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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name BAKER, HOWARD: FILES

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File Folder INF AGREEMENT MATERIALS (3)

FOIA

M09-301

Box Number 2

HERF

8

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
95008	MEMO	RHETT DAWSON TO BAKER RE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH RICHARD PERLE 11/18 R 5/2/2011 M301/1	1	11/19/1987	B1
95009	MEMO	DAWSON TO BAKER RE UPDATE ON ATTACHED PERLE/GAFFNEY REPORT R 1/10/2011 F97-066/6 #95009	1	11/20/1987	B1
95010	MEMO	FRANK CARLUCCI TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF RE RATIFICATION OF THE INF TREATY R 1/10/2011 F97-066/6 #95010	4	7/8/1987	B1
95011	MEMO	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO CARLUCCI RE ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION	2	ND	B1
95012	MEMO	CARLUCCI TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ET AL RE INF TREATY R 5/2/2011 M301/1	1	10/8/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
OA/Box: Box 2
File Folder: INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces]
 Agreement Materials (3)

Archivist: kdb
FOIA ID: F1997-066/6, D. Cohen
Date: 08/04/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Rhett Dawson to H. Baker re 11/18 telephone conversation with Richard Perle, 1p	11/19/87	B1
2. memo	Dawson to Baker re attached report, 1p	11/20/87	B1
3. memo	Frank Carlucci to Chief of Staff re ratification of INF Treaty (w/notations), 4p	7/8/87	B1
4. memo	Cap to Asst. to the President for National Security Affairs re arms control verification, 2p	n.d.	B1
5. memo (91064)	Carlucci to Sec. of State, Sec. of Defense, <i>et al.</i> re ratification of INF Treaty, 1p	10/8/87	B1

RESTRICTIONS

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- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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95008

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 19, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: HOWARD H. BAKER
FROM: RHETT B. DAWSON
SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Richard Perle, 11/18

Richard called seeking an appointment with you to discuss the following issues.

- He increasingly feels he may not be able to support the INF agreement. Because he committed support to you, he wanted you to know. He feels the "almost frantic negotiating climate" is leading us to giving on the most crucial issue -- verification. He cited mistakes we risk in our haste to meet deadlines such as the SS-25/SS-20 issue. He also cited our apparent inability to get detailed, disaggregated data from the Soviets.

- Rumors of Frank Gaffney's nomination being pulled down are very troublesome to him because:

- * there's nothing in his "record" to warrant withdrawal,
- * Gaffney brings much-needed expertise and healthy skepticism to the Pentagon, and
- * Gaffney is not "unconfirmable" as the "rumors" indicate.

Richard is concerned that by pulling the nomination, we will create a "martyr" especially since Warner is still committed to work to get Gaffney confirmed. (NOTE: I did not accept or reject any of this, nor tell him of current plans)

- The INF treaty has more opposition in the Senate and elsewhere than anticipated. He listed Wilson, Rudman, Hollings, and Wallop as Senators with varying degrees of misgivings. Additionally, the Committee on Present Danger has not been turned around even though Paul Nitze may be telling George Shultz that it has.

- During ratification, the President will have to depend on the liberal Democrats who will make unacceptable demands upon us. Pell, for example, is already talking about making INF contingent upon START and nuclear testing. And, there is a danger that the SDI program will be in the bargain, too.

(NOTE: Richard also noted that he is "negotiating with the networks" to be a commentator on the summit.)

Conclusion: My estimate is that while Richard may indeed be stepping away from his support of INF for any number of reasons, the purpose of his call and any meeting with you would be to shore up Frank Gaffney's nomination. This is vintage Perle, but I do not take lightly either his analysis or his concerns.

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Declassify: OADR

BY RND
NLR 1001-301 #95008
DECLASSIFIED
DATE 5/2/11

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

95009

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 20, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: HOWARD H. BAKER
FROM: RHETT B. DAWSON *W*
SUBJECT: Update on Attached Perle/Gaffney Report

Frank Gaffney called me at home late last night to advise me that he had met with Frank Carlucci last evening resulting, according to Gaffney, in his resignation for reasons of substantive disagreement. Carlucci told Gaffney that he wanted to bring Ron Lehman in as Perle's successor.

