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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Withdrawer

DLB 6/1/2005

File Folder INCOMING - 12/04/1985 - CLASSIFIED

FOIA

F99-008/2

Box Number 32

WILLS

34

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 12463 | PAPER | RECEIVING AND DEBRIEFING RELEASED U.S. HOSTAGES R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2 | 3 | 12/4/1985 | B1 |
| 12464 | MEMO | ROBERT OAKLEY TO MR. ARMACOST, RE: NEW INTER-AGENCY UNDERSTANDING ON EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAMS (EST) R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2 | 2 | 11/29/1985 | B1 |
| 12465 | MEMO | RE: INITIATIVES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAM (EST) IMPROVEMENTS FROM A MEETING AMONG NSC, STATE, JSOA, JSOC, AND CIA REPRESENTATIVES, NOV 1985 R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2 | 2 | 11/27/1985 | B1 |
| 12466 | MEMO | JOHN CAMPBELL TO MR. BORG, RE: EST DEPLOYMENT R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2 | 2 | 11/27/1985 | B1 |
| 12467 | MEMO | FOR THE FILES, RE: SRG MEETING, DEC 6 PAR 3/5/2007 F99-008/2 | 2 | ND | B1 |
| 12468 | LIST | TSWG FY 1986 PRIORITIES R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2 | 1 | 11/26/1985 | B1 |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



*file 4 Dec 12463
in class
(Pat gave this to me
Feb 26 -*

United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 4, 1985

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT FOR RECEIVING AND DEBRIEFING
RELEASED U.S. HOSTAGES

PLAN SUMMARY

The Department of State will coordinate the overall reception and debriefing effort of American hostages being held in Lebanon. The FBI will coordinate the interagency effort to debrief the hostages and disseminate the information to all interested USG agencies. If possible, receptions and debriefings for hostages from the Middle East will be held at the Air Force Hospital in Wiesbaden along the lines of the TWA 847 hostage debriefings - medical examinations, psychological screenings and formal debriefings. Other sites to serve returnees from other areas of the world need to be identified and surveyed. To improve on the TWA experience, the reception effort will be extended to a minimum of three days, assuming the hostages do not object. This will permit more detailed debriefings and provide the individuals more time to transition from captivity to freedom.

There are a number of precedents which argue strongly for the Administration to provide free transportation for two or three close family members to the debriefing site and back to the United States (with the released hostages), particularly in high-profile hostage cases. This is an important consideration which must be kept in mind so that timely decisions can be made at the time of a hostage release.

The reception site and debriefing team require at least 24 - 48 hours to properly prepare for the arrival of the hostages and their family members. The interagency debriefing team, therefore, needs to be dispatched at the earliest opportunity, once it is certain that there will be a debriefing. Upon release, freed hostages should be flown by military air from the point of release to the pre-selected reception site. A psychiatrist and a doctor should accompany the hostages from the release point to the reception site. If a tactical debriefing by JCS is warranted prior to arrival at the reception site, it should not begin until government physicians and psychiatrists have had an opportunity to examine each released captive. State

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BY LOT, NARA, DATE 3/5/07

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will ensure that family members are escorted to the reception site, briefed on the reception/debriefing program and provided sufficient opportunity to visit with their loved ones. State will also coordinate all USG relations with the media at the debriefing site.

The FBI will coordinate the interagency debriefing effort along the guidelines used for the TWA 847 effort. If JCS conducts a preliminary debriefing, it will immediately provide the formal debriefing team an interim written report of its interview. The FBI will also ensure that preliminary reports of the debriefing are disseminated as quickly as possible and that a detailed final report is made available to other agencies after a suitable length of time. Follow-up debriefings by the individual agencies are encouraged, but should be coordinated with State and the FBI.

PRE-RELEASE ACTIONS

The IG/T and/or permanent interagency working group, upon approval from the NSC, will accomplish the following pre-release actions:

Provide appropriate overseas diplomatic posts, theater commanders and other governmental agencies the tentative USG plan for receiving/debriefing U.S. hostages to permit them to pre-plan their own support effort.

Determine interagency team leadership and composition to receive/debrief single and multiple releases of the U.S. hostages.

- Identify personnel from each agency and develop necessary alert and deployment rosters.
 - For a single release, 16-18 members - DOS/5, FBI/4, CIA/2, DIA/1, (JCS/1), Theater CINC/4 and (NSC/1).
 - For a double release, 21-23 members - DOS/6, FBI/6, CIA/4, DIA/1, (JCS/1), Theater CINC/4 and (NSC/1).

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- For the release of six, 23-25 members -
DOS/6, FBI/8, CIA/4, DIA/1, (JCS/1), Theater
CINC/4 and (NSC/1).

Forward to DOD likely administrative and personnel support requirements - office space, billeting, communications, security, etc.

Coordinate in advance the interagency strategy and individual agency responsibilities for handling the media.

Develop an interagency debriefing plan which meets the needs of USG agencies and includes a coordinated list of questions.

Develop a plan for notifying families of hostages being released of the USG plans for:

- Receiving and debriefing of freed family members.
- For escorting selected hostage family members to and from the reception site.
- For hosting both released hostages and family members during the debriefings.

RELEASE ACTIONS

Notify concerned Washington agencies and implement pre-coordinated alerting procedures (which include support requirements) to appropriate overseas diplomatic posts and military commands.

Formalize size and composition of reception and debriefing team and appropriately notify individuals.

Formalize transportation requirements for debriefing team, freed hostage and family members with DOD.

Formalize procedures for notifying family members and escorting them to the reception site.

Dispatch an advance element or the entire debriefing team as appropriate.

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TASK FORCE ROUTING SHEET

Date of Receipt 4 Dec Router's Initials RE

Remarks: EST Matters, especially the Egyptian Hijacking case....

| | | | |
|-----------|---|---|-----------------|
| Holloway | Λ | Ⓢ | <u>M</u> |
| Peck | Λ | I | <u>Has seen</u> |
| Coy | Λ | Ⓢ | <u>OK</u> |
| Boink | Λ | Ⓢ | <u>Boink</u> |
| Cole | Λ | I | <u>Has seen</u> |
| Daly | Λ | I | <u>Has seen</u> |
| Earl | Λ | Ⓢ | <u>RE</u> |
| Hutchings | Λ | Ⓢ | <u>Has seen</u> |
| McMunn | Λ | Ⓢ | <u>M</u> |
| Doris | Λ | I | |
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Deadline Date File in "EST" after routing.

Incoming Chrono File YES

Data Base Keyword(s) EST, STATE

Filer DORIS Out

Subject Working File

SECRET

For use of this form, see AR 380-5; the proponent agency is ACSI.

THIS IS A COVER SHEET
FOR
INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
BASIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN
INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM REGULATION
DOD 5200.1-R AS SUPPLEMENTED BY COMPONENT
REGULATIONS

THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THE INFOR-
MATION CONTAINED IN THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S)
COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO CAUSE SERIOUS
DAMAGE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY

HANDLING, STORAGE, REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION
OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN REGULATIONS
CITED ABOVE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

all 6/26/05

(This cover sheet is unclassified when separated from classified documents)

SECRET

DA LABEL 23
1 MAY 73

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS LABEL ARE OBSOLETE * U.S. G.P.O. 1974-552-726



United States Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S

November 29, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

TO: P - Mr. Armacost
FROM: S/CT - Robert B. Oakley
SUBJECT: New Inter-agency Understanding on Emergency Support Teams (EST)

At meetings with DOD, CIA and the NSC on November 14 and 27, we reached a new inter-agency understanding on the organization and deployment of Emergency Support Teams (EST) to supplement the initial agreement of November 1984. We are very pleased with the new arrangement, but will be watching carefully its implementation over the course of the coming months.

The new agreement defines more precisely the mission of the EST and maintains State's lead role. Key new elements are decisions that 1) DOD and CIA will continue their efforts to establish a forward base concept for equipment and advance elements, 2) CIA will be responsible for airlift support once it acquires its EST-dedicated aircraft (due shortly) with DOD providing backstop support, and 3) an EST working group will be established to coordinate and integrate the separate EST components, developing more flexible concept with different team compositions for different types of incident.

DOD was criticized strongly during the sessions for not moving more rapidly on forward basing. JSOC is now considering not only the temporary deployment of 6-8 man teams to Akrotiri for travel in the region to explain EST capabilities and be available for emergencies, but is looking at the forward deployment of a portion of its counter-terrorism force to a base in Europe so that it will be available more rapidly at the time of an incident. State

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DECL: OADR

BY LAT, NARA, DATE 3/5/07

should take a lead role in briefing our Ambassadors on the EST as well as in responding to emergencies, and we will work with DOD and CIA to set up interagency briefing teams. (This will require a couple of additional bodies for S/CT.)

In addition to a copy of the November 27 agreement, which the NSC might be issuing shortly as one of its documents, I enclose a copy of the report which S/CT's leader of the most recent EST prepared which outlines the confusion which reigned once again at the time of departure from Andrews. Had the EST departed with a four-hour lead time from official notification, as JCS and JSOA had told us it would, arrival in Sigonella would have been six hours earlier -- in time deliver specialized equipment and technicians to Malta well before the Egyptian attack.

Attachment: A) Memorandum of November 27, 1985
B) Campbell Memo of November 27, 1985

CC: INR (Abramowitz), PM (Holmes)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
~~DECL: OADR~~



SECRET/SENSITIVE

November 27, 1985

SUBJECT: INITIATIVES FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAM (EST) IMPROVEMENTS FROM A MEETING AMONG NSC, STATE, JSOA, JSOC AND CIA REPRESENTATIVES, NOVEMBER 1985

PARTICIPANTS: State
JSOA
JSOC
CIA
NSC

Participants met on November 14 and November 27 to discuss initiatives to improve the effectiveness and responsiveness of the Emergency Support Team (EST). The following were identified and approved, on behalf of their respective agencies and will henceforth apply to the formation and deployment of the EST.

1. The mission of the EST will be expanded to read: "The mission of the EST is to provide senior embassy officials, host government leaders, and incident managers guidance about U.S. capabilities to provide crisis management assistance, specialized intelligence and increased secure communications. The secondary mission of the EST is to collect intelligence and make other arrangements for possible direct USG intervention. EST support will be responsive, flexible and tailored to the unique requirements of each incident."

2. The National Security Advisor, through the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG) and with approval of the participating agencies will coordinate the deployment of the various EST elements as required. CIA will provide special airlift support. JSOA will coordinate/request military airlift support for the EST.

3. State, CIA and JSOC will provide the primary assets needed to support the EST mission. State will continue to lead the EST teams. The TIWG can draw on the assets of other agencies and organizations on a case-by-case basis, according to pre-coordinated agreements for support.

4. The EST will be formed using pre-configured, deployable packages of personnel and equipment. These elements will be configured in terms of access constraints, deployment responsiveness and capabilities required. (An EST working group will ensure that the elements, while separate

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DECL: OADR

BY MT DATE 3/5/07

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entities, are mutually supportive and adequately integrated with other mission components. Each agency participating in the EST will establish rosters identifying people and equipment charged to support EST deployments. These rosters should be organized according to the separate elements of the pre-configured packages.)

5. Both DOD and CIA will continue their efforts to establish a forward base concept for the EST in conjunction with planning for forward deployments of other counter-terrorism elements.

6. The IG/T will send out a general instruction to all major posts explaining the EST mission and the support it offers. A State-CIA-JSOC briefing team will visit high threat posts overseas to explain EST and JSOC capabilities in detail. The Department of State will establish a program to brief new Chiefs of Mission and Deputy Chiefs of Mission on services and support offered by the EST and JSOC.

7. The IG/T, under NSC authority, should direct and arrange funding for one major exercise a year. A no-notice deployment exercise will be held in the second quarter of FY-86.

8. Each agency will be responsible for planning and executing its portion of the EST mission. To facilitate coordination, EST agencies will meet regularly in a working group forum. Member agencies will keep the IG/T informed by forwarding the status of their EST preparations through their sitting member. The IG/T will forward this information to the TIWG.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 27, 1985

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MEMORANDUM

TO: S/CT - Mr. Borg

FROM: - John Campbell *JL*

SUBJECT: EST Deployment - Egyptair Hijacking, 11/23-25

Following your 7:00 p.m. call, I arrived at Andrews AFB at 10:15 p.m. Saturday, November 25, for a scheduled 11:00 p.m. departure. The CIA (10), NSA (3) and JSOC (4) components of the EST arrived shortly thereafter with their equipment, ready to load. A series of delays ensued, involving at least two MAC aircraft, one of which was found to have a serious fuel leak when it arrived from McGuire AFB about 1:30 a.m. A replacement aircraft was dispatched from McGuire and we finally departed at 4:45 a.m. Sunday. Unfortunately, our C-141 did not have the necessary modification to permit in flight secure voice communication. As a result, we were completely out of touch with developments in Malta for the duration of the 9 hour flight to Sigonella.

takedown at 8:15

Upon arrival at Sigonella at 8:00 p.m. local time, we found that an Italian military helicopter was cleared for a flight to Malta and that the GOM had agreed to permit two of our technicians, with their equipment, to proceed to Lugua airport. It was decided that Les Dubbin, who had arrived with John Tingle from Weisbaden, would accompany the technicians since he had been in Malta very recently in connection with a crisis management course for senior Maltese officials. We received word shortly after 9:00 p.m. that the Egyptian assault had taken place and that there would be no need for EST involvement.

We departed for Andrews at 2:30 p.m., Monday, November 25, minus the JSOC component, and arrived eleven hours later. I arrived home 30 minutes short of 48 hours from my departure.

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BY LAT NARA, DATE 3/5/07

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Once again, a long delay at Andrews made any EST contribution impossible. If we had arrived at Sigonella six hours earlier we might have been able to play an important role in a very different resolution of the incident. Tingle and Dubbin also experienced a lengthy delay in Weisbaden, even after an aircraft had been readied but before flight clearance was received.

If the EST is to be effective, we simply have to be at the scene as early as possible.

If the S/CT representative is to make a serious contribution, we need to have our own secure communications, and a more clearly defined role.

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TASK FORCE ROUTING SHEET

Date of Receipt | 12/8/85 | Router's Initials | ELP

Remarks: FYI

| | | | |
|----------------------|-------|-------------------------------------|------|
| Holloway | Λ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | 4 |
| Peck | Λ | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Coy | Λ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | OK |
| Boink | Λ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | hold |
| Cole | Λ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | |
| Daly | Λ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | |
| Earl | Λ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | |
| Hutchings | Λ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | |
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NLS F99-008/2 #12467

By LOI, NARA, Date 3/5/07

Dec 7 12467
430



FOIA(b)(1)

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for the Files

Subject: SRG Meeting, Dec 6
ERP

A rather hurried but substantively solid meeting, which bore a fairly close relation to both of the agendas (attached).

BONN MEETING. This will be the last effort by the FRG as chairman to obtain agreement over continued French objections to the use of the Summit Seven as a forum for terrorism discussions. The Germans will not succeed; the US is attending as a sign of good faith. The interesting meeting will occur the following day, at which the US and the FRG will propose informal acceptance of a single system for terrorism information exchange, form, reporting method, intelligence data (ORCON controls are a potential problem, but everything that is in the reports is intended to be shared with all participants in the program).

SUDAN. Dep Asst Sec for AF Bishop provided a run-down of the growing concern for the safety of the US personnel and installations in the Sudan, particularly as a result of the changes in attitudes, key people and capabilities of the host government, and the presence of numbers of known PLO and Libyan terrorists, plus their freedom of movement despite US complaints. A first-cut drawdown is being threatened unless the Govt does something about the problem.

EGYPTAIR WRAPUP. A lively exchange of somewhat differing views of what went right and wrong, where and for what reasons followed. Everyone cited the delays in getting underway with the response and force teams as contributing to the outcome, plus some rather severe breakdowns in communication, [REDACTED] and Maltese/Egyptian procedures.

EST GUIDELINES. The NSC will issue them along the lines of the Washington Post article.

DEBRIEF GUIDELINES. Copy attached. State DOD and the CIA, FBI and others deal with the issue of who gets to ask what when.

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MARITIME SECURITY. DOT and the Coast Guard reported last week that no one has any plans to do anything: the costs are

enormous. The baggage problem on cruise ships, with lots of people moving lots of baggage, was cited as an illustration. It may be easier to do ships rather than ports, nevertheless. Agreed standards are in train based on US proposals accepted by IMCO, and teams will be sent to evaluate ports in high-threat areas in the "near future". It appears that new authorities will be needed for MIRAD and others involved in the exercise.

TSWG. OMB has agreed to include the R&D budget of \$23 million in the State supplemental (the Inman supplemental on security and terrorism). Lobbying will be needed by all hands. Copy of the breakdown is attached.

CENTRAL AMERICA. The SFRC has passed a modified proposal, taking out all military assistance and leaving \$20 million for the civilian side. It appears that the House will also pass it, perhaps at the \$15 million level.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. The Working Group has evidently come up with a set of proposals for consideration by the IG/T

SPECIAL BRIEFING. The presentation of the study done for Koch on the impact of government policies and actions on terrorism was put off for a special session at a later date. (We will be invited.) Copy attached. In sum, there seems to be a correlation between what governments say and do and the response of terrorists.. The thin book is a quick read; we would agree with all of it. The Conclusions in the thicker volume at page 7-1, are ditto. (There are also two big books on methodology and numbers gaming.)

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December 3, 1985

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the Interdepartmental Group on
Terrorism

FROM: Ambassador Robert B. Oakley
Chairman, IG/T

SUBJECT: IG/T Meeting, December 6, 1985, 11:00 a.m.,

1. Situation in the Sudan.
2. Summit Experts Meetings in Bonn, December 10-11, and
proposal for a Conference on Terrorists' Use of
Travel Documents
3. Egyptair after action wrap-up.
4. EST guidelines. *NSC will issue as per w/ article*
5. Debrief guidelines. *attached*
6. Public diplomacy working group status report.
7. Legislative coordination working group report.
8. Maritime security status report.
9. Technical support working group report. ✓
10. Central America program.
11. Special briefing on terrorism study (if time permits).

Sudan

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 6/1/02

Amb Peck

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 3, 1985

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the Interdepartmental Group on
Terrorism

FROM: Ambassador Robert B. Oakley *RO*
Chairman, IG/T

SUBJECT: IG/T Meeting, December 6, 1985, 11:00 a.m.,

1. Economic Summit Experts Meetings in Bonn, December 10-11
proposal for a Conference on Terrorists' Use of
Travel Documents
2. Egyptair after action wrap-up.
3. EST guidelines.
4. Debrief guidelines.
5. Public diplomacy working group status report.
6. Legislative coordination working group report.
7. Maritime security status report.
8. Technical support working group report.

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DECL: OADR

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 6/17/05

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NLS F99-008/2#12468

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BY ADT 3/5/07

26 November 1985

TSWG
FY 1986 PRIORITIES

| TASK AREA | PRIORITY | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------|------|------|------|
| | I | II | III | IV |
| I. Threat and Technology Assessment | | | | |
| A. Counterterrorism R&D Data Base | 350 | | | |
| B. Vulnerability Analysis | | | | |
| 1. Energy Systems Vulnerability Analysis | | 500 | | |
| C. Behavioral Effects | | | | |
| 1. Threat Credibility Assessment Systems | | | 500 | |
| 2. Terrorists' