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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files

Archivist: smf

File Folder: Matlock Chron May 1984 (1)

Date: 5/30/97

Box 4

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo (90547)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Proposed Presidential Statement Building Cooperation between US and Soviet Peoples (1 p.)	5/29/84	P1
	<i>R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #71</i>		
2. memo (90547)	Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re Proposed Presidential Statement Building Cooperation between the US and Soviet Peoples (1 p.)	n.d.	P1
	<i>A 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #72</i>		
3. memo (90547)	Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re Proposed Presidential Statement Building Cooperation between the US and Soviet People (2 pp.)	5/8/84	P1
	<i>A 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #73</i>		
4. memo (90547)	Kenneth deGraffenreid to Robert McFarlane re Concurrence on Proposed Presidential Statement on Cooperation between the US and Soviets (1 p.)	5/31/84	P1
	<i>A 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #74</i>		
5. memo (3466)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re US-USSR Agreement (2 pp.)	5/29/84	P1/P5
	<i>R 10/17/05 M02-011 #1</i>		
6. memo (3466)	Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re US-USSR Agreement (1 p.)	n.d.	P1
	<i>A 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #75</i>		
7. memo (3466)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re US-USSR Agreement (2 pp.)	5/8/84	P1/P5
	<i>R 10/17/05 M02-011 #2</i>		
8. memo (3466)	John Lenczowski to Robert McFarlane re US-USSR Agreement (2 pp.)	5/8/84	P1/P5
	<i>R 10/17/05 M02-011 #3</i>		
9. memo (3466)	Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re US-USSR Agreement (2 pp.)	4/30/84	P1
	<i>A 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #76</i>		

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
10. memo (4107)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re US-USSR Agreement (1 p.) <i>R 10/17/05 M02-011#4</i>	5/29/84	P1/P5
11. memo (4107)	Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re US-USSR Agreement (1 p.) <i>R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #77</i>	n.d.	P1
12. memo (4107)	Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re US-USSR Agreement (2 pp.) <i>R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #78</i> <i>R 11/20/02 M02-011 #5</i>	5/21/84	P1
13. memo (4113)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re US Attempts to Reach Agreements with Soviets (2 pp.) <i>R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #79</i>	5/29/84	P1
14. paper	US Proposals and Initiatives toward the USSR Since Early January (5 pp.) <i>R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #80</i>	n.d.	P1
15. talking points	re US Initiatives Toward USSR (3 pp.) <i>R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #81</i>	n.d.	P1
16. memo (4212)	Jack Matlock to Admiral Poindexter re Father Morlion's Request to Meet with the President or Mr. McFarlane (1 p.) <i>R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #82</i>	5/23/84	P1
17. memo (4113)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re US Attempts to Reach Agreements with Soviets (1 p.) <i>R 10/17/05 M02-011#6</i>	5/23/84	P1/P5

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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer CAS

Box Number 4

FOIA M02-011

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MAY 1984 (1)

DATE 3/22/2007

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
5	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE US USSR AGREEMENT (#1)	2	5/29/1984	
7	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE US USSR AGREEMENT (#2)	2	5/8/1984	
8	MEMO	JOHN LENCZOWSKI TO MCFARLANE RE US SOVIET AGREEMENT (#3)	2	5/8/1984	
10	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE US USSR AGREEMENT (#4)	1	5/29/1984	
12	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO MCFARLANE RE US USSR AGREEMENT (#5)	2	5/21/1984	
17	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE US ATTEMPTS (#6)	1	5/23/1984	

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 31, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: Op Ed Piece re Arms Control for
Washington PostRECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Bill Staples at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

not available
R. Lehman concurs.

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Bill Staples

Tab A Incoming correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM STAPLES
Executive Secretary
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Op Ed Piece re Arms Control for
Washington Post

We have reviewed and concur, with editorial changes on
pages two and three, with the redraft of the Op Ed piece
for the Washington Post (Tab A).

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A Draft Op Ed piece

RECEIVED 24 MAY 84 20

TO KIMMITT

FROM STAPLES, B

DOCDATE 24 MAY 84

SUSPENSE

KEYWORDS USSR

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT: OP ED PIECE RE ARMS CONTROL FOR WASHINGTON POST

ACTION: MEMO KIMMITT TO STAPLES

DUE: 25 MAY 84 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LEHMAN, R

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(MD

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Kimmit	x 5/25	FOR SIG	5/26	
Matlock	S 5/28	FOR Further Action	5/29	
Matlock	— 5/29	Recd ACJA 2nd version		RK, 2e

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council
The White House

System #

Package #

4255

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	2		Staff ASAP
Situation Room			to Matlock

using existing #

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

cc Kimmitt
R Lehman

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Office of the Director

May 29, 1984

NOTE TO BOB KIMMETT:

Attached is a revised draft of the Director's OpEd piece reflecting comments from NSC via Jack Matlock. We would appreciate another quick look with your approval for release by noon, Wednesday, May 30, 1984.

Thanks,


Bill Staples

It has become fashionable for many observers today to depict U.S.-Soviet relations as tumbling to their lowest point ever in the post-war era. Indeed, the picture is often portrayed so darkly as to suggest that we are on a road to nuclear conflagration somewhere in the murky but not-too-distant future.

Before this rhetorical roll gains yet more momentum, we should pause to ask: Is it all really true?

Granted, the words from Moscow these days are harsh. The Soviet leadership talks about Italy possibly suffering the fate of Pompeii, Scandinavia and Japan burning in nuclear fires, and President Reagan pursuing a Hitler-like policy. Such statements are indeed aggravating. Granted, the refusal of the Soviets to participate in nuclear arms talks is lamentable. Granted, the increased patrol of Soviet submarines off U.S. coasts is grating, even if they have prowled these waters for many years. And granted, the Soviet Olympic boycott is regrettable.

But are we, really, in a situation where the chances of U.S.-Soviet conflict and nuclear conflagration are higher than in the past? Are we really less secure today than we were four years ago?

I think not. Quite the contrary. The two most likely paths to nuclear conflict -- use by a Third World leader who gets his hands on the bomb in some regional conflict or use in a Soviet-U.S. conflict as a result of an escalating crisis and conventional war -- are both less probable today and in the years to come, than in the past.

first of these possibilities could come about only as
The ~~most likely use of nuclear weapons, although still~~
the result of
~~very remote, involves~~ nuclear proliferation. Herein, surprisingly, lies one of the major success stories in the realm of arms control. One of Parkinson's wisest laws has it that the success of a policy can be measured by the catastrophes which do not happen. By that measure, we have here a welcome success.

And an unforeseen amount of success, at that. In 1958, a special committee of the National Planning Association predicted in a monograph that "by 1970, most nations with appreciable military strength will have in their arsenals nuclear weapons -- strategic, tactical or both." In the early 1960's, President Kennedy warned of a world in 1975 with 15 to 20 nuclear weapon states.

Neither dire forecast has come to pass, largely because for over 30 years we have worked with many other countries to build and buttress the political, legal, and moral barriers against the spread of nuclear weapons. This has been accomplished in a largely undramatic but ultimately effective way, helping to hold proliferation in check. Reinforcing and,

as necessary, revising policies and programs for stopping the spread of nuclear weapons have received top priority under President Reagan.

Herein, not surprisingly, also lies a critical area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue and cooperation. In the past few years, this dialogue has been extensive and intensive. It has not been halted, as were the nuclear arms talks by the Soviets, when NATO proceeded with its year-end missile deployments to counter the Soviets new missiles, the SS-20s. This dialogue endures because the Soviets, like us, share a deep concern about the spread of nuclear weapons. The prospect of a Khomeini, Qadaffi, Amin, or such other leader acquiring nuclear weapons is unsettling to them, as it is to us.

Though we still have much to do on non-proliferation, this path to nuclear weapons use is considered today less likely in the future than was estimated in earlier years. As Barry Blechman, a former arms control official in the Carter Administration, wrote just recently: "A realistic current assessment of the potential number of nuclear weapon states in 1990 would be roughly one-third. . . (that of) previous assessments." We strive to cut that even further, but it is still good progress.

The second most likely path towards nuclear war, that through conflict escalation, is likewise less likely today than in years gone by. Undeniably, we have serious problems in Central America and the Middle East, particularly now in the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, the world flashpoints are less numerous and less heated than many that have come before.

Just go back two decades, for example, and compare President Kennedy's 1,000 days in office to President Reagan's first 1,200 days. The Kennedy era is popularly recalled as one of suave and skillful American stewardship over foreign affairs. Yet, during that brief time, we endured the Bay of Pigs fiasco, a disastrous U.S.-Soviet summit in Vienna, the build-up of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the construction of the Berlin Wall and, certainly not least, the Cuban Missile crisis. Those were dangerous days. Events during the past three plus years, no matter how nettlesome, certainly do not match that cascade of crises.

Likewise in the 1970's, when the U.S.-Soviet dialogue was so rich and hopes for detente so high, regional crises were nonetheless severe. From 1970 to 1976, while American and Soviet leaders held five summits and managed an array of arms control negotiations with each other, the Soviet Union fully backed and armed the continuing infiltration of North Vietnam troops into South Vietnam -- making a peaceful

settlement of the conflict impossible. The Middle East then erupted to the point of the Soviets threatening to intervene with their own troops in the conflict, prompting us to go on strategic nuclear alert. Those too were dangerous days.

In many ways, 1975 symbolized the whole decade. In that year, there was a full-blown U.S.-Soviet dialogue -- a Ford-Brezhnev summit in Helsinki and four Kissinger-Gromyko meetings -- and also severe regional reverses or scares: the fall of three countries in Southeast Asia; a NATO ally, Portugal, being gravely threatened by Communist subversion; and the Soviets arming and dispatching thousands of Cubans to Angola to enable the Marxists to win that civil war.