During this conversation, Gaffney also mentioned that he sensed a growing uneasiness on Cap's part with the direction of the last minute negotiations on INF. He hinted strongly that Cap would evidence this uneasiness at today's NSPG, presumably by arguing for a "go-slow" approach.

CONCLUSION: Now that Gaffney has announced his resignation, I am very confident from this conversation that he will actively oppose the INF treaty. Given the close nature of Richard Perle's relationship with Gaffney and Richard's already developing doubts about the treaty (see the attached), Perle will likely join Gaffney in opposition. If this happens, the opposition in the Senate will greatly harden (and, possibly, broaden). We should take steps very soon to deal with Perle.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F97-D666/6 #95009
BY RW NARA DATE 1/10/01

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

21 Dec

Senator Baker,

Here are the

Papers George

SHULTZ MENTIONED

LAST WEEK.

CF



S/S 8736280
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

9357

December 17, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: INF Ratification Papers

Per my conversation with Paul Stevens, I am sending you various papers on INF ratification.


Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Shultz Points: INF Negotiating Record
2. Nunn Points: Key Principles Concerning the Senate's Institutional Role
3. Shultz Toast to General Secretary Gorbachev
4. Pell-Shultz Letter re INF

INF Negotiating Record

-- Where issues of treaty interpretation arise on which the Senate takes a strong interest, the President and the Senate must work together in good faith to resolve such questions in a manner that, consistent with the Constitution and international law, maximizes the interests of the United States.

-- In this spirit, the Administration will assure the Senate that its testimony on the INF Treaty will be authoritative and that the Senate can rely on it. The meaning of the Treaty as presented to the Senate will be regarded by the Administration as authoritative without the necessity of the Senate incorporating that testimony in its Resolution of Ratification through understandings, reservations, amendments or other conditions. President Reagan will assure the Senate that he will not adopt a meaning for the Treaty different from that presented by the Administration to the Senate.

-- We are prepared to provide the analysis requested by Senator Pell of the obligations in the Treaty and related documents. We are also prepared, if requested, to provide access to documents relied upon to support that analysis. This would include records of the negotiations with the Soviets in Geneva, but would not include internal Executive Branch deliberative documents. (We would need to agree on the persons having access to such materials and the method of their custody and storage.)

-- We will likewise be prepared to respond to further questions by the Senate as to the content and effect of the negotiating record on particular issues of special interest.

-- We will assure the Senate that the analysis and materials we provide will give a full, comprehensive and authoritative picture of the content of the negotiating record on the matters in question. In particular, we would be prepared to assure the Senate that internal Executive Branch deliberative documents not provided would not change the obligations of the United States under international law, or of the President under U.S. law, as we have described them.

NUNN POINTS

December 15, 1987

Key Principles Concerning the Senate's Institutional Role

Any agreement reached with the Administration concerning the relationship between the ratification process and the negotiating record should be measured against the following key principles:

1. The Senate must be assured that the Administration's testimony on the treaty is authoritative and that the Senate can rely on it.

2. The meaning of the treaty as presented to the Senate will be regarded as authoritative without the necessity of the Senate incorporating the testimony in its Resolution of Ratification through understandings, reservations, or amendments.

3. If a subsequent determination is made that the treaty should be given a meaning different from that presented to the Senate, such a change may be accomplished only with the Senate's approval.

Luncheon, December 9, 1987

Mr. General Secretary:

I am pleased to welcome you to the Department of State at the midpoint in your summit discussions. Now is a good time to reflect upon the highlights and accomplishments of the past day-and-a-half, before we move on to more hard work -- and, I hope, more achievements.

