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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

**Withdrawer**

CAS 5/11/2012

**File Folder** TERRORISM; PUBLIC DIPLOMACY/PRESS (1)

**FOIA**

M11-441

**Box Number** 16

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
136478	RECORD	OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION COMMITTEE MEETING <b>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</b>	3	4/23/1986	B1
136479	MEMO	RODNEY MCDANIEL TO SECRETARY OF STATE ET AL RE COUNTER-TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY <b>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</b>	1	5/12/1986	B1
136480	MEMO	WALTER RAYMOND TO MCDANIEL RE AMBASSADOR DAVID MILLER <b>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</b>	1	5/5/1986	B1
136481	DRAFT MEMO	DAVID MILLER TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE COUNTER-TERRORISM - PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (ANNOTATED) <b>PAR 9/15/2017 M441/1</b>	5	5/30/1986	B1
136482	CABLE	USIA 46094 <b>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</b>	3	6/28/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION COMMITTEE  
RECORD OF MEETING  
APRIL 23, 1986 — 10:30 a.m.

I. U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TO COMBAT TERRORISM

USIA is drafting a 60-day public diplomacy action plan requested by the NSC. The Public Diplomacy Working Group is also preparing responses to several recommendations of the Vice President's Task Force Report on combatting terrorism.

Effective implementation of a public diplomacy strategy requires:

- A central public diplomacy coordinator with a mandate from the White House — an "Otto Reich for Counterterrorism";
- A single, small and coherent task force within the PDWG to coordinate guidelines on counterterrorism in general and Libya in particular;
- A pool of readily available experts for Worldnets, Foreign Press Center and other briefings, daily Wireless File features, Ampart programs and other public diplomacy activities;
- A systematic collection of data that can be declassified, and of unclassified data that can be made available to the public in coherent form.

To deal with the immediate Libyan problem, the IIC should take the lead and work closely with both the task force in State and the policy group examining contingencies. USIA should be present at these meetings on contingencies. It is also necessary to keep guidance on Libya flowing and work on an ad hoc basis until there is an approved plan.

ACTIONS:

- A) Appointment of a high-level coordinator is under serious consideration — suggested names are welcome.
- B) Pending such an appointment, a small sub-group of the IIC will fill the gap and implement the 60-day public diplomacy strategy on Libya.

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Classified by: Charles Horner  
Declassify or Downgrade on: OADR

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BY LW NARA DATE 9/15/17

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## II. THE REAGAN DOCTRINE: SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM FIGHTERS

### 1. Draft Public Diplomacy Strategy Paper

USIA's draft public diplomacy strategy paper on the Reagan Doctrine was distributed. An NSC mandate would raise the visibility of public diplomacy efforts on U.S. support for freedom fighters and related regional issues, which are one-fourth of the U.S.-Soviet agenda. A high-level "Ambassador" for freedom fighters should be considered.

#### ACTION:

Comments on draft paper to be made to Maria Copson (USIA/P, 485-8558) by May 2.

## III. BRIEFINGS ON FREEDOM MOVEMENTS

### 1. ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia presents problems for U.S. public diplomacy: almost all opponents of Mengistu are Marxists, Leninists, or "Albanian Stalinist" in orientation, and belong to separatist movements.

Since 1948 the U.S. has recognized the territorial integrity of an Ethiopia that includes Eritrea and Tigre. Any perception that the U.S. is advancing separatist movements would have important consequences in Africa, primarily in the OAU, where support for the maintenance of national borders is the sine qua non of regional relations.

VOA broadcasts in Amharic, but should consider an increase in time. USIA programs are important because the U.S. needs to find ways of maintaining the access gained in Ethiopia as a result of humanitarian aid during the famine.

#### ACTIONS:

VOA to reconsider and report to the IIC on implementation of the NSDD calling for more broadcasts in Amharic.

NSC to recommend USIA attendance at a forthcoming major NSC review of U.S. policy regarding the Horn of Africa.

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II. CAMBODIA

The situation in Cambodia also poses a challenge to U.S. public diplomacy. The U.S. supports two non-communist resistance groups led by Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann, and follows the political lead of ASEAN in finding a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Since 1982, however, these two groups have been closely aligned with the Khmer Rouge.

The U.S. faces the possibility that ASEAN and China -- the largest supplier of military aid to the Cambodian resistance -- will try to make the Khmer Rouge leadership more visible. If the Khmer Rouge were to regain power, one oppressive regime would be exchanged for another. Any move in this direction would dry up support in the U.S. At the Bali meeting with ASEAN ministers, President Reagan might offer to raise the Cambodian question with the Soviets -- this would focus attention on Moscow's role.

3. ANGOLA

OAU condemnation of UNITA/Savimbi is a major obstacle for U.S. public diplomacy.

On the other hand, UNITA is a genuine nationalist movement, has some support in Europe, especially in Portugal, FRG and France, and has representatives around the world. Public diplomacy should stress: the legitimacy of Savimbi's cause; his fight to secure an Angola free of Cuban troops and Soviet intervention; and his desire for negotiations to promote Cuban withdrawal and thus facilitate beginning of national reconciliation.

ACTIONS:

USIA to consider broadcasting in Spanish to Cuban troops in Angola.

USIA needs tasker to IIC to set up working groups on Angola, Ethiopia and Cambodia.

IV. ANZUS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The interagency-cleared updated public diplomacy action plan for New Zealand on ANZUS and nuclear issues was distributed. It will be sent to the NSC for approval as soon as possible.

ACTION: Clearance by telephone to USIA/EA desk officer Daniel Scherr (485-7837), by COB April 24.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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
May 12, 1986

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Counter-Terrorism Public Diplomacy (U)

The NSC, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) has asked Ambassador Dave Miller to develop a comprehensive work plan for the expansion of our public diplomacy efforts in the field of counter-terrorism. Ambassador Miller will work very closely with the IG/T in developing this plan. He will start work immediately and is expected to provide a detailed report on this subject to the NSC on or before May 31. The cooperation of all concerned agencies and departments is requested to facilitate the efforts of Ambassador Miller. This tasking is consistent with one of the major recommendations included in the Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism. (S)

  
Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

May 5, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

**SIGNED**

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR. *WR*

SUBJECT: Ambassador David Miller

Following our conversation with Dave Miller on May 2, I discussed the subject with Ollie North. He is fully on board in having Dave put together a public diplomacy work plan for counter-terrorism. He will meet with Dave on Thursday. But in the meantime Dave will be actively talking to members of Parker Borg's team. I talked further on this subject with Dave Miller today, who asked that NSC put out a note which would, in effect, alert community members of the assignment that we have given him. I think he is right that such a memorandum would smooth any bureaucratic rough spots that he might run into as he seeks to develop a comprehensive work plan on this subject. I have prepared a memorandum for you to send to the concerned Executive Secretaries spelling out Miller's assignment at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the Agencies.

