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Key: Reagan Ballot Strength -- Political Coalition-Building

Objective: Continue to reinforce our natural Republican strength; hold and solidify the traditional Republican voter without alienating the Independent and/or swing voters.

Strategy:

- Coordinate state campaign activities with the traditional Republican organizations, e.g., RNC, NRCC, RSCC's, etc.
- Assist the election or re-election of Republican candidates at all levels, especially in mail fundraising activities directed at the Republican base vote.
- Target traditional Republican neighborhoods for some of our own direct mailings and, where the allocated resources permit, for heavy turnout activities.
- Governor Reagan should meet with Republican candidates for gubernatorial, senatorial and congressional offices to eliminate the late campaign problems of the "we versus them" syndrome when the competition for scarce resources becomes acute. The easiest way to prevent many of these problems from occurring is to establish links of communication and liason before the crunch comes.
- Governor Reagan should adopt the strategy of saying, when questioned about working with a Democratic Congress, "It is not solely a party matter. Mr. Carter is a Democrat and it is obvious that the members of his own party do not respect him or give his policies much support. I have worked with a Democratic legislature, and while I would prefer to work with a Republican Congress, I will make every effort to work with Congress whatever its composition."

Key: Reagan Ballot Strength -- Reagan Win Constituencies

Objective: Avoid unnecessary tension with the Republican Party
"establishment."

Strategy:

- Initiate consciously the internal campaign policy of trading short-term inconveniences for the longer-term building of a winning coalition.
- Clarify with the Party objectives for future cooperation.
- Work, where possible, through state and local Party organizations.

Key: Reagan Ballot Strength and the Current Political Environment -- Democratic Alliance Gives Carter an Edge

Objective: Hold the Right Wing conservatives while broadening the appeal to the moderates.

The appeal to the political center in 1980 does not require an ideological shift or realignment by Governor Reagan. The theme of the campaign is leadership, and what the voters in the center want is a steady hand at the helm. The polls show that Reagan's appeal is cutting across the different constituencies of voters in America, and what is desired most is a president who can rank among other great American presidents by taking firm stands, being mature and unflappable, unlikely to be surprised by world affairs, and steady in adversity.

The center in American political life is non-ideological, not apolitical. They are men and women of ordinary means, observing the work ethic, proud of America and the lifestyle afforded Americans, but frustrated with the problems of inflation, energy shortages, unemployment and loss of U₂S₂ prestige abroad. These are voters to whom Reagan already appeals greatly, and they will respond to the themes of leadership, maturity in office, and firmness.

The political center will be favorably disposed toward Carter because he is sincere, but disenchanted because he is ineffective. In the 1980 presidential election, the centrist voter will be more receptive to a firm -- even tough -- candidate capable of leading them out of their doldrums.

Strategy:

- Enlist the aid of prominent Republicans representing both the moderate and Right Wing views of the Republican Party to maintain interest among voters and work to turn out those who are identified Reagan supporters on election day.

- Do everything possible to enlist the active and visible support of Gerald Ford in the campaign.
- Develop non-ideological positions on selected domestic and foreign issues to make the broadest possible appeal to moderates on the political spectrum. An urban strategy and the North American Accord represent two attractive issue targets.
- Develop specifically targeted "centrist" campaign themes. Since the Republican base is simply too small to win a general election, Governor Reagan needs to show (a) that he is capable of taking moderate positions on selected issues, and (b) that his record as Governor of California illustrates that he did take moderate positions on many issues. It is critical that the public perception is created of Reagan as a politician mediating the issues of the day, rather than as a rigid ideologue.

Key: Reagan Ballot Strength -- Reagan Win Constituencies

Objective: Attract the dissatisfied and disappointed 1976 Carter voters, especially the Southern White Protestants and Rural residents.

The Southern White Protestants have been voting for Republican presidents since the 1960's, but in 1976 supported one of their own by voting for Jimmy Carter. These voters have not been satisfied by Jimmy Carter's performance as President.

