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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 3/25/2008

File Folder TERRORISM: FRENCH COOPERATION (1)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 14

NOUZILLE

218

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
53270	REPORT	RE LEBANON	12	5/23/1983	B1 B3
53271	CABLE	252143Z MAY 84 <i>R 4/9/2010 NLRM2007-081</i>	3	5/25/1984	B1
53272	MEMO	NORTH TO POINDEXTER RE DIALOGUE WITH FRENCH, <i>R 1/26/2012 M081/1</i>	1	8/10/1984	B1
53273	NOTE	TO NORTH RE ATTACHED PAPER <i>R 4/9/2010 NLRM2007-081</i>	1	8/6/1984	B1
53274	PAPER	RE DISCUSSIONS WITH FRENCH <i>R 4/9/2010 NLRM2007-081</i>	2	ND	B1
53275	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 53272, WITH NOTATION <i>R 1/26/2012 M081/1</i>	1	8/10/1984	B1
53276	PROF NOTE	POINDEXTER TO NORTH, ET AL RE FRANCE <i>R 4/9/2010 NLRM2007-081</i>	1	8/21/1984	B1
53277	CABLE	011051Z DEC 84 <i>R 4/9/2010 NLRM2007-081</i>	15	12/1/1984	B1
53278	MEMO	TO ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, ET AL	4	1/7/1986	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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File Folder TERRORISM: FRENCH COOPERATION (1)

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
53279	MEMO	TO ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, ET AL	3	1/7/1986	B1 B3
53280	CABLE	241958Z MAR 86 <i>R 4/9/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	2	3/24/1986	B1
53282	CABLE	RE COOPERATION WITH FRENCH <i>R 4/9/2010 NLRRM2007-081</i>	2	3/28/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
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2	② North	6/17	
3			
4			
5			
6			

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
amp 3/25/08

Cable

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. 400454

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ACTION	FILE
APPROVAL	INFORMATION
COMMENT	PREPARE REPLY
CONCURRENCE	RECOMMENDATION
DIRECT REPLY	RETURN
DISPATCH	SIGNATURE

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REMARKS:

*Separate copy was
sent to North.*


NSC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT

Warning Notice

Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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Collection Name

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 3/25/2008

File Folder

TERRORISM: FRENCH COOPERATION (1)

FOIA

S2007-081

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Box Number

14

218

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 5524 DTG: 252143Z MAY 84 PSN: 072841
SIT831 AN009608 TOR: 149/1850Z

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PRIORITY
DE RUEHC #5524 1462337
P 252143Z MAY 84
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3510

~~SECRET~~ STATE 155524

EXDIS

EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PTER, FR, US
SUBJECT: DIALOGUE WITH THE FRENCH ON TERRORISM
REF: PARIS 18704

EXDIS

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

EXDIS

2. SUMMARY. EMBASSY SHOULD INFORM MARTIN THAT US ACCEPTS FRENCH INVITATION FOR DISCREET CONSULTATIONS ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF TERRORISM. YOU SHOULD UNDERLINE THAT OUR WILLINGNESS TO HAVE CONSULTATIONS ON THIS NARROW ELEMENT OF THE TERRORISM PROBLEM AT THE LEGAL EXPERT LEVEL DOES NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR OUR DESIRE TO ENGAGE THE FRENCH ON THE OVERALL TOPIC OF STATE SUPPORTED TERRORISM AT A HIGHER LEVEL. A SMALL US TEAM HEADED BY DEPUTY LEGAL ADVISER MCGOVERN COULD BE IN PARIS JUNE 25 - 26 FOR THESE TALKS. END SUMMARY.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081753271

BY CJ NAL DATE 4/9/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

SECSTATE WASHDC 5524

DTG: 252143Z MAY 84 PSN: 072841

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3. WE WELCOME MARTIN'S INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON TERRORISM AND WISH TO RESPOND QUICKLY AND POSITIVELY. YOU SHOULD INFORM HIM THAT THE US ACCEPTS THE FRENCH INVITATION. WE AGREE THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD BE LIMITED INITIALLY TO THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF STATE SUPPORTED TERRORISM. WHILE WE DO NOT WISH TO LIMIT OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE FRENCH TO "DIPLOMATIC TERRORISM," WE CONSIDER IT USEFUL TO DISCUSS THE ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITY, AND PREMISES FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES AS A SUB-SET OF THE LARGER PROBLEM OF STATE SUPPORTED TERRORISM. WE PREFER THE CONSULTATIONS TO BE AS INFORMAL AS POSSIBLE AND WOULD NOT PROPOSE ANY SET AGENDA. HOWEVER, IN ADDITION TO THE SPECIFIC TOPICS MARTIN SUGGESTED, WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO INCLUDE AN EXCHANGE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES IN RULES ON DIPLOMATIC POUCHES AND COURRIERS.

4. US SIDE IN CONSULTATIONS WILL BE LED BY DEPUTY LEGAL ADVISER DAN MCGOVERN AND WILL INCLUDE ONE OR TWO OTHERS FROM L AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF MC/T. EUR WOULD LIKE FUTURE OIC FOR FRENCH AFFAIRS DEAN CURRAN TO BE ITS REPRESENTATIVE IF EMBASSY PERCEIVES NO OBJECTION.