Approve *245-10*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*ON*  
Ollie North concurs.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to Agencies

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*CA 5/11/12*

Log Number 3591

Date 12 May 1986

Subject: COUNTER TERRORISM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

(S) PHOSOTONE  
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DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:  TOP SECRET  SECRET  CONFIDENTIAL  UNCLASSIFIED

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506EXEMPTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT  
ARE BASED ON EO 13526~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

May 30, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: DAVID MILLER

SUBJECT: Counter-Terrorism - Public Diplomacy

The "public diplomacy" efforts to win support for the President's counter-terrorism activities are mired in an inefficient and confusing series of inter-agency committees, with virtually no dedicated resources. Not surprisingly, little besides committee memoranda has been produced. While public support in the United States for the President's policies remains high, this is apparently not the case in Europe and the Middle East where the attack on Libya highlighted the different opinions on counter-terrorism held among countries whose friendship and cooperation we value.

The paper proceeds on the basis that (1) we are "at war" with a range of state-supported terrorists who share a common objective of destroying the influence of the United States; (2) we must develop a political philosophy and campaign to counter the terrorist message; (3) we cannot continue on the present course of inter-agency committees which is both inefficient, ineffective, and potentially embarrassing; and (4) we must dedicate a limited amount of human and financial resources, as has been done on other public diplomacy efforts, if we wish to see any real progress.

The War With Terrorism

While there are many terrorist organizations, if we focus on state-supported terrorism with radical Arab sponsorship or Soviet surrogate sponsorship, I believe that we are in a protracted struggle with enemies who share a broad philosophic objective and political strategy. Presumably this strategy is built around discrediting and eventually rendering impotent the United States/Western coalition -- at least in the Middle East, if not the world as a whole -- based on the well-recognized themes of decadence, imperialism, exploitation, Zionism, and so on.

The violent incident on which we tend to focus is simply a tool to advance their political objectives. If the violent incident "goes well" for the terrorist, the attendant media coverage will focus on the "justifiable political grievances" of the terrorists

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and not on the brutal, illegal behavior of psychopathic, anti-social individuals.

For us to win this struggle we must be actively advancing our ideology of the non-violent resolution of social conflict, typically within a democratic, market-oriented framework. While the ability to respond to the violent incident is imperative, we have probably focussed a disproportionate share of our resources on military response and not enough on "selling" our positions to Europe, the Islamic world, and our own public.

I am not sanguine that we are winning this struggle. While we have had covert success and responded forcefully to Libya, it is arguable that the terrorists are obtaining their overall objective of reducing American presence in the world. The "hardening" of our Embassies with attendant expense, the reduction of official personnel, increasing restrictions on personal movement of officials abroad all leave the image of a society on the defensive, threatened and insecure. Our private sector increasingly mirrors this image. Thus, even if we are coming closer to winning the incident struggle, the terrorists' objectives of reducing our presence, limiting our influence and distancing us from allies is arguably succeeding.

#### The "Public Diplomacy" Response

Public diplomacy in its broadest sense, as it must be pursued in this case, is the coordinated efforts of all agencies of our government to win public support at home and abroad for a particular policy. It includes assets in State, USIS, DOD, CIA, and the NSC. Some are obvious (speakers programs), some are not (videotapes of terrorist leaders).

It is ineffective, inefficient, and dangerous, to say nothing of exhausting, to try to win an effort of this importance and magnitude through four inter-agency committees with no dedicated personnel or resources. After more than a year of memos and meetings, <sup>five</sup> inter-agency committees (Public Affairs, Incident Management) *(Informal + (7/7/01))* have been established whose primary output appears to be paper and meetings. A good deal of thoughtful time and effort has been put into this effort, frequently by people whose primary responsibilities have been exhausting, but the end result remains the same -- not much.

In addition, as we move towards implementation of some public diplomacy program, it is dangerous to leave responsibility in the hands of "inter-agency" committees. The subject matter is too delicate.

The current committee structure is confusing. Assets (PSYOPS) and sub-problems (Incident Management) appear as committees. Assuming that it is possible to obtain a few full-time people and financial resources, the committee structures should be recognized. I support the new organization.

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In designing an organization it is useful to remember that form should follow function, and that with ~~counter-terror~~ we have very distinct "customer groups" for whom messages will have to be carefully crafted.

Thus at the outset let us focus on function. That is to say, what customers are selling our product?

#### The American Public and Leadership

We need to maintain the broad public support for the President's recent initiatives, translate that into specific legislative objectives as required, and develop mechanisms to maintain the support for a sustained effort. Without domestic public support all else eventually comes to a halt. It cannot be taken for granted, particularly where the struggle will involve covert successes which cannot be publicized versus the occasional public setback which will certainly get media attention.

#### Western Europe

The recent exercise in Libya certainly highlighted the problem of public support, or lack thereof, for our counter-terrorist efforts. ~~The costs to Mrs. Thatcher appear to have been, at least temporarily, high and the damage to American public perception of European allies is serious.~~ We need to have a country-specific program -- developed in conjunction with each Embassy -- to ensure that President Reagan's counter-terrorism statement is understood not only by the broad public but by key leadership groups. How do we ~~move~~ <sup>move</sup> the perception of the President from John Wayne to Socrates, thoughtfully defending Western values?

#### The Moderate Islamic Community

Many of our ~~MODERATE~~ Middle Eastern friends, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco -- to say nothing of Indonesia, Nigeria, and other non-Middle East Islamic states -- are caught in what they perceive as a virtually inescapable "political box." If the terrorists appear to be anti-Zionist, Moslem fundamentalists, refugee camp <sup>options</sup> supported by "fellow Islamic states," and our policy appears to generally be anti-Arab/Islamic, how do they support us -- publicly or privately? We must work hard to find ideological common ground, and get that message to the publics in these countries as well as the States.

#### The Hostile Islamic Countries

In hostile Islamic countries, "public diplomacy" is simply another tool in the struggle -- usefully viewed as the least violent notice to another sovereign entity that we find their conduct unacceptable. It is important <sup>for</sup> to the long ~~run~~ <sup>run</sup> defusing of the terrorist situation, that the body politics, or the elites of states that support terrorism, understand why we oppose

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terrorism and what the cost to them will be if their country continues to support terrorists. Libya, Syria, Zion, Palestinian camps (?), (to say nothing of Nicaragua) should be the targets of a concentrated effort to get this message out.

#### Soviet, Eastern Block, and China

As part of a long-run effort to get the facts to the general Soviet public, information on their government's training of terrorists should be included on RFE, VOA, and other channels. A special effort should be made to reach the Bloc countries, to explain to their populations and leadership groups how the Soviets are using them, thus damaging their image in the rest of the world, and limiting their acceptance among the community of actions.

It is possible that this also is a subject in which the Chinese card could be usefully played.

