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File Folder MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT AND SELECTED
AMBASSADORS 10/31/1985- TASK FORCE FILE COPY (2
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FOIA

F99-008/2

Box Number 32

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| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
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| 12076 | PAPER | DUPLICATE OF #12063, ISSUE PAPER #22 | 1 | ND | B1 |
| 12077 | PAPER | DUPLICATE OF #12064, ISSUE PAPER #6 - ACTIVE RESPONSE | 3 | ND | B1 |
| 12078 | PAPER | DUPLICATE OF #12065, ISSUE PAPER #14 - PUBLICITY | 2 | ND | B1 |
| 12079 | PAPER | DUPLICATE OF #12066, ISSUE PAPER #16 - DEPLOYMENT | 1 | ND | B1 |
| 12080 | PAPER | DUPLICATE OF #12067, ISSUE PAPER #17 | 1 | ND | B1 |
| 12081 | PAPER | DUPLICATE OF #12068, ISSUE PAPER #21 | 1 | ND | B1 |

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| 12083 | PAPER | DUPLICATE OF #12070 | 1 | ND | B1 |
| 12084 | PAPER | DUPLICATE OF #12071, ISSUE PAPER #20 PAR 7/12/2006 F99-008/2 | 1 | ND | B1 B3 |
| 12085 | PAPER | DUPLICATE OF #12072, ISSUE PAPER #40, PARTIAL CLOSURE R 9/7/2007 NLRRF99-008/2 | 1 | ND | B1 B3 |

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Overseas Visits

TASK FORCE OVERSEAS VISITS AND CONTACTS

26-30 September
Italy, Germany

Col. Cole, LTC Daly

Ambassador and Mission Officers, U.S. Embassy Rome
Ambassador Oakley, Director M/CTP, Department of State
Officials of Civilian and Military Intelligence (SISMI, SISDE)
Chief of Police, Rome
Vice Chief of Cabinet, Interior Ministry

U.S. European Command (EUCOM), Stuttgart

Deputy Chief of Mission and Mission officers, Embassy Bonn
Political Officer, U.S. Embassy Paris
German Ministry of Interior, Police and Internal Security
Foreign Office officials

September 30-October 2
London, England

Adm. Holloway, LCDR Coy

U.S. Ambassador and Mission Officers
Home Secretary
Northern Ireland Office
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Terrorism Specialists
Commanding General, Special Air Service
Scotland Yard officials

October 5-12

Amb. Peck, Capt.
Boink, LTC Earl

Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador

Charge d'Affaires and Mission officers, Bogota
Chief of Security, Royal Dutch Shell
Minister of Defense
Director General, National Police
U.S. business community representatives
Department of Security officers

Chief of Staff, USSOUTHCOM and officers

Deputy Chief of Mission and officers, U.S. Embassy, Panama

Ambassador and Mission officers, U.S. Embassy El Salvador
Vice Minister for Public Security
Director General of Treasury Police
Director General, National Guard
Director General, National Police
Chief of Staff, Ministry of Defense

October 11-22

Capt. McMunn, Mr.
Hutchings

Belgium, Jordan, Israel, England

CIA Station Chief and Deputy, Brussels
Belgian Gendarmerie Terrorism Section chief and deputy

U.S. Ambassador and Mission Officers, Amman
U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait
Political Counselor and RSO, U.S. Embassy Riyadh
Regional Security Officer, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad
Commanding General, Jordanian Armed Forces
Chief of Staff, Jordanian Armed Forces
Director of Jordanian Military Intelligence
Director of the Jordanian Ministry of Public Safety

Acting Consul General and Consulate Officers, Jerusalem

Charge d'Affaires and Mission officers, Tel Aviv
Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Cairo
Advisor to the Prime Minister on Combatting Terrorism
Tel Aviv University Center for Study of Terrorism
Israeli Defense Force, Joint Intelligence Staff

MI-6 Counterterrorism expert, London

ISSUE PAPERS KEYED TO DISCUSSION POINTS

Task Force Issues and Proposals:

International Cooperation - 7, 22, 32
Positive Response to Terrorist Threats - 6
National Program/Policy/Organization - 1, 2, 3

Invited Comments:

Role of Media - 13, 14
Extradition Treaties - 8
Use of Delta Team - 16, 17, 21, 42
Adequacy of Intelligence - 11, 20, 40
Use of Country Teams in Crisis Management - 35
Need for Exercises by Decision makers

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, NSC, CIA

SUBJECT: International Agreements for Combatting Terrorism

ISSUE: To successfully deal with international terrorism, treaties and agreements are required to facilitate the cooperative efforts among the nations upon whose sovereign territory the terrorist incident may have occurred, those nations whose citizens and properties may be involved, and those nations through which terrorists may proceed for deployment or escape. Such international agreements should as a minimum contain provisions to permit and expedite the exchange of intelligence information concerning terrorism; the investigation of terrorist threats and incidents; the apprehension and prosecution of suspected or known terrorists; and the extradition of known terrorists.