Already, you and President Reagan have signed an arms reduction agreement of historic significance. For the first time, our two nations have agreed to eliminate, not just to constrain, an entire class of nuclear arms. If this summit accomplishes nothing more than the INF agreement -- a dramatic reversal in one limited area of the arms race -- your visit will be seen as a precedent-breaking achievement in our joint efforts to create a more stable strategic environment.

Beyond this success in arms reduction, however, we are pursuing a much broader summit agenda. We seek to maintain the momentum of Reykjavik and bring about a fifty percent cut in strategic weaponry through the START process. We are close to agreement on a treaty further limiting the testing of nuclear weapons.

And we are continuing discussion of the other elements of the President's four-part agenda: human rights concerns; regional conflicts; and areas of bilateral interest and cooperation.

But as historic as these accomplishments are, generations to come will view our efforts in a much broader and more profound context -- that of technological, economic and political changes of global scope that are transforming our world.

These global trends were the subject of a wide-ranging discussion at your breakfast yesterday with Vice President Bush and a group of private American citizens. I was impressed by the degree to which we share a common perspective. We all agreed that we are already witnessing an unprecedented transformation of global relationships driven by new scientific breakthroughs and new technologies.

Indeed, ours is a time of change as profound for the course and conduct of international relations as were the watershed years just after World War II. New technologies of computation and communication are profoundly changing the way people live, and the way nations deal with each other. The expansion of scientific and technological know-how is producing a dramatic dispersion of economic, military and political capabilities around the globe.

Our world is becoming ever more interdependent economically, as information systems create global financial and trading markets. Science and technology have opened up untold opportunities to increase mankind's security and material well-being through new production processes in industry and agriculture, new approaches to health care, and new methods of safeguarding the environment.

Yet, ours is a world still widely differentiated in terms of levels of economic and social development and riven by age-old ethnic, religious and regional strife. Tragically, the high-tech weaponry of our age is making these enduring conflicts all the more destructive. And the world community must face the ever more pervasive problems of terrorism and drug trafficking.

Thus, at just the time when we are all blessed with unprecedented possibilities for peace and prosperity, the world community remains burdened with political challenges and ever more lethal threats to international security. Ours is an era of dramatic opportunity and daunting challenge. Pressures for change are accelerating, and contact among contrasting cultures, economies and political systems is pervasive and ever-more intense. In today's world, no one country can prosper in isolation. Every nation bears responsibility for managing the problems of change. Ever greater international engagement, responsibility and restraint are required of all countries.

These unprecedented transformations in international affairs present the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union with an historic challenge to transform our bilateral relations as well. You and the President agree that this emerging era offers us a unique opportunity to do so. Are we up to the challenge?

As we review the history of U.S.-Soviet relations since our wartime alliance against the Nazi scourge, we see several periods in which we might have taken a path of greater cooperation. But each time the adversarial character of our relationship overrode or obscured the other areas where mutual interests might have been found and developed.

We must learn from the missed opportunities of the past, and -- with wisdom born of experience -- grasp the new opportunity before us in this time of global transformation. Our great challenge is to go beyond individual areas of agreement on problems between us to establish a process that might -- over time -- fundamentally transform the character of our relationship for the better. Such a transformation should require neither a sacrifice of our respective national interests, nor an abandonment of our national values.

But we ~~must~~ recognize both the opportunity and dangers of our time: ~~the dangers~~ of again reverting to hostile confrontation; and the opportunity to establish and sustain a long-term effort to build trust and confidence, stability and cooperation.

As world leaders, you and President Reagan can do much to inspire our peoples to meet the challenges of change and grasp the opportunities of a future that is already upon us. It is a future our peoples must share and shape for the better, together with other nations of the world.

Since you came to office, Mr. General Secretary, our two countries have increased the frequency of our high-level bilateral dialogue. Since 1985, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I have had twelve ministerial meetings in addition to our current talks. You and President Reagan have held three summit meetings -- and one further summit is anticipated in Moscow next year. Through this senior dialogue, our exchanges of view have broadened and deepened in content. These exchanges will continue. And, as you and President Reagan have agreed, we must give special attention to developing a sustainable process that will transform our relationship for the better -- a process that will channel the energies of our peoples toward a future of greater security and material well-being. Ours is a time of opportunity we cannot let pass us by.