The last year of that decade, 1979, proved similar. During the first six months, Secretary Vance and Ambassador Dobrynin met some 25 times, followed by the Carter-Brezhnev summit in Vienna. Still, regional crises flared: the discovery of a Soviet brigade in Cuba; the false Soviet statements adding fuel to the already-blazing fires in Iran after the American hostages were seized; and, most seriously, the massive Soviet invasion of Afghanistan -- called by President Carter the greatest crisis since World War II.

It is remarkable to recall that in each year from 1975 to 1981, Soviet armies or armies supported by Moscow (mostly surrogates) invaded and occupied a different country: South Vietnam in 1975, Angola in 1975-76, Ethiopia in 1977, Cambodia in 1978, Afghanistan in 1979, and Chad in 1980.

Nothing on the scale of the above crises has happened over the past three years. This is all to the good, not only for those around the globe spared the imposition of totalitarianism, but also because greater regional stability diminishes the chances of U.S.-Soviet conventional or nuclear conflict. The Soviets have, since 1981, encountered resistance. This is the inevitable product of their own actions. At the same time, American strength and leadership have been restored.

Even so harsh a critic of the Administration's handling of Soviet affairs as Strobe Talbott writes in his new tract, The Russians and Reagan: "Soviet expansionism has been slowed; embittered and impacted as the Soviet-American relationship was, it was also remarkably free of full-scale crises" during the Reagan Administration. He points out that of the three major wars during this period -- those of Iran-Iraq, Lebanon, and the Falklands -- "none had become a superpower confrontation."

This is the key point. The world is not more dangerous today. The factors that make it more stable, that dampen chances of nuclear conflict, are: (1) active U.S. diplomacy and relationships,

which calm down potential flashpoints and build up regional security; (2) increased U.S. deterrent strength, which demonstrates to a potential aggressor that any attack would be too costly, that the anticipated pain far outweighs any conceivable gain; and (3) arms control proposals, which are designed to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on both sides and to reduce the risk that crises will result in the use of nuclear weapons.

These three factors make the recent words of President Reagan, that "the world is a little bit safer than in the past," right on the mark.

To be sure, there is room to improve the current state of affairs. And it does need marked improvement. President Reagan has attempted to do just that by strengthening Allied and other relationships; by restoring a credible military posture; and by embarking on a wide-ranging arms control agenda. He has sought to reopen and deepen the U.S.-Soviet dialogue, as shown in his January 16 speech, and through a variety of private channels. A better dialogue and active nuclear arms talks would be preferable to continued Soviet stonewalling, if the Soviets were willing to undertake serious talks.

But they haven't been willing for the past six months. They walked out of INF and have not agreed to our proposal to resume START not because of the Reagan Administration's approach to the Soviets, not because of any previous or existing rhetoric, and not because of the ambitious "deep cuts" we seek in nuclear arms.

They walked out, quite simply, because NATO stayed the course set in December 1979. That course called for deployment of missiles to counter the ever-growing number of highly mobile and threatening SS-20 nuclear missiles, if arms control was not successful.

It is hard to imagine any U.S. Administration proceeding differently on deployments in the face of Soviet insistence on its "half-zero" option -- hundreds of warheads for the Soviet side vs. zero for our side. And it is hard to imagine any Administration accepting such a lopsided arms control "solution" (quite apart from whether any U.S. Senate would ratify such a skewed accord).

Nevertheless, the Soviets are now emoting outrage, anger and sullenness over the NATO deployments, and over some other things. Whether they truly feel what they so dramatically display may be another matter.

Such a long-time and astute negotiator with the Soviet Union as Ambassador Paul Nitze recently spoke on their "precept" of not letting their "emotion interfere with what they call 'scientific realism.' One should never let anger influence one's judgment, although it might be advisable from time to time to show anger." Witness what they did after the U-2 affair in 1959, and today.

The Administration still strongly hopes -- as do those critical of the Administration -- that the Soviets will recognize, and act on, their interest by returning to the nuclear arms talks. But our beckoning is different from their returning. It brings to mind the question Hotspur asked, when his cousin bragged in Henry IV, Part I, that he could "call spirits from the vasty deep" to help them. "Why so can I, or so can any man, but will they come when you do call for them?"

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 30, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *QFM*
SUBJECT: Op Ed Piece re Arms Control for
Washington Post

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Bill Staples at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

R. Lehman concurs.

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to Bill Staples
Tab II	Incoming correspondence

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 30, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM STAPLES

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Op Ed Piece re Arms Control for
Washington Post

We have reviewed and concur, with editorial changes on pages 2 and 3, with the redraft of the Op Ed Piece for the Washington Post.

RECEIVED 24 MAY 84 20

TO

KIMMITT

FROM STAPLES, B

DOCDATE 24 MAY 84

SUSPENSE

KEYWORDS USSR

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT: OP ED PIECE RE ARMS CONTROL FOR WASHINGTON POST

ACTION: MEMO KIMMITT TO STAPLES

DUE: 25 MAY 84 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LEHMAN, R

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(MD

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<u>Kimmit</u>	<u>x</u>	<u>5/25</u>	<u>FOR SIG</u>	<u>5/26</u>
<u>Matlock</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>5/28</u>	<u>For Further Action</u>	<u>5/29</u>
<u>Matlock</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>5/29</u>	<u>Recd ACJA 2nd version</u>	<u>RK, 2c</u>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council
The White House

System #

Package #

4255

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	2		Staff ASAP
Situation Room			to Matlock
			using existing #

I = Information

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D = Dispatch

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

cc Kimmitt
R Lehman

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Office of the Director

May 29, 1984

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the result of
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It is remarkable to recall that in each year from 1975 to 1981, Soviet armies or armies supported by Moscow (mostly surrogates) invaded and occupied a different country: South Vietnam in 1975, Angola in 1975-76, Ethiopia in 1977, Cambodia in 1978, Afghanistan in 1979, and Chad in 1980.

Nothing on the scale of the above crises has happened over the past three years. This is all to the good, not only for those around the globe spared the imposition of totalitarianism, but also because greater regional stability diminishes the chances of U.S.-Soviet conventional or nuclear conflict. The Soviets have, since 1981, encountered resistance. This is the inevitable product of their own actions. At the same time, American strength and leadership have been restored.

Even so harsh a critic of the Administration's handling of Soviet affairs as Strobe Talbott writes in his new tract, The Russians and Reagan: "Soviet expansionism has been slowed; embittered and impacted as the Soviet-American relationship was, it was also remarkably free of full-scale crises" during the Reagan Administration. He points out that of the three major wars during this period -- those of Iran-Iraq, Lebanon, and the Falklands -- "none had become a superpower confrontation."

This is the key point. The world is not more dangerous today. The factors that make it more stable, that dampen chances of nuclear conflict, are: (1) active U.S. diplomacy and relationships,

which calm down potential flashpoints and build up regional security; (2) increased U.S. deterrent strength, which demonstrates to a potential aggressor that any attack would be too costly, that the anticipated pain far outweighs any conceivable gain; and (3) arms control proposals, which are designed to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on both sides and to reduce the risk that crises will result in the use of nuclear weapons.

These three factors make the recent words of President Reagan, that "the world is a little bit safer than in the past," right on the mark.

To be sure, there is room to improve the current state of affairs. And it does need marked improvement. President Reagan has attempted to do just that by strengthening Allied and other relationships; by restoring a credible military posture; and by embarking on a wide-ranging arms control agenda. He has sought to reopen and deepen the U.S.-Soviet dialogue, as shown in his January 16 speech, and through a variety of private channels. A better dialogue and active nuclear arms talks would be preferable to continued Soviet stonewalling, if the Soviets were willing to undertake serious talks.

But they haven't been willing for the past six months. They walked out of INF and have not agreed to our proposal to resume START not because of the Reagan Administration's approach to the Soviets, not because of any previous or existing rhetoric, and not because of the ambitious "deep cuts" we seek in nuclear arms.

They walked out, quite simply, because NATO stayed the course set in December 1979. That course called for deployment of missiles to counter the ever-growing number of highly mobile and threatening SS-20 nuclear missiles, if arms control was not successful.

It is hard to imagine any U.S. Administration proceeding differently on deployments in the face of Soviet insistence on its "half-zero" option -- hundreds of warheads for the Soviet side vs. zero for our side. And it is hard to imagine any Administration accepting such a lopsided arms control "solution" (quite apart from whether any U.S. Senate would ratify such a skewed accord).

Nevertheless, the Soviets are now emoting outrage, anger and sullenness over the NATO deployments, and over some other things. Whether they truly feel what they so dramatically display may be another matter.

Such a long-time and astute negotiator with the Soviet Union as Ambassador Paul Nitze recently spoke on their "precept" of not letting their "emotion interfere with what they call 'scientific realism.' One should never let anger influence one's judgment, although it might be advisable from time to time to show anger." Witness what they did after the U-2 affair in 1959, and today.

The Administration still strongly hopes -- as do those critical of the Administration -- that the Soviets will recognize, and act on, their interest by returning to the nuclear arms talks. But our beckoning is different from their returning. It brings to mind the question Hotspur asked, when his cousin bragged in Henry IV, Part I, that he could "call spirits from the vasty deep" to help them. "Why so can I, or so can any man, but will they come when you do call for them?"

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 29, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Statement -- Building
Cooperation between U.S. and Soviet Peoples

State has proposed that we consider a Presidential statement to the upcoming Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges to be held at the Smithsonian June 26-27 (TAB II). This would provide an opportunity to make public our efforts to improve bilateral relations with the USSR. As State points out, the message would attract more media attention if the President could receive the group briefly.

I believe that the June meeting is well suited as a forum for presentation of our efforts in the bilateral area, and also could provide an opportunity to spell out the rationale for this aspect of our policy. Therefore, I recommend that State be instructed to prepare a draft message -- which we could review and coordinate with the speech writers -- and that a brief appointment with the President be sought, unless his calendar for the two days in question makes this impossible.

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize transmittal of the Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum at TAB I instructing State to prepare a draft Presidential message.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That you authorize me to prepare a Schedule Request for the President to meet with members of the group for 10-15 minutes on June 26 or 27.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

unavailable
De Graffenreid and Lenczowski concur.

