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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

DLB 6/1/2005

File Folder INCOMING - 11/20/1985 - CLASSIFIED

FOIA

F99-008/2

Box Number 32

WILLS

29

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|--|-------------|------------|----------------|
| 12448 | MEMO | FOR THE RECORD, RE: VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DR. BRZEZINSKI; NOVEMBER 19, 1985.... <i>R 2/2/2012 F1999-008/2</i> | 3 | ND | B1 |
| 12449 | MEMO | E.L.PECK TO THE FILES, RE: IG/T MEETING, NOVEMBER 20, 1985 <i>R 2/2/2012 F1999-008/2</i> | 2 | ND | B1 |
| 12450 | MEMO | ROBERT OAKLEY TO MEMBERS OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP ON TERRORISM (IG/T) <i>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i> | 1 | 11/18/1985 | B1 |
| 12451 | LIST | IG/T LIST OF ATTENDEES <i>PAR 5/16/2006 F99-008/2</i> | 1 | ND | B3 B6 B7(C) |
| 12452 | CABLE | NO CABLE NUMBER, RE: SUMMIT SEVEN: COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION <i>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i> | 5 | 11/5/1985 | B1 |
| 12453 | CABLE | NO CABLE NUMBER, RE: SUMMIT SEVEN: COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION <i>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i> | 6 | 11/15/1985 | B1 |
| 12454 | LETTER | DUPLICATE OF #11495, TO OAKLEY RE: MEETING OF EXPERTS RE: ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM <i>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i> | 8 | 7/24/1985 | B1 |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|--|-------------|----------|--------------|
| 12455 | REPORT | RE: CONSULTATIONS <i>PAR 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i> | 2 | ND | B1 |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TASK FORCE ROUTING SHEET

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20 Nov 85
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Date of Receipt | 21 Nov 85 | Router's Initials | *OK*

Remarks:

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| Holloway | Λ | I | ALREADY SEEN |
| Peck | Λ | I | <i>OK</i> |
| Coy | Λ | I | <i>OK</i> |
| Boink | Λ | I | <i>OK</i> |
| Cole | Λ | I | <i>OK</i> |
| Daly | Λ | I | <i>OK</i> |
| Earl | Λ | I | <i>OK</i> |
| Hutchings | Λ | I | <i>OK</i> |
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Deadline Date

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20 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Vice President's Meeting with Dr. Brzezinski; November 19, 1985 at 4:30 p.m., in the Vice President's White House Office

Other Participants: Admiral Holloway, Ambassador Peck, Don Gregg, Captain McMunn, LtCol Menarchik

Following a brief photo opportunity for the press, the Vice President led an informal discussion on combatting terrorism, eliciting Dr. Brzezinski's comments and recommendations on any legislative initiatives or enhancements in international cooperation deemed appropriate to better deal with the problem. He mentioned the role of the press in covering specific incidents, invited comments on criticisms of governmental rhetoric on terrorism to draw on the ideas of the former National Security Advisor.

Dr. Brzezinski said he had little to offer in those areas, but wanted to make two initial points. First, he felt it was not useful for our government to adopt a particular formula for dealing with terrorism. He was especially skeptical of any policy that refuses to negotiate with terrorists. That establishes an abstract principle that has little applicability to reality. If placed under duress, avoid locking yourself into a rigid formula. His second point was that the issue of terrorism had been "pumped up" as a major threat to the United States. In fact it was nothing of the sort. Terrorism is now a political football. The threat of terrorism has been stressed by actors in regional political conflicts as a means to manipulate American perceptions, to push our government to take their side. Dr. Brzezinski cautioned against succumbing to this "psychosis." While recognizing that there had been a real threat from terrorists to destabilize Italy, this was ultimately met by the Italian government. But Dr. Brzezinski did not see any analogy to that the situation in the U.S. today. Theoretically, a major threat from terrorism could grow out of a regional problem (e.g., severe repression in South Africa could ignite supporters of the "Black cause" or, if Central American violence spilled over into Mexico, Hispanics in the United States might resort to terrorism), but this is highly unlikely. Instead, we will be periodically hit by extensions of the Middle East problems and radical European politics. These the press will "hype up," but in themselves will not constitute vital threats to our national security.

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/2/17

The Vice President asked Dr. Brzezinski if he felt there was any way to constrain the media (e.g., during a hijack incident). Dr. Brzezinski suggested establishing a code of conduct to be self-legislated by the mass media, perhaps through some professional group with indirect governmental involvement.

Don Gregg asked for Dr. Brzezinski's views on preemption or retaliation in response to terrorist attack. Again, the former National Security Advisor counseled against establishing any one policy. Each case was different so "ad hoc" it. Weigh moral concerns, political ramifications, costs, and risks. There should be no generalized principle that we will or will not retaliate. While this reflects our experience so far, it becomes more complicated once links between terrorism and States are identified. Once that happens, it may be appropriate to establish generalized policy guidance principles. There must be consequences for states supporting terrorism because this is in the realm of "principles of international conduct." Ideally, the first such action could be taken in an egregious case (e.g., Col Qadafi) to demonstrate our resolve, but there must be clear unequivocal evidence to support our action.

The Vice President cited the aggressive Israeli approach to combatting terrorism as one that is frequently recommended, but he personally worried about the inevitable loss of innocent lives. It is just not "our way" and the American public could not support it. Dr. Brzezinski agreed, noting that Israel's security is "vitaly at stake" in what amounts to an onslaught of terrorism. In the case of the United States, terrorists do not threaten our vital security (so we cannot justify a concerted proactive effort to go after them). The Vice President mentioned Nicaragua as an example of another government taking a tough approach to elements threatening its security. Those who will not cooperate with the Sandanista government are eliminated through a system of "special measures" executed under their Interior Minister. Dr. Brzezinski was not aware of this.