Although there is much interest among likeminded nations for such international agreements, progress in reaching the agreements has been slow or non-existent. One of the difficulties appears to be that the achievement of a broad international multilateral treaty on terrorism that would be strong enough to be of practical utility, is probably not realistic. A broad multilateral treaty would necessarily reduced to the lowest level of commitment of the least cooperative signatory.

On the other hand, such a broad multilateral treaty could be useful as a demonstration of the breadth of commitment throughout a broad spectrum of nations to the condemnation of terrorism as an international crime against society.

To achieve more practical agreements in such areas as extradition, police cooperation, intelligence sharing, and the combined use of forces, bilateral treaties appear to be more feasible. A bilateral agreement which contains all of those provisions for cooperation that the two signatories can readily concur in can be consummated quickly. Such bilaterals need not be delayed by attempting to achieve cooperation in difficult areas.

The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-83) calls upon the President to encourage the international community to focus attention and secure cooperation against terrorism world-wide. The law further provides the sense of the Congress for the President to negotiate a treaty to incorporate a variety of procedures to improve international procedures to combat terrorism.

Consequently, it would appear that there are advantages in both the multilateral and bilateral approaches to cooperative agreements to combatting terrorism.

PROPOSAL: The Department of State should initiate a two-track effort to secure international agreements for combatting terrorism.

1. A multilateral treaty against terrorism should be sought with a large number of participants in order to attain a broad international expression of condemnation for international terrorism. The objective should be one of wide participation in a general statement, that can be achieved quickly.
2. A parallel effort should be undertaken to obtain a series of bilateral agreements with our allies and likeminded nations for the purpose of combatting terrorism. The objective in these bilaterals would be to move quickly to achieve agreements in areas where there is already a concurrence of views on both sides. If where only limited concessions can be gained, these should be accepted and agreements rapidly concluded. This way, a network of bilateral agreements concerning terrorism might be achieved in a relatively short period of time.

STAFF CONTACT: CAPT L. H. Boink, 395-4950

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COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE

SUBJECT: Controlling Cross-Border Travel of Known or Suspected Terrorists

ISSUE: Increased international cooperation is required to control cross-border travel of known or suspected terrorists. These individuals or groups are currently able to travel from country to country with seeming impunity. Further, individuals expelled from, or denied entry into one country may be unwittingly allowed entry into another. What appears needed is a computerized system designed to monitor and control people movements across international borders. Further, there is a need for a back-up information exchange program between embassies and countries to share data on expelled individuals including known or suspected terrorists.

PROPOSAL: The State Department should take the lead in an interagency effort to upgrade existing systems or recommend development of a new computerized system to monitor cross-border people movements. Upgrading of the State Department's Automated Visa Outlook System (AVLOS) may have application in this area. Additionally, the Department of State should initiate a multilateral program to exchange information between like-minded countries and Embassies to supplement the systems referred to above.

STAFF CONTACT: CAPT L. H. Boink, 395-4950

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/ Program/Policy/Organization

ISSUE PAPER NO. 1

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Agencies

SUBJECT: National Program for Combatting Terrorism

ISSUE: The Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism was directed by NSDD 179 to review and evaluate the effectiveness of current U.S. policy and programs on combatting terrorism. In the process of this review it was found that elements of the overall national capability for combatting terrorism were distributed throughout a number of departments and agencies within the Executive Branch. This in itself is not inappropriate, as each office has assumed responsibilities for combatting terrorism appropriate to the mission or objectives of their department or agency. However, it is not currently possible to go to any one single source to determine where all components of the national effort repose.

In order that national priorities can be set; to eliminate overlap, redundancy, and duplication; to provide the necessary resources for combatting terrorism; and to be certain that no necessary elements of such a program are neglected; all of the component parts of the national program for combatting terrorism should be collected into a single set of documents, where the various components can be identified as to purpose, responsible agency, resources available and assets required. Such a formal statement of a national program for combatting terrorism is required if the total effort is to be properly coordinated and managed at the national level. Today the national program is not properly expressed in such a way that it can be efficiently managed in order to identify shortfalls, eliminate redundancies, generate requirements for resources, and justify legislative and fiscal requests.