Attachments:

Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum for approval
Tab II - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of May 8, 1984

JL does not concur. How can we conduct business-as-usual with the USSR when it has been behaving so abominably? The exchange agreement crafted by State/Matlock will not improve people to people exchanges or increase U.S. access at all. If the President wants to demonstrate his interest in people to people contact, he should deliver a speech to the peoples of the USSR declaring our peaceful intentions and democratic freedom.

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #71

BY SM NARA, DATE 11/17/99

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Statement - Building
Cooperation Between the U.S. and Soviet Peoples

We agree that the meeting scheduled for June 26-27 at the Smithsonian on U.S.-Soviet exchanges might provide an opportunity for a Presidential message outlining our efforts to improve our bilateral relationship with the USSR.

We would appreciate your preparing a draft message and submitting it for consideration by June 10, 1984.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

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NLS F75-074 #72

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

BY sm, NARA, DATE 11/12/99

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II

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May 8, 1984

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Proposed Presidential Statement - Building
Cooperation between the US and Soviet Peoples

We have an opportunity next month to package together and highlight what the President is doing to promote contacts between the US and Soviet peoples. The Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies is sponsoring a conference at the Smithsonian June 26-27 of the major scholarly and professional organizations conducting exchanges with the USSR. Its primary aim is to initiate an effort to break out of the narrow circle of contacts to which the Soviets now try to confine us inside the Soviet Union. The organizations will be sympathetic with what the Administration has been quietly doing to increase US-Soviet communication outside the deadlocked nuclear arms control field. It would be an excellent backdrop for a Presidential statement bringing to public attention for the first time the full range of initiatives we have taken in this area in recent months.

Specifically, the President could present a five-point program for increased contact and cooperation with the peoples of the Soviet Union.

1. Initiation of negotiations on a new exchanges agreement, which will both reopen the way for official exchanges and encourage increased people-to-people private activity. Our proposed agreement contains some novel features, e.g., an annual appearance by each country's leader on the other's television.
2. Opening of new Consulates in Kiev and New York, a move immensely popular in the Ukrainian-American community as it will provide direct access to the Ukrainian people -- the largest non-Russian nationality in the USSR.
3. Reinvigorating existing agreements for practical cooperation in the fields of environmental protection, housing, health and agriculture -- the last area reinforcing how the Administration has responded to farmers' interests, as it did by renewing and strengthening the Long-term Grain Agreement.

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DECL: OADR

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BY smf NARA, DATE 11/17/99

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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4. Renewing three agreements expiring this year -- the fishing agreement (supported by the fishing industry and individual fishermen on the West Coast), the Long-term Economic, Industrial and Technological Cooperation Agreement, and the Incidents-at-Sea Agreement (important in defusing potential naval incidents), and preparing to examine renewal of the World Oceans Agreement (of importance to NOAA and the oceanographic community) with no problems anticipated.

5. Promoting other agreements and steps to deal with problems, e.g. negotiations to settle the Pacific maritime boundary question and technical measures to prevent another KAL disaster.

Most of these agreements have people-to-people implications. All are of obvious humanitarian or economic benefit or serve to improve communication and reduce risks of confrontation.

The statement could be simply released in connection with the opening of the conference (and read there by a senior Administration official). However, its impact would be greatest if the President, schedule permitting, were to deliver it in person at the Smithsonian or invite conference attendees to the East Room (or the Rose Garden) for a brief reception. By reading the statement to the group he would dramatize his interest both in better contact between the American and Soviet peoples and in private sector initiatives (by these organizations) -- two themes he has stressed.

If this approach is approved, we will be pleased to draft a statement.



Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

May 31, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: KENNETH deGRAFFENREID *KL*

SUBJECT: Concurrence on Proposed Presidential Statement
on Cooperation Between the US and Soviets

There is no official CI objection to this proposal. Nevertheless, there may be CI or security concerns with one or more of the agreements. Some of the agreements cited in the State proposal have been vetted by one or another intelligence community groups. Others were approved before we had an opportunity to request review. Also some of the agreements recommended for renewal never had CI review prior to their initial negotiation. Moreover, it should be remembered that, despite our best efforts, the ability and willingness to assess potential agreements for their total security impact is embryonic at best. Often no single agency or interagency group has the knowledge or mandate to provide this review.

It is also important to note, as was borne out by the recent FBI briefing on Moscow Embassy security, the degree of even ostensible reciprocity in many of our diplomatic arrangements with the Soviets is open to very serious question. We should be careful that the President not be seen to imply that he believes that all of these arrangements are acceptable or precedential.

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Declassify on: OADR

BY SMJ NARA, DATE 11/12/97

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 29, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jam*

SUBJECT: Proposed Reactivation of US-USSR Environmental
Cooperation Agreement

On May 8, I sent you a memorandum on this subject (TAB II), which recommended that the State/EPA recommendation be approved, with the proviso that timing of meetings should take the Sakharov/Bonner situation into account. John Lenczowski disagreed, and submitted a separate memorandum on the subject (TAB III).

I do not concur with John's judgment that reactivating the cooperative agreements we have under consideration represents "a revival of the 'detente' relationship" or that the decision would be based on Kissinger's "web of relationships" thesis. The rationale is quite different, and rests on two important considerations: (1) the need to stress our policy of dialogue and negotiation at a time when the Soviets are attempting artificially to make it seem that tensions are rising; and (2) to preserve and expand our long-term contacts with a wide spectrum of Soviet citizens. Cutting the Soviet Union off from contact with us is simply not in our long-term interest (although we of course should be careful to avoid letting contacts be a channel for unauthorized technology transfer).

As for Afghanistan, I believe our long-term pressure on the Soviets will be most effective if it concentrates on steps to increase international disapproval (particularly among the Islamic states), as well as measures of concrete assistance to the resistance forces. Such "sanctions" have a bite, exact a real price, and act to dissuade; those which tend to undermine our own long-term interests in dealing with the Soviets do not.

Therefore, I recommend that we proceed to take steps to reactivate this agreement, with due regard to the evolving Sakharov situation. I have prepared a Kimmitt to Hill Memorandum which makes these points.

Concurrences noted on Memorandum of May 8 (TAB II)

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BY LOS, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Recommendation:

That you approve transmittal of the Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum at TAB I.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum for approval
Tab II - Matlock-McFarlane Memorandum of May 8, 1984
Tab III - Lenczowski-McFarlane Memorandum of May 8, 1984
Tab IV - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of April 30, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Proposed Reactivation of U.S.-USSR Environmental
Cooperation Agreement ~~(C)~~

Your memorandum of April 30, 1984, to Mr. McFarlane on this subject has been reviewed, and the proposal to grant an exception to the Afghanistan sanctions to permit meetings of the Joint US-USSR Committee on Environmental Cooperation has been approved. We also concur that it is appropriate for EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus to assume the position of US Co-Chairman of the Joint Committee. ~~(C)~~

Preparations should be initiated, within the US Government and on an interagency basis, for a Joint Committee meeting in the future, and the Soviets should be informed of our willingness to hold a working level meeting to prepare for a formal Joint Committee session. We should, however, refrain from agreeing to a date for the Joint Committee meeting itself in view of the situation currently facing Academician Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner. Timing of other meetings should also take the Sakharov situation into account. The linkage of the timing with the Sakharov situation should, however, not be conveyed explicitly to the Soviets. ~~(C)~~

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NLS F95-074 #75

BY smf NARA, DATE 11/17/99

DECLASSIFIED

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MO2-D11 #2

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MEMORANDUM

BY

NDI

NARA, DATE

10/17/05

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 8, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Proposed Reactivation of US-USSR Environmental Cooperation Agreement

State, acting on a recommendation by EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus, has recommended (1) that the post-Afghanistan sanction forbidding meetings of US-USSR Joint Committees be lifted in respect to the Environmental Cooperation Agreement, and (2) that Administrator Ruckelshaus be designated as the US Co-Chairman of the Joint Committee. If these recommendations are approved, Mr. Ruckelshaus intends to propose a meeting of the Joint Committee in the near future in order to plan for increased activity and revise the largely outdated agenda.

Discussion

The Environmental Cooperation Agreement is one of the relatively uncontroversial agreements with the Soviets which was allowed to continue operating following the invasion of Afghanistan, and which this Administration decided to renew for five years in 1982. In the absence of Joint Committee meetings, however, activities have gradually decreased as projects were completed and there was no mechanism in operation to agree on new ones.

Since the President has authorized a reactivation of those agreements which do not threaten significant transfer of military-related technology, the agreement on environmental cooperation seems an appropriate candidate.

However, it seems to me that if Mrs. Bonner-Sakharov is held under arrest, it would be inappropriate to move ahead in areas such as this. Therefore, I would recommend that the recommendations of State and EPA be approved, but with the proviso that no meeting date be set for the Joint Committee without further consideration of the question if we learn that Mrs. Bonner is under arrest.

JL does not concur
Fortier, Lenczowski, Robinson and Sestanovich concur.
MEMO WILL FOLLOW.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

Agree

Concur, but given importance of Bonner case (and other likely forms of harassment), we should review even if she is released.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Recommendation:

That you authorize transmittal of the Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum at Tab I.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum

Tab II - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of April 30, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MO2-011 #3

3466 add-on

MEMORANDUM

BY LOT NARA, DATE 10/17/05

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 8, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *JV*

COM HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Reactivation of U.S.-USSR Environmental Agreement

Once again another U.S.-Soviet agreement is up for reactivation or renewal. Once again the issue appears all by itself and out of context. Renewal of such an agreement seems innocent enough. It does not appear to pose the risk of a technology transfer hemorrhage, nor does it appear to pose a significant hostile intelligence threat. Its political impact seems relatively insignificant: not too many people pay attention to meetings between environmental officials at the Under Secretary level.