Strategy:

- Target rural organizations (farm, religious, local) and enlist their leaders in an advisory capacity.
- Identify these voters through survey research and target direct mail toward them, emphasizing the failures of the Carter Administration on farm policy, the family, and keeping America strong.

Key: The Current Political Environment --
Break-Up of the Democratic Coalition

Objective: Increase the appeal to the disaffected Democratic voters in the North and South.

Strategy:

- Target the populist voter through survey research.
- Develop targeted media messages for populist America.
- Policies and media messages directed toward this constituency ought to be simple, direct and optimistic about the prospects of changes in policies that affect their daily lives.
- Develop specific media messages for the blue collar and labor union members who are Reagan supporters to reinforce their newly-formed affiliation or to attract them to the Governor. The principal themes of these media spots should project a realization that these voters are no longer solely motivated by economic concerns but by larger social issues as well.
- Use the convention to focus on blue collar support for Reagan, especially among delegates who have working-class backgrounds.

Key: The Current Political Environment --
Break-Up of the Democratic Coalition

Objective: Attack and break up Carter's Southern Coalition.

Strategy:

- Focus the campaign on several key Southern states (to be determined subsequently through simulation, targeting and survey research), maximizing the discontent now expressed by the Southern white Protestant voters over Jimmy Carter. Provide ongoing assessment of Reagan's best Southern states and the Deep South for the purposes of allocating resources.
- Appeal to the White Southern Protestants and the populist voters in the South.
- Highlight the incompatibilities between Jimmy Carter and the White Southern Protestant voter in terms of interests, concerns and background.
- Differentiate the Border or Outer South from the Deep South. Texas and Florida cannot be treated in the same way as Georgia and Alabama; neither area, however, should be conceded, especially in terms of earmarking campaign resources.
- Develop a special Southern political strike force consisting of hand-picked Reagan loyalists in the Congress, individual states and elsewhere to recruit surrogates and develop issues that will be of special interest to the South. Southern pride was a major Carter asset in 1976; we can turn it into a Reagan asset in some Southern states if we craft a strong message for the South that would be delivered by those having high credibility in Dixie.

Key: Voter Perceptions and The Current Political
Environment -- The Search for a National Leader

Objective: Establish the campaign theme as leadership.

Strategy:

- In the acceptance speech at the convention, establish a set of action steps. Create expectations about some specific action steps Reagan will take.
- Some of those action plans ought to include:
 - . an expanded economic plan addressing the problems of inflation and unemployment which becomes known as the Reagan Plan (drop all references to Kemp-Roth);
 - . a Reagan energy plan;
 - . the development of the aspiring American populist theme of "anti-bigness -- big government, big business, big labor;"
 - . the dangers of international crises -- crisis management and prevention. Heavy emphasis should be on the theme of a "vision for the future;" and
 - . a major farm policy speech.
- Throughout the campaign, use surrogates and some media to force the Carter Administration to defend its record.
- Continue to demonstrate a willingness to confront Carter and/or Anderson in open debate, and to show an openness to the confrontation between ideas and policy alternatives.
- Challenge (heavily through surrogates) the Carter position that he is doing the best job that can be done under the circumstances, that there isn't anyone in the contest who could do a better job, and that he "deserves" four more years.

Key: Voter Perceptions -- Reagan's Strengths and Weaknesses

Objective: Enhance the image of Reagan as a strong national leader and problem solver.

The primary leadership function of the American president is to reaffirm constantly the country's highest purposes and the potential for individual efforts to alter the course of the future in a positive direction.

Strategy:

- Through national forums, provide a vision of the future which indicates that Reagan has a sense of where the country ought to go and can establish confidence among the people to follow his lead.
- Use the convention acceptance speech as the basic vehicle for outlining just where Reagan would take the country. The following week, when the media coverage will be at its maximum, stage a series of regional media events stating (1) the Reagan vision for the future, (2) why Reagan is running for the presidency, and (3) why Carter's record is so abysmal that he should not be allowed to continue as president. This will establish the theme of the campaign as a referendum on Carter's performance as president.
- Commence a weekly, issue-oriented, national radio broadcast by Reagan.
- Increase the perception of Governor Reagan's personal control over the campaign.

