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File: Records, 1981-1985

Folder Title: Memorandums of Conversation –
President Reagan (09/12/1984-October 1984)

Box: 53

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 2/8/2007

File Folder MEMCONS - PRESIDENT REAGAN (09/12/1984-OCTOBER 1984)

FOIA

F04-062

Box Number 53

BARBARA ELIAS

8

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
33555	MEMCON	SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH LORD CARRINGTON, SEPTEMBER 11, 1984	6	ND	B1
33556	MEMCON	MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MOBUTU SESE SEKO OF ZAIRE, SEPTEMBER 23, 1984 <i>R 11/26/2008 NLRRF04-062</i>	3	ND	B1
33557	MEMCON	SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER WILLOCH, SEPTEMBER 23, 1984	4	ND	B1
33558	MEMCON	MEETING WITH PRINCE SIHANOUK AND SON SANN OF THE DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA COALITION, SEPTEMBER 24, 1984	3	ND	B1
33559	MEMCON	THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH MANEA MANESCU, VICE PRESIDENT OF ROMANIA'S STATE COUNCIL: PHOTO OPPORTUNITY	1	ND	B1
33560	MEMCON	MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER MEGUID, SEPTEMBER 27, 1984 <i>R 4/5/2013 M370/1</i>	2	10/2/1984	B1
33561	MEMCON	PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER PERES, ETC., OCTOBER 9, 1984 <i>R 4/5/2013 M370/1</i>	8	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8406779

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

016 1/26/07

RECEIVED 14 SEP 84 15

TO

McFARLANE

FROM SOMMER

DOC DATE 12 SEP 84

KEYWORDS: NATO

GREAT BRITAIN

CARRINGTON, PETER

SUBJECT: MEMCON BETWEEN PRES & CARRINGTON

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 17 SEP 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

McFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSC/FID

(DW)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	9/27	Kimmit's sd memo		RK, PS

DISPATC

9/27

W/ATTCH

FILE

RA (C)

**National Security Council
The White House**

System # I

Package # 67.2

1345

8 SEP 14 AG

22

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	<u></u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Tom Shull	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Wilma Hall	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Bud McFarlane	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>4/6</u>	<u>K/K</u>	<u></u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>	<u></u>	<u>D</u>
Situation Room	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
<u>Nosie</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>done</u>	<u>Conahan</u>

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6779

3

September 27, 1984

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES *dlb 2/6/07*

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL R.J. AFFOURTIT
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Summary of Memorandum of Conversation Between
the President and Lord Carrington

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the
President's meeting with Lord Carrington on September 11,
1984.


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 2/8/2007

File Folder

MEMCONS - PRESIDENT REAGAN (09/12/1984-OCTOBER 1984)

FOIA

F04-062

BARBARA ELIAS

Box Number

53

8

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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33555 MEMCON

6

ND

B1

SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
LORD CARRINGTON, SEPTEMBER 11, 1984

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6779

10

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

September 12, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Pete*

SUBJECT: Summary of Memorandum of Conversation Between
the President and Lord Carrington

Attachment at Tab A is the memcon from the President's
September 11 meeting with Lord Carrington.

RECOMMENDATION:

Following your review of the memcon that you authorize Bob
Kimmitt to forward it to State and Defense.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

Pns for

Rob Lehman concurs.

Attachments

Tab I

-

Kimmitt Memo to Hill/Affour *Att*
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *dh* NARA, Date *2/4/08*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 24 SEP 84 19

TO MCFARLANE

FROM WETTERING

DOCDATE 24 SEP 84 11

KEYWORDS: ZAIRE

UN

MOBUTU, SESE S

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ MOBUTU SEP 23 AT UNGA

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 26 SEP 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8406916

NSCIFID

(CM)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Wettering	5 SEP 25 1984	for redo		
Mcfarlane	8 9/27	for Decision		
	SEP 27 1984	Kennett approved		
	SEP 27 1984	Kennett signed		WETTERING

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA

WET

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 7132

SEP 27 P 1:46

1391

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>T</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>R</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

National Security Council
The White House

1365

94F

System # I

Package # 7132

2 P 6:07

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>4</u>		
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Wettering</u>	<u>3</u>		<u>Redo</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Redone 9/27
GW

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

14

~~UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

7132

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)


September 27, 1984

dlb 2/6/04

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memcon of the President's September 23, 1984
Meeting with President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire

Attached for your information is a copy of the Memorandum of
Conversation covering the President's September 23 meeting with
President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire.


