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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
OA/Box: Box 4
File Folder: Ross Perot

Archivist: kdb
FOIA ID: F1997-066/6, D. Cohen
Date: 08/10/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Vice President to Howard Baker, 1p	4/30/87	B6
2. memo	Craig Fuller to Colin Powell, re phone conversation with Perot, 1p	n.d.	B6
3. memo	George Bush to Perot, 2p	3/23/87	B6
4. memo	Fuller to Vice Pres., 1p [Item is still under review under the provisions of EO 13233] <i>5/5/09 KDB</i>	3/18/87	
5. memo	Fuller to Vice Pres., 2p <i>R 3/18/10 M09-204</i>	3/18/87	B1
6. memo	Fuller memo for the file re 3/19/87 phone conversation with Perot, 2p	3/19/87	B6
7. letter	to Ross, 1p	n.d.	B6
8. background paper	re background information on Perot and Vietnam, 3p <i>R 3/17/06 F97-066/6 #129</i>	n.d.	B1
9. letter	Warren Rudman to H. Baker re Perot, 1p <i>R 3/18/10 M09-204</i>	2/17/87	B1 B6

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
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- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4 May 87

FRANK

→ Sen Baker

He's SHIFTING
FROM ME BACK TO
THE VP's OFFICE.

Colin

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Date 3/18

TO: VP

FROM: CRAIG L. FULLER

I'd suggest that
the President, Howard, Frank
and you discuss this matter.

Let the President decide
and no one else needs to
be informed except Ross.

There are no other
copies and no one else
in the OVP is aware of
this.

CF

March 18, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: CRAIG L. FULLER 
SUBJECT: Perot Mission to Hanoi

Ross Perot phoned today and informed me that a schedule has been set concerning a possible mission to Hanoi. On Friday, March 20 he is to receive an official invitation to visit Hanoi from the Vietnamese ambassador to the United Nations. The ambassador is returning to the United States on Thursday and will deliver the invitation to Mr. Perot's representatives in New York.

The Vietnamese will request that Mr. Perot leave Sunday, March 22 for Hanoi.

Mr. Perot believes that the Vietnamese will state that they will meet his condition for the meeting, namely that he will be able to see and speak with live POWs held against their will. While Ross believes that there is no guarantee this will actually occur, he clearly wants to make the trip if such a condition is agreed upon. As you know, he has had a team of his own in Hanoi meeting with officials as a prelude to the offering of the formal invitation.

Ross, however, has a concern. He will go only if the President really wants him to go. He believes that some elements of the administration do not want him involved. And as a result, while he will do whatever the President wants him to do, he wants to hear from the President.

It is my view that we owe it to Ross to give him a clear signal at this juncture. He says he will do whatever is asked. Hence, there are two questions: 1) what message do we want to send to Ross; and 2) who should send it. The options are below:

The Message

- _____ make the trip if you are satisfied that it is possible your conditions will be met. When you return, meet with General Vessey. I have asked him to determine what next steps, if any, should be taken as a result of your trip.
- _____ please don't commit to a trip. Instead, confer with General Vessey and let him determine the next best step. You have accomplished much, Ross, but this project needs to be turned over to General Vessey.

Who Delivers the Message

- _____ Craig Fuller [I'd be glad to, but it won't do the trick]
- _____ Frank Carlucci [Ross is concerned about the NSC staff that are involve and would prefer not to involve them in his effort]
- _____ General Vessey [possibility]
- _____ the Vice President [certainly acceptable to Ross if done on behalf of the President]
- _____ the President [Ross' preference]

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BACKGROUND INFORMATION
POSSIBLE PEROT MISSION TO VIETNAM

Recent Situation

For about three months, since the Vietnamese have had indications of a possible Perot mission, cooperation with us on POW-MIA has come to a stop. Technical meetings - supposedly every two months - have been held up. Rumors of special emissaries - especially Perot - have circulated among Vietnamese diplomats. Our representations to conduct policy discussions have been rebuffed. These were intended to introduce General Jack Vessey as our representative, and lay groundwork for progress during his visit.

Outcomes Which We should Wish to Avoid

A public perception that we have known that prisoners were being held, therefore, a high-level mission went to Hanoi. If the Vietnamese do not deliver, we have a perception of failure and generate calls for even higher representation.

A public announcement by Perot that he has looked into the issue again, implemented his initiative at the direction of the President and no one remains alive.

A public announcement by the Vietnamese that the USG has been assured at the "highest levels" that no one is alive and that this was accepted.

An opportunity for the Vietnamese to tell all future delegations privately that no one is alive and those "higher than you" have been informed.

Destruction of the linkage between the live prisoner issue and the return of remains, a linkage that is motivating the Vietnamese to account for those who have died to include the visible discrepancy cases (those known to have been alive when captured, but not returned.)

Background on Ross Perot

Ross Perot's reputation as a no nonsense, straight-shooter and patriotic American and his previous involvement in the POW/MIA issue have led some to believe he can resolve the POW/MIA issue. Those who have background on the issue have had concerns about his involvement.

These concerns were demonstrated in a Perot initiative in the mid-1970s to determine if prisoners were being held. He sent a retired officer to Thailand in the 1970s to make a determination. When he returned with a negative, Perot announced to the world that no one remained alive and repeated it for

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NLS F97-066/6#129

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BY WES NARA, DATE 3/17/06

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several years. The families and others were outraged and have not forgotten it. Many who know the history and support the President's strategy fear Perot might again try to write-off the issue. The families would read it as the fifth attempted write-off (Paris, Montgomery, Carter, Woodcock, Perot) and as a betrayal by the President. The earlier missions that went during the Carter administration were seen as attempts to put MIA's "behind us," so that normalization with Vietnam could proceed. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia brought that kind of mission to an end.

In 1984, under our strategy, we were pursuing an initiative to prime Hanoi to receive an offer of substantial payment for the return of prisoners. This was initiated quietly with approval of the President through a third country with connections to the Vietnamese Politboro, then followed up by us directly. Perot entered the scene prior to our mission to Hanoi in March 1985 and proposed to go to Hanoi with his people to bribe the Vietnamese. This would "solve the issue one way or another." He said anyone they turned over would be screened by returned POWs of his choosing for deserters who would be left behind. If the Vietnamese responded negatively, then no one was there. Further, he did not care about "bones" and "Ann Mills Griffiths" could take care of that. Explanations that such a write-off would be unconscionable and that the Vietnamese would be let off the hook for both remains and live prisoners with such a strategy fell on deaf ears. We believe that Perot has softened that stark approach somewhat in his latest iterations.

His reemergence on the scene is a result of our public awareness program, and his being named by former Congressman Hendon in his resolution to establish another commission on the POW/MIA issue, a measure bitterly opposed by the majority of the families, the American Legion and other major voices. As a result, Perot has been inundated with a wide array of misinformation, charges of cover-up, criminal behavior, etc., in the past two years which he apparently feels a responsibility to clear up.

U.S. Objectives

Our strategy to resolve the POW/MIA issue is based upon the realistic foundation that our goal must be the fullest possible accounting of those still missing. In this context, the highest priority of the intelligence community and in our negotiations has been the question of Americans still held alive.

The strategy also recognizes that the fullest possible accounting is critical in that there is a direct relationship between the return of remains and the potential numbers or identity of live prisoners. Despite our best intelligence efforts, thus far, we have yet to find proof of prisoners, but we operate under the assumption it is true in terms of negotiating strategy and resources.

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~~SECRET~~

In our negotiations, our objective has been to gain an admission, so we can play "lets make a deal." Although we have managed to gain some responses on this question from the Vietnamese that are somewhat qualified, they still maintain a bottom line position that they are holding none "under their control or authority."

In one-on-one sessions with the Vietnamese, we have proposed a variety of incentives to include a direct reference to substantial payment to gain an admission. This was rejected abruptly as an insult and resulted in another denial. It must be recognized that Vietnam's long-term objective is normalization and trade, not a direct infusion of cash.

The Vietnamese and Lao recognize the issue is one of the President's priorities and have responded on that basis, acknowledging that normalization is tied to a Cambodian settlement and resolution of the POW/MIA issue is needed to preposition themselves for eventual normalization.

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12/4/02



WARREN B. RUDMAN

United States Senator
Washington, D.C. 20510

February 17, 1987

Honorable Howard Baker
Vinson and Elkins
1455 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20004

Dear Howard:

As you may be aware from recent press accounts, H. Ross Perot, who at the request of the administration has been investigating the POW/MIA issue, met with the Vice President last fall to complain about alleged early 1970's drug and weapons trafficking by Rich Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. I am told that Perot's real complaint stems from a general dissatisfaction with the way Armitage has handled the POW/MIA issue. By press accounts the Vice President basically shrugged off Perot's complaints.

I understand that within the last two weeks Perot met with Frank Carlucci to again complain that the administration has not done enough, and that like the VP, Carlucci told Perot to leave the issue alone.

Pentagon insiders tell my staff that there is a sufficient amount of intelligence to address this issue much more carefully, and it appears that Perot has acquired enough details to question why the administration hasn't.

Since you know Ross Perot and in light of your possible plans as well as the importance of the issue, you might wish to talk to Perot about this subject.

Sincerely,

Paid for and authorized by the Rudman for Senate Committee