The problem with this is that it is part of a pattern of a wide variety of agreements that are appearing before us for renewal one by one. The real policy question here is whether this is a pattern to which we want to subscribe at this time. Other issues which form the pattern include: the reactivation of U.S.-Soviet Health agreements, the U.S.-Soviet Fishing relationship, the Agricultural Cooperation agreement, the agreement on Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation, the Consular agreement, the Exchanges Agreement and others. (The ones listed are only those which have appeared in recent weeks.)

Taken together, these add up to a relationship of wholesale cooperation with the Soviets that amounts to a revival of the "detente" relationship established by President Nixon. These types of agreements were to help diminish the fundamental political tensions between the two systems not only by their intrinsically cooperative nature, but because they formed a web of relationships which were organically linked so as to provide a system of incentives for the Soviets to behave in a more moderate fashion. Fully recognizing that we had more to offer the Soviets in these various fields than vice versa, the threat of U.S. withdrawal from these accords was to serve as the stick accompanying the carrots. Even though it was recognized that these agreements were not truly reciprocal, it was nevertheless part of the price we were willing to pay to supply both the positive and negative incentives of a "linkage" policy so as to encourage in particular Soviet good faith in arms control.

If somebody is articulating the philosophy behind the current renewal of U.S.-Soviet agreements, I have not heard it. Perhaps the strategy underlying this has appeared in secret documents which I have not seen. What I have been able to see is a rather underarticulated policy of "intensified dialogue." But, this expression cannot explain an entire foreign policy strategy.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Is the current policy a repetition of the Nixon policy of "linkage" and incentives? Or are we willing, as it appears, to give more and more carrots to the Soviets regardless of their external behavior?

Today they are conducting a major escalation of their attack on the innocent people of Afghanistan. Yet the reactivation of the Environmental agreement as well as others involves lifting of Afghanistan sanctions which, though imposed by President Carter, we have chosen to retain for three and a half years. The Soviets are harassing the Sakharovs with new intensity. They have rejected countless of our good-faith efforts to get them to return to several negotiating tables in spite of their dubious record of treaty compliance. On top of this, their policy seems pointed, as much as ever before, toward an open attempt to take sides in a U.S. presidential election. How else to explain their decision to pull out of the Olympics?

Under these circumstances, I believe the entire package of agreements should come under review and should be postponed until such time as the Soviets are willing to take even a few steps -- much less move halfway -- toward reaching some kind of mutual code of behavior with us.

Unless we begin to treat these agreements more directly as part of the entire strategic relationship with the USSR, and in doing so link them to Soviet external behavior in a way that establishes a coherent system of incentives, the Soviets will interpret our actions as signs of weakness and will have no incentive to mitigate the various types of aggression which they and their proxies are currently conducting around the world. Clearly we must continue our efforts to demonstrate that we in fact want peace, but the challenge we face in trying to do so involves avoiding adopting the position of a supplicant for Soviet good will.

From a variety of indications, the Soviets appear to believe that they can paint the President as a warmonger to assist his electoral defeat and by tarring him this way, induce him to make concessions in symbol if not substance. They are looking to see if we are conscious of the nature of the signals we send them and if those signals are ones of strength or weakness.

Renewing agreements in the absence of a clearly defined and articulated strategy will only be seen as a sign of weakness -- especially a sign that we fear their anti-Reagan propaganda campaign so much that we are willing to reach even for Environmental agreements in hopes of mitigating it.



Washington, D.C. 20520

April 30, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE,
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Reactivation of US-USSR Environmental
Cooperation Agreement

EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus has requested Secretary Shultz's views on his proposal (attached) to take several steps to increase activity under the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Environmental Protection. Under the sanctions imposed by President Carter in 1979 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan US agencies administering bilateral cooperation agreements with the USSR have been forbidden to have high-level contacts with Soviet counterparts or to hold meetings of the US-USSR Joint Committees which set directions for cooperative programs. They have been allowed to continue programs under way at the time sanctions were instituted, but not to develop new programs.

Mr. Ruckelshaus points out that this Administration found the Environmental Agreement of sufficient value to extend it in May 1982 for an additional five-year term. Inability to hold Joint Committee meetings and have contacts with Soviet counterparts at the policy-making level are, however, constraining the substantive benefits to be obtained from the agreement. To reinvigorate the cooperative program he suggests it might be appropriate for him to assume the now-vacant position of US Co-Chairman of the Joint Committee and initiate planning for a meeting of the Committee to revise the agreement's largely outdated agenda.

The Environmental Agreement has been one of the more successful and less controversial of the bilaterals on science and technology cooperation. As continental, heavily industrialized countries the US and USSR share many environmental problems, on which cooperation can have major benefits for both parties. The potential for undesirable technology transfer is minimal. Encouraging increased activity under this agreement can provide a useful supplement to what we

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DECL: OADR

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BY smf NARA, DATE 11/17/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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are currently trying to do in certain other areas. It should also encounter considerable Allied and public support and private sector involvement. The Soviets would find the onus on them for failing to respond or responding negatively.

The Department considers that in this case continued application of the Afghanistan sanctions runs counter to US interests and recommends NSC approval of Mr. Ruckelshaus' proposals as an exception to that policy.

Charles Hill

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460

March 29, 1984

8409772

THE ADMINISTRATOR

Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

For some time now I have been concerned about the management and implementation of the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection.

As you may know, the Administration decided to extend the Environmental Agreement for a third five-year term effective May 1982. This action was based on a positive assessment, on the part of EPA and the other participating USG agencies, of the Agreement's substantive merit and humanitarian nature. At that time, we were charged, in effect, to continue those activities which were found to be beneficial and which our limited resources would permit us to support, all subject to case-by-case review by the State Department and the National Security Council. At the same time, however, the ban on high-level contact with Soviet counterparts, imposed by the previous Administration in the wake of events in Afghanistan, was left intact. This meant that the position of U.S. Co-Chairman of the US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, a post traditionally held by the Administrator of EPA, was left vacant.

It has been brought to my attention recently, both by my own staff and by Ambassador Arthur Hartman, that this leadership vacuum has come to interfere in a significant way with the implementation of the Agreement. It is constraining more and more the substantive benefit which this cooperative relationship should bring us. We believe that if this program is worth continuing, as seems to be the case, it is worth doing properly. The professionals of this Agency, and of the other participating organizations both public and private, should not be expected to commit their valuable time, talent, and resources to this or any international program without benefit of a genuinely supportive administrative framework and a clear sense of purpose.

Under these circumstances, and in the spirit of the President's January 16 address on US-Soviet relations, I wonder whether it might be appropriate for me to assume the position of U.S. Co-Chairman of the Joint Committee. I would be prepared to do so on the understanding that the extent of my personal involvement would be limited by my very full range of domestic concerns, and that my designated representative would be filling in for me much of the time. Nevertheless, the weight and authority of the Administrator's office must be brought directly to bear if we are to engage the Soviets in revising the Agreement's largely outdated agenda and to restore sound management and effective leadership on the U.S. side. Accordingly, we would expect to initiate planning at an early date for the ninth meeting of the Environmental Joint Committee.

Please advise me what your views and wishes are on this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "William D. Ruckelshaus", written in a cursive style.

William D. Ruckelshaus

MEMORANDUM

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 29, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *Jaw*

SUBJECT:

Rejuvenating the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation
in Housing

Following the President's decision to review the existing cooperative agreements with the USSR to see whether it is in our interest to reactivate them, Secretary Pierce has written Secretary Shultz to recommend that the Joint Steering Committee under the housing cooperation agreement meet. His recommendation follows similar recommendations in regard to the cooperative agreements in agriculture, health and environmental protection. Reactivation of the agreement would require the suspension of a post-Afghanistan sanction, which prevents high-level meetings between U.S. and Soviet officials.

This agreement, like the others we have considered recently, is in an area where the danger of unauthorized transfer of sensitive technology is low, where there is some U.S. commercial interest, and where there is some Soviet technology of potential usefulness to us. I believe it would be appropriate to deal with it as we have with the others, and initiate plans for a meeting of the Joint Steering Committee. While the Sakharov matter is pending, however, I believe it would not be appropriate to set a firm date for such a meeting.

Recommendation:

That you authorize transmittal of the Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum at TAB I, which confirms lifting the Afghanistan sanction in respect to meetings of the Joint Steering Committee, instructs that proposed programs be drawn up on an interagency basis and that a working level meeting with the Soviets be proposed to prepare for a Joint Committee meeting, but that timing of meetings take the Sakharov/Bonner situation into account.

Approve Disapprove

JL
John Lenczowski does not concur; Steve Sestanovich concurs.

Please see separate memo
Attachments:

Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum for approval
Tab II - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of May 21, 1984

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Declassify on: OADR

*only if communications
w/ Soviets underscore
that our ability to
proceed depends on
handling of Sakharov case
SRS*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of StateSUBJECT: Rejuvenating the U.S.-USSR Agreement on
Cooperation in Housing ~~(C)~~

Your memorandum of May 21, 1984, to Mr. McFarlane on this subject has been reviewed, and the proposal to grant an exception to the Afghanistan sanctions to permit meetings of the Joint US-USSR Steering Committee on Cooperation in Housing and other Construction has been approved. ~~(C)~~

Preparations should be initiated on an interagency basis for a future meeting of the Joint Steering Committee, and the Soviets should be informed of our willingness to hold a working level meeting to prepare for a formal session of the Joint Steering Committee. We should, however, refrain from setting a date for the Joint Steering Committee meeting in view of the situation currently facing Academician Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner. Timing of other meetings should also take the Sakharov situation into account. The linkage of the timing with the Sakharov situation should, however, not be conveyed explicitly to the Soviets. ~~(C)~~

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NLS F95-074 # 77BY BNP NARA, DATE 11/17/99



May 21, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Rejuvenating the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation
in Housing

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., has written to Secretary Shultz requesting that activities under the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Housing and Other Construction be strengthened. Since the last meeting of the bilateral housing committee (known as the Joint Steering Committee) in September 1978, the Housing Agreement has become increasingly inactive as a result of the January 1980 decision by President Carter to impose a sanction against high-level US-Soviet contacts which has precluded further meetings of the Committee. In the absence of these meetings, no new programs have been approved under the Agreement and older ones have not been extended when the first phases were completed. The Housing Agreement has, therefore, begun to atrophy.