So, in that spirit of promise born of both the achievements of this summit and of the future that challenges us, let us now raise our glasses to the challenging work that lies ahead!

WILLIAM E. CHAPMAN, JR., CHAIRMAN
JOHN P. LARSEN, VICE CHAIRMAN

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0225

November 30, 1987

19

The Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Over the past several weeks, I have had an opportunity to discuss consideration of the anticipated Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty by the Committee on Foreign Relations and the full Senate with Committee Members and other Senators. I am now beginning to organize the hearings and Committee work.

I anticipate that hearings will begin on January 19 with an appearance by you, either jointly with Secretary of Defense Carlucci, or alone. The hearings will continue throughout January and into February. We will need the full support of the Department throughout that process.

The Committee's consideration of the negotiating record of the treaty will be of central importance. Accordingly, I would ask that you direct the Legal Adviser to prepare, in consultation and coordination with the legal counsels of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a legal analysis covering the full scope and precise content of all obligations undertaken by each party to the treaty, the protocols on inspection and elimination, and the Memoranda of Understanding on data exchange. This analysis should be based on a thorough review of all treaty documents, including instructions, minutes of the negotiations, all records kept by the U.S. side, and exchanges of notes with nations affected by the treaty.

The Legal Adviser should be prepared to appear before the Committee on or about February 18 to present the review, together with all documents relied upon to support the findings of the review.

PAIM/IAP/WI

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It is understood and explicitly stated that the documents provided with the review constitute a full and comprehensive record of the negotiation of the obligations undertaken in the treaty, and that documents not provided have no legal relevance to the obligations imposed by the treaty and its related documents.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

With every good wish.

Ever sincerely,

Claiborne Pell
Claiborne Pell
Chairman

cc: Senator Nunn

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90618
Add-on

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1987
By CLB NARA, Date 8/24/04

ACTION

September 17, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: BOB LINHARD *Bob*
SUBJECT: INF Treaty Ratification

Attached is a copy of the package on INF ratification that we discussed in the car this morning. The staff level sounding-out of conservatives suggested in the package is a little harder now; we had hoped to use Sven's final two months to get that process started. Otherwise I think it's all still valid.

I really think you need to turn to this one soon, boss.

Attachment
As stated

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90618

July 8, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.

SUBJECT: Ratification of the INF Treaty

Thank you for your excellent memorandum of July 8 regarding the above. I would like to meet with you as soon as possible to discuss it and prepare for the next steps.

7/10/87

JyI: Sven
~~_____~~
B: 11

~~SECRET~~
~~ATTACHMENT~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Add-on *KU*

July 8, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI *FC*

SUBJECT: Ratification of the INF Treaty

*Howard -
you asked me
about this issue, so
I asked that something
be put on paper. 950 10*

While we cannot yet be certain, it seems probable that we will conclude an INF agreement with the Soviets later this year. My staff and I have recently been considering possible pitfalls in gaining Senate advice and consent to ratification of such a treaty. This memorandum sets out our preliminary thoughts; once you have had a chance to review it I would like to meet with you to discuss the subject.

The conventional wisdom is that any treaty Ronald Reagan signs will be ratified, especially since (a) even if we don't get all the provisions in our draft, the INF Treaty will have the deepest reductions and the strongest verification provisions of any arms control treaty in history, and (b) a Rand analysis of past ratification debates suggest the most important variable is the degree to which Congress feels consulted during negotiations, and the Administration has a good record in this regard.

I believe it would be dangerous, however, to discount potential pitfalls or to assume the Senate will automatically give its advice and consent to the President to ratify any INF agreement. Senate scrutiny of this treaty will be in depth and prolonged. There are several reasons why we should not be complacent:

- The final provisions for verification and, possibly for numbers (e.g., Asian LRINF) remain to be negotiated and are certain to contain divisive elements.
- A recent speech by Jack Kemp (extract at Tab A) set forth conditions for ratification some of which we may not be able to meet. While Kemp will not play a direct role in the Senate ratification debate, his speech may have set the terms of the debate for conservatives.
- We continue to be plagued by accusations in the aftermath of Reykjavik that the United States does not fully understand what it is doing to European security through deep reductions in nuclear arms. While much of this concern is politically motivated, it also reflects genuine concern.