#### The Organization

If we are going to pursue a public diplomacy strategy on counter-terrorism, we are going to have to devote people and resources. It cannot be won with a seamless web of inter-agency committees directed by a part-time, over-extended "Director of Public Diplomacy." This should come as no surprise as the two previous public diplomacy efforts -- Central America and South Africa -- have both ~~REQUIRED~~ ~~BY~~ people and money.

What organizational structure fits our objectives? What structure will give us accountability for programs, plans, use of assets, and success or failure. I would recommend the following structure which would provide the guidance, strategy, hands-on management of the wide range of assets existing in the existing committee structure and throughout the government.


(CHART TO BE INSERTED HERE)

Comments on the chart may be helpful. The organization will take five to ten full-time professionals who know their region and public diplomacy, secretarial and administrative support, office space, and a budget of \$500,000. Many of the players can be loaned from State or USIS or DOD or CIA for a year on non-reimbursable details. The State Department, as the lead agency, must provide office space, administrative support, and salaries for the "non-detailees." The research requirements would be principally undertaken by the major participating agencies under tasking from the Public Diplomacy Staff.

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
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The incident management team would be composed of the three "lead individuals" enclosed in the "Red box" above, who would be responsible to senior operational officials for the public affairs/public diplomacy component of an incident as required to optimize the planning, execution, and aftermath. They could call on the resource pool reporting to them only when security requirements allowed, but by the very structure of the organization would be in the best position to reproduce rapid and efficient tasking.

As the "lead agency" it is up to the State Department to resolve the current "public diplomacy" situation. State has twice before proceeded vigorously to pursue a public diplomacy program -- presumably it can repeat the performance a third time.

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# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

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4. (S) A NUMBER OF COMMENTS FROM POSTS ARE OF GENERAL INTEREST:  
- WORLDWIDE REACTION, WHILE GENERALLY CRITICAL OF THE U.S. AIR RAID, WAS MUCH LESS SEVERE THAN WE HAD ANTICIPATED. MANY POSTS REPORT ATTITUDES CONVEYED PRIVATELY TO BE SUPPORTIVE.  
- AS TIME GOES ON, EVEN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR LIBYA APPEARS TO BE DIMINISHING. THIS MAY BE TENUOUS, OF COURSE, AND EFFORTS TO ASSESS OPINION WILL CONTINUE. (POSTS SHOULD BE ALERT TO SIGNIFICANT ATTITUDE SHIFTS AND REPORT THEM AS THEY BECOME EVIDENT.)  
- A LARGE NUMBER OF PDSTS STRESS THE NEED TO AVOID ANY HINT OF EMOTION OR FERVOR IN MATERIAL ATTACKING QADHAFI LEST WE INADVERTENTLY MAKE A MARTYR OF HIM. (THIS IS A PARTICULARLY CRITICAL PROBLEM IN MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICAN AND OTHER POSTS WHERE ISLAMIC INFLUENCE IS STRONG.) AS ONE POST STATED: "...EVEN MORE DETAILS NAILING QADHAFI ARE NEEDED--TO BE PRESENTED COOLY, ALMOST CLINICALLY, NOT FERVENTLY."  
- ANOTHER POST STRESSED THE NEED FOR "...DISPASSIONATE AND FACTUAL PROGRAM MATERIALS AND TALKING POINTS."  
- SEVERAL POSTS URGED CARE THAT THIS ISSUE NOT BE CAST IN AN EAST-WEST OR U.S./SOVIET CONTEXT.  
- WIRELESS FILE ITEMS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHICH CONVEY UNEMOTIONAL, FACTUAL, SUBSTANTIATING DATA, ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT NEED ARTICULATED BY POSTS, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL ALSO WANT ONGOING OFFICIAL POLICY STATEMENTS. POSTS REPORT THE  
BT

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EO 12356 DECL: OADR P - CHORNER ASSOC DIR  
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING LIBYAN  
SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM -- POSTS' RESPONSES  
REFERENCE: USIA 34711, USIA 34713 AND RESPONSES

1. (LOU) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: POSTS' RESPONSES TO REFTEL ARE APPRECIATED AS GUIDES TO WASHINGTON IMPLEMENTATION OF 60-DAY ACTION PLAN. THIS MESSAGE REPORTS HIGHLIGHTS OF THOSE RESPONSES AND BRIEFLY OUTLINES AGENCY PLANS FOR THE REMAINING PERIOD. SEE ACTION LAST PARAGRAPH.

2. (U) WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE VERY THOUGHTFUL COMMENTS OFFERED BY A NUMBER OF POSTS. THESE WILL SERVE TO GUIDE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION FOR BOTH THE ACTION PLAN AND

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TO ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL BARCELONA IMMEDIATE  
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AMCONSUL GENOA IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL DURBAN IMMEDIATE  
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE  
ALL POLADS POSTS IMMEDIATE  
NSC WASHDC  
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC  
SECSTATE WASHDC  
XMT AMCONSUL VANCOUVER  
VOA /PHILIPPINE RELAY STATION TINANG  
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PANAMA

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USIA 46094

USIA

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DECD; MACDILL FOR USIA ADVISER; STATE FOR S/CT, NEA, P,

PA; OTHER MILITARY ADDEES FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND POLADS

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MOST EFFECTIVE METHOD OF CONVEYING WIRELESS FILE MATERIAL AS  
QUIET, PERSONALIZED DELIVERY TO RANKING HOST COUNTRY  
OFFICIALS AND OTHER CAREFULLY SELECTED CONTACTS.

- THE CALL FOR MEDIA OPPORTUNITIES AT HIGH LEVELS -- SOME  
MIX OF WORLDNETS, A SEMINAR, INTERVIEWS WITH HIGH  
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, ETC., WERE STRONGLY ENDORSED BY A  
MAJORITY OF REPORTING POSTS.
- CONTACTS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN GROUPS IS  
REGARDED BY MANY POSTS AS AN INITIATIVE NOT LIKELY TO BE  
EFFECTIVE.
- SMALL FORMAT VIDEOTAPE PROGRAMMING IS AN IMPORTANT  
PRIORITY WITH THIRD WORLD POSTS.
- VOA PROGRAMMING IS AN IMPORTANT PRIORITY FOR "CLOSED

5. (LOU) FOLLOWING IS A BRIEF PROGRESS REPORT OF WASHINGTON  
EFFORTS TAKEN THUS FAR:
- POSTS SHOULD ALREADY HAVE RECEIVED WIRELESS FILE ITEMS ON  
EUROPEAN ACTIONS VIS-A-VIA LIBYA, AVIATION SECURITY, LIBYAN  
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN  
BAR ASSOCIATION CONVENTION.
  - OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS POSTS CAN ANTICIPATE A  
CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MATERIAL VIA THE WIRELESS FILE, THE  
EARLY FRUITS OF OUR EFFORTS TO DEVELOP PRELIMINARY MECHANISMS  
FOR DATA COLLECTION, SO THAT ACCURATE AND RELIABLE MATERIAL  
CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE. (LONGER RANGE, AND STILL VERY  
TENTATIVE, PLANS CALL FOR A MORE SYSTEMATIC COMPUTERIZED DATA  
BANK.)
  - OVER TWO DOZEN ITEMS HAVE BEEN FEATURED IN THE DAILY  
SATELLITE TELEVISION FEED TO EUROPE.
  - TEN ACQUIRED VIDEOTAPE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN OFFERED TO ALL  
FIELD POSTS.
  - SEVERAL VOA EDITORIALS HAVE BEEN BROADCAST ON VARIOUS  
ASPECTS OF THE ACTION PLAN.
  - SEVERAL ONE-ON-ONE INTERVIEWS WITH FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS  
HAVE TAKEN PLACE.
  - WITH A SINGLE EXCEPTION, ALL REQUESTS FROM POSTS FOR  
AMPARTS AND TELECONFERENCING HAVE BEEN SATISFIED.