Secretary Pierce points out that, following a positive assessment of the program which noted in particular the support by the US business community, the Administration decided to allow the Agreement to extend automatically for a third five-year term effective June 1984. However, the sanctions policy has resulted in a substantial reduction of the exchange program. In addition, setting of policy guidance has been impeded by his inability to deal directly with his counterparts. To resolve these problems, Pierce proposes that he be allowed to convene a meeting of the Joint Steering Committee to address major substantive and administrative issues necessary to achieve a more effective collaborative program.

The Administration's decision in late December 1983 to extend the Housing Agreement was based on the extensive private sector involvement and support of activities, the technical benefits to the American participants (particularly in the areas of construction in permafrost regions, earthquake-zone construction, fire-preventive coatings for wood and other fire-resistant techniques, and the use of large-scale research models), the future commercial potential for export of American goods and services to the Soviet housing industry, and the

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NLS MO2-011 #5BY CRS NARA, DATE 11/20/02~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

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-2-

intelligence gain to the USG from the regularly-filed trip reports. Furthermore, experience with the program has shown that the potential for undesirable technology transfer has been minimized.

Building up the activities under the Agreement would supplement what the Administration has undertaken in agricultural cooperation and other areas. Reactivation would also demonstrate to the private sector participants the Administration's support of their efforts and encourage them to continue their input to the program.

The letter from Secretary Pierce is the fourth in a series of letters from heads of US Government agencies (Mr. Ruckelshaus - Environmental Protection Agency, Mr. Block - US Department of Agriculture, and Ms. Heckler - Department of Health and Human Services) which conform to the White House agenda of a steady improvement in US-Soviet relations. This agenda, which receives Ambassador Hartman's strong personal support, remains in place despite recent strains.

The Department considers that in this case continued application of the Afghanistan sanctions does not advance US interests and recommends NSC approval of Secretary Pierce's proposal as an exception to that policy.

Donat mley
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 21, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Rejuvenating the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation
in Housing

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., has written to Secretary Shultz requesting that activities under the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Housing and Other Construction be strengthened. Since the last meeting of the bilateral housing committee (known as the Joint Steering Committee) in September 1978, the Housing Agreement has become increasingly inactive as a result of the January 1980 decision by President Carter to impose a sanction against high-level US-Soviet contacts which has precluded further meetings of the Committee. In the absence of these meetings, no new programs have been approved under the Agreement and older ones have not been extended when the first phases were completed. The Housing Agreement has, therefore, begun to atrophy.

Secretary Pierce points out that, following a positive assessment of the program which noted in particular the support by the US business community, the Administration decided to allow the Agreement to extend automatically for a third five-year term effective June 1984. However, the sanctions policy has resulted in a substantial reduction of the exchange program. In addition, setting of policy guidance has been impeded by his inability to deal directly with his counterparts. To resolve these problems, Pierce proposes that he be allowed to convene a meeting of the Joint Steering Committee to address major substantive and administrative issues necessary to achieve a more effective collaborative program.

The Administration's decision in late December 1983 to extend the Housing Agreement was based on the extensive private sector involvement and support of activities, the technical benefits to the American participants (particularly in the areas of construction in permafrost regions, earthquake-zone construction, fire-preventive coatings for wood and other fire-resistant techniques, and the use of large-scale research models), the future commercial potential for export of American goods and services to the Soviet housing industry, [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F95-074 #78

By amp NARA, Date 11/17/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

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Building up the activities under the Agreement would supplement what the Administration has undertaken in agricultural cooperation and other areas. Reactivation would also demonstrate to the private sector participants the Administration's support of their efforts and encourage them to continue their input to the program.

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The Department considers that in this case continued application of the Afghanistan sanctions does not advance US interests and recommends NSC approval of Secretary Pierce's proposal as an exception to that policy.

Donatmley
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 29, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: U.S. Attempts to Reach Agreements with Soviets

State has still not produced an unclassified list of our attempts to reach agreement with the Soviets as you desired, and I have been reluctant to move ahead on my own. However, I attach two papers which should be useful as checklists for restricted briefings with key members of Congress and representatives of foreign governments.

The first, at TAB I, is the more inclusive, and the more sensitive, since it specifies channels and times. It was prepared for Secretary Shultz, who has not yet approved it, and therefore you should not mention to him that you have it. I believe it is quite accurate, and see no problem in drawing on it in confidential briefings, if some of the sensitive details are omitted.

The second, at TAB II, comprises the talking points used by U.S. Embassies in briefing allied and other friendly governments. I see no reason it should not also be used with Congress.

As for an unclassified fact sheet which might be issued or used for press briefings, I believe it would be best to wait a while until we decide how to release the information so that it will have the greatest impact. Regarding our attempts to restore the bilateral relationship, an upcoming opportunity to release this to the public could be during the conference here of foundations active in East-West exchanges, scheduled for June 26-27. (There will be a separate memo on this event.) We could prepare a message from the President to the conference, and -- if we wished to maximize press coverage -- arrange for a brief meeting if the President's calendar permitted.

On the arms control side, I would opt for a comprehensive review by the President in late summer. If he publicizes the whole package earlier, we may have little to add in the fall, and also could be charged with "giving up too soon."

However, if you feel we need an unclassified fact sheet now, we of course will prepare one.

Chris Lehman and Ron Lehman concur.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #79

BY *smf* NARA, DATE 11/17/99

Recommendation:

That we use the classified list at TAB II for restricted briefings of Congress and foreign governments for the time being, and defer unclassified fact sheets until later.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

OR, ALTERNATIVELY

That an unclassified fact sheet be prepared immediately

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

For use only with Congress ____

For use with the press as well ____

Attachments:

- TAB I - Informal List of US Proposals to Soviets Since January (Secret/Sensitive)
- TAB II - U.S. Initiatives Toward USSR: Talking Points Used with Allied and Friendly Governments (Secret)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

U.S. PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES TOWARD THE USSR
SINCE EARLY JANUARY

General: The President's January 16 speech signaled a major effort to improve our relations with the Soviet Union. It was forward-looking, non-polemical, and designed to demonstrate to the Soviet leadership his desire to move ahead on a wide range of issues. Secretary Shultz, in the meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm two days later, affirmed our interest in negotiations on the entire range of agenda items between us. Vice President Bush met with General Secretary Chernenko at Andropov's funeral and, in a useful exchange, emphasized the importance we attach to the President's approach and our hope for progress. The President has sent Mr. Chernenko four letters, laying out his view of the relationship and identifying concrete steps that could be taken to mutual benefit in all four areas of our agenda. Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Hartman have had several meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin and Foreign Minister Gromyko to discuss the various items on the agenda in some detail. Overall, and with the notable exception of nuclear arms issues, the Soviet response was wary willingness to work with us on the issues we had identified, and progress seemed possible. However, the Soviets have recently quite obviously sought to put off individual decisions and stall the whole process, replacing their earlier enthusiasm for "small steps" arrived at through confidential discussions with delaying tactics in private and shrill propaganda for public consumption. Below are specific proposals that the U.S. has made since the President's speech:

Arms Control:

-- INF: In addition to urging the Soviets to return to the INF negotiations, we also told them we are ready to listen to any other ideas they may have on the INF issue, and that we are prepared for discussion not only in formal sessions at Geneva, but also in more private channels. They have steadfastly refused to discuss any aspect of INF.

-- START: As in INF, we said we were prepared to discuss these issues not only in formal negotiations but also in private channels. We told them we have some new ideas on START in which the concerns of both sides and differing U.S. and Soviet force structures could be taken into account, and that we are willing to discuss them at any time. In this connection, we continue to refine and develop our positions in the interagency process in order to have new proposals available the moment the Soviets are ready to talk. The President asked Brent Scowcroft to carry a letter to Chernenko and engage in

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BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/17/99

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- 2 -

a high-level exchange of views on the basis for getting talks on nuclear issues going again. The Soviets offered Scowcroft a third-ranking official, and have been unresponsive to all our efforts, refusing either formal or informal talks on both START and INF.

-- Chemical Weapons: In addition to tabling a draft CW treaty at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on April 18, we suggested bilateral discussions to help move the negotiations forward and resolve some of the verification issues. All the Soviets have done to this point is to denounce our draft treaty.

-- MBFR: In addition to tabling the new Western proposal on MBFR that substantially modified the Western stance on data, we have suggested intensive bilateral discussions in Vienna on MBFR issues. Again, the Soviets quickly denounced our initiative without taking time to study it carefully.

-- CDE: With the Western CBM proposals designed to reduce the risks of surprise attack tabled at Stockholm, Ambassador Goodby initiated private discussions with his Soviet counterpart in an effort to move the meeting ahead. Goodby later invited Ambassador Grinevskiy to Washington for confidential discussions during the recess. When the Soviets said they preferred to meet in Moscow, Goodby went there for talks. In these meetings, we emphasized our readiness to discuss their proposals as long as they are ready to discuss ours.

-- Space Arms Control: Over a year ago, we offered to discuss the implications of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative with the Soviets in START as well as in the Standing Consultative Commission. More recently we proposed a special working group in the SCC on these issues. In response to Soviet proposals for ASAT negotiations, Secretary Shultz offered private discussions to review the entire question of space arms control. In addition, the Secretary invited Soviet Academy of Sciences Vice Chairman Velikhov to discuss space issues with him or other knowledgeable officials during his April visit. Unfortunately, however, the Soviets have been unwilling to pick up seriously on any of these offers.

-- Confidence Building Measures: The United States has long taken the lead in suggesting confidence building measures to improve the atmosphere between the superpowers and decrease the danger of conflict. We have recently taken the following steps:

- Following up on our proposals for advance notification of missile launches and major nuclear exercises we have offered in START and INF, we volunteered advance notification to the Soviets of this spring's GLOBAL SHIELD exercise.