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Memcon

~~UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

7132

3356

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Mobutu Sese Seko of
Zaire (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary of State George Shultz
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick
Counsellor to the President, Edwin Meese III
Assistant to the President, James A. Baker
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, Robert McFarlane
Assistant Secretary of State, Chester
Crocker
Ambassador to Zaire, Brandon Grove
Frederick Wettering, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Alec Toumayan, State Department
(Interpreter)

President Mobutu Sese Seko
Foreign Minister Umba di Lutete
Finance Minister Kiakwama Kiakiziki
Director, Office of the President, Nimy
Mayidika Ngimbi
Ambassador to the U.S., Kasongo Mutuale

DATE, TIME September 23, 1984, 4:00 PM - 4:30 PM
AND PLACE: Presidential Suite, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel,
New York, N.Y.

The President expressed his pleasure at seeing President Mobutu again. He characterized bilateral relations as based on solid friendship and described them as excellent. He commended President Mobutu's courage in dealing with his economic problems and maintaining the reforms. He also thanked President Mobutu for his very positive contribution to the Chad problem. He stated that he personally held President Mobutu in the highest esteem for his courageous actions. (S)

President Mobutu thanked the President for seeing him in the midst of his electoral campaign. But he felt it important to tell the President what his government is doing in economic and political spheres and what seems to be needed. (S)

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 404-062 733556

~~SECRET~~

BY

CN

NARA DATE

11/26/04

~~SECRET~~

16

SECRET

2

President Mobutu noted that in 1982 one senior American official asked him to help himself so that we (Americans) can help you. In 1983 we began a program of economic and financial austerity by ourselves, even without waiting for the IMF. Then in 1984 Zaire turned to the IMF and things have worked out well with the IMF. After bearing these heavy burdens in 1983 and 1984, Zaire must and will continue reform in 1985 but must call on the help of our friends and partners in the manner I will describe, he added. (S)

President Mobutu stated he was leaving a memorandum outlining in detail steps which Zaire has done and will do and what Zaire is asking its friends to do. The principal issue is that he will continue the austerity program in 1985. But the \$900 million debt due next year is beyond Zaire's capability. Hospitals must have medicines, soldiers must have clothing and ammunition, communications must work. Zaire still has aircraft engines in Italy and owes \$29 million for these. He has no stipends for Zairians abroad. We need help in these matters; we want to pay what we owe, but we need to meet around a table and talk about what Zaire can pay, he added. (S)

President Mobutu noted that two months ago he had been massively reelected. But he was unhappy; in going around the country campaigning he found mothers and children looking to him for help, for improvement in life. What can I do, he asked. Must I tell them austerity means no medicine, no clothes? That is why I am here, he declared. (S)

President Mobutu then turned to political aspects. He noted that the US had asked Zaire for help and Zaire had responded without hesitation or bargaining. Ambassador Kirkpatrick knows, he added, that during Zaire's term on the UN Security Council we acted closely and in concert with the US. We ask you to extend all the support and understanding you can. (S)

President Mobutu noted that he had said the same thing to President Mitterrand a few days ago. Mitterrand had said something which embarrassed him, though. Mitterrand said that along with Presidents Houphouet-Boigny, Bourgiba, Sekou Toure, he, Mobutu, was the only African leader worthy of the name. Two very old, infirm men and one dead man, Mobutu grumbled. Mitterrand responded to Mobutu's pleas by saying that he understood and asked Mobutu to tell the American friends that they too should understand. (S)

President Mobutu apologized for speaking candidly, but noted that was his style when in the presence of good friends. (S)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

17

~~SECRET~~

3

The President responded by stating that Ambassador Kirkpatrick had kept him well informed on Zaire's strong support in the Security Council and General Assembly. He noted that he has raised our bilateral assistance this year over last and had asked Congress for an increase for next year. Regarding debt rescheduling, he went on to say, we will try to be of help and we want to be of help, and will work with his people on this.