The Vice President brought up the personal, human aspect involved in responding to terrorism. He alluded to President Duarte's recent experience with his daughter's kidnappers. The Salvadoran leader's close family ties clearly influenced the significant concessions his government made to the terrorists. Earlier El Salvador's Interior Minister of Public Security had told the Task Force that the military and political elements had agreed to a bottom line on concessions. That was never exceeded. However, President Duarte is now being criticized within El Salvador for having given too much to retrieve his daughter. It is difficult to reconcile a rigid policy when your own loved ones are involved. Even Henry Kissinger, who strongly argues for never conceding to terrorists, admitted that. Dr. Brzezinski said he disagrees with Dr. Kissinger's hardline approach. It is not sustainable. Today

we are indirectly talking to the kidnapers of American hostages in Lebanon. This is correct and sensible. In this way you may get the hostages back or you may get intelligence that will lead you to the terrorists. Avoid a categorical policy except in the case of state sponsorship or support (as was discussed above).

The Vice President reiterated his initial prompting on legislative initiatives, specifically referring to the need for additional extradition treaties. Dr. Brzezinski felt this would be superfluous. Like-minded states will extradite and, as with Italy and Yugoslavia in the case of the Achille Lauro terrorists, even friends will act according to their own perceived best interests and refuse our request when those interests diverge.

Dr. Brzezinski asked what direction the Task Force was taking in its study. Admiral Holloway indicated that it was proceeding along the lines of this discussion. The complexity of the problem was recognized and paradoxes abounded. For example, a public opinion poll commissioned by the Task Force underscored Americans' desire to be tough on terrorists but, simultaneously, our citizens do not want anyone but terrorists to get hurt in the process. The media can turn a terrorist incident into a Roman holiday, whipping up emotions and demands for harsh action. There is a real need to understand the public attitudes and to develop greater understanding and awareness regarding terrorism. Dr. Brzezinski agreed, but warned against any over reaction. For example, the grotesque physical barriers at facilities overseas and at the State Department in Washington made it appear that our diplomats work out of fortified bunkers. This is bad. Democracy is open and should appear that way. Barriers weaken democracy. We should not permit these "climatic" changes because it "hypes up the dynamics." This is paranoid and destructive.

The Vice President thanked Dr. Brzezinski for his contribution to the Task Force's effort and the meeting ended on a cordial note.

Submitted by: David J. McMunn

TASK FORCE ROUTING SHEET

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Remarks: *FILE AFTER CIRCULATED*

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| Coy | Λ | (I) | <i>OK</i> |
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| Cole | Λ | (I) | |
| Daly | Λ | (I) | <i>Daly</i> |
| Earl | Λ | (I) | <i>Earl Heavy-handed, Mr. Ambassador</i> |
| Hutchings | Λ | (I) | <i>B</i> |
| McMunn | Λ | (I) | <i>M</i> |
| Doris | (Λ) | I | |
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MEMORANDUM: To the Files

SUBJECT: IG/T Meeting, November 20, 1985

FROM: E.L. Peck *q*

The major item for discussion was the status of the effort to pull together a meeting of "like-minded" countries for the purpose of improving coordination and the exchange of information. As the attached telegrams and letters indicate, progress is rather slow but nonetheless encouraging. There are evidently vast differences between the attitudes of some of the countries, Germany and France being an example, and the US is attempting to disengage the terrorist issue from the Summit Seven context (although not totally), in the hopes of overcoming some of the resistance.

The results of consultations with the Israelis was also covered (paper attached), an indication of how quickly things can move when the other country is willing. There seems to be some concern that things are moving a bit faster than the US really wants in this particular case. FYI To a request from Nir that there be joint exercises, we were told, the US replied that we have only done that once - with the Italians at Sigonella.

As a follow-up to Treasury's suggestion that the Agencies coordinate their positions on terrorism issues that require OMB and then legislative approval, an informal networking channel was discussed and approved. (See attached paper.) The hope is that some of the errors, delays and confusion can be eliminated if everyone is agreed in principle in advance and - above all- is informed. Several horror stories of recent foul-ups were related.

Comment: ORCON It is interesting to note that the players come to these meetings, as the list of attendees shows. I gather that this has been the case right along, and that ~~Colby~~ has been a principle factor. He may not ~~be the only person possible~~, but everyone appears to be sufficiently interested and motivated to appear on a fairly regular basis or send a real deputy. Over and above the substance, the most compelling aspect of the meeting was the role of the NSC rep. His primacy in the entire exercise, seen by no one more clearly than the individual himself, is striking. There is no question whatever

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/2/12

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as to who is the heavy hitter in terrorism, at least as far as the interagency field is concerned. It is blatant, and perhaps not the very best arrangement in terms of organization, efficiency and US interests.

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n o u
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

November 18, 1985

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the Interdepartmental Group on
Terrorism (IG/T)

FROM: Ambassador Robert B. Oakley 
Chairman, IG/T

SUBJECT: IG/T Meeting, November 20, 1985

There will be a meeting of the Interdepartmental Group on
Terrorism next Wednesday, November 20, at 10:00 a.m.

We need to discuss our approaches to coordination with the
Summit Seven countries, in light of the meetings set in Bonn
by the FRG Foreign Ministry (December 10) and the Interior
Ministry (December 11). Our exchange of cables with the FRG
suggesting ideas for the Interior Ministry meeting will be
passed out at the meeting. Other ideas for agenda items
would be appreciated.

We should also review bilateral cooperation with Italy and
Israel in light of the visits of Scalfaro and Nir.

Other Agenda Items:

- Results of IMO meeting.
- Proposals for Legislative Coordination Working Group
(paper circulated October 30 meeting).
- Central America Program.