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- We proposed a draft agreement to upgrade the Hotline, and a team of U.S. communications experts went to Moscow in late April to work out the technical details.
- We also proposed talks on amending the 1971 Accidents Measures Agreement to include consultation in the event of a nuclear terrorist incident.
- We put forward once again our proposals to establish a Joint Military Command Center and upgrade embassy communications in both countries.
- The President proposed to Mr. Chernenko that we institute regular, high-level contacts between U.S. and Soviet military personnel.

With the exception of the Hotline, the Soviets have not shown any interest in our CBMs proposals.

Non-Proliferation Talks: Secretary Shultz first proposed ongoing bilateral consultations on non-proliferation issues in the fall of 1982. The third round of these consultations met in February in Geneva at U.S. initiative and with the U.S. acting as host. Again, at U.S. initiative, we scheduled the next round for December.

Regional Issues: We have emphasized our willingness to address regional issues of interest to the Soviets as well as issues of interest to us in bilateral talks. We have recently discussed the Middle East on several occasions. At our initiative, we also discussed the Iran-Iraq War and Gulf issues. The United States has proposed a special meeting between Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Dobrynin that would include high-level experts on the area from both sides. On other regional areas, we have in the past had three useful meetings between Assistant Secretary Crocker and his Soviet counterpart on Southern Africa. We recently suggested another meeting to discuss events in the area. However, the Soviets have not responded either to this offer or to the proposal for a special Middle East meeting.

Human Rights: Human rights is always a subject raised by our side. In the past few months we have encouraged progress on emigration and cultural freedom, turned over representation lists, raised prominent cases, and, in particular, made high-level requests for improvement in the Sakharovs' situation. In the wake of the KAL tragedy, we proposed concrete measures, such as the installation of radar beacons on Soviet territory along the Pacific air corridors, to help make recurrence impossible. So far, the

Soviets have not been responsive on the human contacts issue nor willing to move forward on the navigational aids.

Bilateral Issues:

-- People-to-People: Despite other broad political concerns, we have supported an improvement in people-to-people contacts between the two countries including the following:

- We proposed the negotiation of a new official exchanges agreement to increase and regularize exchanges between the two countries.
- We have identified areas for increased activity and high-level meetings in fields of particular benefit to our peoples -- the environment, health, housing, and agriculture.
- The U.S. suggested a date for consular review talks designed to improve certain visa and travel procedures.
- We initiated talks on opening consulates in Kiev and New York to facilitate visits between the two countries and improve our official representations.
- We proposed a joint simulated space rescue mission in which astronauts of the two countries would carry out a combined exercise in space simulating a rescue mission of personnel from a malfunctioning spacecraft.

-- Economic and Other Bilateral Issues:

- We have renewed our bilateral economic agreements expiring this year, and in the case of fisheries proposed that the agreement be extended for eighteen months rather than the normal one year.
- We suggested a compromise formula to settle the Pacific maritime boundary dispute between the two countries, hosted a round of talks in January, and proposed a follow-on session.
- We proposed discussions between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine on search and rescue procedures be scheduled for this summer.
- The United States Government made a major effort to ensure the success of the U.S.- Soviet Trade and Economic Council's

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 5 -

May meeting in New York by sending two Deputy Secretaries and a Deputy Assistant Secretary to speak and welcoming the leader of the Soviet delegation to meetings at the top levels of the State Department, Commerce Department, and the NSC.

-- Rhetoric: The Soviets continually complain about the supposed anti-Soviet rhetoric of the Administration. President Reagan signaled in his Time Magazine interview at the start of the year that he did not intend to engage in harsh polemics with the Soviets. In his major January 16 address, the President emphasized his desire for constructive cooperation in the relationship. The Soviets, however, instead of responding in kind by lowering their own rhetoric, have greatly stepped up their polemics and anti-Administration propaganda. Most recently, their rhetoric has reached a disgusting level -- comparing the President with Hitler, saying the Secretary of State was acting like a "dimwit" and calling Assistant Secretary Burt "a petty snooper and provocateur" -- that would be ludicrous if it were not coming from a major world power. Clearly the Soviets have been unwilling to carry out the lowering of voices that they so strongly advocated in public and private.

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TALKING POINTS

U.S. Initiatives Toward USSR: Talking Points Used with Allied and Friendly Governments

- The President's January 16 speech established the framework for U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union aimed at building a more productive and stable relationship.

In that speech, the President cited the profound and obvious differences in policies and political systems that divide the U.S. and Soviet Union, but stressed the vital common interest that the two countries share in the avoidance of war and reduction of existing levels of arms and tensions. It is this need to preserve the peace that is at the heart of U.S. deterrent policy. The U.S. will defend its interests, but does not seek to threaten the Soviet Union.

- The President also elaborated on the basic aims of the U.S. in its relationship with the Soviet Union: developing ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in international disputes; significantly reducing the vast arms stockpiles in the world, particularly nuclear weapons; and establishing a better working relationship with the Soviet Union characterized by greater cooperation and understanding and based on mutual restraint and respect. He emphasized that the U.S. will be guided in its efforts to those ends by realism, strength and willingness to engage in serious and practical dialogue.
- Following up on the President's January 16 speech, in recent months the U.S. has sought to engage the Soviet Union in just such a productive dialogue aimed at finding practical solutions in three broad areas: arms control and security, regional problems, and bilateral issues. We have of course also made clear that gestures in the humanitarian field would lead to significant improvement in the overall atmosphere of our relationship.
- The most pressing arms control and security issues undoubtedly are START and INF. We have underscored our readiness to return to the negotiating table, without preconditions, and to be flexible in renewed negotiations. We have made clear our readiness to discuss the substance of the START and INF negotiations at any time and any place the Soviets choose. We have also made clear that we understand negotiations must be a give-and-take process in which the concerns of both sides and the differing force structures of the two sides must be taken into account. Both countries made adjustments in their positions before negotiations were broken off, and we are ready to resume this process, but thus far the Soviets refuse to engage in such discussions.

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NLS F95-074 #81

BY amp NARA, DATE 11/17/99

- We recently tabled a new draft chemical weapons treaty at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. We hope the Soviet side will reconsider its initial negative reaction to the U.S. initiative. As Chairman Brezhnev once advised us with respect to MBFR, "Let us taste the wine."
- The same also still holds for MBFR itself. The U.S. and its Allies have introduced a new initiative at the MBFR talks in Vienna. That proposal attempts to build upon constructive elements of the East's latest proposals, and to find a creative way around the long-standing dispute over data. As with our chemical weapons proposal, we hope the Eastern side will, upon reflection, respond in a constructive fashion.
- Regarding the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), U.S. delegation Chief James Goodby consulted with his Soviet counterpart in Moscow late last month to explore the possibilities for moving forward and particularly to permit full discussion of Eastern proposals for specific confidence-building measures.
- U.S. and Soviet communications experts also met in Moscow last month to discuss improvements in the "hotline" linking our two capitals. These talks concluded April 27, with agreement reached on most technical aspects. We feel we should be able to resolve the few remaining technical and procedural difficulties in short order if the political will is there on the Soviet side.
- On regional issues, we have discussed with the Soviets consultations on Southern Africa as well as a more intensive diplomatic dialogue on the Middle East, and we are ready to proceed with such exchanges. We have long made it clear to the Soviets that we are prepared for any bilateral exchange of views which might contribute to a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan.
- With respect to bilateral issues, we have begun proposed exchanges concerning arrangements to open new Consulates in Kiev and New York, and are awaiting a Soviet response. The U.S. side is also prepared to negotiate a new U.S.-Soviet Exchanges Agreement.
- Annual talks pursuant to U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement will take place in Moscow at the end of May.
- The U.S. side has proposed resumption of talks to review a number of smaller consular problems of mutual interest. This would resume discussions that began last May.
- The two countries have had several rounds of negotiations concerning depiction of our maritime boundary in the Bering Sea, and we would like to see another round take place in the not-too-distant future.

- Finally, those bilateral cooperative agreements that were to expire this year have been renewed, and the U.S.-Soviet Trade and Economic Council will meet in ¶New York later this month. It will involve the participation of senior U.S. Government officials, and senior Soviet participants will be appropriately received in Washington as well.
- This is by no means an exhaustive list. But it serves to illustrate that the United States is indeed making a concerted effort to enhance our bilateral dialogue with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the Soviet response in many cases has been negative or they have not responded at all. We are not sure why, but the authorities in Moscow do not seem prepared for constructive dialogue at this time.
- Their decision to boycott the Los Angeles Olympics was completely unjustified. The U.S. was bending over backwards to meet Soviet concerns -- and we had met them. This decision surprised and clearly dismayed even their closest allies.
- They have responded harshly to the expressions of concern not only from the U.S. but from many other nations over the health of Andrei Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner.
- Regardless of their behavior, however, the United States is steady and patient. Our agenda remains on the table.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 29, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JK*SUBJECT: Letter to Mr. Peter Ueberroth, President of the
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee

We have reviewed and concur, with editorial change on page 2,
with the Department of State's draft letter to Mr. Ueberroth
for Mr. Deaver's signature.

Deb *SRB*
DeGraffenreid and Sestanovich concur.

Attachment:

Tab I Draft letter to Mr. Ueberroth



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 25, 1984

UNCLASSIFIEDMEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to Mr. Peter Ueberroth, President of the
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee

At Michael Deaver's request the Department has prepared a letter for his signature to Mr. Peter Ueberroth, President of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, concerning actions taken with respect to the 1984 Summer Games. A suggested draft response is attached for forwarding to Mr. Deaver.

for *Brockmeyer*
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
as stated.

UNCLASSIFIED

Mr. Peter Ueberroth
President,
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee
Los Angeles, California 90084

Dear Peter,

I would like to bring you up to date on the actions taken by the Federal Government in recent weeks concerning the Soviet boycott of the 1984 Olympics.

