD options associated with M-X deployed in a CSB array by October 1, 1983.

C. The U.S. Intelligence Community on a priority basis will monitor, with all sources, Soviet activity to provide maximum warning of a Soviet adaptive threat to M-X. The Department of Defense will develop and have available contingency plans to allow a response in sufficient time to offset the Soviet threat as necessary. (S/NT)



by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC under provisions of E.O. 12958 by MS

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D. R&D on Deep Underground Basing will continue because of its application to an enduring secure reserve force, its potential for command, control, communications and intelligence functions supporting such a secure reserve force, and its synergism with the capability provided by an M-X force deployed in a closely spaced basing array. (8)

The military capability provided by the M-X missile deployed in the closely spaced basing array is absolutely essential to providing sufficient, modern strategic forces to support our national security needs and our commitments to friends and allies. (\mathscr{S})

In the START negotiations, an M-X program in being is more vital than ever. M-X is not, however, a "bargaining chip" to trade off against heavy missiles, but rather a long-term offset to existing Soviet medium missiles. (8)

This NSDD supersedes the appropriate portions of NSDD-35. (U)

Rovald Reagon

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