(S)

Secretary Shultz noted that we would carefully study the aide memoire and sit down with President Mobutu's advisors. He thought we could parse it into separate areas - Paris Club, bilateral aid, etc. - and that we would sit down with his people and go through it with them. No doubt we can develop a program, he added. (S)

President Mobutu added that he was not asking us to bear the burden alone. He had met with President Mitterrand and on Wednesday he would meet with the Belgians and Chancellor Kohl of the FRG, on Friday he would be in Rome, and possibly on Thursday he would meet with Prime Minister Thatcher. (S)

The President wished President Mobutu well and asked him to pass the President's regards to the leaders he would soon see. He concluded that we would study President Mobutu's memorandum carefully. (S)

President Mobutu wished the President well in his campaign and the meeting ended on pleasantries. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

18

~~SECRET~~

7132

ACTION

September 24, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

FRED WETTERING *W*

SIGNED

SUBJECT:

Zaire: Memorandum of Conversation Covering
the President's September 23 Meeting with
President Mobutu (S)

Herewith is the memorandum of conversation covering the President's bilateral meeting with Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko on September 23, 1984, in the Presidential Suite, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, New York. (S)

As is customary I have attached a Kimmitt/Hill memo transmitting a copy of the memcon to State for their information. (U)

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the memcon; approve the attached Kimmitt/Hill memo of transmittal.

APPROVE

K

DISAPPROVE

Attachments

Tab I

Kimmitt/Hill Memo of Transmittal
A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *dlb* NARA, Date *2/6/07*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 27 SEP 84 1!

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM SOMMER

db 2/6/87

DOCDATE 25 SEP 84

KEYWORDS: NORWAY

NATO

WILLOCH, KAARE

AP

HS

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ PM WILLOCH 23 SEP

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 01 OCT 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(CT

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

Sommer	SEP 28 1984	for redo		
Mcfarlane	X 9/29	for sig.		
C	9/29	Kimmitt 5 gtd memo		PS, RR, RA

DISPATCH

✓ 9/29w

W/ATTCH

FILE

7A

(6)

National Security Council
The White House

8F

System # T
Package # 7177

08 28 P5 43

1375

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>	<u></u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	<u></u>
John Poindexter	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Tom Shull	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Wilma Hall	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Bud McFarlane	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u></u>	<u>D</u>
Situation Room	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

**National Security Council
The White House**

System # I

Package # 7177

1372

SEP 27 P 3: 37

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>IC</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Sumner</u>	<u>3</u>		<u>redo</u>

I = Information	<u>A = Action</u>	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Good note

Redone

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7177

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20521

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES db 2/6/02

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

September 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Summary of Memorandum of Conversation Between
the President and Prime Minister Willoch

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's
meeting with Prime Minister Willoch on September 23, 1984.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 2/8/2007

File Folder

MEMCONS - PRESIDENT REAGAN (09/12/1984-OCTOBER 1984)

FOIA

F04-062

BARBARA ELIAS

Box Number

53

8

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
33557	MEMCON SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER WILLOCH, SEPTEMBER 23, 1984	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7177

25

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

ACTION

U
C

U

REMOVAL OF

dlb 2/6/87

September 25, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Summary of Memorandum of Conversation Between
the President and Prime Minister Willoch

Attachment at Tab A is the memcon from the President's
September 23 meeting with Prime Minister Willoch.

RECOMMENDATION:

Following your review of the memcon that you authorize Bob
Kimmitt to forward it to State.

Approve RHK

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I - Kimmitt Memo to Hill
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 26 SEP 84 15

TO

KIMMITT

FROM CHILDRESS

db 2/6/87

DOCDATE 26 SEP 84

KEYWORDS: KAMPUCHEA

SUBJECT: MEMCON PRES MTG W/ DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA COALITION

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 27 SEP 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(DW CT)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

SEP 27 1984

Kimmitz spd memo

RK, RC,

DISPATCH

✓ C.T. 9/27

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA

(C.T.)