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BY LOJ 3/5/07

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DEC: ~~OADR~~

IG/T LIST OF ATTENDEES

November 20, 1985

Chairman: Robert Oakley

Justice: Jay B. Stephens

State: Parker W. Borg

CIA: [REDACTED]

OASD/ISA: Noel Koch

JSOA: MGen W. H. Rice

DOE: Col Edward V. Badolato

FBI: [REDACTED]

Treasury: Robert McBrien

DOT: Richard Noble, Deputy to Vincent

V.P.'s Office: No representative

NSC: Oliver North

DEA: Tom Cash, Deputy to Westrate

V.P. Task Force: Edward Peck

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FOIA(b) (7)(c)

12452

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11/05/85 EXT. 29892
EUR:WMOESSNER

EUR - C.H.THOMAS
EUR/RPM - M.KLOSSON

S/S-0 - D.SMITH

S/CT, EUR, EUR/RPM, S/S-0

IMMEDIATE BONN, LONDON IMMEDIATE, OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

TERREP EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER

SUBJECT: SUMMIT SEVEN: COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION

REF: LONDON 24022

RBO
RBO
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S/S-0

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY - UK RESERVATIONS, OUTLINED REFTEL, TO MEETING OF INTERIOR MINISTRY EXPERTS PROPOSED IN THE OAKLEY/HEUER LETTERS PARALLEL COMMENTS MADE BY UK EMBASSY. ALTHOUGH MEETINGS LAST MARCH HOSTED BY THE FRG INTERIOR AND FOREIGN MINISTRIES HAD COMMON ORIGINS IN THE PREPARATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION OF TERRORISM AT THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT, DEPARTMENT BELIEVES INTERIOR MINISTRY TYPE MEETING SHOULD BE DISTINCT FROM THE SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS GROUP (I.E. FOREIGN MINISTRY REPS.), DELINKED FROM THE SUMMIT PROCESS, AND EXPANDED TO INCLUDE A FEW SELECT NON-SUMMIT LIKE-MINDED NATIONS. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT AN EARLY MEETING OF EXPERTS FROM MINISTRIES OF INTERIOR AND OTHER AGENCIES TO SECURE AGREEMENT ON IMPORTANT PRACTICAL ISSUES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND

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BY LOT NARA, DATE 3/5/07

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INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES COMBATting TERRORISM. OUR SUPPORT FOR THIS MEETING DOES NOT SIGNAL ABANDONMENT OF THE EXPERTS GROUP, WHICH WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT. AS AGREED BY SEVEN FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THEIR SEPTEMBER DINNER, SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS GROUP SHOULD MEET TO PREPARE FOR THE TOKYO SUMMIT. WE ARE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A MEETING TO HELP RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF A WIDER MANDATE. PROGRESS IS NEEDED IN BOTH FORA. EMBASSIES ARE REQUESTED TO REVIEW THIS ISSUE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS AND REITERATE SUPPORT FOR A MEETING OF INTERIOR MINISTRY EXPERTS. END SUMMARY.

3. ON OCTOBER 28 UK EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVE PRESENTED UK RESERVATIONS TO INTERIOR MINISTRY TYPE MEETING, PARALLELING COMMENTS OUTLINED IN REFTEL. THE UK EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVE, SPEAKING WITH OAKLEY, NOTED THAT THE BRITISH WERE NOT AGAINST THE IDEA OF SUCH A MEETING AND RECOGNIZED ITS POTENTIAL UTILITY, BUT WORRIED THAT THE TIMING COULD CAUSE FRENCH ANNOYANCE AND DAMAGE CHANCES FOR A MEETING OF THE SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS GROUP SUGGESTED BY THE FRG TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF A WIDER MANDATE. THEY FEEL FIRST PRIORITY IS TO HAVE FRG SPEAK WITH FRANCE TO THRASH OUT FRENCH VIEWS ON WIDER MANDATE, MAKING CLEAR THAT FRENCH PARTICIPATION IS DESIRED.

4. DEPARTMENT RESPONDED THAT THE TWO MEETINGS DIFFER IN FUNCTION AND PURPOSE, AND ARE CONCERNED WITH DIFFERENT AND DISTINCT QUESTIONS, ALTHOUGH THEY BOTH DEAL WITH THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF TERRORISM. AS DISCUSSED BY SUMMIT SEVEN FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THEIR SEPTEMBER DINNER, WE WOULD WELCOME A MEETING OF THE SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS GROUP AND HOPE IT COULD HELP RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF A WIDER MANDATE; WE AGREE THAT THE FRENCH SHOULD BE INCLUDED IF POSSIBLE; BUT THIS MEETING SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED SOMEHOW IN COMPETITION WITH AN INTERIOR MINISTRY TYPE MEETING. AN INTERIOR MINISTRY TYPE MEETING, TO FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS RAISED AT AND SINCE THE MEETING HOSTED BY THE FRG MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR LAST MARCH, IS NEEDED TO FINALIZE AGREEMENT ON IMPORTANT PRACTICAL ISSUES OF COOPERATION AND COORDINATION AMONG THE SEVEN'S LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WHICH ARE INSTRUMENTAL IN THE EFFORT TO COMBAT TERRORISM. WE WOULD WELCOME APPROPRIATE FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN SUCH A MEETING, WHICH WE SEE AS A NON-POLITICAL, UNPUBLICIZED FORUM TO REACH AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL COOPERATION, AS OPPOSED TO THE SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS GROUP FORUM WHICH IS VALUABLE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY ALSO TO DISCUSS POLITICAL QUESTIONS. WE DO NOT SEE THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR TYPE MEETING AS NECESSARILY A SUMMIT SEVEN GROUP, AND FEEL

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THAT NON-SUMMIT EUROPEAN NATIONS COULD USEFULLY BE INCLUDED IN SUCH A FORUM. WE SUGGEST ONLY THAT BEFORE EXPANDING THE PARTICIPATION THE INITIAL FOLLOW UP MEETING BE AMONG THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SIX {OR SEVEN IF FRANCE ATTENDS} TO CONCLUDE MATTERS THEY PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED IN MARCH.