As you know, in the latter part of April the Soviet media and Olympic officials spread allegations that the U.S. had "violated" the Olympic Charter and sought to gain political capital out of the Games in Los Angeles. In light of these spurious charges, the State Department instructed our Embassies in Eastern Europe to explain clearly that the U.S. Government welcomes athletes from all countries, that the Olympic Charter would be strictly enforced, and that the U.S. was prepared to take whatever measures would be required to ensure security at the 1984 Games. On May 9, these instructions were reiterated.

On April 27, Ed Derwinski, Counselor of the State Department, met with Soviet Minister-Counselor Isakov to give the Soviet Government official and direct assurances of what we were prepared to do for Soviet visitors, along the lines of my letter to you of March 16, 1984. Several of our proposed actions constituted major exceptions to the procedures normally followed for Soviet nationals --procedures which are instituted

by the U.S. Government in reciprocity for Soviet restrictions on Americans in the USSR.

On May 9, the State Department furnished guidance to all its posts overseas to explain our position and enable each of them to respond authoritatively to the Soviet allegations about the Olympics. Similiar briefing materials were sent out by USIA at the same time.

On May 12, the State Department cabled its posts again with additional material refuting the various Soviet charges.

On May 14, the State Department took the unusual step of releasing the "non-paper" Ed Derwinski had given to the Soviet Embassy on April 27, in light of the absurd and wholly inaccurate interpretation given that meeting by Marat Gramov and the Soviet media. The same day, the Department ~~formally~~ *delivered a formal* protested ~~Gramov's remarks~~ to the Soviet Embassy. *regarding Gramov's remarks.*

You met with George Shultz and me on May 15 and outlined the stand you would be taking in Lausanne at the forthcoming meeting of the IOC. We offered the assistance of two State Department officials, which you later declined.

On May 23, we relayed to our Embassies LAOOC's request for information from eighteen National Olympic Committees with whom your communications had been faulty. At LAOOC's request, we also sent a second message along these lines to an additional thirteen countries. We also authorized our Ambassadors in four key African countries to encourage attendance of their Olympic teams.

Our objective throughout this period has been to give quiet but firm and effective support to your own efforts to encourage or confirm attendance at the Games prior to the June 2 deadline, without intensifying the politicization of the Games caused by the Soviet boycott.

We are encouraged that no country outside the hard core of Soviet allies has so far chosen to stay away from the Games. Moreover, non-bloc press and official comment reported to us has exhibited no signs of reluctance to have their national athletes attend the Games. The State Department is, of course, sharing these assessments with your staff on a continuing basis.

While there is room to be optimistic, I believe there is more that could be done to "grease the skids" and I would like to offer some suggestions.

The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA) will meet in Upper Volta June 14-16 to discuss the Olympics and its agenda for the coming year. Sending an American representative to the meeting to explain the arrangements in Los Angeles and generally spread goodwill could be extremely helpful. While this occurs after the June 2 deadline, it is important to remember that the Africans withdrew from the 1976 Olympics while in Montreal. One excellent candidate for this job would be Mayor Tom Bradley, who is both very knowledgeable and very well-respected in Africa.

The number of press accreditations for African journalists has long been a sensitive issue. We understand Nigeria, for example, has received only three accreditations, Ivory Coast one, and VOA's Africa service none. Given the enormous African interest in the Games and the important role of sports in the national life of these countries, we feel that LAOOC would do itself a large favor by indicating a willingness to grant additional accreditations.

We also anticipate that some African or other heads of State or very senior officials will decide to attend the Games only at the last minute. We hope that the Organizing Committee is prepared for such an eventuality and has the flexibility to accommodate requests for additional tickets, whether by

allocating additional seats to the national committees or by granting more liberal access to Stand G. In this connection, we understand you have granted special tickets to SCSA Secretary-General Lamine Ba. We believe this action will help significantly to promote full African participation.

Lamine Ba also hopes to bring between 100 and 150 African Olympic contenders to Atlanta in July to participate in a pre-Olympic training camp organized by Mayor Andrew Young, with support shared by Mayor Young, the U.S. Information Agency, and Lamine Ba's organization. The training camp has proven extremely popular with African athletes and sports officials. If these numbers (or more) actually show up, there may well be a financial shortfall which the Committee or its corporate sponsors might wish to help cover.

You may also wish to consider a personal appearance on AFNET, a closed circuit satellite television hookup run by the US Information Agency to many African countries. It would be a good means of spreading the word about the Los Angeles Olympics to opinion leaders throughout the continent.

Please continue to let me know if there is any way we can help on these or any other projects to ensure fullest possible participation at the Games. We all continue to have the highest

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respect for the tremendous job you and the Committee are doing on behalf of a successful 1984 Summer Olympics.

Sincerely,

Michael K. Deaver

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

May 23, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JW*

SUBJECT: Father Morlion's Request to Meet with the President or Mr. McFarlane

As you suggested following your telephone conversation with Norman Bailey, I met with Father Andrew Morlion this morning. He wants a five-minute meeting with the President, if possible, and if not with Bud, to present an idea he has to bring the Soviets back to the negotiating table, or else to solidify public opinion behind our positions. Specifically, he would like the President to propose (following informal soundings in Moscow) a limited delay in deployment of a portion of the INF missiles provided the Soviets resume negotiations.

In what may have been a coincidence, I received a call from Norman Cousins just after I met with Morlion, and Cousins urged a variant on the same theme: that informal soundings be made with the Soviets (he suggested through Gen. Jones and himself) to see if they would respond to a fixed period of delay in deployments by resuming negotiations on INF.

I of course gave neither any encouragement, but said that I would see that their suggestions received appropriate consideration. In Morlion's case, you may want to receive him briefly so that he can be reassured that he was taken seriously, but I do not consider this essential.

Recommendation:

If your schedule permits, that you schedule a brief meeting with Father Merlion.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Time:

Attachments:

Tab I Copy of Merlion's letter to the President and copy of his proposal

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLS F75-074 #82BY Amf NARA, DATE 11/17/99



CROP COMMITTEE OF HUMAN RELATIONS FOR PEACE COMITE DE RELATIONS HUMAINES POUR LA PAIX

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PRESIDENT
w F. Morlion O.P.
de Pola, Rome
444989-859303

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D. C.

UNTS-COMPTES

Dear Mr. President:

n° 410192387
di Sicilia Ag. 8
la Nomentana

At this crossroad of history, I respectfully note that you alone among the world leaders can act to assure the survival of mankind. Having been personally associated with the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis through the simple mediation of Pope John XXIII which enabled President Kennedy to break the political-military deadlock with Khrushchev, I believe I can make that observation. Thus, I seek your consideration as I pray for your initiative to arrest the threat of nuclear warfare.

n° 30326546
Générale
de Sévres

You can assure the peoples of the world that peace is possible and that you, as America's President, are committed to its preservation. I know of and have been deeply impressed by your gracious reception of two Franciscan fathers who were unable to achieve a reciprocal acceptance by President Chernenko. Having demonstrated beyond a doubt America's firm resolve and your commitment to your country's strength, Mr. President, you are in the unique position of being able to call for and act on a "Pause for Peace".

n° 43006756140
thunk
d'Arenberg
les

I enclose a memo in the hope that upon returning to Rome on June 10th I can carry a light of hope in a favorable reaction. I believe you can strengthen your policy of national security with the support of the public opinion of most peoples of the world with a courageous, unilateral initiative, a limited but realistic proposal to initiate a first and a decisive step--an act for peace.

c/o H.C. Röglin
u Crop
Friedrich Ring
dorf Tel. 578285

I believe my prior efforts as well as my current chancellorship of the International University of Social Studies in Rome are known to your government as may be my recent efforts for private diplomacy which have now brought me to Washington where I will be staying at St. Dominic's Rectory, 630 E Street, NW, phone 554-7863, until May 25th. In union with the prayers of hundreds of millions of our brothers and sisters of the human family, that you will be our Lord's providential agent for peace on earth,

Account CROP
cal Bank
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ok N.Y.
ohn P.E. Brown
Suite 6F
Park Avenue
ok N.Y.
424483

PRESIDENTS
a Cousins
Hussain

Cordially yours in Christ,

Andrew F. Morlion, O.P.

ary Publications
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President
nt

WHY PRESIDENT REAGAN CAN REDUCE THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR

by Andrew F. Morlison, O.P.

- I. President Reagan is, today, uniquely the one world leader able to initiate a realistic first step for peace.

President Reagan has demonstrated the resolve for a strong American policy in the Western alliance, has buttressed U.S. military power and has presided over a strong economic recovery. A Reagan rescheduling of one-third (174) of the 522 *new* American missiles to be implaced in western Europe by 1989 to subsequent years, declared unilaterally, and combined with a call for matching force reductions by the Soviets, might create a climate of sufficient confidence for phased unilateral-matched force reductions.

- II. Chernenko and the Soviets cannot initiate a unilateral force reduction. Illness and age, flux in leadership, and the internal structural problems of the Soviets do not afford the confidence and intrinsic strength essential for a policy of mobility. The Soviets would have more difficulty in dismissing a unilateral act of force reduction calling for a matching move than in its rejection of the President's last addresses.

- III. A Presidential Appeal for Unilateral but Matched Force Reductions and an Appeal to the Conscience of the World to replace the open ended escalating multiplication of nuclear

arms will win the widest support as it will

- A. Be welcomed by the peoples of the world as a constructive de-escalation in the nuclear arms race. It can arouse the ~~sensitivity~~ *for President Reagan's concrete peace policies*, of world political leaders, religious leaders (such as the Pope and Catholic bishops in America and abroad) as well as the masses of peoples desirous of peace.
- B. Unite the American people and their allies behind the president's appeal to the world's conscience for unilateral, matched de-escalation.
- C. Provide sufficient time, 'A Pause for Peace', for the leaders of the Soviet Union to react more constructively to an American proposal in support of peace.
- IV. A 'Pause for Peace' will afford an opportunity for private and personal diplomacy to operate, to open dialogues at different levels of the American social and academic, scientific and cultural communities which, in the United States, are ready to support constructive acts for peace consistent with national security and international welfare. Private diplomacy never commits political or religious leaders; if successful, it provides a supportive base for their achievements.