6. (C) THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE UNDER DEVELOPMENT:  
BT

~~SECRET~~



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13

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01      USIA WASHDC 6094      DTG: 280052Z JUN 86      PSN: 051588  
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USIA

WHITE HOUSE FOR DJEREJIAN AND NSC RAYMOND; FT BRAGG FOR

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OECD; MACDILL FOR USIA ADVISER; STATE FOR S/CT, NEA, P,

PA; OTHER MILITARY ADDRESSES FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND POLADS

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- AMONG THE PRINTED MATERIALS PLANNED FOR RELEASE AND DISTRIBUTION ARE AN UPDATED (AND MORE COMPLETE VERSION) OF THE JANUARY LIBYA WHITE PAPER AND AN UPDATED CHRONOLOGY.  
- DATA COLLECTION ON THE FOLLOWING IS PROCEEDING AND SHOULD PRODUCE WRITTEN RELEASES BEFORE THE END OF THE 60-DAY PERIOD: A COMPENDIUM OF SELF-INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS BY QADHAFI, EVIDENCE OF LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS AND TERRORIST NETWORKS, A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF LIBYAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS SINCE QADHAFI CAME TO POWER, A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TERRORISM, AND EVENTS IN LIBYA  
- A SEMINAR FOR FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS AT THE BUREAU CHIEF LEVEL IS SCHEDULED FOR JULY 9. SECRETARY SHULTZ WILL

PARTICIPATE.

- THE SCRIPT FOR A VIDEO DOCUMENTARY IS ALMOST COMPLETE; PRODUCTION WILL BEGIN SHORTLY.  
- FOUR WORLDNET INTERACTIVES ARE UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION. (AFFECTED POSTS HAVE BEEN SOLICITED SEPTEL.)

7. (LOU) ACTION REQUESTED:

- POSTS SHOULD CONTINUE ON A PRIORITY BASIS TO REPORT MEDIA REACTION (OR MEDIA COVERAGE) ON ALL ASPECTS OF THIS ISSUE.  
- POSTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE ALERT FOR PUBLISHED OR BROADCAST ACCOUNTS OF ACTIONS TAKEN OR PROGRESS IN COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORTED TERRORISM AND REPORT THOSE ACCOUNTS IN UNCLASSIFIED FORM.  
- FINALLY, POSTS ARE URGED TO MAKE THEIR NEEDS KNOWN TO WASHINGTON. THIS EFFORT IS AN ADMINISTRATION PRIORITY. (P/G) WICK  
BT

~~SECRET~~



/

Public Attitudes Toward Terrorism

Table 1. Most Important Problem (CBS/NY Times, 4/6-10/86)

"What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?"

	<u>April 6-10 1986</u>	<u>Nov. 18-19 1985</u>
Terrorism	<span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">15%</span>	-
War/nuclear war	10	20%
Defense, Russia, arms control	3	7
Middle East	1	-
Central America	1	-
Other foreign affairs	9	2 (incl. terrorism)
(Total: Foreign Policy)	(39%)	(29%)
Unemployment	11	12
Other economic issues	11	13
Budget deficit	6	9
Government/taxes	2	4
Domestic programs	7	-
Farmers	3	-
Crime, drugs	3	-
Other domestic issues	3	10
(Total: Domestic issues)	(46%)	(48%)
Misc.	6	13
No opinion	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>
	100%	100%

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Public's Top Concerns (Roper Polls)

"Here is a list of things people have told us they are concerned about today (RESPONDENT SHOWN CARD containing 13 ITEMS). Would you read over that list and then tell me which 2 or 3 you personally are most concerned about today?" (Polls were conducted in January of each year.)

	<u>1986</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1974</u>
OUR RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES	37%	28%	19%	13%	18%
GETTING INTO ANOTHER WAR	24	18	19	10	7
Crime and lawlessness	34	42	35	40	30
Inflation and high prices	27	33	56	44	56
A recession and unemployment	17	20	24	20	15
Wrongdoing by elected officials	16	15	18	32	40
Pollution of air and water	13	14	10	11	12
The fuel and energy situation	7	7	30	22	46

A. NBC/Wall Street Journal, April 14 and 15

1. Approval: "U.S. bombers attacked some targets in Libya tonight (last night). Do you favor or oppose these attacks on Libya?"

	<u>April 15</u>	<u>April 14</u>
Favor	75%	69%
Oppose	16	19
No opinion	9	12

2. Expectation: "Do you think that these US attacks on Libya will cause Libya to stop terrorism, will lead to more terrorism, or won't make any difference?"

	<u>April 14</u>
Lead to more terrorism	40%
Cause Libya to stop terrorism	23
Won't make any difference	23
No opinion	14

## B. ABC, April 14

1. Approval: "As you know, United States military aircraft have attacked targets in Libya tonight. The White House said the air raids were limited to Libyan military sites and terrorist targets and did not involve civilian areas. Do you approve or disapprove of the United States having launched these air raids against Libya?"

Approve	70%
Disapprove	17
Don't know	13

2. Expectation: "The White House said the raids were in response to the recent terrorist bombing of a West German night club in which an American was killed. The White House also said the raids were made because the United States had information that Libya was planning further such terrorist acts. Do you think tonight's air raids by the United States will discourage Libya and its leader Colonel Qadhafi from sponsoring further terrorist acts, or do you think the raids will encourage Libya to sponsor more?"

Encourage Libyan terrorism	45%
Discourage it	40
No difference (Volunteered)	4
Don't know	11

C. CBS, April 15

1. Approval: "Do you approve or disapprove of the United States jets bombing Libya last night?"

Approve	77%
Disapprove	14
No opinion	9

2. Expectation: "Do you think yesterday's bombing of Libya will reduce terrorism, or will it lead to even more terrorism, or will it not have much effect?"