5. BECAUSE MANY EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTRIES ARE LESS OPERATIONALLY INVOLVED THAN OTHER HOST GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WORKING TO COMBAT TERRORISM, THE USG HAS ALSO BEEN WORKING WITH THE FRG AND LIKE-MINDED INTERIOR MINISTRIES, WHO SEE TERRORISM AS A SERIOUS, URGENT THREAT; WHO SEE THE NEED FOR URGENT ACTION ON UNILATERAL, BILATERAL, AND MULTILATERAL BASES; AND WHO SEEM MORE ABLE WHEN NECESSARY TO WORK AROUND QUESTIONS OF FORM {SUCH AS WHETHER OR NOT THE GOF ATTENDS} IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE RESULTS.

6. THE MEETING {WITHOUT FRANCE} IN BONN LAST MARCH CHAIRED BY FRG MINISTRY OF INTERIOR PRODUCED RAPID AGREEMENT ON SEVERAL VERY PRECISE, IMPORTANT MEASURES FOR IMPROVED COOPERATION IN COUNTERING TERRORISM. THE NEXT WEEK'S MEETING {WITH FRANCE} CHAIRED BY THE FRG MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS RESOLVED NOTHING {BONN 08019}. THE MEETING CHAIRED BY THE FRG INTERIOR MINISTRY DID NOT CAUSE GOF NOT TO ATTEND THE FOLLOWING WEEK'S SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS MEETING, NOR DID IT HAVE ANY NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE HOLDING OF A SUBSEQUENT SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS MEETING IN JULY.

7. IN A VERY USEFUL FOLLOW UP TO THE MARCH MEETING, THE FRG MINISTRY OF INTERIOR PRODUCED SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR SYSTEMATIC SHARING OF INFORMATION AND OTHER AREAS OF COOPERATION, AND SUGGESTED ANOTHER MEETING TO CONSIDER THESE PROPOSALS. THE USG HAS MADE AN EQUALLY SPECIFIC REPLY WHICH WE BELIEVE IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH A NUMBER OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS HELD IN LIAISON CHANNELS BETWEEN USG AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS, PARTICULARLY FRG, ITALY, UK AND CANADA {AND IN THE OTTAWA MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTRY REPS WITH THE LATTER TWO}. IT IS OUR STRONG BELIEF THAT URGENT ACTION NEEDS TO BE TAKEN TO OBTAIN APPROVAL OF PRECISE MODALITIES FOR SYSTEMATIC EXCHANGES, AND TO ENLARGE THE CIRCLE OF PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS. THIS IS ESSENTIAL TO RESPOND TO THE REAL-WORLD TERRORIST THREAT.

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8. AS THE CURRENT SUMMIT CHAIRMAN, IT IS CLEARLY UP TO THE FRG TO DECIDE HOW TO FOLLOW UP ITS SUGGESTION AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' DINNER IN SEPTEMBER FOR AN EXPERTS MEETING TO CONSIDER FUTURE COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION AMONG THE SEVEN. A SECOND MEETING TO THAT HOSTED BY THE INTERIOR MINISTRY SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED. FOR OUR PART, WE SUPPORT MEANINGFUL ACTION IN BOTH FORA WITH FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN BOTH IF POSSIBLE. ALTHOUGH THE TWO GROUPS HAD COMMON ORIGINS IN THE PREPARATORY PROCESS LEADING UP TO THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN BONN LAST MAY, WE BELIEVE THE TWO GROUPS ARE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT IN FUNCTION AND PURPOSE AND THAT THE INTERIOR MINISTRY GROUP SHOULD BE DIVORCED FROM THE PREPARATORY PROCESS OF ECONOMIC SUMMITS AND INSTEAD CONSIDERED A GROUP OF LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THIS GROUP CAN BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE TOKYO SUMMIT. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE VALUABLE IN FUTURE TO EXPAND PARTICIPATION BEYOND THE SIX {OR SEVEN IF FRANCE PARTICIPATES} TO A FEW SELECT LIKE-MINDED STATES. IF THE FRG CONCLUDES THAT IT CAN NOT PRESENTLY HOST SUCH A MEETING, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEE ANOTHER NATION HOST IT OR TO DO SO OURSELVES, WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE UK, CANADA, AND OTHERS. IF THE HOST WERE NOT THE SUMMIT CHAIRMAN, IT MIGHT HELP DE-LINK SUCH A MEETING FROM THE SUMMIT CONTEXT.

9. FYI ONLY - DEPARTMENT HAS DISCUSSED THE IDEA OF TWO DISTINCT TYPES OF MEETINGS, ONE AMONG THE SUMMIT'S EXPERTS AND ONE AN INTERIOR MINISTRY TYPE MEETING EXPANDED TO LIKE-MINDED NATIONS, WITH MR. JOHN HADWEN, THE NEW DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND DEPARTMENTAL SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA, AND MR. GERALD SKINNER, DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA, AT A MEETING NOVEMBER 4 IN WASHINGTON. CANADIAN DELEGATION AGREED IN PRINCIPLE WITH U.S. DISTINCTION, AND NOTED THAT CANADA IS WRITING TO THE FRG TO URGE THEM TO CALL AN INTERIOR MINISTRY TYPE MEETING. END FYI. LONDON AND BONN SHOULD COORDINATE WITH THE CANADIAN EMBASSY TO INSURE OUR VIEWS REINFORCE ONE ANOTHER WHEN SPEAKING WITH HOST GOVERNMENT.

10. POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO APPROACH THE FRG INTERIOR MINISTRY, THE OFFICE OF THE CANADIAN SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UK HOME OFFICE TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE USG ATTACHES TO EARLY CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN HEUER LETTER OF JULY 24 AND USG REPLY OF 18 OCT {STATE 320484}. THEY SHOULD DRAW UPON BACKGROUND AS SET FORTH ABOVE AND IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS OF USG POSITION ON THE SUMMIT SEVEN.