Key: Voter Perceptions -- How Much Is Known?

Objective: Strengthen the Reagan image among those voters who know him but cannot yet describe his political stands.

Strategy:

- Deal to Reagan's perceived strengths among the voters. Position him as a doer, a man of action. (The campaign slogan, "The Time is Now," conveys this sense of directed energy.)
- Use existing positive perceptions to build the Reagan image, including "Reagan offers the best hope to reduce inflation," "Reagan has the strong leadership qualities this country needs," and "Reagan will keep after a problem until he gets results."
- Avoid telling people that he will create a task force to study a problem and make recommendations. Most observers view the task force approach as an exercise for delaying something or doing nothing at all. Reinforce the image of a doer by talking about having legislation ready to alleviate a problem within some reasonable time after taking office. Create expectations.
- Be presidential in dress, manner and speech. Reinforce the already existing perception of Reagan as a strong, decisive leader capable of making tough decisions. Downplay the folksy, down-to-earth image of Reagan in a cowboy hat on the ranch. The country has already had cause to regret its endorsement of one "good ol' boy" and his ineptness.
- Take maximum advantage of the perceived credibility of those who will campaign for us -- Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, Bill Simon, etc.
- Enhance the public image of the "Reagan team" that will govern the country, stressing their professional backgrounds, diverse viewpoints and geographic distribution, while showing Reagan as the clear leader in the group.

Key: Voter Perceptions -- Carter's Strengths and Weaknesses

Objective: Take maximum advantage of Carter's perceived liabilities among the voters by following an aggressive attack strategy, focusing on the many failures of the Carter Administration, his indecisiveness and policy reversals.

Strategy:

- Do not attack Jimmy Carter personally. He still enjoys a widely-held perception of being an honest, moral and trustworthy president.
- Use the existing perception of Carter as error-prone to hammer home the failures of the Carter Administration.
- Paint Carter as incompetent, indecisive and a weak leader. Voters must be made to realize that he is politically motivated, acting in response to polls instead of on the basis of what is good for the nation. Surrogates should be used to make these points.
- Point out that Carter has not lived up to his commitments to the public and that in many cases he has gone back on them.
- Put Carter on the defensive because, surely, he will attempt to put Reagan on the defensive.
- Attacks should begin immediately and should not let up. This means a strong opposition research effort, prepared speeches, fact books, etc. We are not going to convince voters in just the last two weeks that Carter should not be president; it is going to take a full campaign effort.
- Attack Carter on his total record -- what he has done and not done as President, the scandals in his Administration, his dealing with Congress, and his attitudes toward the people.
- Attacks on Carter should be absolutely accurate and backed up by well-documented fact. The campaign should not be afraid to go on the offensive. Perceived timidity is equated with lack of leadership.

- Television spots, of course, are a great mechanism. They should be utilized extensively, especially during the last three or four weeks of the campaign, in order to reinforce what Reagan and others have been saying. Radio should be used also. In fact, the whole range of media, as well as a troupe of surrogates, should be used in our Carter attack.
- Develop a battery of hard-hitting attack issues which regularly hammer away at the failures of the Carter Administration, both domestically and internationally. Hit hard every failure of the White House.
- Suggest that a former Democratic president (Johnson) whose record was very weak decided not to run again for the presidency. This point should be made before the Democratic convention, but can always be used afterward as a way of going after what Carter will be saying is his strongest attribute -- his integrity.
- Identify a series of critical domestic and international policy reversals, e.g., Korea, defense spending, arms control, a balanced budget, credit policy, etc., and exploit the lack of judgment and leadership displayed therein.

Key: Carter's Campaign -- Grantsmanship

Objective: Turn Carter's "grantsmanship" from a political asset into a political liability.