Lead to more terrorism	43%
Reduce terrorism	30
Not have much effect	16
No opinion	11

PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD TERRORISM

Table 1. How to Deal with Terrorists

"An increasing number of terrorist attacks have been made against US embassies or military headquarters in recent years, as well as airplane hijackings and kidnappings of American officials, all involving loss of American lives. There is now a debate about how to deal with these attacks. Here is a list of some ways currently being discussed. (Respondent shown card) Would you please tell me whether you approve or disapprove of each one of these ways of dealing with the terrorist problems?" Roper poll, Jan. 1986 (Percentages in parentheses come from Roper poll taken in Feb. 1985; Don't Know responses omitted)

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>
<u>Improve Security:</u> "Put a lot more money and effort into strengthening security measures at our embassies and overseas military headquarters."	74% (78%)	17% (15%)
<u>Improve Intelligence:</u> "Put a lot more money and effort into gathering intelligence information so that we have a better chance of knowing in advance where terrorists will strike next."	69 (66)	21 (24)
<u>Retaliation:</u> "Strike back with American military forces against terrorists who have attacked US facilities or citizens even though some innocent people might be killed in the process."	38 (35)	47 (51)
<u>Preemption:</u> "Attack known terrorists with American military forces first if we think they are planning to attack us, even though innocent people might be killed in the process."	24 (19)	63 (67)
<u>Capitulation:</u> "Meet the demands of the terrorists for money or for the release of other terrorists from jail in order to save lives."	15 (18)	77 (71)

Gary C. Lawrence Co. of California  
March 1986

Now let's talk about the problem of terrorism.

8. Which of the following do you think the U.S. should do to reduce terrorism that is sponsored by another nation? (READ CHOICES; MARK ONE ONLY)

Take military action against any economic or military target in that country.....1	(10%)
Take military action against terrorist facilities in that country...2	(39%)
Enact economic sanctions against that country.....3	(27%)
Enact diplomatic sanctions against that country.....4	(14%)
Take no action.....5	(7%)
No opinion.....6	(3%)

*(Handwritten annotations: 49, 48)*

Table 2. West European Publics' Preferences on Ways to Counter Terrorism (USIA, March-April 1985)

"What actions on this list (RESPONDENT SHOWN CARD) should the (survey country) government take against other countries that harbor or support terrorists?"

	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>4-Country Average</u>
"Try to <u>prevent</u> terrorists attacks by striking against suspected terrorists in other countries"	45%	35%	13%	11%	26%
" <u>Retaliate</u> by using military force against terrorists who have taken refuge in other countries"	9	12	13	8	10
(Total: Military Action)	(54)	(47)	(26)	(19)	(36)
"Use <u>economic sanctions</u> to get the terrorists punished or handed over to (survey country)"	23	18	36	36	28
"Use <u>diplomatic pressure</u> to get the terrorists punished or handed over to (survey country)"	41	62	62	56	55
(Total: Econ and Dipl. Pressure)	(64)	(80)	(98)	(92)	(83)
"Do nothing"	2	3	4	7	4
Don't know	19	5	9	4	9
	<u>139%*</u>	<u>135%</u>	<u>137%</u>	<u>122%</u>	<u>132%</u>

Underlines added

\* Total exceeds 100% due to multiple responses.

Table 2. Causes of Terrorism

"Here are some statements various people have made about the increasing acts of terrorism today. (Respondent shown card) For each statement please tell me if you think it is a major reason for the increase of terrorism, a minor reason for the increase in terrorism, or not a reason at all?" Roper poll, Jan. 1986

	<u>Major Reason</u>	<u>Minor Reason</u>	<u>Not a Reason</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
<u>Radical Sponsorship:</u> "Professional terrorists are sponsored and financed by radical countries such as Libya, Syria, and Iran."	68%	14%	7%	11%
<u>Western Softness:</u> "Western countries have been too soft in dealing with terrorism."	58	23	12	7
<u>News Coverage:</u> "Terrorist acts are encouraged by the vast amounts of coverage they get in the news."	53	28	11	8
<u>Result of Suppression:</u> "Various groups have resorted to terrorism because they feel their proper rights have been suppressed."	43	27	20	10
<u>Poor Security:</u> "Inadequate security at US embassies, and other facilities has encouraged terrorist actions."	37	31	23	9
<u>Soviet Sponsorship:</u> "Professional terrorists are sponsored and financed by Russia."	34	25	19	22
<u>Response to US:</u> "US support for rebels in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and other countries encourages terrorist acts against American interests."	31	33	19	17



Background: International terrorism is a serious and growing threat to the US and the world. It is becoming increasingly frequent, indiscriminate, and state-supported. The US is a prime target because we have an extensive official and commercial presence overseas: our citizens and facilities are accessible to the public; our policies, values, and culture are directly opposed by many terrorist groups; and moderate pro-Western governments that we support are often those which terrorists are trying to destabilize.

Terrorist activity: From 1975 through 1985, more than 6,200 terrorist incidents were recorded worldwide, leaving roughly 4,700 people dead and more than 9,000 wounded. During 1985, the US Government counted about 812 international terrorist incidents, up more than 30% from the 1984 level and 55% higher than the average for the previous 5 years. Most terrorist incidents in 1985, some 45%, occurred in the Middle East, an additional 25% in Europe, with about 15% in Latin America, and the remaining 15% in other regions. Total 1985 casualties were 2,223 (926 dead). In the first 3 months of 1986 we recorded 162 casualties, with France sustaining the most, 47. The past year also has seen a dramatic rise in state-supported terrorism, with terrorists affiliated or supported by Libya, Iran, and Syria claiming many of the attacks. Terrorists are increasingly willing to use more violent methods: the murders of innocent civilians at the Rome and Vienna airports, the slaying of Leon Klinghoffer aboard the Achille Lauro and of Robert Stethem on the hijacked TWA 847, the bombing of the Air India jetliner and, more recently, the bombing of TWA 840 and the disco in Berlin all point to greater violence intended to hit as many people as possible. The scope of terrorism has also widened: last year terrorists hit citizens and facilities of more than 90 nations.

Chief perpetrators and targets: The most deadly terrorists continue to operate in and from the Middle East, including Libya. Middle East terrorists were involved in the majority of terrorist attacks in 1985, many of them in Western Europe. The two main categories of Middle East terrorists include: militant Shi'ites from various Arab countries, especially Lebanon, inspired and trained, often armed and financed, and, to varying degrees, guided by Iran; and radical Palestinian elements of the mainline Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), often with the direct support of Libya, Syria, and Iran. In addition, actual agents of governments such as Libya often act directly rather than through surrogates. The targets of Middle East terrorists fall principally into three groups: Israel; Western governments and citizens, particularly France and the US; and Arab governments and their officials, including Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, as well as the mainline PLO.

In Europe, many terrorists have operated during the past decade: lesser known ethnic groups as well as leftist organizations such as the Red Brigades, Direct Action, Red Army Faction, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Beginning in late 1984, several different

terrorist groups in various West European countries adopted a common propaganda line and attacked a common set of targets related to NATO. This resurgence of leftist terrorist activity in West Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal, plus continued terrorism in Greece, accounted for most of the increase in European incidents, with Middle East-origin terrorism accounting for the rest.