5. WE WANT TO RESPOND QUICKLY TO THIS INVITATION IN THE HOPES WE CAN FOLLOW-UP WITH THE ORIGINAL IDEA OF A HIGH LEVEL VISIT IN THE FALL. YOU SHOULD SUGGEST JUNE 25 - 26 FOR THE CONSULTATIONS. IF QUAI INVOLVEMENT IN THE FONTAINEBLEAU SUMMIT MAKES THOSE DATES IMPOSSIBLE, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO SCHEDULE THE TALKS ON THE FOLLOWING TWO DAYS BUT THERE IS A STRONG PREFERENCE FOR JUNE 25 - 26.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 5524 DTG: 252143Z MAY 84 PSN: 072841

6. WE AGREE TO FRENCH SUGGESTION TO KEEP TALKS AS DISCREET AS POSSIBLE.

7. COMMENT. WE AGREE WITH EMBASSY THAT FRENCH ARE NOT OFFERING THE KIND OF DIALOGUE WE DESIRE. IN FACT, ATTEMPT TO CHANGE THE FOCUS OF OUR BILATERAL TERRORISM EXCHANGES TO "DIPLOMATIC TERRORISM" UNDERCUTS MUCH OF THE THRUST OF OUR PUSH TO GET THE FRENCH TO COME TO GRIPS MORE FULLY WITH THE LARGER PROBLEM OF STATE SUPPORTED TERRORISM. NONETHELESS, WE AGREE WITH EMBASSY THAT THIS RARE FRENCH OFFER SHOULD BE SEIZED. IT IS IMPORTANT THE FRENCH REALIZE THESE CONSULTATIONS ONLY DEAL WITH A SMALL PART OF THE PROBLEM AND THAT STILL DESIRE FURTHER BROADER DISCUSSIONS. SHULTZ
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SYSTEM II
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 10, 1984

53272

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Dialogue with the French on Terrorism

Bob Sayre has proposed that after your November meeting with the British in London, that you continue on to Paris for a similar bilateral discussion with the French. Bob suggests this as a response to Ambassador Galbraith's recommendation for a bilateral dialogue with the French. A multilateral meeting is scheduled in London for September 19 on implementation of the London Declaration. Secretary Shultz is expected to meet with the Summit Seven Foreign Ministers during the UNGA about two weeks after the multilateral meeting in London.

Bob has discussed the matter with EUR and with AMEMB Paris. All agree that we need periodic meetings with the French to compare notes on state-sponsored terrorism, intelligence exchanges, and cooperative responses. The key difficulty in the bilateral context is that in the USG our principal actor is the State Department, whereas in Europe the problem is internal and the principal actor is the Interior or Home Ministry. We have a bureaucratic problem for State and our Embassies moving the discussion in the proper venue without "heartburn" in the Foreign Ministries.

A solution to this problem is an approach to the French similar to what we have started with the British. We could move in this direction in November, if you would agree to visit Paris after London. A U.S. group, which you would lead, could meet with a French delegation headed by someone from Elysee. The French would undoubtedly include representatives from the Foreign Ministry, the Interior, Defense, and probably Security. If you agree to this approach, Mike Armacost can take this up with the French when he visits Paris at the end of the month. Bob Sayre will arrange once you concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you call Bob Sayre and indicate your concurrence in principal to a meeting with the French in Paris after your November meeting with the British in London.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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Declassify: OADR

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NLR M07-081 #53272

BY RW NARA DATE 11/26/12

53273

8/6/84

Ollie North:

The attached paper provides more detail ~~on~~ the idea we explored briefly on the telephone. A visit by John should help break the impasse on trying to get some kind of structure for a realistic dialogue. The French are reluctant because they have doubts that we can really be discreet. Our embassy has problems with anything bilateral that they do not run--the idea of bilateral discussions to develop a multilateral consensus seems a little difficult to grasp.

DECLASSIFIED/2/10/80

NLRR 107-081 #53273

BY CU NARA DATE 4/9/10

RMS

~~SECRET~~

Paris 29634

Ambassador Galbraith has recommended bilateral discussions with the French at least at the Deputy Secretary level. The proposal really appears to propose bilateral discussions by the Secretary with French counterparts in the Foreign Ministry, Interior, and Defense.

Sayre and McGovern had bilateral discussions with the French in Paris in late June. These discussions were only with the Foreign Ministry.

A multilateral meeting is scheduled in London for September 19 on implementation of the London Declaration. The key item will probably be controlling abuse by states of diplomatic privileges and immunities that amount to state sponsored terrorism. Other items will probably be the sanctions against Afghanistan's Ariana Airlines and the hijacking of the Air France plane to Teheran. We should probably seek to develop a consensus document on state terrorism.

The Secretary is expected to meet with the Summit Seven Foreign Ministers in New York during the UNGA about two weeks after the multilateral meeting in London.

Undersecretary Armacost is going to Paris soon but to talk primarily at the Foreign Ministry. A request for appointments at other ministries could raise questions and issues, but the key actors in the French Government on terrorism are in Interior and probably Defense, and the Security Services.

What we need is a periodic meeting with the French on international terrorism to compare notes on state sponsored terrorism, other terrorist issues, etc. To be most useful this should be at the assistant secretary level. Neither the Secretary nor the Deputy Secretary have the time to be engaged with the French on a regular basis on this subject. They can of course address the subject in the context of other meetings as the Secretary did at the London Summit and as he expects to do at the UNGA.

A key difficulty in the bilateral context is that within the USG the key actor is the State Department whereas in France as in other European countries the problem is internal and the key actor is the Interior (Home) ministry. There is a bureaucratic problem for State and our embassies to move the discussion into the proper ministries without some "heartburn" on the part of Foreign Relations.

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M67081 #53274

BY CU NARA DATE 1/9/10

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-2-

The French more than most European countries insist on dealing with the key issues on international terrorism only on a bilateral basis. Our Paris embassy has some problem with Washington based officials regularly conducting bilateral discussions with the French on these issues.

Key Questions

1. Should we recommend to the Deputy Secretary and/or the Secretary that they undertake bilateral discussions in depth with the French on this subject?
2. Should we recommend to Undersecretary Armacost that he take this up with the French in Paris?
3. Should we seek some other alternative to have a periodic discussion and review of international terrorism with the French?

Discussion

The French are willing to have a serious bilateral discussion on terrorism issues as evidenced by the Sayre/McGovern discussions with them and the interchange with Embassy Paris. They have also been willing to talk about the issues at the Secretary/Foreign Minister level as well as with the Defense Minister. They have listened at multilateral gatherings but have not really contributed.

The real problem is to get an ongoing bilateral discourse among the key officials in both governments responsible for the issues such as we have with the UK, Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Sayre/McGovern exchange was a first step. It in fact occurred at French initiative. It would be useful to build on that. The next step could be the Armacost visit at which he reviews the general situation. He could propose a more extensive bilateral exchange later in the year to include officials from the French ministries of Interior and Defense. Admiral Poindexter (No. 2 in NSC) plans a trip to London in November for that purpose and he could include a visit to Paris. A US group led by Poindexter should have the natural effect of a French group headed by someone from the Elysee plus the Foreign Ministry, Interior and Defense. We could then seek to have following meetings with essentially the same composition on both sides.

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SYSTEM II
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

North

August 10, 1984

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

53

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Dialogue with the French on Terrorism

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RECOMMENDATION

That you call Bob Sayre and indicate your concurrence in principal to a meeting with the French in Paris after your November meeting with the British in London.

Approve _____

Disapprove *J*

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Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Waste of time. Nothing would come of it. Only chance of success would be dealing secretly with Elysee and

then only on a specific case.

BY RWJ
NARA DATE 1/24/12
REF ID: A653275

DECLASSIFIED

North

MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: Ollie North

+08/21/84 17:29:43

To: Ollie North

~~SECRET~~

76

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER
SUBJECT: France and Combatting Terrorism

Bob Sayre finally talked me into agreeing to go to Paris as well as London in Nov. if everything can be worked out. I am not very sanguine about Paris but I am willing to try. State has it for action to try to set up.

copy to: Peter Sommer, Ty Cobb, Jack Matlock

cc: NSRMK --CPUA BOB KIMMITT

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NLRR 107-081 #53776
BY CU NARA DATE 4/9/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 PARIS 5741
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TOR: 336/1218Z

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NLR 107081 #53277

BY CU DATE 4/9/10

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DE RUFHFR #5741/01 3361104
P 011051Z DEC 84
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2746

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 45741

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DEPT PASS NSC FOR POINDEXTER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, FR
SUBJECT: POINDEXTER/OAKLEY TALKS WITH FRENCH ON
TERRORISM

REF: STATE 309658

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: THE CONSTRUCTIVE NOVEMBER 14 MEETINGS OF
RADM POINDEXTER AND AMBASSADOR OAKLEY WITH FRENCH
OFFICIALS ALLOWED THE TWO SIDES TO COMPARE NOTES ON
TERRORIST THREATS AND ENHANCE THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 PARIS 5741

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GOVERNMENTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PROBLEM. FRENCH OFFICIALS WERE, HOWEVER, MORE WILLING TO EXPLAIN THAN TO DEBATE THEIR GOVERNMENT'S CONCEPTION OF TERRORISM. ALTHOUGH THEY REGARD THE LEVEL OF TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST FRENCH INTERESTS AS SERIOUS, THEY GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THEY VIEWED THE PROBLEM AS SEVERE ENOUGH TO REQUIRE A NEW POLICY LINE. NOR DID THEY GIVE GROUND IN THEIR CONCEPTION OF TERRORISM AS A SET OF DISTINCT -- AND ULTIMATELY POLITICAL -- PROBLEMS. DESPITE STATISTICAL DATA CITED BY POINDEXTER, GOF OFFICIALS APPEARED UNSWAYED IN THEIR BELIEF THAT FRANCE IS LESS THREATENED THAN THE US BY TERRORISM.

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3. EMBASSY NEVERTHELESS BELIEVES SUCH DIALOGUE WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS ON TERRORISM IS USEFUL AND NECESSARY BOTH TO INFLUENCE ATTITUDES OVER THE LONGER TERM AND TO ENHANCE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVERGENT VIEWS IN SPECIFIC CRISIS SITUATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, GOF OFFICIALS DID NOT RULE OUT PRE-EMPTIVE OR PUNITIVE ACTIONS AGAINST TERRORISTS IN CONCERT WITH THE USG IN SPECIFIC CASES, ALTHOUGH UNDOUBTEDLY THEIR STANDARDS OF PROOF AND SENSITIVITY TO POLITICAL CRITICISM WOULD BE HIGH. THE GOF ALSO WELCOMED COOPERATION AMONG COUNTER-TERRORISM EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES, PARTICULARLY ON TECHNOLOGY TO COUNTER TERRORIST THREATS. WE WOULD WELCOME FURTHER HIGH-LEVEL USG DELEGATIONS IN PARIS TO DISCUSS THE TERRORISM PROBLEM WITH THE FRENCH, AS WELL AS OPPORTUNITIES FOR GOF OFFICIALS TO VISIT THE US FOR THE SAME PURPOSE. ACTION REQUESTED: SEE PARAS 16, 17 AND 18. (NOTE: DELEGATIONS DISCUSSION ON TERRORISM WITH GEN. SAULNIER OF THE ELYSEE WAS RECORDED SEPARATELY BY OLIVER NORTH OF THE NSC).
END SUMMARY.

4. MEETING WITH QUAI SEC GEN FRANCOIS GUTMANN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 PARIS 5741

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POINDEXTER THANKED GUTMANN AND HIS DEPUTY JACQUES MARTIN FOR RECEIVING THE DELEGATION TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF TERRORISM, WHICH HE SAID POSES A GROWING PROBLEM. HE THOUGHT THAT DISCREET EXCHANGES OF IDEAS ON THE ISSUE WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES WERE USEFUL AND INDEED NECESSARY. THE USG WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHERE IT WAS BEING USED PURPOSELY AND WITH SOME EFFECTIVENESS TO DESTABILIZE CERTAIN COUNTRIES. UNFORTUNATELY, IT WAS CLEAR THAT OUR LEVERAGE AGAINST TERRORISM WAS EXTREMELY LIMITED. THE GROUPS INVOLVED IN TERRORISM WERE CONSTANTLY CHANGING THEIR PROFILES. THEY WERE HARD TO CONTROL. POINDEXTER SAID HE HOPED CONTACTS SUCH AS PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S IMMINENT TRIP TO DAMASCUS MIGHT HAVE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE.

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5. GUTMANN SAID ON THE TERRORISM ISSUE WE ALWAYS SEEM TO BE COUNTERING THE PREVIOUS ATTACK. IF TERRORISTS ARE WILLING TO SACRIFICE THEIR LIVES, THERE IS NO GOOD DEFENSE. HOWEVER, HE NOTED, A FEW ELEMENTARY PRECAUTIONS IN BEIRUT IN 1983 COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE TRAGIC BOMBINGS AGAINST THE US AND FRENCH BARRACKS. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE CONCEPT OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM WAS NOT ALWAYS ACCURATE. SOME TERRORISTS WORK FOR A STATE, OTHERS FOR AN ORGANIZATION WITHIN

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A STATE, SOME SIMPLY FOR A CAUSE. ALIGNMENTS OFTEN CHANGE, AND THERE ARE SOME GROUPS THAT ARE BASICALLY FOR HIRE. FRANCE ENDEAVORS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE DIVERSITY OF THE GROUPS AT TIMES TO PLAY THEM AGAINST ONE ANOTHER.

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6. POINDEXTER COMMENTED THAT IT IS USEFUL FOR BOTH THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 PARIS 5741

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US AND THE FRENCH TO KNOW HOW THE OTHER IS DEALING WITH THE TERRORISM PROBLEM. HE WONDERED WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS WE COULD TAKE TO TRACK TERRORIST GROUPS AS THEY MOVE FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO KEEP BETTER TRACK OF TERRORISTS' IDENTITIES.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 PARIS 5741
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DTG: 011051Z DEC 84 PSN: 019419
TOR: 336/1222Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP /001

PRIORITY
STU3443
DE RUFHFR #5741/02 3361106
P 011051Z DEC 84 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2747

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 PARIS 45741

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DEPT PASS NSC FOR POINDEXTER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, FR

SUBJECT: POINDEXTER/OAKLEY TALKS WITH FRENCH ON

POINDEXTER ALSO NOTED THAT OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES ABOUT TERRORISM HAVE NOT ALWAYS SHOWN AGREEMENT ABOUT WHAT CAN BE DONE. HE CITED DISAGREEMENT ABOUT TREATMENT OF THE TERRORISM ISSUE AT THE LONDON SUMMIT.

7. MARTIN NOTED THAT FRANCE IS SOMETIMES UNHAPPY WITH TREATING SUCH ISSUES ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS. HE CITED AN EXAMPLE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH FRANCE HAD SHARED WITH THE US. SEVERAL DAYS LATER, DIFFERENT REPORTS ON THE SAME SUBJECT REACHED THE FRENCH FROM THE ITALIAN AND

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 PARIS 5741

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TURKISH GOVERNMENTS. THE SOURCE OF THIS "NEW" INFORMATION TURNED OUT TO HAVE BEEN THE ORIGINAL FRENCH REPORT, BY NOW MUCH DISTORTED. BUT IT TOOK THE FRENCH SEVERAL DAYS OF DIGGING -- PLUS MUCH TIME AND ENERGY -- TO DISCOVER THIS. GUTMANN SAID THAT IT WOULD MAKE MORE SENSE TO HAVE COORDINATION IN THE FIELD BETWEEN OUR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (ON A BILATERAL BASIS) TO AVOID SUCH PROBLEMS. BUT FRANCE WAS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT MEETINGS ON A POLITICAL LEVEL INVOLVING SEVERAL COUNTRIES TRYING TO COORDINATE THEIR ANTI-TERRORISM POLICIES.

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8. POINDEXTER ASKED IF GUTMANN AND MARTIN HAD ANY ITS SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. GUTMANN REMARKED THAT FRANCE WAS PERHAPS THE ONLY COUNTRY AS BADLY PLACED AS THE US TO INFLUENCE IRAN. CERTAINLY LITTLE COULD BE DONE TO PREVENT IRAN'S PROSELYTIZING FOR AN ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. HE SAID HE WAS 90 PERCENT CONVINCED THAT THE RELIGIOUS REGIME WOULD ENDURE IN IRAN EVEN AFTER KHOMEINI WAS GONE. GUTMANN QUOTED A REMARK BY SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO TO THE EFFECT THAT OUTSIDE COUNTRIES WOULD JUST HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL AN IRANIAN LEADER EMERGED WHO WAS CAPABLE OF COHERENT THOUGHT. THERE MAY BE OCCASIONAL CHANCES FOR PREVENTION OR DETERRENCE OF SPECIFIC TERRORIST ACTS, BUT THIS SHOULD BE DONE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS RATHER THAN THROUGH A GENERALIZED PUBLIC POLICY. GUTMANN THEN MENTIONED TERRORIST TRAINING SITES IN IRAN AS THE KIND OF IDENTIFIABLE TARGET AGAINST WHICH WESTERN NATIONS MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACT. POINDEXTER WONDERED WHAT THE EFFECT WOULD BE OF AN AIR STRIKE AGAINST THESE CAMPS. BACKTRACKING A BIT, GUTMANN SAID THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER SUCH A STRIKE WOULD ENCOURAGE OR DISCOURAGE THE EMERGENCE OF COHERENT THOUGHT IN TEHERAN. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT COULD NOT GIVE A DEFINITIVE REACTION AT THIS TIME TO A HYPOTHESIS WITH

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PAGE 03 OF 04 PARIS 5741

DTG: 011051Z DEC 84 PSN: 019419

SUCH SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS. IN SUMMARY, HE THOUGHT THE WEST SHOULD BE PRUDENT NOW. WE NEED A POLICY FOR WHEN THE IRANIAN REGIME EVENTUALLY DOES CHANGE.

9. IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER QUESTIONING BY POINDEXTER AND OAKLEY ABOUT POSSIBLE PRESSURE AGAINST IRAN, GUTMANN NOTED THAT FRANCE WAS TRYING TO ENCOURAGE A BALANCE OF POWER IN THE AREA AND A REDUCTION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE BY AIDING IRAQ. FRANCE HAD MAINTAINED RELATIONS WITH IRAN DESPITE MANY IRANIAN PROVOCATIONS, INCLUDING BOMBS, HIGHJACKINGS, ETC. THE FRENCH REGULARLY TOLD TEHERAN THAT TERRORIST ACTIONS WERE UNACCEPTABLE, BUT WITHOUT DISCERNIBLE EFFECT. ONLY THE THREAT OF GREATER FRENCH AID TO IRAQ SEEMED TO INFLUENCE THE IRANIANS AT ALL. FRENCH POLICY TOWARD IRAN WAS ONE OF CONTAINMENT WHICH COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO PAY DIVIDENDS IN THE SHORT TERM, BUT IT WAS ALL THAT WAS PRACTICABLE.

10. POINDEXTER SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE WEST APPLY ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE AGAINST COUNTRIES THAT EXPORT TERRORISM. IT MAY BE THAT THE ANSWER LIES IN TAKING A NUMBER OF SMALL STEPS RATHER THAN A FEW BIG ONES, BUT WE SHOULD LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED

IN LOOKING FOR SOLUTIONS. GUTMANN REPLIED THAT FRANCE WAS AS CONCERNED AS THE US ABOUT THE NEED TO FIGHT TERRORISM EFFICIENTLY. THIS HAD TO BE PRACTICAL AND PRAGMATIC WORK, BASED ON THE REALITIES OF VARIOUS SITUATIONS RATHER THAN GENERAL PRINCIPLES. POINDEXTER REPLIED THAT THE US AGREED IT WAS PRODUCTIVE TO DISCUSS SPECIFICS.

11. US-FRANCE EXTRADITION TREATY:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 PARIS 5741

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PAGE 01 OF 04 PARIS 5741
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DEPT PASS NSC FOR POINDEXTER

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, FR

SUBJECT: POINDEXTER/OAKLEY TALKS WITH FRENCH ON

POINDEXTER THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE US AND FRANCE. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD HELP US DEAL BETTER WITH SOME ASPECTS OF THE TERRORISM PROBLEM, AS WELL AS OTHER KINDS OF CRIMES. WHEN COMPLETED, IT SHOULD ENSURE THAT THOSE WHO COMMIT VIOLENT ACTS ARE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE. THE USG BELIEVED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD MOVE FORWARD AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. GUTMANN RESPONDED THAT THE SUBJECT WAS A DIFFICULT ONE POLITICALLY IN FRANCE. THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE WAS THE ACTION AGENCY ON THIS MATTER.

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PAGE 02 OF 04 PARIS 5741

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12. MEETINGS WITH DST AND DGSE

THE DELEGATION ALSO MET WITH YVES BONNET OF THE DST (DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE) AND ROBERT LACOSTE OF THE DGSE (FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE). IN THESE MEETINGS POINDEXTER AND OAKLEY STRESSED USG SATISFACTION WITH THE CORDIAL AND PRODUCTIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FRENCH SERVICES AND OUR OWN. MUCH USEFUL INFORMATION IS EXCHANGED BY THESE METHODS ON THE TERRORISM ISSUE. THEY OUTLINED THE PURPOSE OF THEIR VISIT TO PARIS, NOTING THAT INTERNATIONAL, STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM WAS A GROWING PROBLEM. INDEED, STUDIES PRODUCED WITHIN THE USG SHOWED THAT TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST FRENCH INTERESTS HAD INCREASED DRAMATICALLY OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS, TO THE POINT THAT THEY EVEN EXCEEDED ACTIONS AGAINST US INTERESTS. POINDEXTER STRESSED THAT THE US WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, ITS LINKS TO TERRORISM, AND THE TENDENCY OF BOTH TO DESTABILIZE FRIENDLY COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. TERRORISM, INDEED, WAS BEING UTILIZED SPECIFICALLY TO ACCOMPLISH SUCH DESTABILIZATION. HE SOLICITED FRENCH VIEWS ON HOW TOGETHER WE MIGHT BETTER COMBAT THESE THREATS.

13. BOTH BONNET AND LACOSTE EMPHASIZED THAT ALTHOUGH BOTH FRANCE AND THE US HAD BEEN TARGETS OF TERRORISM AT VARIOUS TIMES, THEIR POSITIONS IN THIS REGARD WERE FAR FROM IDENTICAL. ESPECIALLY NOW THAT FRANCE HAD WITHDRAWN ITS MILITARY FORCES FROM LEBANON, IT WAS NOT NEARLY AS MUCH OF A TARGET FOR TERRORIST ACTION AS THE US. THE FRENCH OFFICIALS OUTLINED THEIR PERCEPTION OF THE TERRORIST THREAT TO FRENCH

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PAGE 03 OF 04 PARIS 5741

DTG: 011051Z DEC 84 PSN: 019420

INTERESTS, INCLUDING FRENCH EXTREME LEFTISTS, SEPARATISTS SUCH AS THE CORSICANS, AND MIDDLE EASTERN GROUPS. THEY WARNED AGAINST LUMPING THESE GROUPS TOGETHER IN OUR ANALYSIS, BECAUSE THEIR AIMS WERE DIFFERENT.

14. BONNET AND LACOSTE CONTENDED THAT THE US, BECAUSE OF ITS STATUS AS A WORLD POWER, AND ESPECIALLY ITS STRONG TIES TO ISRAEL, FACED A MUCH GREATER THREAT FROM TERRORISM THAN DID FRANCE. THEY SHOWED SOME SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE STATISTICS ON ANTI-FRENCH TERRORISM, AND ASKED TO SEE DOCUMENTATION ON THIS QUESTION. BONNET AND LACOSTE ALSO WARNED AGAINST LINKING THE TERRORISM QUESTION MAINLY TO ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM. IN LEBANON, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY CONTENDED THAT THE MOST VIOLENT TERRORIST GROUPS WERE NOT ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS. THEY WERE EXTREME LEFTISTS, OFTEN CHRISTIANS. BONNET OF THE DST WAS UNEQUIVOCAL IN ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY TO DAMASCUS FOR MUCH OF THE TERRORIST THREAT. HE NOTED THAT A SYRIAN AIR FORCE GENERAL CONTROLLED SEVERAL OF THE TERRORIST GROUPS THAT POSED THE GREATEST DANGERS TO THE US AND FRANCE. HE ALSO STRESSED THAT THE SOVIETS WORK CLOSELY WITH, AND PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR, THE MOST DANGEROUS MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORIST GROUPS.

15. ASKED HOW FRANCE AND THE US COULD COOPERATE MORE EFFECTIVELY AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, DST AND DGSE OFFICIALS OUTLINED THE CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH THEY WORKED, INCLUDING THE PERMEABILITY OF WEST EUROPEAN BORDERS TO EXTREMIST GROUPS. THEY GAVE NO HINT, HOWEVER, THAT THEY BELIEVED THIS SITUATION COULD BE CHANNED THROUGH POLITICAL ACTION. FOR US-FRENCH COOPERATION, THEY STRESSED PRACTICAL

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PAGE 04 OF 04 PARIS 5741

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INNOVATIONS SUCH AS WAYS OF TRACKING SUSPECTS
FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY. BOTH COUNTRIES ARE WORKING
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DEPT PASS NSC FOR POINDEXTER

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, FR

SUBJECT: POINDEXTER/OAKLEY TALKS WITH FRENCH ON

ON A COMPUTERIZED IDENTITY CARD SYSTEM WHICH WILL
USE FACIAL FEATURES TO IDENTIFY SUSPECTED CRIMINALS
WHEN THEY ENTER A COUNTRY. IT WAS AGREED TO EXCHANGE
NOTES ON THE PROGRESS OF THESE PROJECTS.

16. FOR THE FUTURE:

EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS PERIODIC HIGH-LEVEL
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH ON TERRORISM. IN
OUR VIEW, SUCH MEETINGS HAVE A CUMULATIVE EFFECT IN
NARROWING GENERAL DIFFERENCES, WHILE ENHANCING THE

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PAGE 02 OF 03 PARIS 5741

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POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS, ESPECIALLY CRISES. A FURTHER TOOL, IN OUR VIEW, MIGHT BE THE ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (ATA) OUTLINED IN REFTEL. ALTHOUGH PARIS WAS NOT AN ACTION ADDRESSEE ON THIS CABLE, WE BELIEVE THAT THIS PROGRAM, IF PRESENTED TACTFULLY AS A MEANS OF ENHANCED CONSULTATION AND LIAISON, MIGHT STIMULATE INTEREST AMONG GOF OFFICIALS. THE PROGRAM WOULD BE A MUCH MORE POTENT INSTRUMENT, HOWEVER, IF FUNDING WERE PROVIDED FOR TRAVEL TO THE US AND PER DIEM FOR THESE OFFICIALS. ACTION REQUESTED:

THAT FRANCE BE INCLUDED AS A COUNTRY ELIGIBLE FOR THE PROGRAM, AND THAT FUNDING FOR TRAVEL AND PER DIEM BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED.

17. EMBASSY ALSO BELIEVES THAT USG STUDIES ON TERRORISM AGAINST FRENCH INTERESTS CAN HAVE AN IMPACT ON GOF THINKING. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO SHARE SUCH STUDIES AND DISCUSS ANY DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE GOF. STUDIES SHOULD BE DONE PERIODICALLY AND TRANSMITTED BOTH TO SIRO AND EMBASSY FOR USE WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE CONTACTS.

18. FINALLY, WE REITERATE EMPHATICALLY OUR LONG-STANDING RECOMMENDATION THAT CONCLUSION OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FRENCH ON REVISION OF OUR BILATERAL EXTRADITION TREATY BE GIVEN A HIGH PRIORITY, AND BE MENTIONED IN EVERY REPEAT EVERY SENIOR LEVEL MEETING WITH THE FRENCH. ONLY THROUGH SUCH STEADY POLITICAL PRESSURE ARE WE LIKELY TO DISLODGE THIS MATTER AND REACH A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION. UNTIL THE TREATY IS REVISED WE RISK HAVING ADDITIONAL TERRORISTS SLIP THROUGH OUR FINGERS.
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
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53278	MEMO	4	1/7/1986	B1
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
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53279	MEMO TO ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, ET AL	3	1/7/1986	B1 B3

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FROM CONSUL GENERAL

E.O. 12356: DECL: GADR
TAGSMS ASEC, MCAF, PHSA, PTER, FR, XL, FW
SUBJECT: TERRORISM: [REDACTED]

1. (SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE PREFET (GOVERNOR) OF MARTINIQUE HAS TOLD MOXSHAT, IN HIS CAPACITY AS FRENCH DELEGATE FOR THE SEAS (I.E. PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR MARITIME SECURITY FOR THE FRENCH CARIBBEAN, HE IS PLANNING WITH LOCAL FRENCH MILITARY COMMANDERS TO STAGE AN EXERCISE DESIGNED TO TEST THE ABILITY OF FRENCH FORCES IN THE REGION TO ASSAULT A HIJACKED SHIP ON THE HIGH SEAS AND WREST CONTROL BY FORCE FROM HIJACKERS/TERRORISTS. INITIAL PLANNING ENVISAGES HELIBORNE OR SEABORNE ACTION BY ONE OR BOTH OF TWO SPECIALIZED INTERVENTION UNITS PERMANENTLY STATIONED IN MARTINIQUE, SUPPORTED BY CONVENTIONAL FORCES AS NECESSARY. THE TWO UNITS ARE A SWAT-TYPE TEAM OF GENDARMES AND A DELTA FORCE-TYPE ARMY/MARINE CORPS UNIT. (COMMENT: THE PRESENCE OF A GENDARME SWAT TEAM HAS NOT BEEN KEPT OVERLY CONFIDENTIAL, BUT THE PRESENCE OF A FRENCH MILITARY DELTA FORCE IS ONE OF THE MOST CLOSELY HELD SECRETS ON THE ISLAND.) THE PREFET INDICATED THAT THE EXERCISE WILL BE RUN AGAINST A FRENCH FLAG SHIP BUT THAT AUTHORITIES ARE FAR FROM CERTAIN THAT DEPLOYMENT AGAINST A THIRD FLAG VESSEL OUTSIDE FRENCH TERRITORIAL WATERS WOULD BE LEGALLY ACCEPTABLE. HE ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. HAS EXPERIENCE IN SUCH MATTERS AND WHETHER WE WOULD BE PREPARED INITIALLY TO OFFER ADVICE AND EVENTUALLY PERHAPS TO COORDINATE CONTINGENCY

DECLASSIFIED
NLR 007-081
BY CJ NARA DATE 4/9/10

SIT: SIT NORT
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WHSR COMMENT:

PAGE 01 AMCONSUL MARTINIQUE 0325 DTG:241958Z MAR 86 PSN:019908
TOR: 085/1516Z

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PLANNING ON SUCH MATTERS WITH THE FRENCH IN THE CARIBBEAN.

3. IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT THE PREFECT IS PROCEEDING WITH THE APPROVAL OF PARIS AND THAT HE WAS DESCRIBING A SERIOUS INITIATIVE. I RESPONDED THAT I HAVE HEARD RUMORS THAT THE U.S. HAS IN FACT STUDIED THE PROBLEM AND MADE SOME PROGRESS TOWARDS CONTINGENCY PREPARATIONS; THAT ON THE MATTER OF LEGAL AUTHORITY, EITHER PERMISSION OF THE FLAG COUNTRY OR A DETERMINATION OF AUTHORITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL PIRACY LAW CAN BE EXPLORED IN A GIVEN CASE. ON THE ENORMOUSLY MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF HOW TO ASSAULT A SHIP ON THE HIGH SEAS WITHOUT EXCESSIVE DANGER TO PASSENGERS AND CREW, I OFFERED TO INQUIRE FURTHER. I DID NOT TELL THE PREFECT SO, BUT IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT WE HAVE IN FACT RUN EXERCISE ASSAULTS AGAINST A CRUISE SHIP, AND THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION AGAINST A HIJACKED CRUISE LINER IN THE CARIBBEAN HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO FBI MIAMI.