A p p e n d i x

A RELEVANT CHRONOLOGY OF PERSONAL DIPLOMACY

1. October 22, 1962

The author of this document, through two of his trusted friends, obtained Khrushchev's acceptance of the mediation of Pope John XXIII to resolve the Cuban nuclear crisis.

2. January, 1963

Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador in Washington and a member of the Soviet Central Committee called the author in response to a request for a further gesture of good will and advised that Khrushchev had freed the Eastern rite but catholic 'metropolitan' of Ukraine, Archbishop Slipyi. A personal friendship between the author and Dobrynin followed and fruitful meetings have occurred as often as three times a year since then.

In respect to more recent events:

3. June, 1983

Through the Czechoslovakian ambassador and the Soviet ambassador in Rome, a dialogue was started which resulted in the author's participation in six meetings of a world assembly in Prague. The author focused on the premise that 'understanding and trust were more important than deterrents.'

4. September, 1983

Through the Soviet ambassador in Rome exchanges with the Academy

of Sciences were opened through cable, phone and personal communications.

A first subject proposed for joint research were comparative studies for Slavic civilizations and their relations to other cultures. The proposals envisioned three levels:

- (a) Natural sciences and technology
- (b) Social sciences and methodology
- (c) Human sciences and arts

This initiative of our Committee of Human Relations for Peace (CROP) was inspired by the motto, 'Science is a bridge for peace between peoples.'

5. September and December, 1983

Received the impression that American scientists would be welcomed by their Soviet counterparts.

Arranged to go, as founder of the International University of Social Studies in Rome, to the Soviet Union with two leaders in American science, Professor Linus Pauling and President Jean Mayer of Tufts University, for whom the Soviets issued visas.

6. January 5, 1984

Met with Anatoly Dobrynin upon his return from Moscow when he confirmed that cultural relations should be intensified.

7. January 18, 1984

Learned from Moscow that eminent Soviet scientists and other personalities desire to prove they are peace loving. U.S. Ambassador Hartman (whose children are studying at Tufts University, whose

president is Jean Mayer) had been advised that authorities of the Soviet Academy of Sciences had confirmed their desire to start more global scientific cooperation with American and other scholars. During Ambassador Hartman's absence at the Stockholm Conference, his counselor Hart phoned the author from Moscow on this date with this information.

8. January 19, 1984

To assure that private diplomacy would not be inconsistent with U.S. governmental aims, the author had been in touch with the State Department. On this date, Byron Morton, deputy chief of the Soviet Desk phoned the author in New York to confirm that there were no objections to private initiatives for peace.

9. January 23, 1984

At 10 am on the day of departure, the author was advised that our group would not be able to have official contacts with counterpart scientists in the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Clearly Kremlin authorities were not ready to accept private contacts with leaders of either the Academy or peace committee.

The author queried whether this limitation held also for Patriarch Pimen, head of the Orthodox Church of Russia, to whom he had sent a personal letter proposing study of the spiritual traditions of orthodoxy via the Orthodox Dean of St. Nicholas Cathedral of New York, who was traveling to Moscow. The Russian consul said he would inform himself. An hour later he advised us that this contact was forbidden. We would not be picked up at the airport.

The decision was made that the author, Professor Pauling and

President Mayer (who was officially scheduled to lecture on Friday, January 27th at the Soviet Academy) would postpone the trip.

Subsequently, a letter to the author from Dobroselsky, head of the Foreign Relations department of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., stated that 'my letter sent from New York on January 21, 1984, to Moscow is of the competence of the governmental organs'. My letter, written in Russian, had been delivered by hand to Patriarch Pimen. The reply, also in Russian, from the Academy of Sciences demonstrated that the head of the Orthodox Church does not represent a private religious party but is an organ subordinate to political authority.

10. March 2-3, 1984

At an international conference in Milan on 'Encounter with the Future', the co-chairman for the Soviet Committee for Science and Technology, Germen Gvishiani, was scheduled to speak on the plan of the Soviet Union for 1985-2005. He was unable to attend as his permission to travel was cancelled. A text which consisted only of Gvishiani's political introduction was read in his place by an English professor from Birmingham University.

11. May 13-20, 1984

A telegram to Rome from Yuri Zhukov, editorial writer for Pravda and President of the Soviet Peace Committee, suggested a meeting with the author on the occasion of the Dartmouth Conference in the U.S.A. These conferences have been held alternatively in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. since 1960. His proposal appeared to suggest a reluctance on the part of Soviet authorities to break this long standing tradition

of private exchanges between eminent Americans and Soviet personalities, many of whom are members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and Peace Committee.

12. May 10, 1984

At 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, May 10th, Father Morlion received a visit in Rome from Peter A. Vares, head of the Soviet Academy of Sciences section for receiving foreign guests. He told me that we were officially invited to proceed with the research agreement starting October 1984 with a preparatory visit of Prof. Pauling, Prof. Mayer and myself to Moscow. It is now officially accepted that we open a private channel for peacemaking on the basis of objective scientific conclusions..

In summary, at this time:

A. The above and related events appear to signal a program of tighter control over scientific, spiritual and other activities. Soviet focus appears to be shifting with less dependence on party ideology and more concentration on nationalist oriented fear of encirclement and nuclear aggression. This is reflected in the unmonitored queries of Russian youth: 'Is it true that Reagan will throw bombs on us soon and then we will all be dead?' The conciliatory character of recent presidential addresses have either not been described or have been dismissed.

These efforts appear to have been more effective than the Soviet program to promote official atheism. After two generations the Soviets have 6 million Orthodox, 5 million Catholics, 2 million Protestants, 3 million Jews, 50 million Moslems, so many of whom stubbornly cling to their religious traditions that 120 million of the 230 million Soviet citizens claim the right to participate in religious practices.

B. A number of academic and scientific leaders in the U.S. are prepared to engage their efforts to utilize private diplomacy to open dialogue with Soviet citizens. Such dialogue can encourage and in turn be made more fruitful by a presidential act to arrest nuclear escalation which would demonstrate confidence in the conscience of the human family and would help mobilize American and Soviet citizens in support of such presidential initiative even as it would contribute to a constructive competition for peace.

MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: Jack Matlock
To: Jack Matlock

+05/22/84 15:05:56

~~-- SECRET --~~

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

Subject: Forwarding Note 05/22/84 15:02 Father Andrew F. Morlion

I did not put the address on the first copy.

* * * F O R W A R D E D N O T E * * *

To: NSGVE --CPUA GEORGE VAN ERON

~~-- SECRET --~~

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Father Andrew F. Morlion

Norman Bailey called today to say he had subject who is Chancellor of International University of Social Studies in Rome in his office. Father Morlion apparently has what Norman thinks might be a good idea on the subject of US-Soviet relations. Norman wanted him to see me. I told Norman it would be better for him to see you and if you think it is important, I can see him. He will be in town through Friday. He can be reached at 554-7863. I said you would see him. Norman suggests it might be useful if Walt Raymond sat in if you can get schedules to match. Let me know what its all about.

cc: NSFEG --CPUA FLORENCE GANTT

cc: NSFEG --CPUA FLORENCE GANTT

DECLASSIFIED
(EO 13526, Sec. 3.4(b))
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
BY smf NAT 5/29/97

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NLS MO2-D11 #6

BY NOI, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

4113

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

May 23, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK 

SUBJECT:

U.S. Attempts to Reach Agreements with Soviets

I am working with State on the unclassified checklist of actions we have taken in regard to the Soviets, and will be consulting with Chris and Ron Lehman on the list before I send it up.

However, I believe we should think through the timing and manner of our release of this information. It will get far greater attention if we work it into a Presidential speech at an appropriate time. If we feed too much out so that it is reported piecemeal, then we may fall victim of the Scylla of attracting too little attention, and the Charibdis of having many react to a Presidential statement as "nothing new." Still, we must stay in front of the power curve in our public diplomacy.

My initial thought is that it will be useful to start citing some of the facts to Congress in private briefings, but that we should hold off on trying to attract publicity for a couple of months still. Otherwise, we risk the charge this fall that we gave up too soon, and may find ourselves on the defensive more than necessary as the campaign heats up. I think a record at this time of patient quiet effort can in fact pay dividends in September and October.

One upcoming occasion for a Presidential announcement covering part of our package is the planned meeting of institutions involved in U.S.-Soviet exchanges the last week in June. A message to that group from the President could lay out what we have been attempting in this area, and if we want to maximize media attention, the President could even invite the group to the White House for a short meeting. (The fly in this particular ointment is that the Sakharov situation has prevented us from moving ahead as we had intended in formally proposing a cultural exchanges agreement and steps to reactivate some of the cooperative agreements.)

If you can find time, it would be useful to discuss some of these thoughts.

cc: Chris Lehman
Ron Lehman

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # _____

84 MAY 21 P 2: 37

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>Stuff</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Achm Matlock
Cmt R. Lehman
 C. Lehman

Memo to RCM due 5/21.

4113

1/4MSG FROM: NSRMK --CPUA TO: NSRA --CPUA
To: NSRA --CPUA

05/21/84 13:05:27

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt

Subject: Forwarding Note 05/21/84 12:55 Note to Jack Matlock
print

* * * F O R W A R D E D N O T E * * *

To: NSPBT --CPUA

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Note to Jack Matlock

While at a "Foreign Policy Day" for two Congressmen this a.m. one of them mentioned to me that the public needs to have a better appreciation of how far the President has gone to try to solve problems with the Soviets. She said it would be useful to have on the public record the several attempts we have made to reach agreement in arms control and other issues--bilateral, regional and otherwise. I think there is something to this although there are pitfalls. Could I ask you to work with Ron Lehman to put together a useable document? Many thanks

copy to R. Lehman C. Lehman

cc: NSJMP --CPUA

NSRMK --CPUA

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12854, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
BY smf, NARA, Date 5/27/97