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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/20/2005

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1986 (1/6)

**FOIA**

F06-114/5

**Box Number** 18

YARHI-MILO

1805

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8576	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING GORBACHEV: SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY REGARDING SIZE AND STYLE OF MEETINGS <b>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</b>	4	ND	B1
8578	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN YOUR MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV IN REYKJAVIK <b>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</b>	2	ND	B1
8581	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING GORBACHEV: SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY REGARDING SIZE AND STYLE OF MEETINGS <b>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</b>	4	10/3/1986	B1
8582	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE PROS AND CONS OF SMALL MEETINGS <b>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</b>	1	10/2/1986	B1
8583	MEMO	MATLOCK/DEAN TO POINDEXTER RE WEEKEND READING MATERIALS FOR THE PRESIDENT ON MEETING WITH GORBACHEV <b>PAR 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5</b>	1	10/3/1986	B1
8584	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE WEEKEND READING MATERIALS ON YOUR MEETING IN REYKJAVIK <b>PAR 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5</b>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/20/2005

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**FOIA**

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**Box Number** 18

YARHI-MILO

1805

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
8585	PAPER	HOW GORBACHEV THINKS <i>D 3/14/2011 F06-114/5</i>	5	10/2/1986	B1	B3
8586	PAPER	GORBACHEV'S POSITION ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT <i>PAR 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5</i>	3	ND	B1	B3
8587	PAPER	GORBACHEV'S GOALS AND TACTICS AT REYKJAVIK <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	2	ND	B1	
8588	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT RE LESSONS FROM THE DANILOFF CASE <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	1	10/4/1986	B1	
8591	PAPER	THE DANILOFF CASE: INSIGHTS INTO SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY BY MATLOCK <i>PAR 6/23/2010 M125/2; UPHELD 3/14/2011 F06-114/5 #8591</i>	3	ND	B1	B3

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Meeting Gorbachev: Soviet Psychology Regarding  
Size and Style of Meetings

It is significant that, when Gorbachev proposed the meeting in Iceland or London, he specified that what he had in mind was a one-on-one meeting (or perhaps just with Foreign Ministers), and that it should be "confidential, closed and frank." It may be useful to speculate on his reasons for doing so, bearing in mind traditional Soviet attitudes toward meeting size and confidentiality.

Gorbachev's Probable Motivations

1. Meeting with you one-on-one, or with just foreign ministers present, conveys the image not only of dealing as equals -- which is important to him -- but also the image of a leader who is as much in charge of his bureaucracy as you are of yours. We know that Gorbachev faces major bureaucratic resistance to many of his policies. Asserting his authority by meeting you alone is a powerful way to signal that he is in charge and will make the final decisions.

2. Meeting totally in private and confidentially normally is a sign of serious intent on the Soviet part. The Soviets know very well that most of their propagandistic proposals are not realistic. When they are really serious about striking a deal, they go private. Privacy is particularly helpful to a Soviet leader who knows he must change some traditional policies, since it makes it possible for him to structure his dealings with his colleagues, and to modify public presentations of policy issues, to make it appear that he is not really backing down. Given deep-seated Russian psychological resistance to being seen compromising on principle and the extreme importance the Soviets attach to "face," any Soviet leader needs some "running room" to arrange justifications for policy shifts which avoid the impression within the Soviet Union that he has given way under pressure.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/5 #8574

BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07

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3. From the Soviet point of view, small meetings also have the advantage that bureaucratic elements who might oppose compromises can be excluded from direct participation. That way, the General Secretary has under his control what others are told and how it is presented to them. Infighting over "turf" is very intense in the Soviet system, and Soviets are so protocol conscious that it is difficult for them to exclude anyone from a meeting if his American counterpart is present. Shevardnadze is presumably Gorbachev's man, so Gorbachev doesn't mind including him. However, he clearly prefers not to open Pandora's box by including others.

4. One possible motivation Gorbachev could have in proposing small private meetings would be to attempt to play you for the sucker by trying to get you to agree to something without the advice of technical specialists. However, I very much doubt that this is indeed his intent. He knows enough from dealing with you in Geneva to realize that you are not the sort of person who would buy a used car sight unseen from a fast-talking salesman without having your mechanic check it out. And he also knows from Geneva that you are not the sort to be persuaded by gimmicks and disinformation. (In any case, if he should try such a tactic, it is easy enough to deal with.)

#### American Interests: Using Soviet Psychology to Our Advantage

We have no interest in building up Gorbachev's prestige because he is Gorbachev. We should not fall into the trap of feeling that one Soviet leader is more favorable to us than another, and therefore that it is in our interest to do him favors. We should not think of Soviet political figures as falling into "good guy/bad guy" categories. They are all "bad guys" so far as U.S. interests are concerned.

However, if we want to maximize any Soviet leader's ability to modify policies to reach agreement with us, we have an interest in cooperating to create conditions <sup>that</sup> which permit him <sup>to</sup> manage the bureaucratic and perceptual barriers to change which are inherent in the Soviet system and Russian psychology. In this sense, we too have a stake in small meetings and confidentiality, though not as a personal favor to Gorbachev. (Needless to say, it is even more important to keep real and tangible pressure on him to move in our direction. Such pressure is likely to be most productive when circumstances permit us to do it relatively quietly, so that ~~the~~ Gorbachev can cave without making it obvious that he has done so.)

Another aspect of one-on-one meetings, and very small meetings, is the impression it leaves on the Soviet leaders of your own leadership position. Russians respect strength and leadership. The past rulers they glorify are the ones who forced the Russians



-- kicking, screaming and suffering -- into a position of power in the world. Unspeakable cruelties to their own people are almost forgotten: what counts is that they were strong and that they were leaders.

Despite all the propaganda attacks they previously levied against you, one thing is absolutely clear: both Gorbachev and the Soviet people as a whole respect you as a real leader. Your popularity here and your demonstrated political effectiveness are important factors in this judgment, but the way you handled the private meetings with Gorbachev in Geneva is not the least of them. Nothing should be done to leave the impression that your authority might be eroding as your second term progresses. In Soviet eyes, a real leader does not need to be propped up by a lot of "advisers." They can understand the usefulness in having a few experts around to consult between rounds (the mechanics to check out the used cars being offered), but instinctively feel that having a lot of people, representing various "constituen-cies," around the table is a sure sign of weakness and division.

The reason for this Soviet attitude derives from their own practice. When other Soviet officials are present at a meeting (except for members of one's own immediate office or very close political or personal associates), there is a tendency to make points just for the record, to demonstrate to various interest groups represented (or who will read the record of the meeting) that the Soviet leader was vigorous in defending their interests. They suspect that foreigners have the same tendency, therefore tend to discount much of what is said at large meetings. Real business, in their eyes, is done in private -- and kept private until ripe for announcement.

\* \* \* \* \*

In sum, we can best take advantage of these various Soviet attitudes by seeing to it that you go to Reykjavik with a small, substantive staff, and conduct the meetings on a very confidential, very small group basis. This is also in keeping with our overall aim to make clear to the public that the meeting in Iceland is not a surrogate Summit.

I believe that you should plan to spend a substantial amount of your time in Reykjavik with Gorbachev one-on-one, just with interpreters. The rest of the time should probably be with George and Shevardnadze, with interpreters and -- perhaps -- a notetaker on each side, to insure an accurate historical record. If new ideas are introduced, they can be discussed between rounds with a small team which would come along to vet them. In addition, if the first day's meetings indicate that some real progress is being made, representatives from each side could be delegated to work Saturday evening on the details of possible instructions to delegations, which could be discussed by the two

of you at your Sunday morning (final) session and either approved or modified, as you both see fit.

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Your Meetings with Gorbachev in Reykjavik

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR 1016-114/5 #8578  
BY CIS NARA DATE 11/29/07

Gorbachev's immediate objective in meeting you in Iceland is to define one or more agreements in the arms control area which can be completed during his trip to the United States. Your objective will be impress upon him the necessity for progress across the range of issues as you have defined them, and to determine how far he is likely to go to reach concrete agreements.