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-0166/6 #95010

BY RW NARA DATE 1/10/11

- R. D. Shu*
- Depending on future decisions, there is a possibility of a confrontation with Congress over ABM Treaty interpretation before the INF ratification debate begins. This could have the effect of polarizing arms control issues even more than they are now.
 - Even some of the President's strong supporters may have reservations on verification. Cap Weinberger's attached memorandum (Tab B) is a recent example. Ken Adelman also has testified that we have only 30-40 percent confidence in verification. The relevant point for this memorandum is not whether they're right or wrong but that such views will inevitably impact the debate on ratification.
 - The fact that there are few if any Administration officials knowledgeable on arms control who have direct links with hard line conservatives on the Hill limits our ability to work that important segment of Congress.
 - Finally, there is the simple fact that the ratification debate will take place in an election year, and at such times strange things happen. If, for example, conservatives make all or most of the Jack Kemp criteria a litmus test, Presidential candidates such as Senator Dole might find it difficult to lead the charge for the President's position. This is not the only scenario, but it is certainly not an impossible one.

Obviously, the degree of opposition an INF Treaty will face depends on its contents. In terms of the actual treaty provisions, the Administration should be on high ground, especially if we get the global zero-zero option, for which there is strong support in Congress. Congressional concerns will focus on:

- the linkage with the conventional imbalance in Europe;
- verification.

Congress will mostly blow smoke on the conventional imbalance in Europe. Congress is unwilling, just as are the Europeans, to fund the conventional arms needed to rectify this imbalance. And no one will want to jeopardize one arms agreement in hand on the basis of linkage to one which has been the subject of fruitless negotiations for more than 10 years.

Verification, however, could prove fertile ground for extensive Congressional scrutiny:

- it is easier to understand and articulate than the technical aspects of weapons systems and their limitations;

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- it appeals to that side of the American public which suspects the Soviets and their dubious intentions; and
- it offers a chance to scrutinize the verification efforts of an Administration that has made a major issue of Soviet non-compliance and of the ineffectual efforts toward verification of past administrations.

This suggests that, in looking forward to the ratification debate, we need to pay special attention to ensuring we get the tightest possible verification arrangements and are prepared to present the strongest possible defense of our approach. Inadequate verification standards and provisions will be difficult to sell on the Hill no matter how organized and ardent the campaign. I have met with the senior members of the arms control community on this subject; all recognize its importance.

In our view, however, we also need to begin concerning ourselves with the attitude toward an INF Treaty of specific Congressional leaders, especially Senators Byrd, Dole, Nunn, Warner, Glenn, Lugar and the conservatives in general. If this group believes the treaty contributes to NATO's strength and is verifiable, and can be active in helping to meet any concerns to the contrary, we will have no problems. If the reverse is likely to be true, we need to know it soon.

Democrats will face a difficult choice on the conclusion of an INF agreement. After criticizing the Administration for years for having no arms control policy and for concluding no agreement, they will find it difficult to oppose an agreement. They do, however, have nightmares about Ronald Reagan capping his Presidency with an arms control agreement which will gain political mileage for the Republicans. In the final analysis, however, I doubt liberal Senate Democrats will vote against an arms reduction treaty unless recognized experts like Nunn and Glenn legitimize such actions by their own opposition. Therefore, it will be particularly important not to hand opponents a victory either by submitting a treaty with inadequate verification provisions or by failing to do adequate advance work to ensure we are both ready and able to deal with Congressional concerns.