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11. FOR LONDON: YOU MAY WISH ALSO TO RAISE ISSUE WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY, SEEKING TO DRAW DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT WE BELIEVE SHOULD AND CAN BE TWO DISTINCT AND UNIQUELY USEFUL TRACKS. IF SO, YOU CAN RESTATE POINT THAT THE USG HAS NO OBJECTION TO UK, OR OTHERS, PURSUING THE SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS GROUP FORUM TO RESOLVE THE MANDATE QUESTION, BUT WE SEE ABSOLUTELY NO REASON TO WITHHOLD URGENTLY NEEDED CONSULTATION AND ACTION BETWEEN THOSE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM. MOREOVER, IN DISCUSSION LAST WEEK WITH OUR EMBASSY, QUAI D'ORSAY ONCE AGAIN EXPLAINED CLEARLY ITS CONCEPT OF VERY LIMITED ROLE WHICH SUMMIT SEVEN CAN PLAY (I.E. ONLY LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO CIVIL AVIATION).

12. FOR BONN: WE WOULD APPRECIATE STATUS REPORT ON 1. FRG REACTION TO OCTOBER 18 OAKLEY MESSAGE, AND 2. PLANS FOR FOLLOW UP TO SUMMIT SEVEN FOREIGN MINISTER DINNER, INCLUDING SCHEDULING OF EXPERTS MEETING. WE ARE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN WHETHER THE FRG SHARES THE DISTINCTIONS WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THESE TWO GROUPS.YYY

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S/CT:RBOAKLEY

SY:DFIELDS
EUR/RPM: MKLOSSON
CIA: DDO/DC/CPN:JPREHN
S/S-0: GTALCOTT

INR/GI
EUR/CE: MSTEINITZ
FBI:WAYNEGILBERT
S/S: JFCOLLINS

IMMEDIATE ROME

TERREP EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER

SUBJECT: SUMMIT SEVEN: COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION

~~RBO~~
~~RB~~
DF
MS

FOLLOWING IS A REPEAT QUOTE

O 180233Z OCT 85
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY FROM IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 320484

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER

SUBJECT: SUMMIT SEVEN: COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION

1. {~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.}

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO DR. GERHARD HEUER, DIRECTOR, INTERNAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F99-008/2 #12453

BY LOS NARA, DATE 3/5/07

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3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR DR. HEUER:

THE EXCELLENT SET OF PROPOSALS FOR INTENSIFYING COUNTER-TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AMONG THE SEVEN, CONTAINED IN YOUR LETTER OF JULY 24, HAS GIVEN US A GREAT DEAL TO WORK ON. MY REPLY, KEYED TO YOUR PROPOSALS FOR ACTION, REFLECTS THE VIEWS OF THE VARIOUS CONCERNED AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

1. AND 2. THE STANDARD EUROPEAN REPORTING FORMATS ON TERRORIST GROUPS AND INCIDENTS FOUND BROAD SUPPORT AMONG UNITED STATES AGENCIES. SOME CHANGES AND ADDITIONS WERE SUGGESTED, AS OUTLINED BELOW, IN ORDER TO MAKE THESE FORMATS AS COMPATIBLE AS POSSIBLE WITH THOSE BEING USED BY OUR AGENCIES AND TO MAKE THEM AS COMPLETE AS POSSIBLE. THIS SHOULD FACILITATE EXCHANGES AMONG US. ADDITIONALLY, WE SUGGEST EXPANDING THE SECTION ON INDIVIDUAL TERRORISTS. THESE FORMATS COMPLEMENT AND REINFORCE INITIATIVES ALREADY UNDERTAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO DEVELOP THE COUNTERTERRORISM MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM {CMAP} AND RELATED TWO-WAY COMPUTERIZED EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION WITH LIAISON SERVICES OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE SEVEN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT.

WE HAVE TRIED TO BALANCE BETWEEN THE NEED FOR COMPLETENESS, SO THE FORMATS WILL BE USEFUL TO SPECIALIZED CONSUMERS, AND SIMPLICITY, SO THAT THEY WILL BE SUITABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS WHO ARE TO RECEIVE THEM. THE SUGGESTED FORMATS ARE AT TAB A.

WE ARE CONCERNED, AND BELIEVE YOU SHARE OUR CONCERN, ABOUT WHICH AGENCIES IN PARTICIPATORY GOVERNMENTS ARE TO RECEIVE THESE REPORTS AND TO WHAT USES THEY WILL BE PUT. OUR CONCERN STEMS FROM THE NEED TO PROTECT METHODS AND SOURCES, MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY, NOT JEOPARDIZE POSSIBLE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, AND STILL DISSEMINATE THE INFORMATION AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE.

WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST QUESTION, WE BELIEVE THAT THE REPORTS SHOULD BE EXCHANGED THROUGH ESTABLISHED INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS, AND, IN OUR CASE, WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO APPROPRIATE INTELLIGENCE AND ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. THEY WOULD NOT BE

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DISTRIBUTED TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OR THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. HOWEVER, THIS INFORMATION WOULD BE REVIEWED CLOSELY TO SEE WHETHER IT MIGHT BE OF USE TO THESE OR OTHER AGENCIES. IN OUR VIEW, THE REPORTS ESSENTIALLY SHOULD BE AN INTELLIGENCE TOOL. FOR EXAMPLE, WE DO NOT ENVISAGE THEM BEING USED, IN THIS FORM, TO SUPPORT LEGAL PROCEEDINGS OR IN ANY WAY WHICH COULD BECOME PUBLIC. SHOULD IT BECOME NECESSARY TO USE THIS INFORMATION IN SUCH WAYS, PERMISSION OF THE ORIGINATING STATE MUST BE OBTAINED IN ADVANCE.

3. ON CONTROLLING THE TRAVEL OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, WE SUPPORT THE ARRANGEMENTS WORKED OUT BY THE TREVI GROUP. THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA SHARE A VERY OPEN BORDER AND ARE WORKING ON SIMILAR ARRANGMENTS BILATERALLY. BEYOND THESE ARRANGEMENTS, AS CAN BE SEEN FROM OUR PROPOSED ADDITION TO THE STANDARDIZED REPORTING FORMATS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DATA BANK ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS WOULD BE A USEFUL AREA FOR COOPERATION.