**National Security Council
The White House**

System # I

Package # 7200

8 SE 26 P 1:38

1570

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>Δ</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

~~SECRET~~

7200

30

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Sihanouk and Son Sann,
September 24, 1984

Attached is the approved Memorandum of Conversation for the meeting between the President and Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann, September 24, 1984, at the Waldorf-Astoria.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A 9/24/84 Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 2/6/07

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 2/8/2007

File Folder

MEMCONS - PRESIDENT REAGAN (09/12/1984-OCTOBER 1984)

FOIA

F04-062

BARBARA ELIAS

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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33558 MEMCON

3

ND

B1

MEETING WITH PRINCE SIHANOUK AND SON
SANN OF THE DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA
COALITION, SEPTEMBER 24, 1984

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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~~SECRET~~

7200

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 26, 1984

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

ACTION

11/21/07

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB KIMMITT

FROM: DICK CHILDRESS *DC*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Sihanouk and Son Sann,
September 24, 1984

Recommend you sign the memorandum at Tab I transmitting the
cleared MEMCON of conversation (Tab A) to State.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Kimmitt/Hill Memorandum
Tab A 9/24/84 MEMCON
Tab II Original of 9/24/84 MEMCON

cc: Gaston Sigur
Don Fortier

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7200

35

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 26, 1984

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES *dlb 2/6/07*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB KIMMITT

SIGNED

FROM: DICK CHILDRESS *(signature)*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Sihanouk and Son Sann,
September 24, 1984

Recommend you sign the memorandum at Tab I transmitting the
cleared MEMCON of conversation (Tab A) to State.

Approve *K*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Kimmitt/Hill Memorandum

Tab A 9/24/84 MEMCON

Tab II Original of 9/24/84 MEMCON

cc: Gaston Sigur
Don Fortier

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 8407324

CLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
FROM ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 03 OCT 84 12

TO MCFARLANE FROM DOBRIANSKY

DOCDATE 28 SEP 84

KEYWORDS: ROMANIA

MANESCU, MANEA

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ ROMANIAN VP SEP 25

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 05 OCT 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8406734 8407042 NSCIFID (CM)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C OCT 03 1984

Kimmitt Approved

DO RK

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)

27

**National Security Council
The White House**

System # I

Package # 7324

1382

8 SEP 2 10:55

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information	<u>A = Action</u>	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

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**National Security Council
The White House**

System # I

Package # 7324

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>		
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Dobriansky</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>Redo</u>

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Memcon needs to be
paragraph marked

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 28, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ⁷⁷SUBJECT: Memcon of the Romanian Vice President Manescu's
Photo Opportunity with the President

Attached at Tab I for your approval and for the record, is a memorandum of the President's brief encounter and conversation with Mr. Manescu.


RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum at Tab I for the record.

Approve RMK Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation for the record

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 2/8/2007

File Folder

MEMCONS - PRESIDENT REAGAN (09/12/1984-OCTOBER 1984)

FOIA

F04-062

BARBARA ELIAS

Box Number

53

8

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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33559 MEMCON

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B1

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH MANEA
MANESCU, VICE PRESIDENT OF ROMANIA'S
STATE COUNCIL: PHOTO OPPORTUNITY

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 03 OCT 84 19

TO TO THE RECORD FROM RAPHEL, A

DOCDATE 02 OCT 84

KEYWORDS: EGYPT

MEGUID, ABDELL

GHORBAL, ASHRAF A

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ FOMIN MEGUID & AMB GHORBAL 27 SEP

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

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LOG 8407222

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NLRR M37D/1 #33560
BY KML NARA DATE 4/5/13

7468

33560

NSC

~~SECRET~~

October 2, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

FROM: NEA - Arnold Raphael *am*
SUBJECT: Meeting between the President and Foreign
Minister Meguid

PARTICIPANTS:

The President	Egyptian Foreign Minister Meguid
Secretary Shultz	Ambassador Ghorbal
Mr. McFarlane	
Mr. Kemp	
Mr. Raphael	

TIME AND PLACE: September 27, 1984, 1630, the Oval Office

The President opened the conversation by noting that the resumption of diplomatic relations between Jordan and Egypt was encouraging. The Minister agreed, and then complimented the President on his UNGA speech. Meguid said that many delegations were pleased by the speech, especially its reference to peace in the Middle East.

The Minister then gave the President a letter from President Mubarak. After reading it, the President said that we would be back to the GOE with a response.

Meguid said that the Jordanian move on recognition would help the peace process. He added that there had recently been some positive moves from the new Israeli government. There was the possibility of movement on Lebanon, the Palestinian issue and Taba.