In Latin America, social, economic, and political turmoil prolonged existing patterns of insurgency and international and domestic terrorism in several countries, particularly El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, and Peru. Most Latin American terrorism appears aimed at governments associated with the US and at US Government installations, officials, and private businesses. Nicaragua and Cuba have been implicated in some regional terrorist activity.

US policy: President Reagan said in June 1985 that "America will never make concessions to terrorists--to do so would only invite more terrorism--nor will we ask or pressure any other government to do so." US policy is direct. We make no concessions, we pay no ransom, we permit no release of prisoners, nor agree to other acts that might encourage further terrorism. We make no changes in US policy because of terrorist threats or acts. If US personnel are taken hostage or endangered, we are prepared to consider a broad range of actions. Each case must be considered on its merits.

We have many political, economic, and military options that we use as appropriate. The military option against Libya in April was used only after years of trying to bring economic and political pressure to bear against Qadhafi's support for terrorism. The anti-terrorism options include a variety of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral steps. A major program is underway to improve the physical security of US embassies and missions worldwide. The US also is improving its intelligence on suspected terrorist activity, to help deter and control these threats. Various laws have strengthened the anti-terrorist effort: the 1985 Foreign Assistance Act, which helps improve international counterterrorism measures; the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, which provides for rewards for the conviction of terrorists; and the Export Administration Act and its regulations, which restrict the sale of certain items to countries officially listed as repeated supporters of international terrorism.

Bilateral efforts, such as the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, allow the US Government to train and exchange ideas on the practical aspects of counterterrorism with representatives of friendly governments. Multilateral steps to strengthen, consolidate, and coordinate international anti-terrorist actions include the Hague Convention on aircraft hijacking; the Montreal Convention on aircraft sabotage; UN conventions against murder, kidnaping, and other attacks against diplomats and the taking of hostages; the 1978 Bonn declaration by the seven economic summit countries, which provides for concerted action against states that fail to take appropriate legal action against hijackers; and the strong stand taken by the economic summit countries and EC representatives this spring in Tokyo.

Whatever our commitment and capability, we cannot succeed alone when the threat originates and is carried out abroad where other governments have the major responsibility. Unless other governments are willing to make the same commitment, the unfavorable trend experienced in 1985 will continue.

SELECTED 1986 CHRONOLOGY: LIBYA SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM  
AND THE EFFORT TO COMBAT IT

1986

- July 1 Libyan businessman associated with pre-Qadhafi government and living in exile in France is found murdered near Paris.
- June 30 All U.S. companies terminate operations in Libya. Secretary Shultz reports to Congress that U.S. will not entertain even the appearance of continuing to do business as usual with Qadhafi. He indicates additional measures will be forthcoming. ←
- June 23 Further restrictions announced on exports from the U.S. to third countries which may be reexported for the benefit of Libya's petroleum or petrochemical industry.
- June 11 Qadhafi cancels live appearance at Libyan rally and appears on Libyan TV demanding punishment for Western Europe, Japan and the U.S. and alliance with the Soviet Union. Qadhafi states that "Libyans who went to Egypt went to liquidate Libyans...it does not concern the Egyptians."
- June 5 A former Libyan diplomat in Pakistan found guilty of acts of terrorism in a series of murders but released in the custody of the Libyan ambassador.
- May 12 Right-wing Spanish army officer arrested and charged with leaving his post and traveling to Libya to meet Qadhafi and seek funds for rightist group in Spain to carry out terrorist attacks.
- May 5 Meeting at the Tokyo Economic Summit, the leaders of seven major industrial nations and the representatives of the European Community issue a joint statement on international terrorism reaffirming condemnation of international terrorism in all its forms and pledging to make maximum efforts to fight the scourge of terrorism. The statement specifically names Libya as a state clearly involved in sponsoring or supporting international terrorism.
- April 25 Staff member at US Embassy in Sanaa was shot near his residence by unknown assailants. Although no "smoking gun" has been found, Libya remains the prime suspect in the attack.

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What are these  
may tell?

- April 23 Attorney General Meese meets with members of the EC Trevi group to discuss intelligence exchange on terrorism, as well as extradition and U.S. jurisdiction in selected overseas terrorist attacks against Americans.
- April 21 A former Libyan diplomat arrested in Rome in connection with a failed assassination attempt on the American ambassador in 1985.
- EC foreign ministers meet in Luxembourg, agree to reduce Libyan diplomats in EC to "essential minimum", restrict their movements, and apply stricter visa requirements for all Libyans.
- April 18 Four Libyans arrested in Ankara, Turkey for attempting to attack a U.S. Air Force officers club.
- Four Libyans expelled from France for suspected terrorist activity against U.S. targets.
- April 17 Two British hostages and one American hostage, Peter Kilburn, murdered in Beirut, allegedly in response to the U.S. airstrikes on Libya from British bases.
- Four rocket-propelled grenades were fired at the British ambassador's residence in West Beirut.
- The Omar Al Mukhtar, a Libyan-named group, claimed credit for the attack.
- April 15 A communications officer at US Embassy in Khartoum was shot and critically wounded in the head while driving home.
- Unsuccessful Libyan rocket attack on U. S. Coast Guard LORAN station on the Italian island of Lampedusa (near Sicily.)
- April 14 European foreign ministers meeting in Netherlands brand Libya as supporter of terrorism and vow to restrict movements of Libyan diplomats.
- U.S. responds to planned Libyan terrorist attacks against Americans abroad with airstrikes against terrorist-related targets in Libya during the night of April 14-15.
- Central African Republic expels two Libyan diplomats for suspected terrorist activities against American targets.

- April 12 Special U.S. envoy Vernon Walters begins series of closed door talks with world leaders seeking allied support for U.S. action against Libya.
- April 10 Qadhafi says he was prepared to "escalate the violence against American targets" if the United States uses the West Berlin discotheque as an excuse to attack Libya.
- Bodies of four Americans killed in the TWA bombing are flown back to the U.S.
- April 9 Two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups in the Mediterranean are ordered to remain in the area. Qadhafi threatens to attack U. S. targets worldwide if Reagans orders military strikes against his nation.
- April 5 A bomb rips through a West Berlin discotheque frequented by American troops, killing an American serviceman and a Turkish woman and injuring more than 230 people, about one fourth of them Americans.
- France expels two Libyan diplomats for involvement in a planned attack against U.S. interests in Paris.
- March 28 Libya, claiming victory over the U.S. in the Gulf of Sidra confrontation, urges "all Arab peoples" to attack anything American, "be it an interest, goods, a ship, a plane or a person."
- The Libyan-named Omar Al Mukhtar Group claims responsibility for a rocket attack against the U.S. Porfin Embassy compound in West Beruit.
- March 25 Qadhafi vows his forces will not give up their "brave confrontation" against the U.S. military in the Mediterranean.
- March 24 While on maneuvers in international waters in the Gulf of Sidra, U.S. Navy planes are fired upon by Libyan ground-to-air missiles. U.S. forces targeted the missile sites and Libyan "fast attack" guided missile boats and returned fire. U.S. missiles hit a Libyan radar installation twice and sunk several Libyan vessels.