4. WITH REGARD TO A GREATER EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS BY OR FOR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO SUBMIT SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS AT THE NEXT MEETING.

5. AND 6. WE ARE FULLY PREPARED TO COOPERATE AT THE LEVEL OF OUR DIPLOMATIC POSTS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO COUNTER TERRORIST THREATS. WE AGREE THAT A SENSIBLE WAY TO PROCEED IS FOR EACH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO INSTRUCT ITS POSTS OF THE EXISTENCE OF THIS COOPERATION, AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO MEET, EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE THREAT AT POST, AND REPORT BACK ON MEASURES FOR ONGOING COOPERATION AND FOR EMERGENCIES. THE SECURITY OFFICE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WILL TAKE THE LEAD ON THIS ACTIVITY FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

HOWEVER, INFORMATION INVOLVING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND INTELLIGENCE LIAISON RELATIONS SHOULD REMAIN IN INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS.

WE APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR LIST OF THE TERRORIST THREAT EXISTING AT YOUR VARIOUS DIPLOMATIC PORTS. I WILL SEND YOU SEPARATELY A LIST OF OUR DIPLOMATIC POSTS ABROAD WHERE THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREAT. IT MAY WELL BE USEFUL FOR ALL PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS TO EXCHANGE THESE LISTS. OBVIOUSLY, EACH GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE ITS OWN CRITERIA AND ITS OWN VIEWS ON THE DEGREE OF

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THREAT TO ITS CITIZENS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.

7. WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT ON THE MEASURES YOU SUGGEST TO IMPLEMENT THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONS, SPECIFICALLY IN SUPPORTING THE EFFORTS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, INCREASED CONSULTATION AMONG THE SEVEN ON DIPLOMATS BELIEVED TO BE ENGAGED IN TERRORIST RELATED ACTIVITIES, AND INCLUDING THIS COOPERATION IN OUR CONSULTATIONS AT POSTS.

WITH RESPECT TO REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ANY PERSON AS A DIPLOMAT WHO HAS BEEN EXPELLED FROM ANOTHER COUNTRY FOR TERRORIST RELATED ACTIVITIES, WE SUGGEST THAT, AS A FIRST STEP, THIS BE ACCEPTED AS AUTOMATIC AMONG THE SEVEN, AND THAT A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO THIS EFFECT BE INCLUDED IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE HEADS OF STATE AFTER THE TOKYO SUMMIT. WITH RESPECT TO DIPLOMATS EXPELLED BY OTHER COUNTRIES, WE PROPOSE THAT PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS CONSULT FIRST BEFORE DECIDING ON WHETHER TO REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE PERSON.

8. WITH REGARD TO YOUR POINT ABOUT INTENSIFYING AND BROADENING COOPERATION TO FIGHT TERRORISM TO OTHER STATES, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A SPECIFIC SUGGESTION.

BEFORE THE END OF 1985 WHEN JAPAN ASSUMES THE SUMMIT SEVEN CHAIRMANSHIP, I WOULD URGE YOU TO CALL A FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO THAT HELD LAST MARCH IN BONN. PERHAPS A PRACTICAL WAY TO PROCEED WOULD BE TO CALL A ONE-DAY MEETING OF THE SEVEN, WITH THE GOAL OF OBTAINING THE AGREEMENT OF PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS ON THE STANDARDIZED REPORTING FORMAT AND ON THE VARIOUS MEASURES WE HAVE DISCUSSED.

THIS MEETING COULD BE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY A SOMEWHAT LARGER ONE DESIGNED TO EXPLORE THE EXTENT TO WHICH OUR AGREEMENTS COULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS THAT SHARE THE APPROACH SUGGESTED, ARE THREATENED BY SOME OF THE SAME TERRORIST GROUPS AS THREATEN THE SEVEN AND WITH WHOSE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO COOPERATE SATISFACTORILY. COUNTRIES I WOULD PROPOSE FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION AS INVITEES TO SUCH A LARGER MEETING ARE SPAIN, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS AND DENMARK.

I LOOK FORWARD TO GETTING TOGETHER WITH YOU SOON.

SINCERELY,

~~SECRET~~

ROBERT B. OAKLEY
DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY

TAB A

PART I {INCIDENT}

1. COUNTRY/OFFICE/DATE
2. TYPE OF INCIDENT {BY CODE}
3. COUNTRY/PLACE/ DATE AND TIME OF INCIDENT
4. TERRORIST GROUP {BY CODE}

PART II {INCIDENT}

1. DATE/TIME
PLACE/PROVINCE
METHOD OF OPERATION
PERSONS INVOLVED
GROUPS INVOLVED
2. MEANS USED {WEAPONS AND OTHER TECHNICAL MEANS}
WEAPONS
EXPLOSIVES {INCLUDING TIMING DEVICES, ETC.}
MEANS OF TRANSPORT
MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, IF ANY {RADIOS, ETC.}
3. CASUALTIES:
ATTACKERS/VICTIMS
KILLED/WOUNDED
HOSTAGES
4. CLAIMS AND MOTIVES {MESSAGES}
PLACE/DATE/DISTRIBUTION
DEGREE OF CREDIBILITY
WARNINGS GIVEN BEFORE INCIDENT
MOTIVES
5. NEGOTIATIONS:
DEMANDS/RESPONSE TO DEMANDS
DEADLINES/ RESPONSE TO MISSED DEADLINES
THREATS
6. TARGET
PERSONS {INCLUDE DETAILS OF POSITION}
PROPERTY {INCLUDE DETAILS ON TYPE OF TARGET}
PROTECTION OF TARGET