The President responded that we are determined to move. Jordan's action is a good step. He then added that we hope Egypt will soon return its Ambassador to Israel. Meguid said that he had a good, frank discussion with Foreign Minister Shamir in New York. Meguid has noticed that the GOI no longer links its withdrawal from Lebanon with Syria's. It no longer insists on specifically mentioning the Camp David framework when it talks about discussions with Jordan. On the third issue, Taba, Egypt is prepared to go to arbitration. Once this is settled, there can be a Summit meeting between Mubarak and

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DECL:OADR

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~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Peres and then "we can go ahead". Meguid summed up his mood, and concluded the substantive part of the meeting, by saying he was "cautiously optimistic".

cc: S/S
S
D
P
PM
NEA
AmEmb Cairo
AmEmb Tel Aviv
NSC

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL RECEIVED 18 OCT 84 08
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

TO MCFARLANE FROM HILL, C

Ch 2/6/87 DOC DATE 17 OCT 84

44

KEYWORDS: ISRAEL

PERES, SHIMONS

SUBJECT: STATE MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ PERES OCT 9

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO KIMMITT TO HILL DUE: 20 OCT 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

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COMMENTS

REF# 8428720

LOG 8407500

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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	— 12/17	ONIZ		

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

National Security Council
The White House

System #

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	1		
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3		
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5		A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Because of the importance of these memcons,
recommend you both review.

November 29, 1984

410

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: HOWARD R. TEICHER *HRT*

SUBJECT: Memcon of the President's Meetings with
Shimon Peres

Attached at Tab A for your approval is a consolidated memcon of the subject meetings.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memcon at Tab A.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Memcon of President's meeting with Peres

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By *dlb* NARA, Date *2/6/07*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
OCTOBER 9, 1984
THE OVAL OFFICE, ROOSEVELT ROOM, CABINET ROOM
11:30 a.m. - 1:40 p.m.

United States

The President
The Vice President
Mr. Meese
Secretary of State Shultz
Ambassador Lewis
Assistant Secretary Murphy
Mr. Howard Teicher, NSC

Israel

Prime Minister Peres
Foreign Minister Shamir
Ambassador Rosenne

The President began with the observation Israel is facing an enormous challenge. The United States has an unwavering commitment to Israeli security and maintenance of its qualitative edge. U.S.-Israeli ties have grown significantly, and we are determined to see the alliance grow stronger. The President invited Peres to comment on the Israeli economy. (C)

Peres thanked the President for his sincere friendship to the Jewish people. As a small country surrounded by so many difficulties, the Israelis particularly appreciate the human aspect of Reagan's support. The President thanked him. He then said he felt that Israel's economic situation could only be solved by reforms which would be difficult, as he knew from his own experience. (U)

Peres said that economic problems stem from Israeli mistakes, which Israel itself must correct. After a prolonged period, a generation of austerity, the new generation wanted to enjoy higher living standards. The government policy had probably relaxed too much. However, Israel would never ask the U.S. to make the lives of Israeli citizens easier and more comfortable. He observed that if Israel sacrifices its defenses it can solve its economic problems. But Israel is a real fighting democracy ready to pay the price not to let the Middle East become another tumultuous area. Virtually 50

-2-

percent of Israel's operational budget of \$11 billion will go to defense. So Israel can be made stronger economically if the policy is chosen to make it weaker militarily. Israel, however, thinks it is a mistake to give up military strength. Israel has and will always act without U.S. troops but does need U.S. financial and military support. Shamir and he do not intend to take any easy way out of their present economic difficulties. There will be economic restraints and they will appreciate it if the U.S. can help both maintain its military posture and give a ray of hope for the future as it works for economic independence. (S)

The President commented that the JEDG should be an effective way to consult on economic policies. He understood Peres' views on a strong defense and assured the Prime Minister that the U.S. is committed to peace in the Middle East. Achievement of peace would be all the more important because it would mean Israel would not have to pour the percentage of its resources it now does into defense. The President noted our plans for the Free Trade Area and his hopes for quick implementation. (C)