PROPOSAL: A programming document should be established that incorporates all of the diverse elements and components of the national program for combatting terrorism. This document should be so constructed as to facilitate the management and coordination of the total interagency program at the national level, identifying shortfalls, eliminating redundancies, generating requirements for resources, and justifying legislative and fiscal requests.

The programming document prepared by the Task Force to establish the baseline of the existing national program for combatting terrorism should serve as the interim programming document.

The programming document for combatting terrorism will be maintained by the National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism on the NSC staff (see Issue Paper 3).

STAFF CONTACT: LTCOL R. L. Earl, 395-4950

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Department and Agencies

SUBJECT: National Policy for Combatting Terrorism

ISSUE: There should be a national policy on terrorism clearly expressed to serve as guidance for the program for combatting terrorism, the counterterrorism strategy, and the tactics for dealing with terrorists incidents. There could be both public and classified versions of this policy statement. Currently statements of U.S. Government policy toward terrorism are included in several national security documents. These existing policy statements may be sufficient and suitable for the purpose, but they should be reviewed to ensure that they provide the necessary guidance for both the development of the national program for combatting terrorism and a strategy to implement the national program.

PROPOSAL: A policy statement along the following lines should be expressed by the appropriate national security directive to serve as guidance in all national matters concerning terrorism.

"The U.S. Government is opposed to domestic and international terrorism and is prepared to act in concert with other nations or unilaterally when necessary to prevent and/or respond to terrorist acts." (NSDD 179 and NSDD 180).

"The USG considers the practice of terrorism by any person or group in any cause a threat to our national security and will resist the use of terrorism by all legal means available." (NSD 138)

"Terrorism is a problem shared by all nations. We will work intensively with others to eliminate the threat of terrorism to our way of life. States that practice terrorism or actively support it, will not be allowed to do so without consequence. (NSD 138) State-sponsored terrorist activity or directed threats of such action are considered to be hostile acts and the U.S. will hold sponsors accountable. Whenever we have evidence that a state is mounting or intends to conduct an act of terrorism against us, we have a responsibility to take measures to protect our citizens, property, and interests." (NSD 138)

"The U.S. Government will make no concessions to terrorists. It will pay no ransoms, nor permit releases of prisoners or agree to other acts which might encourage additional terrorism. It will make no changes in its policy because of terrorists, threats, or acts. The U.S. is determined to act in a strong manner against terrorists without surrendering basic freedoms or endangering democratic principles. The USG encourages other governments to take similar strong stands against terrorism." (Ambassaur Oakley's speech)

STAFF CONTACT: LTCOL R. L. Earl, 395-4950

ISSUE PAPER NO. _____

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: National Organization for Combatting Terrorism

ISSUE: The organization for combatting terrorism must be compatible with the overall organizational structure of the U.S. Government, be capable of administering the programmatic aspects of the national program for combatting terrorism, be able to generate a counterterrorist strategy, and provide the operational capability for dealing tactically with terrorist threats and incidents. The existing organization utilizes the interagency approach, and the two principal components are the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism which formulates policy, manages the program, and generally outlines the counterterrorism strategy; and the Terrorist Incident Working Group which generally operates in a tactical fashion to resolve threats and incidents in an operational context.

PROPOSAL: The existing interagency approach utilizing the basic organizations of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the Terrorist Incident Working Group should be retained with the following modification.

There will be established the position of National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism in the National Security Council organization at the level of a Senior Director for National Security (Special Assistant to the President). The coordinator will:

1. Be supported by a small, full-time, dedicated staff.
2. Serve as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.
3. Serve as Executive Director of the TIWG.
4. Be responsible for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.
5. Provide management coordination of the entire national program for combatting terrorism through the programming documents and the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.
6. Provide a focal point for all matters concerning terrorism other than those clearly the sole responsibility of a single agency or department.

STAFF CONTACT: Mr. B. Hutchings, 395-4950

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, NSC, CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Domestic Public Awareness

ISSUE: An important facet of America's ability to deal effectively with terrorism will be the extent to which the public understands the true nature of the threat. Administration statements on the subject convey, at a minimum, a reasonably accurate description of what we face. The words we use must carry the full weight of our condemnation and rejection, but should not obscure the nature of terrorism. The terrorists we face are not "mindless" nor are they "common criminals." Clearly criminal, terrorism is focused and intentional, planned and executed in the expectation that it will contribute to their political and ideological goals of the terrorists.