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7. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION
 - IDENTITIES {REAL AND FALSE} TRAVEL DOCUMENTS
 - {INCLUDING
 - VISAS, REAL AND FALSE}
 - OTHER DOCUMENTS
 - ROUTES AND PLACES STAYED AT
 - ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES
 - SUPPORTERS AND CONTACTS
8. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
 - ARREST WARRANTS
 - LEGAL ACTIONS ABROAD
 - SENTENCES
 - RELEASES {EXTRADITION OR DEPORTATION}
 - OTHER
9. REMARKS

PART III {PERSONS}

1. NAME {INCLUDING KNOWN ALIASES}
2. BIOGRAPHIC DATA
 - DATE OF BIRTH
 - PLACE OF BIRTH
 - HEIGHT
 - WEIGHT
 - COLOR: EYES/HAIR/SKIN
 - DISTINGUISHING MARKS OR CHARACTERISTICS
 - BUILD
 - CURRENT AND PAST ADDRESSES/TELEPHONE NUMBERS
 - EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND
 - EMPLOYMENT, PAST AND PRESENT
 - CRIMINAL RECORD: DATES/ OFFENSE/LOCATION/DISPOSITION
 - IDENTIFYING NUMBERS

12454

DER BUNDESMINISTER DES INNERN

Geschäftszeichen (bei Antwort bitte angeben)

(0228)

1.1.1.1

IS 3/P I 2 - 626 522/22

681-5415 24 July 1985

Der Bundesminister des Innern, Postfach 170290, 5300 Bonn 1

Dienstgebäude Nr. 1

Robert D. Oakley
Ambassador
Department of State, Head of the
Office for Combatting Terrorism,
State Department

Subject: Meeting of experts of the states party to the World Economic Summit on an "Analysis of Terrorism"
Reference: Meeting in Bonn on 7 and 8 March
Enclosures: - 4 -

Dear Mr. Oakley,

At the meeting in Bonn on 7 and 8 March 1985 the experts responsible for internal security considered a range of measures aimed at intensifying the exchange of information between the Seven with a view to warding off dangers arising from international terrorism. The experts issued the recommendation that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany as hosts to the meeting of experts engage in consultations with other Summit countries with the aim of implementing the measures agreed. In compliance with this decision I should like to propose the following options for concrete implementation of the measures planned:

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NLS F99-008/24 12454

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 3/5/07

1. Possibilities of further improvement in the cooperation of the authorities and agencies of the Seven Summit countries in the fight against terrorism

Within the framework of cooperation between the member states of the European Community as regards terrorism, a standardized pattern for establishing records of terrorist groups was developed which serves as a basis for reports in the member states. In detail the pattern provides for the following points:

- name of the group
- origin
- ideological complexion and public backing
- strength, structure and logistics
- field of activities, targets, mode of action
- connections to and amalgamation with other groups/circles/agencies at home and abroad
- support of the group by third persons
- actual dangerousness, tendency and prognosis.

At present experts in matters of terrorism of the member states of the European Community (so-called TREVI-cooperation) follow this pattern when establishing records of terrorist groups. As example you will find enclosed in this letter a description of the terrorist groups "Red Army Faction" and "Revolutionary Cells" active in the Federal Republic of Germany which is based on this pattern (enclosure 1).

Proposal for further action:

The pattern developed by TREVI could also serve as a basis for the exchange of information between the Seven in particular as regards terrorist groups operating on an international level.

Subsequent to the establishing of first records of terrorist groups a regular up-dating would have to be agreed upon in order to secure at any time topical information on active terrorist groups.

2. Exchange of data on past incidents in order to create a broader agreed data base and consideration of agreement on the basic information to be provided in reporting specific incidents

The working and information group on the fight against terrorism which basically consists of the competent heads of terrorism divisions of all central police authorities of the member states of the European Community but also of some other European countries has drawn up a standardized form for establishing records of terrorist activities and findings relating to these - in particular as regards any means and resources used by the offenders and mode of action (enclosure 2).

It is the purpose of this procedure to establish a joint inventory for the recognition of international terrorist activities. . .

Proposal for further action:

The standardized form could possibly also serve as a basis for the exchange of information between the competent security authorities of the Seven. The competent authority in the Federal Republic of Germany is the Federal Office of Criminal Police.

3. Intensification of measures to prevent from entering or remaining in their countries persons of other nationalities who are suspected of terrorism

One TREVI group of experts worked out a draft agreement on setting up an international system for the exchange of information among the member states of TREVI on undesirable aliens from third countries who constitute a terrorist threat. Details on the arrangements planned can be obtained from the agreement (enclosure 3).

The Ministers of the European Community responsible for internal security approved of the agreement at their meeting on 21 June 1985.

Proposal for further action:

An agreement along the same lines could also be concluded among the Seven.

4. Continuing to make full use of all intelligent sources of security authorities and established channels for exchanging information on terrorist threats and incidents, offenders (suspects), technical data and information on the behaviour and methods of responsible groups. Increase whenever possible the exchange of information on financial transactions by or for terrorist organizations.

This point should be covered by the exchange of information lined out in No 1-3.

5. Immediate bilateral and, as appropriate, multilateral consultations in case of a serious acute terrorist threat or a response or concerted action through established channels.

This point refers to a case by case measure.

Proposal for further action:

Further preparatory work as regards procedure does not seem to be necessary at present. Relevant consultations will, when appropriate, be started by a country subject to a terrorist threat or activity.

6. Cooperation to reach improved protective measures on site (embassies etc.) to counter terrorist threats more effectively

From our point of view the following German embassies are to be considered as being subject to particular threat:

South America/Central America

- | | |
|---|--|
| - Argentina (Buenos Aires) | - Mexico (Mexico City) |
| - Brazil (Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paolo) | - Nicaragua (Managua) |
| - El Salvador (San Salvador) | - Peru (Lima) |
| - Guatemala (Guatemala) | - Trinidad and Tobago (Port-of-Spain) |
| - Jamaica (Kingston) | |
| - Colombia (Bogota) | - Venezuela (Caracas) |

Africa

- | | |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| - Angola (Luanda) | - Burkina Faso (Ouagadougou) |
| - Guinea (Conakry) | - Zambia (Lusaka) |
| - Kenia (Nairobi) | - Senegal (Dakar) |
| - Mozambique (Maputo) | - Chad (N'Djamena) |
| - Nigeria (Lagos) | - Uganda (Kampala) |
| - Nigeria (Kaduna) | |

Near and Middle East

- | | |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------|
| - Iran (Teheran) | - Thailand (Bangkok) |
| - Lebanon (Beirut) | - Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby) |

Proposal for further action:

Embassies of the Seven located in the countries mentioned above - and as appropriate in other countries where according to your point of view a particular threat is given - could be instructed to hold regular joint discussions on the security situation and to report on it. These discussions should not only deal with an exchange of information on concrete threat assessment, protection of VIP's and vulnerable objects planned or carried out including experience gained, but should also cover questions of concrete cooperate and mutual assistance to reach improved protection against threats on site. Security experts should be dispatched to take part in the discussions if necessary.

The paper worked out by the Federal Office of Criminal Police on securing and protecting German diplomatic missions abroad (distributed at the London meeting of experts in April 1984) and the decisions on mutual assistance taken at the Washington meeting of experts in January 1981 could serve as a guideline for these joint security discussions.

7. Measures to counter misuse of diplomatic privileges by certain states sponsoring terrorist activities

Several multinational bodies have dealt with questions of terrorism in relation to misuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities. Most recently the Council of Europe and an ad hoc-working group set up by the Council have started work on the problem. It is not the purpose of this work to bring about a revision of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations but rather to deal with the implementation of the Convention.

Proposal for further action:

The Council of Europe should be supported in its dealing with the problem.

As a concrete measure the Seven should strengthen their cooperation when exchanging information on members of diplomatic missions of whom there is reason to believe that they are involved in terrorist activities. In general, a member state should refuse to accept any person as diplomat who was expelled from another country for his links with terrorism.

In the case of a possible joint response to a concrete case of misuse standing in relation to a terrorist activity the country concerned has the opportunity to initiate relevant consultations (no. 5).

8. Intensification of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism with other states and within international organizations

Within the Council of Europe and between the member countries of the European Community a readiness for closer cooperation in the fight against terrorism can be discerned. The a.m. measures planned by the experts of the Seven serve the same purpose. Some countries are furthermore supported in police training, equipment etc.

Proposal for further action:

Steps in the direction of a closer cooperation in the fight against terrorism should be expressly supported. Concrete shortcomings and if possible ways of remedying them should remain on the agenda of future meetings of experts of the Seven.

I should be obliged to you if you sent me your opinion on the proposed implementation of the decisions taken at the Bonn meeting of experts on 7 and 8 March 1985 and possibly put forward further considerations.

Enclosure 4 is a revised edition in German and in English of the report on terrorism in the various regions of the world.

Moreover, I included several photographs of our last meeting in Bonn on 7 and 8 March.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. Lenz". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "G" and a long, sweeping underline.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F99-008/2 #12455

by L01 3/5/07

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SUBJECT: US-Israeli Consultations on Counter-Terrorism

The following items were discussed during consultations with the Israeli Prime Minister's Advisor on Terrorism, Amiram Nir, during his visit to Washington, November 13-15, 1985:

International Organizations, Agreements and Sanctions

State's Legal Advisor and the Israeli MFA legal advisor agreed to exchange draft outlines of legal issues relating to terrorism and how international organizations could be most effectively used. After reviewing the respective drafts, a follow-up meeting would be useful in late December or mid-December.

Discussions on Security and Emergency Planning

State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security Asst Secy Lamb discussed with Nir areas for future consultation and cooperation

Discussions on Aviation Security and R&D Cooperation

- An FAA team led by Billy Vincent will visit Israel Dec 9 to discuss aviation security and explosive detection.
- An FBI HRT team will visit Israel's military and police HRTs in January 1986. DOD and FBI are invited to send technical experts on rapid entry to join this visit.
- TS† - Exchange of aviation security
Col Zur, Isr Emb, to visit TS† to discuss airline security measures, techniques
- ATF exchange studies and analysis
team to visit Israel in Jan or Feb
- Hostage negotiation
Israel will send 10-12 man team to visit FBI academy and NYPD for exchanges in Feb

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FOIA(b)(1)

--Enhanced response techniques

State will forward to Israel prior to Dec 1 info clarifying research areas which fit under this topic

--Air and ~~water~~ borne intrusion devices

State will provide response bun Dec 1 for setting up visits

--Chemical/biological research

State will advise Israel by Dec 1 of status of DOD efforts to adapt C/B detectors for use in detecting non-military agents.



--financial movements of terrorist orgs

FBI working with Treasury and CIA will work out needs and area for cooperation

~~SECRET~~

to AMBASSADOR OAKLEY

Department
of the Treasury

Office of the
Assistant Secretary
for Enforcement
and Operations

room 4314 date: 9/24/85

RE: Legislative Initiatives and Terrorism

FYI, Treasury's views on one recent piece of terrorism legislation.

It seems to me that the various pieces of terrorism-related legislative ideas being introduced on the Hill ought to have a better coordinated Administration response than the rather uncertain, unreliable OMB clearance process for legislative comments.

It ought to well serve the IG/T if individual agency views on terrorism bills were solicited through the IG/T members in addition to the OMB process. We could resolve differences at the policy level (I hope) and drive the position being taken by the Administration rather than allowing OMB to "piecemeal" our views on terrorism bills.

Perhaps agency views on terrorism related bills could be circulated among IG/T members as a matter of SOP. We would not need to have meetings unless significant differences in key views had to be resolved. Written views, even telephone calls, would probably suffice in most instances.

Attachment


Robert McBrien
Deputy for Security Affairs
and Crisis Management
room 4314
phone 566-8534