While our principal focus must remain on negotiating the soundest possible treaty, I believe we should also start now to take some discreet steps to determine if we have a potential problem with ratification, and, if so, to begin to deal with it in advance. Such steps might include:

- Continuing to consult closely with the Congress on the INF negotiations using the fora of the Arms Control Observer Groups as we have in the past.

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- Quietly sounding out Dole's staff and other conservative staffs on their sensing of whether ratification will be a problem. We would explore, in as low-key a fashion as possible, whether LRINF verification concerns are major and whether it would make any difference if we end up with a solution that defers SRINF reductions to future negotiations. We might also explore what, if any "safeguards" they might propose.
- If these staff level soundings suggest further discussions would be useful, meeting privately with Sam Nunn and John Warner to discuss the NATO aspects and gain a sense of their views. At the same time you and I might quietly discuss the subject with Bob Dole.
- Depending on the results of those discussions, establishing separate and individual consultative channels with Dole, Byrd, Nunn, Warner, Lugar and a few others on the issue of verification. If John Glenn makes this his issue, as he did during the SALT II debate, we need to identify someone to counterbalance his expertise who will be more friendly to the Administration than he potentially could be.

We are not advocating putting Congress into the role of treaty drafting. The object of these discussions would not be to turn the Administration into a middle man, attempting to negotiate language that both the Congress and the Soviets can accept. That is both wrong Constitutionally and unworkable practically. Rather, the objective would be to identify and meet obstacles to the ratification of the treaty that the President negotiates.

Before proceeding further I would like to discuss the subject with you in light of your unique understanding of the Senate and its relations with the Administration. While none of the specific steps suggested above may be appropriate, we are convinced that it is not too early to begin to think through ratification if we are to avoid unpleasant surprises.

Attachments

Tab A	Extract from Kemp Speech (Highlighted)
Tab B	Weinberger Memorandum

cc: Will Ball

INF ARMS CONTROL: IMPERILING NATO'S FUTURE

by Representative Jack Kemp

These questions fill me with profound concern and apprehension. Nevertheless, I realize full well that we may sign an INF agreement with the Soviet Union. Therefore, let me set out what I consider to be four minimum provisions, four critical provisions, any agreement must incorporate before it is submitted to the Senate.

Verification and Loopholes. First, any INF agreement must provide for a true global zero in all INF forces. Soviet ground-launched cruise missiles must be included if NATO's are to be banned. And we must not permit a 100 warhead loophole. Verification would be hopeless if the Soviets are permitted to retain mobile SS-20s in Asia which they can move about at will. The NATO ministers have made true zero a condition of their support. And our Asian friends have already objected to accepting 100 SS-20 warheads targeted against them.

Second, any agreement must include verifiable and equal limits on short-range INF systems, and a NATO guarantee to deploy compensatory short-range forces as necessary.

Third, any agreement must mandate effective verification including on-site inspection of suspect sites on demand.

Outgunning the U.S. And fourth, any agreement must establish a timetable for the destruction of deployed INF systems that first equalizes force levels and then imposes a simultaneous drawdown of weapons. In other words, the Soviets greatly outgun us. If we are agreed on reducing to equality, then let them reduce first to our level before we irrevocably begin destroying our few launchers.

But even if these four conditions are met, the agreement may still not be in our interest. It must be judged in the context of Soviet behavior and the overall strategic and theater military balance.



95011
DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M301 #95011

BY KML NARA DATE 9/14/11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT ^{Frank} TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Arms Control Verification (U)

1. (C) I want to bring to your attention a concern that I believe will become more troublesome as we proceed toward INF, START, and other arms control agreements with the USSR. We are very much on the public record as willing to accept only truly verifiable treaties. Yet the prospect of attaining high standards of verification in the present treaty proposals for both START and INF is low. This means we are either going to accept treaties we cannot verify confidently, or we are not going to sign treaties in their present form. Our public image, however, is very much at odds with this real dilemma. Let me explain.

2. (S)

Those were the counting measures of that regime. Under SALT II, those counting measures were retained, but new requirements crept in. For example, air-launched cruise missiles, throw-weight changes, and some limitation on warhead fractionation were introduced.