The most favorable outcome from our point of view would be an agreed date for Gorbachev's trip to the United States. However, the best way to maximize the odds that Gorbachev will commit himself to a date is to avoid seeming too eager. If Gorbachev feels that the fact of a meeting in the United States is supremely important to you, he is more likely to try to extract a substantive payment for it. It will be best to maintain the attitude that Gorbachev is welcome to come at any reasonable time convenient to him, and that you wish his visit to be as productive as possible (thus your agreement to the meeting in Reykjavik), but it is up to him to make agreements possible on fair terms if he seeks them.

In Geneva, you engaged him in considerable debate about philosophical attitudes and historical experience. In Reykjavik, Gorbachev is likely to be more goal-oriented, concentrating on what can be achieved -- though he will doubtless rise to sharp debate if he feels challenged on matters affecting his pride or the prestige of his country.

Since time will be severely limited, you will want to concentrate on a few key issues which either seem good candidates for further movement on the Soviet part, or else are of such importance that firm markers must be set down. Several arms control issues fall in the first category, while regional issues like Afghanistan and Central America fall in the second. Human rights issues fall somewhere in between: they are unlikely to be candidates for formal agreements, but Gorbachev must be convinced that more progress is required in this area if some of the other things he wants are to become feasible.

~~SECRET~~

Although Gorbachev may possibly throw in a few "sweeteners" at the outset, he probably will reserve most of his real concessions (if he is bringing any) until late in the day (or rather, until the second day). Therefore, it will probably be wise to use the first day to lay out and defend our current positions and listen carefully to what he says. By your final session, it should be clear whether we are near closure on any important points -- and whether Gorbachev is prepared to move enough on some key issues to justify movement on our part.

The people Gorbachev has named to his "official delegation" are all very close to him personally and bureaucratically: all, except for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, come from his immediate office or the Central Committee Secretariat which is under his direct command. This means that he retains considerable flexibility to interpret the results of your meetings as he wishes in reporting to his Politburo colleagues.

My guess is that he has a keen interest in a "successful" meeting, which would enhance his prestige and authority at home and prepare the way for a visit to the U.S. -- which could bring further domestic benefits. If so, you will enter the meeting with a very strong hand, and should be able to secure some significant movement in some Soviet positions. On the other hand, if Gorbachev turns out to be unyielding, your willingness to meet him in Reykjavik should make clear to U.S. and allied publics that Gorbachev is the problem.

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1986

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90691  
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SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *John*

BY *CI* NLRR FOI-14/5 78581  
NARA DATE 11/29/07

SUBJECT: Meeting Gorbachev: Soviet Psychology Regarding  
Size and Style of Meetings

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cc Vice President  
Don Regan

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DECLASSIFY: OADR

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- 2 -

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~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

of you at your Sunday morning (final) session and either approved or modified, as you both see fit.

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~



8582

11

SYSTEM II  
90691

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE

October 2, 1986

ACTION

**SIGNED**

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Pros and Cons of Small Meetings

You asked me to do a paper on the Soviet attitude toward small meetings, and the pros and cons that derive from the Soviet view. Frankly, I can think of very few cons, since the fact is that small confidential meetings are both the most efficient way to get things done with Soviet interlocutors, and also the most effective way to demonstrate the President's authority.

A Memorandum for the President is attached which explains the Soviet view toward these matters and suggests that the President decide on a "small group, strictly confidential" approach.

Recommendation:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve *JM*

Disapprove       

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 26, 1997  
By 41 NARA, Date 8/26/09

8583  
Chron 12

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7216

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~  
ACTION

October 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*  
(R. SCOTT DEAN)

SUBJECT: Weekend Reading Materials for the President on His  
Meeting with Gorbachev

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President forwarding  
3 background papers for the President's weekend reading in  
preparation for his Reykjavik meeting.

The 3 papers, [REDACTED]  
(Tab A), [REDACTED] (Tab B),  
and "Gorbachev's Goals and Tactics at Reykjavik" (Tab C).

Ty Cobb and Steve Sestanovich *SS* concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memo at Tab I forwarding the papers to the  
President for his weekend reading.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A [REDACTED]

Tab B [REDACTED]

Tab C NSC Paper "Gorbachev's Goals and Tactics at  
Reykjavik"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~  
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR F06-114/5 #8583  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

Sec. 3.3 (b) (1)  
E.O. 12958  
135219

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Weekend Reading Materials on Your Meeting in Reykjavik

Attached are three papers which you may find useful as background reading in preparation for your meeting with Gorbachev in Reykjavik.

The first paper (Tab A) [REDACTED]

The second paper (Tab B) [REDACTED]

While I do not fully agree [REDACTED] that Gorbachev "would probably prefer to shelve his U.S. visit than concede too much in Iceland," and believe that the paper somewhat overstates Gorbachev's political strength at home, I believe you will find it of interest.

The third paper (Tab C) "Gorbachev's Goals and Tactics" presents an NSC analysis of three alternative approaches Gorbachev may be bringing to the meeting. We will have more to say about them as our preparations progress.

Recommendation

<u>OK</u>	<u>No</u>
_____	_____

That you read the attached papers as background for your meeting with Gorbachev.

Attachments:

Tab A [REDACTED]

Tab B [REDACTED]

Tab C NSC Paper "Gorbachev's Goals and Tactics at Reykjavik"

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~  
Decl: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRRF06-114/5 #8584  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11



FOIA(b)(1),(3)  
~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] 8586 19

## GORBACHEV'S POSITION ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT

General Secretary Gorbachev will be coming to the meeting in Iceland in a strong domestic political position, and will be able to exercise broad latitude in negotiating and tactics. He wants a deal on arms control in part to advance his long-term economic agenda, but is under little immediate economic or political pressure to reach a quick agreement and would probably prefer to shelve the U.S. visit than concede too much in Iceland.

Since your last meeting Gorbachev has strengthened his position in the leadership.

- He has added additional allies to the Politburo and put remaining Brezhnev holdovers on the defensive.
- Although there were reports of tension between Gorbachev and the number two man in the party--Ligachev--last year, recent evidence indicates that Ligachev supports the full range of Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies.
- Gorbachev's month long summer vacation in the Crimea, his extensive plans for foreign travel over the coming year, and especially his vigorous pursuit of a summit suggest that he feels politically secure and self confident.

Over the past year Gorbachev also enhanced his power over the decision making process by gaining operational control over the central party apparatus, particularly in the foreign policy sphere.

- At the party congress in March, Gorbachev successfully packed the Secretariat--the party's executive arm. All but three of the ten other members of this key body gained their positions under Gorbachev.
- He has built up Dobrynin's department in the Secretariat as a counterweight to the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs.

Major elements of Gorbachev's domestic policy--the discipline campaign and anti-corruption measures--have enhanced the KGB's role and by most accounts KGB chief Chebrikov appears to be an ally.

For now, Gorbachev also appears to have the backing of the military for his economic strategy.

- He has successfully muzzled forces in the military that put top priority on current defense needs and won support for his strategy that Soviet long-term security interests require building up the country's overall economic base.

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR F06-114/5 #8586

BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11



- He told top military leaders in July 1985 that the party runs the military, and that if they can't use their resources better he will find generals who will-- subsequently he made a number of top-level changes in the military.

Gorbachev's new foreign policy team is pressing a strategy of arms control primarily to undercut long-term pressure for increased defense expenditures.

- His economic strategy requires keeping a lid on current defense spending in order to modernize the economy and allow it to compete more successfully with the U.S. over the long haul.
- To this end he wants a stable, predictable relationship with the U.S.
- He does not need an "agreement" for its own sake and will hold out for terms that advance these objectives, e.g., blocking SDI.
- At the same time he appears to have a more realistic appreciation than past Soviet leaders that he may not be able to get such an agreement cheaply, even though he will try.

Gorbachev's efforts to pursue this strategy have almost certainly led to some arguments over specific moves and skepticism in some quarters about the wisdom of his approach-- particularly to summitry. But, he does not appear to face concerted opposition to his foreign policy. While the Politburo ultimately decides Soviet foreign policy, it appears to be giving him considerable leeway to take the lead.

- Gorbachev's letter to you proposing the Iceland meeting indicates that the Politburo has given him a mandate to conduct negotiations even though there is no promise of success.
- He has demonstrated his ability to get approval of controversial arms control measures, such as the nuclear testing moratorium and concessions on INF, that impinge on the interest of the military.
- In making foreign policy he does not have to contend with the large number of entrenched and powerful bureaucratic interests of the sort that impinge on his ability to shift domestic policy. The Soviet foreign policy apparatus is very small.
- Most Politburo members have little experience in foreign policy and are more concerned with domestic policy issues that directly affect their own spheres of influence.



A positive summit would clearly be a plus for Gorbachev at home, and would give him political momentum he could transfer to his domestic agenda. But even though his Politburo colleagues are giving Gorbachev wide latitude to negotiate with you, he will still need to convince them that the results of the meeting advance Soviet interests.

- The other Politburo members are politically independent and Gorbachev cannot automatically count on their support; [REDACTED]

- Since your last meeting he appears to have been spending a lot of time defending his U.S. policy.
- Some reports suggest Gorbachev drew criticism in the Politburo following your Geneva meeting for not achieving more tangible results.

If he mistakes in the negotiations with you--for example by being perceived as too accommodating--he would damage his political position at home, limiting his future freedom of action in the foreign policy sphere and making it more difficult to confront entrenched interests at home.

- Unhappiness with the results of the meeting, particularly within the military, could provide ammunition for opponents who are threatened by his domestic policies and want to limit his power.

It is perhaps for this reason that Gorbachev chose to seek a meeting with you outside the United States to explore--first hand--whether there are real prospects for concrete agreements addressing Soviet concerns.

- If he can't get results in Iceland that advance his longer term objectives, Gorbachev would put the Washington summit on hold for now, arguing that more preparation is necessary to make it successful and hoping that the delay will bring pressure on the U.S. to be more forthcoming.



Gorbachev's Goals and Tactics at Reykjavik

We go into Reykjavik next week with very little knowledge of how Gorbachev intends to use the meeting. The same was true of Geneva of course, but the uncertainty is perhaps greater this time around.

Gorbachev's long-term goals are clear enough: to unravel the Western consensus behind tougher policies toward the Soviet Union, to stabilize US-Soviet relations in a way that gives him greater latitude in his domestic policies, and over time to regain a more favorable position in the global balance of power. Arms control negotiations play a central role in this strategy, as Soviet proposals all year long have made clear. Given all this, how is he likely to play his hand at Reykjavik?

Gorbachev's letter to you called this a preparatory meeting for the Washington summit, saying that he hoped enough agreement could be reached that would make it possible for the two of you to sign 2-3 documents during his visit. We can't yet know the thinking that lies behind this statement but see three broad possibilities:

-- Despite his coyness, Gorbachev may already have made the basic decision to come. He may consider the Iceland prep session a way of protecting himself politically, by seeming to test what your views really are on key issues. Or he may see it as an opportunity to claim personal credit for getting concessions from the US. Whatever his motives, he may believe that his basic criteria have been met by, for example, the convergence of US and Soviet positions on INF, on risk reduction centers, and so forth. If so, the purpose of next week's meeting will be mainly to seal the deal.

-- Alternatively, Gorbachev may be genuinely undecided, even skeptical. He could calculate that progress made so far is not enough to protect him from charges that you are wearing him down, or from an international perception of growing Soviet weakness. If so, he may come to Reykjavik eager to listen but determined to win a major breakthrough on his primary concerns. In this case, you would find him ready to say at the end (with a heavy heart, of course) that a summit has not yet been adequately prepared. He could thus claim that he had given us a chance and was not responsible for breaking the agreement he made at Geneva.

-- A final possibility is that Gorbachev is ready to make a decision to come, but only if he can get a little bit more in the way of concessions and assurances next week. If so, he will be strongly inclined to respond favorably to what he hears, and will not necessarily insist on movement in the areas he has harped on most loudly (SDI, testing). What he would insist (for domestic reasons but also to strengthen his international reputation) is that he have something more in hand when he leaves than when he arrived.

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NLRR F06-114/5 #8587



There is no agreement within the government on which of these readings is correct. It is perhaps fair to say that the second possibility has the least, but still quite significant, support among our analysts; the third probably has the most, but even those who hold to it are not sure exactly what Gorbachev would regard as enough progress to meet his criteria. Also unclear is whether Gorbachev will be ready to make his own concessions for the sake of agreement, and how significant they will be. His letter to you of last month and Shultz's talks with Shevardnadze don't settle these matters at all.

On the issue of SDI, for example, the letter adopted a tough tone -- saying that the Soviet Union had no intention of helping the US into space, as Gorbachev put it. On the other hand, since mid-summer the Soviet line on strategic defense has apparently begun to waver just a bit, with the shift from demanding a total ban to a more outwardly negotiable extension of the ABM treaty for 15 years.

Similarly, we can't be sure how Gorbachev will relate these arms control issues to other items on his and our agendas. Will he be less demanding on these questions if he thinks there is a chance of winning Soviet participation in a Middle East conference? Will he offer significantly increased Jewish emigration if he thinks this will induce you to budge on the remaining unresolved issues of an INF agreement?

It is conceivable that between now and Reykjavik we may see some Soviet probes that begin to tip their hand, and to indicate which of these routes Gorbachev will follow. More likely, however, is that you will have to smoke him out during your discussions. If Gorbachev has already settled on coming, he may well open the meeting by simply proposing a date. Such a bold stroke to create a good atmosphere, and to encourage us to reciprocate his show of good faith, would be quite consistent with his style (though not with traditional Soviet negotiating tactics). Equally consistent, however, would be to toy with the question until the end, particularly if he is working from a short list of "must-have's." And he may combine these approaches -- announcing that he would like to come on a specific date, but then setting out a series of conditions that he hopes can be met before the Reykjavik meeting is over.

Between now and your departure for Reykjavik, we will present you more detailed thinking on these matters, and in particular on the kinds of tactics you should consider.

Prepared by:  
Stephen Sestanovich

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~~SENSITIVE~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX #

ADMIN FAX #

RECORD #

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FROM/LOCATION

1.

The White House Situation Room

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

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INFORMATION ADDRES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Syp II 90695

Lessons from the Daniloff Case

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CLASSIFICATION

WHCA FORM 8, 15 OCTOBER 84

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CAS NARA, Date 6/25/02



~~SECRET~~

*Matlock*  
SYSTEM II

90695

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

October 4, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *JM*

SUBJECT: Lessons from the Danilooff Case

I believe that the way the Soviets handled Danilooff's arrest illustrates some important differences in Soviet and American psychology, and that these are relevant to our tactics in other negotiations with the Soviets. Therefore, I asked Jack Matlock to summarize these points.

You may wish to take a look at Jack's paper, which has some thoughts that will be useful to bear in mind as you prepare for your meeting with Gorbachev in Reykjavik.

Attachment:

Tab I "The Danilooff Case: Insights into Soviet Psychology"

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F016-114/5 #8888

cc Vice President  
Don Regan

BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

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The Daniloff Case: Insights into Soviet Psychology

Aside from providing another clear example of the way a totalitarian regime can act with reckless disregard for truth, justice and the rights of individuals, the Soviet decision to arrest Nick Daniloff, and the Soviet handling of the matter after his arrest illustrates some important differences in Soviet and Western attitudes on a number of fundamental issues.

Soviet View of the Key Issues

1. The question of [REDACTED] innocence was fundamentally irrelevant to the Soviet decision to arrest him, and to their subsequent handling of the case -- except in the sense that "evidence" of his "guilt" was useful for their public presentation. This is in diametric contrast to the American approach: Zakharov would not have been arrested -- and could not have been successfully prosecuted -- if he had not committed a criminal act.
2. Although it doubtless had some form of high-level political sanction, the Daniloff arrest was probably intended as a limited action, to achieve a limited goal of the KGB: to force the release of Zakharov. Although it doubtless also had secondary goals (to intimidate foreign journalists and Soviet citizens in contact with them), the first was probably controlling.
3. The apparent failure of the Soviet political leadership to anticipate the vigorous public reaction in the United States and Western Europe, illustrates a persistent Soviet inability to understand fully the Western mindset -- and therefore to predict accurately the consequences of their actions.
4. The Soviet attempt to exact a precise parity of treatment between Zakharov and Daniloff illustrates their penchant for trying to create an apparent parallelism where none exists -- when it is to their tactical advantage to do so. (We see the same phenomema when they claim that invasion of another country is only the pursuit of collective security -- support for allies who have sought their assistance.)
5. One or both of two factors must be present to induce them to draw back, once they have started on a particular course:
  - (a) Realization that they stand to lose more than to gain from the perpetuation of the action; and/or
  - (b) Clear evidence that failure to resolve the problem can result in tangible damage to matters of greater importance to them.

E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3(6)(1)



~~SECRET~~ 21

6. If these factors are brought clearly into play at the beginning of the dispute, the Soviets are capable of cutting their losses rapidly before more damage is done. However, if the matter escalates and the prestige of the political leaders becomes involved, it is more difficult for them to extricate themselves, even if they realize their concrete interests are suffering.

7. The Soviets had no interest in Zakharov as an individual -- they were motivated by KGB institutional interests and Soviet national interests as the political leadership sees them. For the U.S., on the other hand, Danilooff's personal situation was a very important factor.

#### Implications for U.S. Tactics

These Soviet attitudes suggest that some tactics are likely to be more successful than others in dealing with disputes with the Soviets.

1. It is important to find ways to make clear from the outset of a dispute what the costs may be to Soviet interests -- particularly if we intend to react in a manner different from what the Soviets have experienced historically. Ideally, such information should be conveyed privately in the first instance, to avoid unnecessary or premature engagement of Soviet prestige.

2. While it is important to our public position (and for the record) to argue the facts of the case, we should not expect to resolve contentious issues by reasoned argument. The Soviets never really cared whether Danilooff was innocent or guilty. Therefore, while we needed to make clear to the public, and to the Soviet leadership, that we knew he was innocent, we had no real hope of solving the problem until we had given the Soviets concrete incentives to solve it.

E.O. 12958

As Amended

Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

3. A corollary of the second point is that we should always be careful to avoid giving undue weight to elements of no real importance to the Soviets.

[REDACTED] This was of importance to the Soviets only to the degree it could be used to make their case credible to our public -- or to employ as implicit blackmail on us, if they thought we feared "exposure."

4. We should always be mindful of the bureaucratic implications in the Soviet Union of the actions we take. In Danilooff's case, the KGB doubtless instigated the arrest. It was important to move against KGB assets in order to demonstrate that their own parochial interest would be the first to suffer -- and thus give them incentive to help find a solution. The fact that we finally

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moved against Soviet intelligence assets in the U.S. was doubtless an important element -- along with the Soviet desire to get the Summit back on track -- that led to its resolution. It is possible that we could have resolved the issue more quickly if we had moved at the very outset against KGB assets -- before the prestige of the leadership became too much involved. The analogy in the arms control area is to give the Soviet military concrete incentives to move in the direction we desire through our defense modernization programs.

E.O. 12958

As Amended

Sec. 3.3 (b) (1)

5. In trying to resolve a confrontational situation with the Soviets, we must be prepared to take calculated and reasonable risks -- and make sure the Soviets understand we are.



But even if retaliation on their part had been more probable than it was, it would have been a basic error to convey that we were fearful of that possibility. It would have been far better for them to get the impression that we would welcome the excuse to "cream" them, regardless of what happened to us.

6. We should never take the Soviets seriously when they say "you can't deal with us this way." (Usually, such statements are very good evidence that we are dealing with them precisely in the most effective way.) Such statements are usually made when we tell them in advance that we will take certain concrete actions if they persist in a particular course of behavior. Their protests have some validity only in the sense that if threats or ultimata are made public, the Soviets usually find it impossible to meet them, because of their concern for face and prestige. This does not apply, however, to warnings issued privately, if they are credible.

7. Finally, our experience in the Daniloff case illustrates clearly the utility of confidentiality and direct, very candid communication, in solving such problems. It was not until we dealt with them confidentially that we worked out the solution. It was also useful to have a "back channel": the message delivered in Vienna was an important element in bringing home to the KGB (and to Gorbachev) the dangers to Soviet interests if they allowed the matter to escalate by retaliating on our installations in the Soviet Union.

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock



29

SYSTEM II  
90695

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE

October 3, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *kw*

SUBJECT: Daniloff "Lessons"

**SIGNED**

Attached at Tab A is the paper you requested on the general lessons to be learned from the Soviet handling of the Daniloff case.

Recommendation:

That you forward the paper to the President for his weekend reading.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A "The Daniloff Case: Insights into Soviet Psychology"

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 20, 1997  
By *CXS* NARA, Date *6/25/02*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 6, 1986

UNCLASSIFIEDINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Archie Brown Article

I believe the article is basically sound - although Brown is more sanguine that Gorbachev has fundamental reform in mind than I am. Also, Brown may implicitly underestimate the degree of opposition to Gorbachev's domestic program.

Nevertheless, the article is not seriously misleading.

Attachment  
Archie Brown Article

UNCLASSIFIED



National Security Council  
The White House

System # \_\_\_\_\_

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DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

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Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
Rodman/Cockell	_____	_____	_____
Al Keel	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Florence Gantt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	1	J	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
MATLOCK	2	_____	_____

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Regan    Buchanan    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Jack.  
The President has read this. Is there anything mis-leading in it. J

Archie Brown

## CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION

**W**estern reaction to the 27th Soviet Party Congress has been mixed. On the one hand, those who had forecast revelations or a shift of direction on the dramatic scale of the 20th Party Congress—when Khrushchev delivered his secret speech attacking Stalin—were disappointed. On the other hand, those who expected little in the way of new ideas or policy changes to emerge from the congress found what they expected to see.

If the expectations of the former group were too high, the ingrained skepticism of the latter group may have led them to underplay what was new. If this year's congress was not the earth-shattering event that all party congresses are made out to be in the Soviet Union, it was, nevertheless, the most interesting and significant such occasion since the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, when Khrushchev extended and made fully public his criticism of Stalin and many aspects of the Stalin period.

No Soviet leader in his first year of office has presided over such sweeping changes in the composition of the highest party and state organs as Mikhail Gorbachev. The scale of the turnover, especially in key domestic and foreign policy posts, raises the possibility of policy innovations worthy of the name. So, too, do the failures of the Brezhnev years—in the Soviet economy and in international relations—which left his successors with severe and unresolved problems. Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko reached the top job too infirm and with too little time to take the difficult decisions, though Andropov at least made a significant start by facing up to the seriousness of the failures and encouraging some fresh ideas and fresh faces. Before looking at the extent to which new policies are indeed being promoted under Gorbachev—and the evidence for this at the 27th Party Congress—and examining the scope

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Archie Brown, a Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford, since 1971, spent the Fall semester 1985 as Visiting Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. His most recent book (as editor and co-author) is *Political Culture and Communist Studies*, 1984.



## CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION 1049

for and limitations on further policy innovation, we turn first to the changes in the party and state leadership.

## II

It is worth underlining both the sheer importance of those offices now held by new people and the remarkable extent of the personnel changes in the highest echelons of Soviet political life. The most powerful positions in the Soviet Union are the party general secretary, the senior secretaries of the Central Committee (those who hold a secretaryship in conjunction with membership of the Politburo), the chairman of the Council of Ministers and the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Immediately prior to Chernenko's death on March 10, 1985, only Gorbachev, among present incumbents, held any one of these positions—he was a senior secretary. When he succeeded Chernenko as general secretary, other changes were soon set in motion. The following month, Yegor Ligachev and Nikolai Ryzhkov, who had been brought into the top leadership team<sup>1</sup> only under Andropov, became senior secretaries; and in October 1985 Ryzhkov succeeded Nikolai Tikhonov in the no less responsible post of chairman of the Council of Ministers. In July 1985 the only senior secretary who was a holdover from pre-Gorbachev days, Grigory Romanov, the former leader of the Leningrad party, was unceremoniously fired, and in the same month Andrei Gromyko was much more subtly moved out of the Foreign Ministry and into the post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (thus reducing his impact on the content of Soviet foreign policy). More recently, gaps in the ranks of the senior secretaries have been filled with the completion of the meteoric rise of Lev Zaikov, who moved from Leningrad to join the Central Committee Secretariat no longer ago than July 1985 and was elected a full member of the Politburo at the party congress. Like Romanov before him, he supervises the Soviet military and the defense industry.<sup>2</sup>

The 27th Party Congress saw also the completion of extensive changes under Gorbachev in the composition of the top foreign policy makers in the Soviet Union. New heads were

<sup>1</sup> By "top leadership team" I mean the full and candidate members of the Politburo and the secretaries of the Central Committee.

<sup>2</sup> Thus, the top five people in the Soviet Union as of April 1986, in terms of institutional power, are Gorbachev (age 55), Ryzhkov (56), Ligachev (65)—who is the de facto second secretary of the party, Zaikov (63) and Gromyko (76).



## 1050 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

appointed to the two departments of the Central Committee with the most important international responsibilities—the International Department, which deals with non-communist countries and with non-ruling communist parties, and the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, which is responsible for relations with the communist world. In 1985 Gorbachev lost no time in showing that his was going to be the most important single voice in the making of Soviet foreign policy and that he was going to conduct a much more active diplomacy than either Andropov or Chernenko (or Brezhnev in his last years) had been able to pursue. His frequent foreign policy pronouncements in 1986 confirm this.

The selection of key colleagues also bears his stamp. The days of "Ivanov's turn" in Soviet politics are over. No longer can the first deputy head of a ministry, state committee or Central Committee department wait in confident expectation of filling his master's shoes.

Taken together, Gorbachev's appointments show imagination and indicate his desire to bring fresh minds to bear on problems and to break up cozy relationships in Moscow. Thus, the highly capable Georgian, Eduard Shevardnadze, had no particular reason ever to step inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until he was appointed to head it, with a full seat in the Politburo; the equally skilled (and, in foreign affairs, vastly more experienced) Anatoly Dobrynin had not served a day in the party apparatus before he became a secretary of the Central Committee and head of its International Department. The men they replaced, Gromyko and Boris Ponomarev, were powerful figures within the foreign policy realm and, at least in Gromyko's case, enormously competent. But given their ages (Gromyko will be 77 in July and Ponomarev was 81 in January) and the fact that Gromyko had headed his ministry for 28 years and Ponomarev his department for over 30 years, it would have been more than a little surprising if they had been receptive to new ideas and to a new style of conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

The turnover at the top of the key foreign policy making institutions was completed with the retirement of the 76-year-old Konstantin Rusakov as a secretary of the Central Committee and as head of the Central Committee department responsible for relations with communist countries. His replacement, Vadim Medvedev, is 20 years younger and has moved over



## CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION 1051

from heading the Department of Science and Education. His previous, rather varied career included teaching economics in technical institutes, a short spell in the apparatus of the Leningrad party organization, eight years as a deputy head of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee and five years as rector of the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the Central Committee. The last-named post (which he held from 1978 to 1983) would have brought him into contact with some of the rising stars in the East European firmament.

Also of consequence is Leonid Zamyatin's departure from the leadership of the Central Committee International Information Department to become Soviet ambassador to Britain. Accompanied as it was by the promotion of Aleksander Yakovlev to a secretaryship of the Central Committee, it may signify an extension of Yakovlev's authority over international as well as domestic propaganda.

Coming at the end of a year of significant changes in the top leadership, it is noteworthy that as many promotions as five new secretaries of the Central Committee (including the first woman in the team for a quarter of a century),<sup>3</sup> one new full member of the Politburo (Zaikov) and two new candidate members were made at the Central Committee plenum in March 1986. This means that at the end of Gorbachev's first year, no fewer than 12 people out of the top leadership team of 27 are complete newcomers<sup>4</sup> and only seven out of the 27 hold both the same rank and the same responsibilities they held before Gorbachev took over.

Just one rung farther down the political hierarchy, at the still very important Central Committee level, the changes that emerged at the party congress were a far cry from the turnovers of Brezhnev's time, though less spectacular than the change at the very top. It has, indeed, been a characteristic of personnel movement under Gorbachev that the higher the political echelon, the greater the extent of the change. In some ways this makes innovation in foreign policy easier to introduce and implement than in domestic policy, for the opportunities for

<sup>3</sup> Gorbachev had already urged party organizations "to promote women more boldly" and it was surely on his initiative that Aleksandra Biryukova, who had served in the central secretariat of the Soviet trade unions since 1968, became a secretary of the Central Committee. The last woman in the top leadership team was Ekaterina Furtseva, a Politburo member from 1957 until 1961.

<sup>4</sup> That is to say, they were neither Politburo candidate members nor secretaries of the Central Committee under Chernenko.



1052 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

people lower in the political hierarchy to undermine leadership decisions are greater in the latter than in the former case.

Given that the Central Committee is composed of people who, in most cases, possess important executive functions, it is of some consequence that the proportion of new Central Committee members increased markedly as compared with the turnover characteristic of the Brezhnev years. The contrast between the 26th and 27th Party Congresses is quite striking. Whereas new members accounted for approximately 28 percent of Brezhnev's Central Committee elected in 1981, they made up 44 percent of those elected at the recent congress.<sup>5</sup>

Neither at the Politburo nor Central Committee level did the changes amount to a clean sweep for Gorbachev and his allies. Shortly before the congress, Gorbachev succeeded in removing a senior conservative opponent, Viktor Grishin, from the Moscow party first secretaryship and the Politburo. But he still has in the Politburo two archetypal Brezhnev clients in the shape of Dinmukhamed Kunayev, the Kazakhstan first secretary, and Vladimir Shcherbitsky, who heads the Ukrainian party organization. That their survival caused some raised eyebrows is a measure of the speed with which Gorbachev has moved and the expectations he has aroused. Kunayev and Shcherbitsky are now, after all, the only survivors of Brezhnev's Politburo apart from Gromyko and Gorbachev himself. Perhaps more surprising is the retention in the Central Committee of a number of venerable party figures of conservative disposition who had lost their executive posts—among them former Premier Tikhonov, the former chief of Gosplan Nikolai Baibakov and longtime head of the International Department Ponomarev. This may reflect the undoubted fact that substantial support for the views they represent is still to be found in the party, or it may be a way of distinguishing their honorable retirement from the distinctly less honorable retirement of a Romanov or a Grishin.

Within the governmental hierarchy, the increase in the pace of personnel change under Gorbachev has been no less marked. More ministers and chairmen of state committees were replaced during Gorbachev's first year than in the Andropov and

<sup>5</sup> The difference is even more marked if one concentrates on the completely new faces—that is, by excluding those promoted to the full Central Committee from candidate membership or from the Central Auditing Commission. There were 41 such complete newcomers out of 319 in 1981 and 95 out of 307 in 1986.



## CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION 1053

Chernenko periods put together.<sup>6</sup> In addition, in November 1985 five ministries and one state committee were abolished and replaced by a single new state committee (for the agro-industrial complex) with the real loss (as distinct from relabeling in the new institution) of between 40 and 50 percent of the jobs which had existed in those organizations. Gorbachev, an appreciative reader of *Parkinson's Law* (as he made clear on his visit to Britain in December 1984), intends to reduce the size of the state bureaucracy as well as to speed up the turnover of those who head it. To do so requires the cooperation and support of the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and it is probably not coincidental that the process of reduction of the number of ministries and of the size of the state bureaucracy got seriously under way only after Ryzhkov had taken Tikhonov's place at the apex of the ministerial system.

## III

The 27th Party Congress produced important changes of style and substance as compared with the previous three congresses. The tone was far less complacent and reflected that of Gorbachev's statements ever since he became general secretary. Sycophancy was discouraged—Gorbachev interrupted one delegate to rebuke him for excessive invocation of his name. An important theme of Gorbachev's first year, that no ministry and no republican or regional party organization should remain beyond criticism, was pointedly reiterated.

At the congress, Ligachev, who has been a close ally of Gorbachev in his efforts to tighten discipline as well as the driving force behind the anti-alcohol campaign,<sup>7</sup> emphasized that "all organizations—whether Moscow, Leningrad, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Stavropol, Tomsk or Sverdlovsk—all of them must be within the zone of criticism and open to party critique." The examples were telling ones, for the Soviet cognoscenti were well aware that Grishin's Moscow, Romanov's Leningrad, Shcherbitsky's Ukraine and Kunayev's Kazakhstan were beyond "the zone of criticism" in Brezhnev's time and that Stavropol, Tomsk and Sverdlovsk are the local political bases of Gorbachev, Ligachev himself and Premier Ryzhkov.

Criticism was extended to embrace also institutions which

<sup>6</sup> Three times as many changes were made under Andropov as under Chernenko.

<sup>7</sup> Whether he would wish to go as far down the road of economic reform as Gorbachev may be prepared to go is less certain.



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had not been attacked in the pre-congress months. In one of the liveliest and most forthright speeches of the congress, Boris Yeltsin, the new first secretary of the Moscow party and a candidate member of the Politburo, did not spare the Central Committee apparatus. He was critical of the Department of Party-Organizational Work and drew attention to the fact that the departmental structure of the Central Committee apparatus had come gradually to resemble that of the ministerial system, leading to duplication of the work of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) and of the Council of Ministers. While it seems highly unlikely that Yeltsin would call for reform and restructuring of the Central Committee's economic departments against the wishes of Gorbachev and Ligachev, it is, perhaps, noteworthy that his closest personal association is with the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Ryzhkov—they worked together in Sverdlovsk; Ryzhkov obviously has a particular interest in the achievement of a clearer division of labor between the Central Committee apparatus and the ministerial system and the granting of more political space to the chairman and Presidium of the Council of Ministers.

Another highly unusual target for criticism was the newspaper, *Pravda*—this time from Ligachev. While giving a qualified endorsement to the more open criticism found recently in the Soviet mass media, Ligachev indicated that some of them had on occasion overstepped the mark. The example he cited was that of the most authoritative and normally untouchable of all Soviet newspapers. It is likely that he had in mind, in particular, a remarkable collection of readers' views published in *Pravda* two weeks before the party congress, in which a party member from Kazan called, in the name of social justice, for an end to the special privileges of party, soviet, trade union, economic and Komsomol leaders and drew attention to the existence of special eating places, shops and hospitals for them. If the bosses had to wait like everyone else, the writer argued, then something might be done sooner about the lines in the shops. In the same issue a Moscow party member since 1919 called for the introduction of a law to establish periodic purges of the party! The *Pravda* commentary dissented from that suggestion, though it published the allegations of excessive privilege without comment.

The 27th Congress adopted a new, revised version of the Party Program, which had remained unaltered since it was endorsed by the 22nd Congress in 1961. Reflecting Khrush-



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chev's over-optimism, the 1961 program had promised that "a communist society will in the main be built in the U.S.S.R. by 1980" and that the Soviet Union would overtake the United States in per capita production by 1970. As it turned out, it was the Party Program that was overtaken—by events—and the new version of the program (in many respects foreshadowed by Andropov in June 1983) largely eschews futurology and is more realistic and circumspect in its assessment of the tasks ahead.

## IV

Before and after the congress, one of the questions most frequently asked is whether there is going to be within the Soviet Union an economic reform that goes significantly beyond the tinkering with the economic mechanism characteristic of the Brezhnev years. The answer is not yet wholly clear; the signals are mixed.

To accept, on the basis of the absence of a comprehensive reform package at the party congress, that there will be no reform would be a mistake. Some Western observers have jumped prematurely to that conclusion because they assumed that if there was going to be a reform, the congress would be the occasion for unveiling it. But several important statements of Gorbachev himself point in the opposite direction. While it could be argued that so far he has not gone beyond rhetoric, personnel changes and some organizational restructuring, it is important to recognize that these were the logical places to start.

In order to change, it is first of all necessary to create a climate of opinion for change, and this is a task to which Gorbachev has addressed himself with great vigor and, it would appear, with some success. To get people "to work in a new way"—a favorite phrase of Gorbachev—it helps to replace those at the top of the various hierarchies who have been working in the "old way" for more years than most of them care to remember. And while organizational change does not in itself amount to economic reform, it may be a necessary precondition for it. A first step toward reducing excessive bureaucratic interference in the activities of industrial associations, enterprises and agriculture (in the last, this has already been recognized and acted upon) is to reduce the functions and size of the bureaucracy whose *raison d'être* is to interfere.

The evidence available on Gorbachev's position suggests not



only that he takes seriously the deficiencies of the Soviet economy, but also that he does not believe that tinkering with the economic mechanism will be enough. In December 1984 he warned that the unjustified preservation of "obsolete elements in production relations may bring about a deterioration of the economic and social situation." In June 1985 he declared that "the acceleration of scientific and technical progress insistently demands a profound reorganization of the system of planning and management and of the entire economic mechanism." Without this, he told a conference convened by the Central Committee to discuss the acceleration of scientific and technical progress, "everything that we are talking about today may remain just fond hopes."

In his Political Report to the congress in February 1986, a report that carries the authoritative weight of the entire leadership, Gorbachev went further. It is of some significance that when speaking of the economy, Gorbachev not only used the word "reform" for the first time but he even said: "*A radical reform is necessary*" (italics added). This was not a phrase thrown out in passing. Gorbachev must have known that it would be cited and used by those Soviet specialists in favor of far-reaching economic reform and would provide little comfort for conservative opponents of change. It was used also by Ryzhkov in his speech (which on the whole, however, was less reformist than Gorbachev's) and was soon reiterated in an editorial in *Pravda*.

Gorbachev indicated, moreover, that the economic reform process was just beginning. He said: "We are only at the start of the journey. . . . To restructure the economic mechanism in the conditions of our country with its immense, complex economy, requires time and energy." After the congress, Gorbachev returned to this theme. Addressing workers at the Volga Car Works in the town of Togliatti on April 8, 1986, he said: "Can you manage an economy which runs into trillions of rubles from Moscow? It is absurd, comrades. Incidentally, it is in this—in the fact that we have attempted to manage everything from Moscow up until very recently—that our common and main mistake lies."

Gorbachev has also made it clear that there is both covert and overt opposition to economic reform. Covertly, it takes the shape of ministerial encroachment upon the independence even of those industrial enterprises which are part of an economic experiment specifically concerned with enhancing that



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independence. On several occasions he has publicly criticized this practice. In his April 8 speech in Togliatti, he told his audience that he had learned that "contrary to the resolutions of the Central Committee and the government," the Ministry of Finance had become involved with the Volga motor vehicle works and begun "editing the experiment." Gorbachev added: "I made a note of this, and we shall check why this is happening."

It is, however, part of the logic of the administered economy that the higher administrative units, which are ultimately held responsible for the results of the lower units, try to control the activity of the latter. In the absence of a greater degree of self-regulation within the economy and of concessions to the market, this is likely to continue. That Gorbachev is against "market socialism" is not to say that he believes that the Soviet economy can dispense entirely with the market. A number of his pronouncements on agriculture suggest otherwise. If, as reported recently in this journal, he believes that Yugoslavia (in particular) and China are examples of countries that have bowed too far to the dictates of the market,<sup>8</sup> he may still hold that the Soviet Union has not yet gone far enough in achieving the optimal balance between central strategic economic decision-making and market forces.

That he has been pushing to go further than some of his colleagues want to go—that there is overt as well as more disguised opposition to taking Soviet economic reform further—was made plain by Gorbachev in his Political Report to the party congress. He spoke about a "widespread" attitude whereby "any change in the economic mechanism" is seen as "a virtual departure from socialist principles." His reply to this ideological criticism was a pragmatic one: "It is the socio-economic acceleration, the strengthening of socialism in practice, that should be one of the highest criteria of perfecting management as well as the entire system of socialist production relations."

Some of the most clear-cut innovation has been in agricultural policy. Gorbachev has long favored giving much greater autonomy to groups of farmers within the large collective and state farms, including family-based groups, and has wished to protect the farms themselves from excessive administrative

<sup>8</sup> Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, "The Genesis of Gorbachev's World," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World* 1985, esp. pp. 612-13.



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interference. The fact that when he was the Central Committee secretary responsible for agriculture such changes were not instituted on a wide scale is sometimes cited as evidence of a lack of reforming zeal on Gorbachev's part. It should be more correctly interpreted as a reflection of the strength of political and administrative resistance, which Gorbachev was in a position to overcome only when he had the resources of the general secretaryship at his disposal. The significance of the creation of the new State Committee for the Agro-Industrial Complex last November lies not only in its streamlining of the agricultural administrative machinery but also in the fact that its chairman is Vsevolod Murakhovsky. He succeeded Gorbachev as first secretary of the Stavropol regional party organization in 1978, and his obviously good relations with Gorbachev stretch over 30 years.

With a reliable ally in charge of the new body overseeing agriculture, and the weight of the general secretaryship behind that body, Gorbachev's policy initiatives in this sphere should have a much better chance of reaching the stage of implementation. Among these priorities are encouragement for family and other groups of workers to enter into a contract with their collective or state farm, which gives them a large measure of financial and organizational autonomy, and in which the material incentives are closely linked to what they produce; the right for the farms themselves to sell products in excess of planned quotas to the state or on the local market to the financial benefit of the farms; and (in Murakhovsky's words) "a flexible policy of price formation and provision of credits for enterprises in the agro-industrial complex."

The last point touches on a key issue. Pricing reform and a greater price flexibility will be necessary components of any far-reaching economic reform, and it will be of great interest to see if they emerge in the more comprehensive reform package. It already seems clear that there will be reform at least to the extent of a further administrative streamlining—including a reduction in the number of Central Committee departments and of ministries—but whether something more radical will in due course be adopted remains an open question. In any case, the risk of dilution of proposed reforms exists at every step.

Some contradictory signals are still to be found in Soviet economic pronouncements—even in the speeches of leaders. Thus, a stress on the need for superior quality of production



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(which Gorbachev is attempting to make a matter of patriotic pride) makes a strange bedfellow with favorable references to the Stakhanovite movement (of the 1930s) in which quality was sacrificed to quantity and record-breaking output was frequently achieved under highly artificial conditions. Though Gorbachev has spoken of "the notorious stress on volume of production," a very great emphasis is, nevertheless, still placed on speeding up the rate of growth in quantitative terms.

In agriculture, of course, such quantitative improvement would be particularly beneficial to the Soviet economy. The sharp drop in the international oil price in recent months has made considerable inroads into the Soviet Union's foreign earnings and provided yet another incentive to reduce or eliminate the need to spend hard currency on grain imports. Since this is the area in which a more pragmatic approach to economic problems has made the greatest strides under Gorbachev, perhaps a more surprising obstacle to the sale of American grain to the U.S.S.R. than the deterioration of superpower relations may yet emerge—a significant improvement in Soviet agricultural performance.<sup>9</sup>

On the prospects for economic reform more generally, all that can safely be concluded is that some reform will take place and that more far-reaching reform is at least on the political agenda. A very wide range of views is appearing in Soviet publications, and it seems highly likely that this debate has its less public counterpart within the major party and state institutions.

Gorbachev was not only on the reform wing of the Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko Politburos, but would appear to be also on the reform wing of his own Politburo. There is nothing strange about this, nor is it an entirely new phenomenon. Though Brezhnev was by temperament a conservative and by choice a centrist within his own Politburo (and even Stalin began by pretending to be a centrist), Khrushchev and Andropov both took the lead on reform. Khrushchev's reformism, however, suffered from impulsiveness as well as inconsistency and Andropov's was undermined by his rapidly failing health. Gorbachev would appear to have the advantage over Khrushchev of a calmer temperament and over Andropov of health

<sup>9</sup> The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant could provide unexpected complications for Soviet agriculture, but the extent of the setback—how much of the surrounding Ukrainian farmland has been rendered unusable—is at the time of writing unclear.



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and vigor. Having, as compared with Khrushchev, 20 more years of sobering experience to contemplate and having, unlike Andropov, a possible 15 years or more ahead of him as Soviet leader, Gorbachev has no reason to rush into an ill-prepared economic reform. He may also wish to see what results can be achieved by the measures adopted and foreshadowed thus far—personnel change, tightened discipline, organizational restructuring and some devolution of responsibility—before embarking on more drastic measures.

It is evident that Gorbachev is dedicated to transforming Soviet economic performance. If minor reforms do not achieve that, my reading of his character is that he possesses the self-confidence, pragmatism and political will to go further.

v

That the links between Soviet economic and foreign policy are closer than ever is a point that has been frequently reiterated by Gorbachev himself. An increase in international tension and an accelerating rate of military expenditure would exacerbate the difficulties of economic reform and diminish the prospects for significantly enhancing Soviet economic performance. A concern for the consumer has been a recurring theme in the post-Stalin years. But Gorbachev has raised expectations more than Brezhnev did. This may be of benefit in the short term inasmuch as people may be coaxed into working harder, but it could turn into a disadvantage if they feel their efforts have gone unrewarded.

It therefore made sense for Gorbachev to reassess Soviet foreign policy to see what innovation might be required in this area, too, to complement his ambitious domestic programs. In his report to the congress he observed that "continuity in foreign policy has nothing in common with the simple repetition of what has gone before, especially in the approach to problems that have accumulated." He pointed to a number of unilateral steps that the Soviet Union had taken—notably, the moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, the reduction in the number of them, and the suspension of nuclear weapons testing.

The coming to power of any new top leader in the Soviet Union changes, to a greater or lesser extent, the correlation of forces among the various institutional interests, opinion groupings and issue networks which exist within both the domestic and foreign policy making realms. Under Gorbachev it must



be said that thus far the military has been kept in a very subordinate position, as is reflected not only in its relatively modest representation in the highest echelon of the party (unlike his two immediate predecessors as minister of defense, Marshals Andrei Grechko and Dmitri Ustinov, the current incumbent, Marshal Sergei Sokolov, remains only a candidate rather than a full member of the Politburo), but also in the tenor of Gorbachev's and Shevardnadze's speeches. The latter include Gorbachev's reference to Afghanistan as a "bleeding wound" (albeit turned into one "by counter-revolution and imperialism"); an expressed willingness to compromise in arms control and public acceptance of monitoring and verification (on the principle that "disarmament without monitoring is impossible, but also monitoring without disarmament is meaningless"); the argument that security in relations between the superpowers can only be on the basis of mutual security; and the public use of the language of "national interest."

While the notion of national interest has long been an implicit part of Soviet leaders' way of looking at the world, Gorbachev's public espousal of it must have been displeasing to the Marxist-Leninist fundamentalists. At the Geneva press conference following the 1985 summit, Gorbachev recalled that in Britain a year earlier he had quoted approvingly to Mrs. Thatcher Lord Palmerston's dictum that "England does not have eternal friends and eternal enemies, only eternal interests," while at the party congress he brought the term into somewhat closer correspondence with traditional Soviet theory (albeit flexibly interpreted) when he said that "we understand very well that the interests and goals of the military-industrial complex are not at all the same as the interests and goals of the American people and the real national interests of that great country."