Jimmy Carter may well have overplayed his hand in using the spending power of the White House so blatantly during the primaries. This may afford us an opening to keep him on the defensive and thus sensitize him against using the grant-making power of an incumbent president to defeat a challenger in the general election.

Strategy:

- Staff and surrogates should call press attention to Carter's grantsmanship. Some cases in point:
 - . Just prior to the crucial Florida vote, an electric cooperative in the Sunshine state was granted a billion dollar loan only two months after the application was filed. Such loans normally take at least a year to process.
 - . Similar cases of "grantsmanship" turned up in Illinois, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts and Wisconsin at primary times.
 - . Ohio was perhaps impacted by the Carterites more heavily than any other state. It was the only big state that Carter carried on June 3rd. Part of that success might be attributed to a \$1.4 million grant to Cincinnati for conversion of its train depot into a shopping mall; \$50 million went to the recession-stricken Youngstown/Warren area; one congressional district received an \$829,000 community block grant, three summer youth recreation grants, an award to a local college, plus an announcement that a local historical society had been added to the national register. The White House largesse in some cases went too far -- it announced a \$9 million grant to Dayton for highway improvements -- funds which the community had already received.
- We can neutralize Carter's use of the presidential purse in the Fall by selecting spokespersons to review his record of

grantsmanship. Further, all presidential grants-in-aid should be monitored regularly and, where these are applied politically, that should be made known publicly.

- Carter can and should be painted as the most politically motivated president of modern times.
- The campaign should prepare, in the near future, a Jimmy Carter fact book for our spokespersons, documenting his political expediency.

Key: Carter's Campaign -- The October Surprise

Objective: Neutralize Carter's "October Surprise."

Just as Jimmy Carter timed good news (e.g., the possible release of the hostages from the militants' grip) to secure maximum political advantage, so we can expect that he will dump an October Surprise in our laps. The political impact of that kind of move can be blunted.

Strategy:

- The key campaign personnel, as press opportunities afford, should begin to sprinkle their conversation with references to "Carter's October Surprise."
- We know it is not beneath Carter to try anything, no matter the consequences, if such action might better posture him as "presidential" and "in control." Our objective is to precondition the American people so they will see such October maneuverings in a more cynical perspective.
- It is important that we simply raise the question and spur people to their own imaginings about what that surprise may be. We do not volunteer our own ideas -- at least not for the time being. Keep it open-ended, speak of it frequently, and get people to start anticipating some blatant Carter political move using the powers of the presidency.

Key: Carter's Campaign -- "A Man of Peace"

Objective: Counter Carter's claim that he is the "Man of Peace."

Carter will make the case that he has pushed hard to get the hostages back, strengthened the NATO alliance, penalized the Soviets because of their incursion into Afghanistan, and made important progress in the Mideast.

The skill with which Carter can wear this "man of peace mantle" may be dependent upon how the world stands in the Fall of 1980. More specifically, if a further peace agreement is reached between Egypt and Israel, more credibility will be lent to Carter's claim. On the other hand, if international tensions run high, that claim may come back to bite Carter.

Strategy:

- Governor Reagan should point out repeatedly that long-term prospects for real and enduring peace in the world depend directly on our economic and military strength and the prestige America can command abroad. All three have suffered terribly under the Carter Administration.
- Surrogates from our foreign policy advisory group should take on strongly and critically Carter's claim that the world is more "peaceful" now than it was when he assumed office in 1976 because of his own actions.
- Nevertheless, all of us should keep in mind that our prime issue strength and the voters' major interest lie in coming to grips with our economic problems. Our major media and communications resources should focus on this issue, not on countering Carter's peace stance.

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Key: Carter's Campaign -- Attack Strategy

Objective: Blunt Carter's personal attacks against Reagan.

We must pre-empt the Carter charge that Reagan is "dumb, dangerous and deceptive" by assuming the position early that the Administration and the President have made so many critical domestic and foreign policy blunders and failures that they, not Reagan, are "dumb, dangerous and deceptive." (We should of course not explicitly label Carter as dumb, but convey that message by criticizing his policies.)