3. (TS)

COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES

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4. (S) To be sure, we have tabled demands for verification with the Soviets that purport to deal with these problems. Forbidding [redacted] "on-site inspection" are the [redacted] schemes for overcoming the dilemma. As I become more familiar with the ambiguities and complexities of these verification methods, the more dubious I am that (a) they can be negotiated successfully, and (b) [redacted]

[redacted]

"On-site inspection" has been considered many times in the past. It was examined closely during the last years of the Eisenhower Administration. It was considered in the connection with CTB during the Carter Administration. With the exception of PNET (not yet ratified), a successful formula has proven elusive. We are trying hard now in the INF negotiations, but grounds for optimism are not good. If we had the level of trust with the USSR needed for effective on-site inspection, we probably would not need an arms control treaty in the first place.

5. (C) I am moved to voice this concern because I see clear danger of either generating public expectations of a treaty this year which we cannot meet or signing a treaty which the Senate will fail to ratify because the verification standard we can meet is imprudently low. I believe Ken Adelman fully shares the views in this memorandum.

6. (U) I am prepared to join you with our intelligence community officials to discuss this matter in its fuller implication.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
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Baker
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CHRON FILE

October 8, 1987


MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Task Force to Facilitate
Ratification of an INF Treaty (C)

The White House is establishing a task force, along the same lines as the task force for the MX missile, to coordinate and oversee Administration efforts to facilitate ratification of the INF treaty by the US Senate. This task force will be chaired by White House Legislative Affairs. Substantive support for the task force within the White House will be provided by National Security Council staff. (S)

The size of the task force should be kept small, to permit it to provide guidance and coordination for activities by responsible Cabinet agencies, without becoming the actual operating body for ratification support efforts. White House Legislative Affairs will be contacting each agency to ascertain its membership on the task force. An initial meeting of the task force should occur before October 15, 1987. (C)

The task force will be responsible for formulating and coordinating implementation of all activities to provide support for ratification of the INF treaty. (S)


Frank C. Carlucci

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
NLRR MD9-3D1 #95012
BY RW NARA DATE 5/2/11

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DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

66B NARA, Date 8/24/01

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I have directed the U.S. INF negotiator in the Nuclear and Space Talks at Geneva to present to the Soviet Union at today's meeting of the INF Negotiating Group our proposal for implementing a double global zero treaty eliminating all U.S. and Soviet ground-based INF missiles. Our negotiator will also present an inspection protocol which details the procedures which we consider necessary to effectively verify compliance with the treaty.

The draft we are presenting is a logical progression from a draft text designed to reduce INF missiles to a specified level to a draft treaty which would eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet missiles.

Key elements of our proposal to implement the double global zero outcome include:

- The elimination of all U.S. and Soviet INF missiles and launchers. Longer-range INF missiles and launchers would be eliminated within three years; shorter-range within one year;
- A ban on the modernization, production or flight testing of any INF missile system;
- A comprehensive and effective verification regime tailored to a double global zero outcome.

I have always made clear my firm belief that not having a treaty is better than having one which cannot be effectively verified. Accordingly, we are proposing the most stringent verification regime of any arms control agreement in history. The most effective verification possible is vital to ensure that an INF agreement makes a lasting contribution to peace and stability. We will not settle for anything less.

We have come a long way in our efforts to remove the threat posed by Soviet INF missiles. NATO resolve to deploy U.S. INF missiles to counter this unprovoked Soviet threat, while at the same time seeking negotiations with the Soviets, laid the foundation for the historic agreement which is now within reach.

Difficult issues remain to be resolved, including verification. We have presented a comprehensive and effective verification regime. The Soviets have said they agree in principle with a number of our verification requirements, but have yet to provide some key details. Further, some of the details they have provided have not met the test of ensuring verification and confidence in compliance.

It is up to the Soviet Union now to demonstrate whether it shares our determination to conclude a treaty eliminating all US and Soviet INF missiles.

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Tail to Hum
P nail - arms control unit
Bardar