Though the tone of the first part of Gorbachev's Political Report to the party congress—concerned with laying, as it were, the Marxist-Leninist foundations for what follows—is less conciliatory than the later section on foreign policy, there, too, a fresh approach to the eternal verities is discernible. Gorbachev criticized as "contrary to the spirit and essence of Marxism-Leninism" any attempt to turn "the theory by which we are guided into an assortment of ossified schemes and prescriptions valid everywhere and in all contingencies." This section, for which drafts and proposals were probably submitted from a rather different group of people than those involved in the foreign policy part of the report, is sharper in its criticism



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of the United States and of imperialism, but even here it is the "right wing of the U.S. monopoly bourgeoisie" (rather than the entire bourgeoisie) that is blamed for building up international tension as a means of justifying military allocations and, ultimately, global supremacy.

Another possible source of innovation in Soviet foreign policy is to be found in the nature of the recent appointments to the top foreign policy making team, not least the bringing together in the Secretariat of Yakovlev and Dobrynin. What makes their joint presence in the Secretariat especially piquant is that they would appear to have different outlooks on the world and, in particular, different attitudes toward the United States. Yakovlev takes a very dim view indeed of the U.S. and has been quite pessimistic about the prospect for better relations. He is rightly seen as a leading spokesman for a more multipolar Soviet foreign policy who regards the prospect for improved relations with Western Europe and Japan as more realistic than that of getting on significantly better terms with the United States.<sup>10</sup>

In contrast, Dobrynin, having spent almost a quarter of a century dealing on a day-by-day basis with every American administration from Kennedy to Reagan, and having earned a reputation as a bridge-builder, presumably not only believes in the possibility of doing business with the United States but also sees the Soviet relationship with the United States as the central one. Apart from bringing into the Secretariat a different outlook from that of Yakovlev (and different again from that of his conservative predecessor, Ponomarev), Dobrynin carries into the inner circle of Soviet foreign policy formation an unrivaled knowledge of what might play in Washington.

There has been evidence already during Gorbachev's general secretaryship of much more serious Soviet efforts to improve or consolidate relations with a wider range of countries, not excluding informal contacts even with Israel. Gorbachev is scheduled this year to visit Greece, Italy and India as well as (all being well) the United States. It is probable that he sees high-level overtures to important West European and Asian countries not as a substitute for better relations with the United States, but as a complement—and even a stimulus—to them.

<sup>10</sup> On this point, see, for example: Jerry Hough, "Gorbachev's Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1985, esp. pp. 52-53; and Jeremy R. Azrael and Stephen Sestanovich, "Superpower Balancing Acts," *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1985, esp. pp. 490-91.



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At the congress, he observed that "one must not in world politics restrict oneself to relations with just one country alone, even if it is a very important one." To do so, "as experience shows," said Gorbachev in a passage which indicated that he thought Soviet policy until the most recent period had been too exclusively bipolar, "only encourages the arrogance of strength." He immediately added: "But, of course, we attach great importance to the state and nature of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States."

Gorbachev may well suppose, and not unreasonably, that if the Dobrynin thesis that the Soviet Union can do business with the United States is posited against the Yakovlev antithesis that this is a forlorn hope and that the leadership would be better occupied directing their political and diplomatic energies elsewhere, the synthesis could be a more conciliatory policy on the part of a United States unwilling to be diplomatically outflanked. If the Soviet Union comes to be perceived in the outside world as an increasingly circumspect superpower, and one more willing than the United States to curb military expenditure, this could indeed be an inducement to a U.S. administration to modify its policies—assuming it was adequately attuned to the international political environment and not only to the domestic one.

That the Soviet Union's newly widened diplomatic horizons do not mean any downgrading of the superpower relationship was indicated clearly by the format of Gorbachev's Political Report to the party congress. In a departure from Brezhnev-era congresses, there was no listing of the state of the Soviet Union's relations with a series of individually named countries in a kind of ranking of political performance of the bourgeois world. Only the United States among non-communist countries was singled out for attention. Yet, equally, the failure to mention others could hardly be taken to indicate their lack of importance in Soviet eyes, for in contrast with the 26th Party Congress the East European countries also were given scant attention, and the centrality of that region to the Soviet leadership's political and security concerns is not in doubt. Only China, apart from the United States, was the subject of a careful assessment, in which Gorbachev noted with satisfaction "a certain improvement in the Soviet Union's relations with its great neighbor—socialist China" and observed that "the reserves for cooperation between the Soviet Union and China" were "enormous."



If I have been correct in suggesting that Gorbachev has the political will to make significant innovations in both Soviet domestic and foreign policy, the question remains: has he got the political means? While it would be rash indeed to answer with a categorical yes, it would be an even bigger mistake to assume a priori that he can change nothing. Much turns, of course, on the extent of the changes intended.

The general secretary, in the years since Stalin's death, has not been a dictator. Khrushchev, for all his good intentions, at times veered in that direction, but his fate demonstrated the existence of limits on the top leader's power. For a general secretary, however, who builds alliances with greater skill than Khrushchev and uses his powers with greater boldness than Brezhnev, the office has enormous potential. Gorbachev—unlike Khrushchev—respects such conventions of collective leadership as the necessity of not making public announcements of policies that have still to be agreed upon by his colleagues. That may be one of the reasons why his reform rhetoric has appeared more radical than the reform measures introduced thus far. Even in the early stages of his general secretaryship, Gorbachev can decide for himself the tone of his speeches and the extent to which he wishes to promote expectations of further change, but concrete changes themselves require consultation with institutional interests and Politburo approval.

Gorbachev's position is already very strong. He is referred to as "the head" of the Politburo and "the head" of the Central Committee. He is cited in speeches and articles as the ultimate contemporary Soviet political authority, and he would be quoted even more profusely had he not decided that the traditional excessive homage to top leaders was unseemly. He has not only made important personnel changes at unprecedented speed, he has included among them a number of people with fresh ideas. A few worked with him in Stavropol and may be regarded as especially close allies.

Yet, in making his initial appointments, Gorbachev was selecting from a pool of talent that was far from being entirely of his own choosing. The sense of hierarchy in the Soviet Union is such that no one can mount too many rungs of the ladder in one leap. If, therefore, Gorbachev is going to overcome resistance to reform, he may have to use the threat of dismissal of those already appointed and to advance quickly the



careers of those who had not reached particularly high positions under Brezhnev. Certainly, using to the full his de facto powers of appointment will constitute one of his most potent weapons in the fight against bureaucratic inertia and overt resistance.

Gorbachev's authority—which complements and assists his exercise of power—has been established remarkably early in his general secretaryship. The wide publicity given to his speeches and meetings in the mass media enhances his prestige more than similar publicity enhanced Brezhnev's. That is not just because it took Brezhnev years to establish the command of the media Gorbachev acquired within months, but because Gorbachev, in contrast with Brezhnev (and with his immediate predecessor, Chernenko), is an effective speaker. He benefits similarly from his well-publicized meetings with groups of people from different walks of Soviet life.

Opportunities for publicity do not in themselves guarantee real enhancement of a leader's authority and support for his power; he has to have the skills to take advantage of them. This is one of Gorbachev's strengths, for it is harder—in the Soviet Union as elsewhere—to frustrate the will of, or to conspire against, a popular leader than an unpopular one. (Khrushchev by 1964 had lost most of the popularity he had earlier gained.) Gorbachev is sometimes described misleadingly in the West as a technocrat. In reality, he is a politician to his fingertips.

A change of top leader tends to bring about a shift in the relative strength of various institutions and opinion groupings within the Soviet Union. The changes wrought in this respect by Gorbachev's accession to the general secretaryship appear to be, on the whole, encouraging ones from the standpoint of both the Soviet population and the international community. Though the fate of Gorbachev's policy innovation will be determined essentially within the Soviet Union itself, it requires something more from the West than the stock response.