Strategy:

- Pre-empt the Carter attack by engaging Carter first -- Carter, not Reagan, is "dumb, dangerous and deceptive."

Dumb refers to the Carter White House's inability to deal with the economy and America's defense posture.

Dangerous refers to the failure of the Carter Administration to send clear signals to the Soviet Union about its aggressive adventures around the world; its misreading of the intentions and motivations of Soviet leadership; the number of international crises which the United States has been involved in during the last four years for which it was badly prepared; and the deterioration of the conventional fighting forces, making nuclear war America's only foreign policy option.

Deceptive refers to the Administration's frequent reversal on many domestic and foreign issues, and its subsequent attempt to pass off on the public that it has been doing a good job:

- . It blamed most of America's inflation on OPEC despite the fact the 11 of the 13 industrial nations which are more dependent on OPEC than the U.S. have lower inflation rates.
- . Carter said, as the economy tumbled, that his economic policies "suit me fine," etc., etc.
- The timing of the pre-emption strategy is critical; the pre-emption ought to come during or before the three-week

period between the Republican and Democratic national conventions. The convention and some of the speakers may provide an ideal forum for this message. Specifically:

- . Henry Kissinger should pick up the "dangerous" (foreign policy) theme.
- . William Simon is an ideal spokesman to attack Carter's "dumb" economic policies.
- . Gerald Ford is well-positioned to highlight Carter's "deceptive" programs and policies.

Key: Carter's Campaign -- Attack Strategy

Objective: Counter Carter's attack strategy.

Monitor carefully the negative campaign which Carter wages against Reagan, which will try to make Reagan the central issue of the campaign. The general thrust of Carter's strategy will be to focus on the shortcomings of Reagan even more than on the strengths of Carter. The Carter people waged just such a campaign against Kennedy as they attempted to come from behind against the Senator in the Democratic primaries. Carter, while highlighting Reagan's shortcomings, will play up what he is (the man -- sincere, warm, personable) rather than what he has done, though he will repeatedly make references to the record. In this sense, the 1980 campaign will be a repeat of the 1976 campaign, which was "style over substance." Nobody ever knew where Carter was on the issues, only that he portrayed himself to be a man of integrity. The proper counterattack consists of the following elements:

Strategy:

- Governor Reagan must not respond to the Carter attacks that he is "dumb, dangerous and deceitful." He ought to be above it and behave in a more presidential fashion than Carter.
- When an attack on Reagan's record as Governor is made, he ought to say that the record is a matter of history, open to anyone who wants to examine it, but that the 1980 presidential election is about Carter's record as President, not his as Governor, and then attack that (Carter's) record.
- Under no circumstances should the Governor respond to the attacks of the Carter campaign, except to re-focus the challenge to the issue of Carter's record.

- Develop and prepare counterpunch teams in the areas that the Carter campaign will likely attack. These teams will have in place:
 - . Spokespersons who are credible and knowledgeable about the area under attack -- the Governor's record, taxes, the environment, etc. They will prepare the "best" responses to such attacks and will have collected in advance materials to mount such counterpunches.
 - . Identify other spokespersons to serve as buffers against the Carter attacks and to shift the emphasis to the central themes of the Reagan campaign -- leadership and the record of the Carter Administration.
- It is important that all of Reagan's radiocasts, columns, etc., be gathered and scanned closely so that we can be prepared for discrepancies and contradictions in what he has said and be able to respond to all points which may be raised by the opposition which may make him politically vulnerable.
- In drafting major position papers and speeches, the Governor should let it be known explicitly that they are a distillation and culmination of all that has gone before, and make it absolutely clear that, yes, he has examined everything that has gone before, and while he may have taken a somewhat different position earlier, he no longer thinks that way. We must not let him be hampered or hurt by any past statements.

Key: Carter's Campaign -- Attack Strategy

Objective: Prepare to neutralize the Carterite attacks.