After a brief one-on-one meeting, the President and Peres joined the full delegations in the Roosevelt Room and invited Peres to make an opening statement. Peres said that the new government was only 20 days old. It would try to decrease divisiveness within Israel. It would work on the economy, put an end to problems with Lebanon through secure borders, and reopen, under reasonable conditions, negotiations with its neighbors. He touched on economic measures already taken against inflation: cutting the budget, restricting luxury goods, and reducing foreign travel allowances. He said he was close to achieving a national compact to restrain wages and profits for a short period. The political-military situation is more complex. The last two wars have cost Israel \$10 billion. Its total bill on the costs of war and peace (returning the oil fields to Egypt and removing its infrastructures from Sinai) came to a total of \$14 to 15 billion. (S)

U.S. inflation in the course of a decade has totalled 50 percent. An F-4 equivalent aircraft is now \$40 million a copy instead of \$4 million twenty years ago. Israel knew the U.S. is committed to its maintaining a qualitative edge. We ask the U.S. to share the burden with us. Israel is a worldwide U.S. ally and is so out of complete confidence. Were Israel not in the Middle East, the U.S. would have had more troubles there. (S)

-3-

Peres said he was not asking for immediate help but rather for a safety net through this difficult stretch of time and a ray of hope to encourage the Israeli people that after a period of reform and standing on its own feet, production and exports would increase. He aims to make his people self-reliant. (C)

The Secretary remarked there had been several hours of discussions on the economy and Lebanon. He had heard Israeli analyses and a number of programmatic ideas concerning a safety net. We had discussed this with Treasury and worked out an understanding of our competence on the situation, our capabilities and limitations. He noted that Peres had suggested ideas which we want to think through: just what is sought, how it would be funded, what incentives could be found, etc. The JEDG is a way to go about this and it should meet promptly. By the time Congress reconvenes, we should be in a position to make recommendations to be considered for the long term. Israel has a vision of long term development which will place it on the cutting edge of modern technology. Only Israelis can deal with their own problems. We have said we are ready to help more; particular attention needs be paid to the inflation rate. (C)

Peres said he had met with Secretary Weinberger. It is customary for our respective military people to meet and plan ahead three to four years. The Secretary will review plans for the Air Force and other aspects of the Israeli military establishment. He urged that offsets/buy back be continued. He asked that the 15 percent offset rate be raised slightly to 20 percent, and if possible continued. He noted the President had mentioned the LAVI program in his B'nai B'rith speech. He asked that the U.S. Army be enabled to buy supplies from Israel since Israel buys most of its technology in the U.S. (S)

Secretary Regan said that a strong defense has top priority but this comes only from having a strong economy. He added that Treasury is worried about Israel's economy. There is no halt to inflation in sight. Although your Foreign Minister talked about new policies, other ministers are saying they can't live with it. How are you going to crack the whip? What discipline will you put into the economy? Peres replied that the basic reason for having a GNU was that no minister can effectively threaten the government by resigning. The government has already taken Draconian measures and more will be taken shortly. (S)

Peres then expressed thanks for U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation, for the unprecedented FTA and added his personal thanks to the President and the Secretary for their helpfulness

-4-

on Soviet and Ethiopian Jews. The Department's efforts may have saved the lives of 10,000 Ethiopian Jews now in the Sudan. Israel feels there is a new awakening among Soviet Jewry. The President observed that the Israelis may not see our focus on Soviet Jewry on the front pages, but this is because we realize we should work quietly with the Soviets on this issue so their position does not become more rigid. A previous President had successfully followed quiet diplomacy on this issue and he was determined to do the same. He emphasized his personal strong feelings on the issue. (S)

At the follow-on lunch, Weinberger said they had discussed a number of questions during the Prime Minister's call on him at the Pentagon earlier in the morning. The JPMG should consider a joint review of FMS and hardware, looking several years ahead. The best way to pursue this would be through a military to military framework. Peres had raised stage three of the LAVI program. DOD will look at it sympathetically, as it will the question of offsets. Weinberger said he would take all of these issues up with Rabin next week in Israel. (S)