4. THE UNITED STATES HAS A MAJOR INTEREST IN THE SAFETY OF SHIPS, INCLUDING CRUISE SHIPS IN THE CARIBBEAN IN PARTICULAR, WHERE ALMOST ALL PASSENGERS ARE AMERICANS. I ASSUME THAT, SINCE WE MIGHT WARMLY WELCOME FRENCH COOPERATION IN CASE OF AN INCIDENT, WE MAY BE PREPARED TO COORDINATE PRE-INCIDENT CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND OTHER PREPARATION.

5. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE ADVISE HOW TO PROCEED IN THIS MATTER. MY OWN SUGGESTION, IF WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITH FRENCH HERE, IS THAT AN AMERICAN OFFICIAL COMPETENT TO ADDRESS THE SPECIFIC SUBJECT OF ANTI-SHIP-HIJACKING MEASURES BE SENT TO MARTINIQUE TO DISCUSS WITH THE PREFECT OUR EXPERIENCES TO DATE, TO ASCERTAIN MORE PRECISELY JUST WHAT HE MAY HAVE IN MIND, AND TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE COOPERATION.

6. DEPARTMENT PASS TO EMBASSY PARIS AND OTHERS AT ITS DISCRETION.
FROM
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DRAFT

572.2

S/CT:RPORTER:04830
03/28/86 EXT. 77796
S/CT:RBOAKLEY

EUR:CHTHOMAS

ARA:RNHOLWILL
S/S-0:

S/S-0 ONLY, FOR PRIZE MONEY OFFICER
PRIORITY PARIS, MARTINIQUE PRIORITY

EXDIS SPECAT FROM OAKLEY TO ROGERS AND BROWN

DECL: OADR

PTER

MARTINIQUE - CT COOPERATION WITH FRENCH

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ADDITIONAL CAPTION: PRIZE MONEY MESSAGE.

REF: A} MARTINIQUE 0325 {NOTAL}. B} STATE

1. ENTIRE TEXT IS SECRET/SENSITIVE.

FOR PARIS

2. REFTEL A RELAYED TO DEPARTMENT PREFECT OF MARTINIQUE'S INTEREST IN COOPERATING WITH THE USG REGARDING MARITIME COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE CARIBBEAN. PREFECT APPARENTLY WANTS TO PLAN AN EXERCISE WITH LOCAL FRENCH MILITARY COMMANDERS DESIGNED TO TEST THE CAPABILITY OF LOCAL FRENCH FORCES TO ASSAULT A HIJACKED SHIP ON THE HIGH SEAS. HE WAS INTERESTED TO KNOW WHETHER THE USG HAD EXPERIENCE IN SUCH OPERATIONS AND WOULD BE PREPARED INITIALLY TO OFFER ADVICE AND EVENTUALLY PERHAPS TO COORDINATE JOINT COUNTERTERRORISM CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN THE CARIBBEAN WITH THE FRENCH.

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NLRP M07-081 #53707
2025

BY GL NADP 4/9/10

FOR MARTINIQUE

3. DEPARTMENT WAS VERY PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR CABLE AND IS INTERESTED IN EXPLORING THE PREFECT'S PROPOSAL FURTHER. WE BELIEVE COOPERATION WITH THE FRENCH IN HANDLING MARITIME TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE CARIBBEAN COULD BE VERY BENEFICIAL TO BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS. WE SUGGEST YOU INFORM PREFECT THAT IN THE COURSE OF ANY TERRORIST INCIDENT, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT INVOLVES AMERICAN CITIZENS, THE USG WOULD CERTAINLY MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO BE HELPFUL SHOULD HIS GOVERNMENT REQUEST OUR ASSISTANCE. WE WELCOME HIS SUGGESTION THAT IT IS BEST TO GET TOGETHER BEFORE THE CRISIS THAN AFTER IT BEGINS.

4. REFTTEL CLEARLY SHOWS THAT CONGEN FULLY APPRECIATES THE SENSITIVITY OF COUNTERTERRORISM MATTERS, ESPECIALLY WHEN IT CONCERNS BI-LATERAL COOPERATION OR A NATION'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES. WE CONGRATULATE YOU ON THE WAY YOU HANDLED THE PREFECT'S QUESTIONS. BEFORE MOVING FORWARD, HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT TO BRING EMBASSY PARIS ON BOARD {AS YOU SUGGESTED} AND ENSURE THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT SUPPORT THE PREFECT'S INITIATIVE.

5. THE PREFECT SHOULD ASK HIS GOVERNMENT TO APPROACH OUR EMBASSY IN PARIS WITH THIS PROPOSAL. HE SHOULD KNOW THAT UNLIKE MOST GOVERNMENTS, THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS THE LEAD USG AGENCY FOR OVERSEAS TERRORISM MATTERS AND COORDINATES THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OTHER AGENCIES INCLUDING THE MILITARY. BY CONTACTING THE AMBASSADOR OR OTHER PRINCIPAL, THE FRENCH COULD BE CONFIDENT THAT THEIR PROPOSAL WOULD NOT ONLY BE WELL RECEIVED, BUT ALSO WOULD BE PROPERLY HANDLED FROM THE POLICY DOWN TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL. AFTER TALKING TO THE PREFECT, PLEASE ADVISE US.444