Jimmy Carter practices piranha politics -- he eats his opponents alive. Beneath that sanctimonious guise is the heart and mind of a street fighter. He will do anything to win. We must expect the worst. We must expect the Carterites to attack Reagan, his competence, his record as Governor, his inconsistencies, his total record, his lack of national experience, and his tendency to occasionally misspeak. They will portray him as dumb, dangerous and deceptive.

Strategy:

- This means that we must be prepared. Reagan's record must be combed so that WE know exactly what it is. Every radio script, every column, every article, every available speech must be scrutinized.
- We need to establish definitive positions on the major issues and, in that process, initiate a new beginning. We must not get locked into defending, for example, a statement made in 1968 about taxes. This is essential.
- In response to attacks on Reagan's record, we should stand on it and talk positively about it. We should dig up defenders of it from both parties. The point is not to get into nit-picking defenses on details, but to establish the fact that Reagan was indeed a good governor. He did keep budgets balanced. He did reform welfare. He did reform mental health care. He was fair to the schools and colleges. He did return money to the people whenever possible. He did work to maintain and restore the environment. He was a good governor -- we must repeat it and repeat it and repeat it through the mouths of every prominent Californian we can find. We should dig out the articles all the papers ran on his governorship, picking out the good statements using them, especially in brochures and direct mail efforts.
- The Governor cannot afford any new mistakes, misstatements of fact, warlike statements, jokes or remarks that can be

twisted to suggest an interpretation of racist, sexist or any other "ist."

- When they attack, we should not give them any further ammunition to use against us.
- Ignore the attack and attack right back. Brush off press queries and point out how bad Carter is.
- The campaign should have its materials out in advance of any attacks. The Governor's positions need to be set. The comparisons between the two men need to be ready to go.
- Fact books on both Carter and Reagan need to be prepared and distributed soon.
- We need to be alert to any misstatements or distortions on the part of Carter or Anderson, and then be prepared to disseminate those distortions to the press.
- We cannot be casual about this; we cannot be careless. We must be ready to move quickly, but without panic. Any decision as to how to respond to a major attack must be carefully considered in every case by the policy group, and then assigned to the appropriate divisions for the requisite responses to be carried out immediately. We cannot afford to lose opportunities or let attacks be accepted by the press and public as fact.

Key: Carter's Campaign -- Attack Strategy

Objective: Prepare (innoculate) the voters for Carter's attack campaign.

Strategy:

- In the very early stages of the campaign, right after the Republican convention, have some strong surrogates use various forums to prepare the voters for the Carter onslaught.
- The public should be told that Rafshoon and Carter are as one. What Carter creates, Rafshoon produces.
- Voters should be forewarned that Carter has in the past, and will in the future, practice piranha politics. He will do anything to win.
- Our vice presidential candidate could well be one of the surrogates to sound this theme.

Key: Carter's Campaign -- Attack Strategy

Objective: Minimize the credibility of the Carterite charge that Ronald Reagan is anti-union, anti-Black and anti-elderly.

Without question, the Governor's "anti-labor" views on the minimum wage, labor law revision, and applying the anti-monopoly laws to labor unions as well as business will be strongly touted by Carter to the unionists and the rank and file.

We can fully expect the Carterites to remind the elderly of Reagan's past call for "voluntary" Social Security. This line of attack could be damaging because we have already lost some support among the older voters, primarily because our tax cut proposal offers no returns for those on zero incomes and thus affords no economic relief for those most hurt by rising prices -- the elderly on fixed incomes.

Lastly, we should expect the powers of the presidency to be brought in full force to reinforcing Carter's strength among Hispanics and Blacks. The recent multi-million dollar grant to Miami was only for openers.

Strategy:

- As we follow through on the strategies to strengthen our support among all Republicans and then begin to reach out to the Independents, blue collar and soft Democrats, some of the sting in the charge, "a captive of the Right Wing," will dissipate.