Particular factors facing the nation include:

- The decay of national morale; the feeling of helplessness or frustration on the part of the public.
- The institutional and psychological effects of terrorism are likely to be far more significant than the actual destruction.
- The loss of confidence by our allies.
- The potential boost in confidence for terrorists and their organizations by the perception of our lack of resolve.
- The threat of assassination of national leaders.
- The threat to U.S. infrastructure (monetary, electrical, communications, etc.)
- The threat of nuclear/biological blackmail.
- The lack of risk-free options when dealing with terrorists.
- The necessity for international cooperation to defeat terrorism.

During a terrorist crisis, one of a government's most important responsibilities is to maintain a public confidence in its ability to cope with all contingencies. If the U.S. is going to be successful in furthering its global interests while concurrently maintaining international peace and security, it must find a way to communicate with world audiences and gain support for its policies in the critical area of public opinion.

Although an Interdepartmental Counterterrorism Public Diplomacy Committee has recently been formed and a draft strategy and action plan has been composed, virtually no initiatives have been implemented toward an aggressive long-term public affairs program designed to combat terrorism.

PROPOSAL: The Interdepartmental Counterterrorism Public Diplomacy Committee should undertake an aggressive program to focus national and international attention on the actual nature of the terrorist threat.

- The program should generate a "national credo" of U.S. attitudes toward terrorism in order to pre-condition the public to the range of potential government responses to particular terrorist acts.
- Government statements on terrorism should avoid using words and phrases that do not accurately convey the profound danger posed to our national interests.
- That a public awareness survey be conducted to explore in depth the American people's perception, consciousness and understanding of terrorism and its impact on a free society.

STAFF CONTACT: LTCOL P. F. Daly (395-4950)

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 8

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE

SUBJECT: Extradition Treaties

ISSUE: The spread of international terrorism, involving frequent travel across borders on the part of terrorists to commit violent acts abroad or to escape prosecution at home requires us to reexamine the intent of the "political offense" exception in our extradition treaties. As it presently stands, the language of our law can be used, and is on occasion being used, as a safehaven for terrorists. The United States may extradite fugitives to foreign countries only pursuant to a treaty. Our extradition treaties preclude extradition if the fugitive is wanted for a "political offense." Current interpretations of the political offense exception by the courts and by defense attorneys is that anything goes as long as the crime was political in nature. These interpretations are frustrating U.S. efforts to gain the cooperation of other governments in closing legal loopholes that help terrorists. When terrorists are apprehended, there must be an effective means of extraditing them to the nation with jurisdiction to bring them to trial. This is particularly justifiable when that nation is a democratic regime which offers a fair judicial system. Extradition treaties should exclude specified crimes of violence from the scope of the political offense exception to extradition. These include such serious offenses as aircraft hijacking and sabotage, hostage taking, murder and manslaughter. Truly "political" offenses such as treason and espionage would continue to be excepted. The 1971 European Convention of the Suppression of Terrorism contains such a provision.

PROPOSAL: The State Department should conduct a review of the U.S. situation with respect to extradition arrangements. Following this review, it should initiate action for the USG to enact such treaties or supplement current treaties with democratic regimes which offer fair judicial systems. (Note: The US/UK Supplemental Extradition Treaty, revising our 1972 bilateral extradition treaty with UK, was signed on June 25, 1985, and transmitted to the Senate on July 17, 1985.)

STAFF CONTACT: COL D. L. Cole, 395-4950

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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~ISSUE PAPER NO. 42

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, NSC, CIA

SUBJECT: Deployment Policy for JSOC

ISSUE: Issue Paper No. 16 discusses the advantages of early deployment of counterterrorist (CT) forces. The issue is interrelated with operational security (OPSEC) matters and with exercises and training. For example, a national policy that required automatic deployment of some JSOC forces to the theater in which a terrorist incident has just occurred would not only reduce the OPSEC problem of JSOC forces being seen by press deploying from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina (i.e. this would be publicly acknowledged policy) but would also increase the deterrence of international terrorism (terrorists would know that the USG will do everything possible to create the capability to go after them militarily). (See Issue Paper No. 17 on JSOC OPSEC.) The decision to employ US CT forces would, of course, remain a decision of the National Command Authority, the President of the United States. On the matter of exercises and training, forward deployment of CT forces in high threat or crisis areas can, in effect, be accomplished by conducting increased training and exercises in that high threat area. Again, the spin off benefit on deterrence can be useful.