- February 4 Israel intercepts a Libyan civilian jet flying from Tripoli to Damascus and forces it to land in Israel in a search for Palestinian terrorist leaders. Libya accuses U.S. Navy ships of aiding the Israeli action.
- February 1 Many Americans leave Libya by the President's February 1 deadline. Some risk legal action and stay.
- January 9 Qadhafi declares Libya will train, arm and protect Arab guerrillas for "suicide and terrorist missions."
- January 7-8 President Reagan announces economic sanctions against Libya and orders all American business out by February 1 under penalty of legal action.

23 June 1986

## TERRORISM

The first report in March 1986 concluded that Americans were slowly becoming more willing to support military action against nations that sponsored terrorism. Since then several terrorist incidents, the principal one being the night club bombing in Berlin, and America's response to them by attacking Libya have caused Americans to cross the threshold of supporting military action against terrorism.

An early April (pre-U.S. raid on Libya) CBS/NYT poll showed that terrorism, for the first time ever, was the number one problem facing the country. It surpassed such traditional concerns as war/nuclear war, unemployment, the deficit, and inflation.

With this in mind, NSIC's June poll sought to test the various public opinion thresholds relative to fighting terrorism to determine just where Americans stand on this critical issue. As a basis, the thoughts of Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations (see "Terrorism: How the West Can Win, Time, April 14, 1986:48), and William V. O'Brien, Professor of Government at Georgetown University (see "Counterterrorism: Lessons from Israel," Strategic Review, Fall 1985:32) were used as guides.

To fight terrorism, one must understand its causes, which Netanyahu claims to be rooted in the "political ambitions and designs of expansionist states" and not "born of social misery and frustration." To test American opinion on this, the NSIC poll asked:

Which do you think is the main cause of terrorism today ... is it more ... the frustration that comes from social problems such as poverty and injustice ... or ... the ambitions and designs of some people who want more power?

Social Problems	25%
Ambitions and Designs	75%

Clearly Americans believe that terrorism is the product of the desire for greater political power and not the result of social injustice.

Netanyahu also noted that "our present notions of terrorism are informed not by history but in large measure by the media," and that "a thoughtful press can turn terrorism's greatest weapon against the terrorists themselves." In a major communications study, Gabriel Weimann (see "The Theater of Terror: Effects of Press Coverage," Journal of Communications (Winter 1983): 38)

found that exposure to press coverage of terrorists selectively redefines the image of the terrorists. This redefinition can shift the public's attention from what it knows to be the generic cause of terrorism, as demonstrated above, to localized grievances and particular problems that are blown out-of-proportion to their real merit.

The media can have a particularly strong effect on that part of the public which has not developed strong opinions about terrorism, that is the public that becomes galvanized by a particular incident. First, the media gives the impression that what the terrorists are doing must matter because why else would the media be paying so much attention to them. The media enhances the status of terrorist incidents.

Second, the media makes positives out of negatives. Terrorists are called "another man's freedom fighters" or "separatists" or "nationalists," all of which obscure the criminal nature of their acts.

Another way in which the media generates sympathy for the terrorists is to focus on the unexpected behavior of the victims of terrorist hostage-taking. These victims often experience a form of the "Stockholm Syndrome" where they sympathize with the perpetrators and any sign of this is played up by the media, which only generates more sympathy for the "cause" of the terrorists.

The media also inadvertently creates an "underdog" affect for the terrorists. They are shown as being small in number with modest arms facing large, well armed forces just waiting for the opportunity to do them in. During the TWA hijacking, the three hijackers were constantly being sized up against the "Delta Force" which was "somewhere nearby."

This leads to the last way in which the media aid terrorists. The reporting of details about efforts to combat terrorism provide information that the terrorist use in avoiding punishment or planning their next perpetration. Concerned about this, NSIC asked the following question in its June poll:

In your opinion, should the press ... exercise its right to tell the American public the details of our intelligence and military operations against terrorists even though it might help the terrorist avoid detection in the future ... or ... exercise self-restraint and not tell the American public everything it finds out so that future operations against terrorists are protected?

Exercise Its Right to Tell	23%
Exercise Self-Restraint and Not Tell	75%



The emphasis here was placed not on the right to tell, this was acknowledged as a given, but on the propriety in the telling. Clearly the American public believes that regardless of "rights" the press has a responsibility to protect action against terrorists. The research supports the notion that the press can have an effect on the public's perception of terrorism and that Americans understand the need for the press to act responsibly in this area.

Netanyahu warns against a country ruling out retaliation because of the risk of civilian casualties in such retaliation. Figure 1 shows that over the past 11 months the American public has moved in a direction from avoiding the use of military force because innocent people would be killed to that of not hesitating to use military force to punish terrorists sponsors.

Netanyahu warns against a country ruling out retaliation because of the risk of civilian casualties in such retaliation. Figure 1 shows that over the past 11 months the American public has moved away from a position that discourages the use of military force "because innocent people would be killed," and toward a position that the US "should not hesitate to use military force ... to punish" terrorist sponsors. The June survey asked people to identify the opinion they felt was most like their own:

...[W]e should not use military force against terrorism because ... violence begets violence and innocent people would be killed .... Such action would make us no better than the terrorists.

39%


...[S]everal governments have actively created the conditions ... that have led to attacks on Americans. Therefore, we should not hesitate to use military force against these countries to punish them ... by not punishing violence, we encourage it to spread.

61%

In looking at the groups where the change has occurred the most, a pattern appears that will carry over to other questions where attitude changes are occurring. Men, those over 55, the well-educated and high income earners are those where the most significant change has taken place. Those who would be most thoughtful about national security affairs problems such as terrorism have finally recognized that terrorism cannot be controlled if retaliation is ruled out because it might cause civilian casualties.

The public needs to understand, according to Netanyahu and O'Brien, that retaliation is a deterrence, it works. When the bombing raids on Libya initially occurred, the public did not think it would deter future terrorism. The June NSIC poll asked the public to review the two months since the bombing and indicate whether or not the retaliation had been effective.

FIGURE 1  
**USE OF MILITARY FORCE  
AGAINST TERRORISM**



Smith=no military force--innocents might be killed  
Jones=use military force against sponsors

Looking back over the last two months, do you think the U.S. bombing of Libya has ... reduced terrorism ... led to even more terrorism ... or ... hasn't had much effect?

	NSIC <u>6/86</u>	CBS/ <u>NYT</u> <u>4/86</u>
Reduced Terrorism	50%	30%
Led to Even More Terrorism	15%	43%
Hasn't Had Much Effect	34%	16%

Despite their initial apprehensions about the bombing raids, the public has perceived the raids to have had an impact on reducing terrorism during the past two months. To the extent the public continues to believe that retaliation works, then it will be easier for the U.S. to retaliate when the situation demands it.

The experts on terrorism also claim that the government must be willing to execute and the public accept a continuous campaign against the sponsors of terrorism to effectively eliminate it. A CBS/NYT poll conducted immediately after the bombing raids on Libya asked:

If the United States made it a policy to take military action against a government it believes has trained or financed terrorists, do you think that would reduce terrorism in the long run, or would it only make things worse.

Reduce Terrorism	57%
Make Things Worse	27%

This is a 17 point shift from a similar question asked in January 1986. It represents the fact that Americans have begun to accept the need for continuous effort against terrorism. However, given a specific situation, Americans were not quite ready to cross this threshold totally. They were asked in the June NSIC poll the following:

Which of these comes closest to your own opinion about the bombing of Libya with respect to the future?

The bombing was only the first step in a process of repeated military measures we must take to combat terrorism.	34%
OR	
The bombing might have been necessary to send a message to terrorists, but we don't need to continue down that path anymore.	65%

A majority of hardliners favored the "repeated measures" response, with internationalists next at 38%, followed by

isolationists (27%) and accommodationists (18%), who clearly did not want this type of military action repeated.

Netanyahu and O'Brien both agree that there is no moral imperative that confines retaliation to specific targets. Respondents were asked in the March and June NSIC polls the following:

Which of the following do you think the U.S. should do to reduce terrorism that is sponsored by another nation?

Take military action against any economic or military target in that country.

Take military action against terrorist facilities in that country.

Enact economic sanctions against that country.

Enact diplomatic sanctions against that country.

Take no action.

The responses for the two surveys are presented in Figure 2. Clearly there has been a significant change from March to June. The total for military action is up, most of it shifting to military action against any target. However, the plurality still favors limiting the retaliation to specific types of targets and nearly as many also favor no military action.

There is a definite movement toward opening up the range of retaliatory possibilities, lead by the subgroups cited above: older men, the well-educated, and upper-income respondents. But, the threshold has yet to be fully crossed.


Finally, Netanyahu and O'Brien cited the need for preemptive strikes to control terrorism. NSIC measured this by asking the following question:

The U.S. has said it would use military force against Syria if presented with clear evidence that they had sponsored an act of terrorism. Authorities in Europe have linked recent terrorist incidents or attempted incidents to Syria. In your opinion, should the U.S. now respond militarily to Syria at a time and place of U.S. choosing designed to disrupt terrorist activities ... or ... should the U.S. wait for terrorists to strike once more before the U.S. uses military force?

Respond militarily at own choosing	31%
Wait for terrorist to strike	67%

Americans have not crossed the pre-emptive strike threshold as yet, either. Responses to this question relate to gender (men

FIGURE 2  
**How to Reduce Terrorism**



are more likely to support pre-emption than women) and education (the higher the education, the lower the support for pre-emption). Interestingly, there does not appear to be a link to ideology; both left and right had similar response patterns. However, within the international subgroups, hardliners came the closest to producing a majority (49%) in favor of pre-emption while the other three groups (internationalist, accommodationist, and isolationist) each have 71% opposition to pre-emption.

Overall, the American public has come along way since June 1985 and the TWA hijacking in its view of the efforts needed to control terrorism. It is more prepared than ever for the use of military force against states that sponsor terrorists, but in its almost infinite patience, the American public still places limits on the types of behavior it will accept from its government. These limits appear to be linked to the American value system and the desire to deal honorably and within the rules of acceptable international behavior, even with terrorist outlaws.

This is another great example  
of state's reaction to any idea  
that in any way attempts to  
have them adjust their current  
way of doing business.

OLN <sup>N</sup> RICE <sup>C</sup>

July 13, 1986

TO: RBO  
FROM: MK  
SUBJ: Amb. Miller's paper

His completed paper has been sent to the White House and came back to us for comment.

Based on a quick look, and his draft paper which he showed to Parker and me many weeks ago, I have some observations about points he glossed over.

He ignored completely the fact that many "Public Diplomacy" themes which develop from our discussions and contacts and ideas are being cranked out and used as part of the day-to-day workings even though they are not identified as "Public Diplomacy" as such.

Examples:

- Working "messages" or points into the daily press guidance, volunteering statements instead of merely being reactive;
- Talking points for statements and testimony by the principals;
- material for friendly members of Congress who were meeting with foreign officials and parliamentarians (Good example of the virtues of our lean operation, I can often just recycle press points in addition to using Congress in a good cop bad cop capacity.
- a big effort to meet with foreign correspondents (You've met separately with about a dozen, and Parker, Long, Bentley and I have met separately with another dozen and half or more in addition to several group meetings with USIA-sponsored tours.
- various "White papers", including mini-papers

LACK OF RESOURCES have really cramped some of the efforts--it's difficult to get anyone, even Terry Arnold, free enough to help produce White Papers. USIA finally came up with \$1,000 to hire one of his grad students to do research work but the fact sheets he and a junior USIA officer produced were needed/need considerable rewriting to be useful for release.

The Miller paper also completely ignores the useful avenue of working through Congressional members and Non-government organizations. One weakness is a lack of time to go out and do missionary work with groups which don't normally get in touch with us--such as Greek-Americans, some veteran organizations etc. Public diplomacy is not just working the media or giving speeches to American audiences.

STRUCTURE:

I think his proposal for a separate office is too elaborate and inefficient. The tail would be as large as the dog. A separate operation would not be as effective. Public diplomacy should be very closely geared to support and supplement the more traditional diplomacy and shouldn't be zigging when policy is zagging. One of the weaknesses/difficulties I already see is being informed enough on what's going on to be able to generate, or pull back on ideas and approaches as appropriate. A separate office would have additional problems on these lines.

Whoever heads up the operation should be plugged into the day-to-day situation, not just someone giving speeches, although sometimes I think we need a DAS to give speeches.



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-- A press officer to deal with the day-to-day guidance, queries, etc.

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-- A good writer/researcher to do initial drafts of papers or do initial rewrite of material from the regional officers, INR, etc.

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TERRORISM PRESS GUIDANCE

Q: WITH THE PAN AM HIJACKING, THE ISTANBUL SYNAGOGUE ATTACK, THE ITALIAN CONSULATE SEIZURE IN CAIRO, AND NOW ANOTHER AMERICAN KIDNAPPED IN WEST BEIRUT, IS THIS THE "BOW WAVE" OF A SPATE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS? IS THE "LULL" IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM SINCE OUR BOMBING OF LIBYA NOW OVER?

A: It is premature to determine a trend or pattern on the basis of a few incidents. While we have never claimed that our military action on April 15 would put an end to terrorism, we do feel that our firm response to state sponsorship of international terrorism in concert with the increased international cooperation with other civilized nations, particularly at the Tokyo Summit last May, have laid down a marker that state sponsorship of international terrorism will no longer be tolerated.