However, we must do more than this. Reagan must address and persuade the moderates and Ticket-Splitters that his presidency offers hope beyond ideology, promise beyond

party. He must be viewed as a man capable of leading the entire nation.

- The selection of a moderate vice presidential running mate will do more to lay the charge of "ideological captive" to rest, forever, than any other decision we make.
- We must defuse the anti-Black, anti-union and anti-elderly charge by developing positions, consistent with the Governor's beliefs, that speak convincingly to these groups about problems of their special interest:
 - . a workable urban policy;
 - . a program that will offer some economic hope to the elderly who have been so squeezed by Carter's inflation; and
 - . policies that have some economic payoff for the working men and women of this country.
- The Governor and the other campaign spokespersons should attack Carter regularly for his failures to meet the needs of these groups.

Key: Issues of Overriding Interest -- Pocketbook Concerns
and Need for a General Economic Program

Objective: Develop a comprehensive economic plan which can serve
as the linchpin of the entire Reagan campaign effort.

If Ronald Reagan is to capture the issue of the day and excite the support of American voters, he must derive a comprehensive, credible, proprietary economic program. This program must go beyond the isolated treatment of pocketbook issues -- inflation, unemployment, balanced budget and taxes -- to a complete proposal for curing the nation's economic ills. Voters are aware of the dual economic demons of inflation and unemployment and desire a proposal which copes with both. Although voters may not understand economic theory or the relationship of economic factors, they do understand that economic issues are complex and not subject to facile resolution. A Reagan proposal, while remaining straightforward, must convince the voters that it deals with the full spectrum of economic complexities.

Strategy:

- Develop a comprehensive economic plan early in the campaign so that it is firmly in place before Carter has a chance to pre-empt it in the late summer. The plan must treat the broad spectrum of economic issues as a unit and project a view of the future.
- Create credibility of the economic plan by selling it to the nation's economists at the earliest possible stage. When the plan is presented to the public, it should already have earned the endorsement of noted economists.
- While the plan must be sufficiently complex to treat the spectrum of economic issues, a summary should be prepared which is easily understood by the lay voter. This summarized version of the plan should be presented with some fanfare to the press so that it will be passed on to the public.
- The plan must take advantage of the voters' overwhelming desire to see cuts in federal spending. Even if the plan is built primarily on tax cuts, Reagan should never enter

an economic discussion or give an economic speech without mentioning cuts in government spending at the outset.

- The Reagan economic plan must be proprietary. It must be identified as the Reagan plan and must never be referenced in whole or in part to Jack Kemp's economics.
- The sophisticated electorate shuns economic simplicity. Voters should not be told that resolution of the nation's economic ills is a simple matter. Instead, they should be told that, although the matter is complex, it can be summarized in an understandable form.
- The plan should stress increasing the productivity of the private sector. Voters are very much aware that national productivity has waned and are receptive to a plan which might reverse that trend.
- The plan must cope equally with the problems of inflation and unemployment. One can expect that unemployment will match inflation as an object of public concern in the near future.

Key: Issues of Overriding Interest --
The United States' Peace Posture

Objective: Establish Ronald Reagan as a leader capable of returning the United States to a position of world leadership and promoting world peace.

Strategy:

- Whenever Ronald Reagan talks about foreign affairs, he must speak in terms of promoting international stability with an aim towards world peace. Rather than a "defense posture," Reagan should use the term "peace posture."
- Given the voters' strong feelings about the slippage of the United States in world opinion, it will be very difficult for Carter to sell himself as a man of peace unless there is a massive intervening cause or event, or unless the Reagan campaign gives signals that Ronald Reagan in the Oval Office would increase rather than decrease the chances of war. The campaign must avoid giving any such signals.
- Since Reagan's opposition to draft registration is not in accord with the mainstream of public sentiment, any time the Governor mentions his opposition to the draft he must in the same breath outline his alternative: improving wages and conditions in the military to attract more good people into military service.
- Reagan should explain defense spending in terms of the irreversibility of the error of underspending. While the nation can, with the right strategy and enough perseverance, cope with the budget problems caused by increased defense spending, it cannot recover from the consequences stemming from too little defense spending.