Peres then initiated discussion of the quality of life for West Bankers and Gazans. He feels that the Palestinians are beginning to return to reality. For his part, he is determined to improve conditions on the West Bank (Comment: Peres used the term "West Bank" throughout his conversations). A basic thrust would be to facilitate better economic opportunities. For this purpose, there will be an Arab bank on the West Bank and new factories. The traditional system is agricultural. With population increases, there is a need for industrial development to create more jobs. More hospitals and schools are part of his program. In the near future, Arab mayors will be arranged for the five towns which do not currently have them. Arabs, Peres observed, are often surprised by what Israel means by democracy. It is not a familiar concept in Arab history. Once the Arabs rebelled against royal leaders because they felt they were the root cause for the Arabs having fallen behind other peoples. They then introduced socialism. Now West Bankers are experiencing a free press and a free society. (He recounted an anecdote involving Sheikh Ja'bari of Hebron some years ago, who complained bitterly that the Jabbari family was subjected to customs duties on their personal imports which other West Bankers and Israelis were compelled to pay.) The Palestinians are, however, a very intelligent people. (S)

On Jordan, Peres said, we would like to talk about peace. We have many economic issues, such as the level of the Dead Sea and its effect on our respective potash industries. There are

-5-

water schemes, transport organizations of mutual concern. Israel has not given up hope on the King despite some of his unpleasant declarations. We will start by suggesting Camp David as a framework for the talks, but will keep an open mind for any other opportunities. (S)

With Egypt, Israel hopes to improve its relations. There are some difficulties, but they will try their best. We want to make a real peace, having given all the land, we did not get such a peace. (S)

The Vice President asked about current Israeli attitudes on Lebanon. Peres said they were worried. Lebanon had stopped being a basically Christian country and was turning into a Shiite country with a strong tendency towards fundamentalism. Israel wants to withdraw, it never intended to remain. It had only tried to get rid of the PLO state in the south. If Israel remains too long, the resentment of Shiites toward Israel may increase. To withdraw, Israel must make sure that Syria will not extend or deploy its forces deeper in Lebanon and that Syrian controlled areas will not become areas for infiltration. Referring to Murphy's recent visit to Damascus, Peres characterized the Syrian first reaction as typical, i.e. "never generous". Israel would like to see UNIFIL replace the IDF and that there be no vacuum in the south. It sees a role for local forces. It believes that the Government of Lebanon is completely devoted, under Karami's leadership, to Syria. He thanked the President for not having received Karami. (S)

There are three points to the Lebanese problem: 1) unilateral withdrawal with secured northern border; 2) a Syrian role. The IDF is 18 miles from Damascus. If Syria wants Israel out, it must agree on Israeli conditions. Israel is not negotiating from weakness; 3) Lebanese problems are such that Israel can only talk with the GOL. It has no expectation of reaching a binding agreement. Israel would follow U.S. advice on this matter. It wants to see a U.S. success and would not ask Washington to go further than it should. Israel accepted our desire for a low profile, unpublicized role but asked that we continue our efforts. (S)

The President asked if there would be problems with the Soviets regarding UNIFIL. Weinberger observed they had a veto power twice a year on UNIFIL renewal. Peres believed that the Soviets will support the Syrian position and not veto an extension or expansion of the mandate. The Vice President said that both questions are important. The UN Secretary General may add a declaration to his report to enable him to explore

-6-

expansion of UNIFIL responsibilities. The Secretary said there is a question if this could be done without adding other things. He recalled at the time of the last renewal a number of potentially anti-Israeli actions were contemplated in connection with the mandate. Ambassador Kirkpatrick had done an excellent job facing this down and working out a simple renewal. We would be glad to see more discretion for the Secretary General, but if additional anti-Israeli items are added to the mandate, it would be better to settle for simple renewal. Peres said he would not like to see any Soviet or satellite forces in Lebanon, be they Poles or Mongolians. The further away the Soviets are, the better. (S)

The Vice President raised Central America, expressing surprise that Nicaraguan violations of human rights and the anti-Semitic actions stimulated by the PLO presence in Nicaragua had not triggered an Israeli reaction. Are the Israelis aware of this phenomenon? If so, why have there been no expressions of criticism? Peres replied that the Socialist International was interested in keeping Nicaragua from suffering the fate of Cuba, but leaders of the S.I. had had disappointments in dealing with Nicaragua. He noted a different viewpoint toward Central America on the part of Portugal and Spain. He recalled the Sandinista grudge against Israel for supporting Somoza. He had told a Sandinista leader that Somoza had been alone in supplying arms to Israel in 1948. Israel was not ashamed and would never forget its debt of gratitude to Somoza. (S)

Shamir interjected that he had had a very successful visit to Washington last November, with two decisions already bearing fruit: establishment of the JPMG and negotiations on the FTA. He hoped that this present visit would be looked back on a year from now as equally successful. (U)