PROPOSAL: The national deployment policy for JSOC should include the following:

(1) as a public policy, US CT forces will deploy to the theater of an international terrorist incident involving American hostages, and

(2) as a classified policy, US CT forces will whenever possible conduct training and exercises in high threat theaters to familiarize/condition the CT forces, reduce deployment time in the event of an incident, and increase deterrence (to the extent terrorist groups perceive this higher CT profile in the region).

STAFF CONTACT: LTCOL R. L. Earl, 395-4950, (Secure via WH switch)

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 20

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: CIA

SUBJECT: Expanded HUMINT Capability Against Terrorism

ISSUE: With the emergence of terrorism as an issue of national concern, our intelligence agencies shifted increased attention and assets to collection, analyses and dissemination of information on this threat. The nature of the small, fanatical, close-knit terrorist groups that have become very active in the recent past makes them difficult targets to collect against, particularly using the traditional or high technology methods on which we rely for collection against the strategic threat.

The objective, to pinpoint the plans and targets of terrorist grounds, will not easily be attained under the circumstances. It will be a long and costly effort which may not be entirely successful, but which nonetheless must be undertaken. The effort will of necessity be based heavily on HUMINT, the method most likely to provide the type of timely, specific information which can be of utility in terrorist situations. The U.S. will have to redevelop its capabilities in this field, focusing on high-threat areas, and

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STAFF CONTACT: CAPT D. J. McMUNN, 395-4950

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 40

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Staff Contact: CAPT D. L. McMunn, USN, 395-4950
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ISSUE PAPER NO. 40

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Staff Contact: CAPT D. L. McMunn, USN, 


ISSUE PAPER NO. 35

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, CIA, JCS

SUBJECT: Country Team Briefings

ISSUE: A terrorist incident often forces an Embassy Country Team to deal with the variety of resources the USG has committed to combat terrorism. The Ambassador may be required to present potential options or describe our capabilities to the host nation. Prior knowledge of USG policies, resources, and capabilities will ensure a quick transition to the necessary crisis management.

PROPOSAL: The Department of State should arrange for and require all Ambassadors, DCM's, Chiefs of Station, and Military Attaches be briefed on USG policies, resources, and capabilities committed to combatting terrorism. This briefing should be provided in conjunction with a risk assessment of the particular country and region.

STAFF CONTACT: Mr. B. Hutchings, 395-4950

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Congressional

LEGISLATIVE LIAISON

The Vice President met with selected members of Congress on September 16 in the White House. The following were in attendance:

The Vice President
Senator Denton
Senator Hatch
Senator Johnston
Senator Nunn
Senator Rudman
Senator Thurmond
Representative Daniel
Representative Fascell
Representative Ireland

Working Group members have met with staff representatives from both the House and the Senate. (Senate Select Committee Intelligence, Senate Judiciary, Senate Appropriations, House Foreign Affairs, House Appropriations Committee)

The Executive Director is scheduled to meet with Senator Durenberger on November 1, 1985.

MEDIA CONSULTATIONS

Scheduled to meet with the Vice President on November 23, 1985:

| | | |
|-------------|------------------|----------------------------------|
| TIME | Strobe Talbot | Washington Bureau Chief |
| NEWSWEEK | Morton Kondracke | Washington Bureau Chief |
| US NEWS | David Gergen | Washington Bureau Chief |
| AP | Charles Lewis | Washington Bureau Chief |
| UPI | David Weesly | Washington Bureau Chief |
| NY TIMES | William Kovach | Washington Bureau Chief |
| WASH POST | Ben Brandlee | Editor |
| CNN | Ed Turner | President, News Division |
| NBC | Larry Grossman | President, News Division |
| ABC | Roone Arledge | President, News Division |
| CBS | Ed Joyce | President, News Division |
| Columbia U. | Fred Friendly | Graduate School of Journalism |

Media Seminars Attend by Working Group Members:

CSIS CHALLENGES FOR THE PRESS

| | |
|---------------------|-----------------------|
| Fred Friendly | Columbia University |
| Fred Barnes | New Republic |
| Charles Krauthammer | New Republic |
| Daniel Schorr | National Public Radio |
| John Wallach | Hearst Newspapers |

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Arnavd de Borchgrove Editor, Washington Times

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| | Terry Baker | Executive Director |
| | Jerry Nachman | Director of News |
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