Key: Issues of Overriding Interest -- Energy Concerns

Objective: Present to the voters a comprehensive energy plan which deals credibly with the spectrum of energy issues as they pervade society today.

Strategy:

- Address the spectrum of energy concerns and promulgate a strategy for coping with all the effects of energy problems as they occur in the economic, cultural and international spheres.
- Present the comprehensive strategy in simple enough terms that voters can understand the practicality of the concepts employed and have faith that the plan will work.
- Detail the implementation sufficiently so that energy experts will be able to examine and develop faith in the plan. Voters will depend upon the opinions of these experts in weighing the merits of the Reagan energy plan.
- Voters believe that the nation's energy problems can be solved by a concerted application of Yankee ingenuity to the problem. They perceive much of the problem as stemming from Carter's failure to provide the strong leadership necessary to direct the nation into a period of technological advance. Therefore, Reagan must fill the leadership void by projecting the leadership ability to guide the country into such a period of technological progress.

Key: Issues of Special Opportunity

Objective: Employ issues of special opportunity to accomplish the following goals:

- draw large blocs of voters directly impacted by the issue into the Reagan camp;
- solidify a public impression that Reagan is a compassionate individual who has concern for the common man and understands the problems facing voters in their daily lives;
- point out Carter's failures in servicing the daily needs of voters and in fulfilling his 1976 campaign promises; and
- control the direction and focus of the presidential campaign by making national issues of concerns which are crucial to large segments of society but which are not currently at the forefront of the national issue agenda.

Strategy:

Reagan can accomplish the goals outlined above by developing and delivering targeted speeches on the following topics:

- Urban affairs
- Farm policy
- Health care
- Care for the elderly
- Immigrants
- Education
- Welfare
- Justice in America
- Freedom of the press
- Families
- Neighborhoods

Key: Issues of the Single-Issue Voter

Objective: Bring single-issue voters into the Reagan camp without arousing opposition to Reagan among those voters who may take the other side on these same issues.

Strategy:

The above objective may be accomplished by developing appropriate messages on the following topics for rifle-shot targeting to appropriate voters and interest groups:

- Abortion
- Equal Rights Amendment
- Panama Canal
- Gun control

Key: Targeting 1980 -- Results

Objective: Win the easiest and least expensive 270 electoral votes.

Strategy:

- Identify the most natural Reagan base states in the large, medium and small state categories.
- Allocate campaign resources to the list of recommended base states on the basis of the need to secure the vote.
- Periodically update the state targeting list to reflect changes in the relative ballot strengths of Governor Reagan, President Carter and Congressman Anderson.

List of Recommendation: Coalition States
and Need for Resources

<u>Large States</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>Need for Resources</u>
1. California	45	Very high
2. Illinois	26	High
3. Texas	26	Very high
4. Ohio	25	High
5. Pennsylvania	27	High

NOTE: As both Michigan and New York must be "tracked" to determine whether they offer better targets of opportunity as the campaign progresses than they do now, we should keep them on the list as:

Special Consideration

1. Michigan	21	(More information needed)
2. New York	41	(More information needed)

Medium States

1. Indiana	13	Medium
2. Virginia	12	Medium
3. Tennessee	10	(More information needed)
4. Florida	17	High
5. Maryland	10	(More information needed)

Small States

1. Idaho	4	None
2. South Dakota	4	Very low
3. Wyoming	3	Very low
4. Vermont	3	Low
5. Utah	4	None
6. Nebraska	5	Low
7. North Dakota	3	Very low
8. New Hampshire	4	Low
9. Kansas	7	Low
10. Montana	4	Low
11. New Mexico	4	Very low
12. Nevada	3	Very low
13. Arizona	6	Medium
14. Oregon	6	Medium
15. Alaska	3	Low
16. Iowa	8	Medium
17. Colorado	7	Medium
18. Washington	9	Medium
19. Maine	4	Low

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