The Secretary said he hoped that it didn't take the passage of a year to rate this visit as a success. The Secretary then complained of comments by the former Venezuelan president, who was gentle with the U.S. in private discussions but extremely harsh in public. This has become a world phenomenon, assuming that one can say anything publicly and then explain privately it does not matter. The gap has become too wide between speech and actions. (S)

The President said we have occasionally had disappointments when we, in a desire to bring peace to the Middle East, provided weapons to Arab nations. We want Peres to know where we stand. We will never supply arms to be used to Israel's

-7-

disadvantage, but if we are to be helpful on peace and securing Israel's right to exist, we have to win Arab confidence that we can be reasonable and fair. We would take action to ensure that our arms supply was never a threat to Israel. Peres commented that there are occasions when Israel does not object to supply of arms to Arabs. The best example is U.S. supplying Egypt. When we disagree, and Jordan is one example, he appealed that we take into account the Israeli position that it has invited Jordan to come and talk without prior conditions. Egypt has learned the lesson. It has now converted to U.S. arms. Hussein, however, wants to keep the policy of belligerency and get U.S. technology at the same time. If he changes his policy to one of peace and gets arms, then we all benefit. But the King gets away with criticizing U.S. policy. Why does he complain so much? When the Reagan initiative was announced, the U.S. had grounds to believe Hussein would not object. The problem is not supplying technology but a question of policy. Let Hussein embark on a dialogue. Both of us must consider whether a change in policy should precede a policy of supplying arms. The U.S. has leverage. Hussein will gain if he talks to Israel. The minute he talks with Israel he may reduce the Syrian threat. Whether he talks with Israel directly or through the U.S., it would be good for him to change his policy. The dilemma is whether he should depart from traditional belligerency or get supplies without having to change his policy. (S)

The President observed that Hussein didn't take a hostile attitude until the Stinger question arose. We couldn't persuade our Congress. We believe our friendship for Jordan is beyond question, but sometimes we cannot convince our own Congress. They refused Stinger and Congress acted that way thinking they were doing it on behalf of Israel. Now Hussein is going to Moscow. (S)

The Secretary commented that this not need be discussed in the press. Concerning Jordan's reaction to Syrian threats, when Jordan announced restoration of relations with Egypt, there was an immediate and public Syrian threat. We are both seeing the emergence of Syrian efforts against Jordan. You suggest we ought to work on talks between Israel, Jordan and the U.S. to put Hussein's concerns to rest. If Syria were to attack, there would be a built in readiness of two friends, both of whom want to be closer to Hussein. This could improve the atmosphere for peace. The Secretary noted that he recognized this had been in effect earlier, but maybe there is something here we could quietly pursue, another way of getting at the arms issue. (S)

-8-

Meron observed that Syrian aggression against Israel and other Arabs has been discussed in the JPMG. (S)

Peres recalled that Israel had an unpleasant experience in 1961-62 when Washington decided to supply Jordan with U.S. arms, which Hussein promised would never be used against Israel. But they were used in the 1967 war. The problem is that the King has made some mistakes. I am unsure, Peres said, that Hussein is enchanted with Soviet arms. The very missiles he has been considering from the Soviet Union were the ones Israel had destroyed in Syria. Hussein knows he needs U.S. arms. If Hussein can be convinced he has to change his policy for his own welfare, this could change Israeli views on our supplying Jordan with arms. Jordan is not a sworn enemy of Israel, but the King has "started to enjoy his disappointments." He forgets he didn't keep his promises on the Reagan initiative. Labor and Likud can act together and try to see the problem, but first there should be a change in Jordanian policy. The Secretary commented that Hussein has always supported the President's initiative but he could not assemble an acceptable Palestinian delegation. Things can be done to improve the atmosphere on the West Bank and they can possibly affect the King's overall policy. Peres observed that Arafat changed his mind after initialling a draft agreement with Hussein. The Secretary attributed this to Syrian pressure. Damascus does not want to see a peace process unless it can dominate it. (S)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

84 1 P 54

October 17, 1984

SH 100M

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: President's Meeting with Prime Minister Peres

Enclosed for your approval is the memorandum of conversation reporting on the President's meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Peres on October 9.

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation

SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 2/6/07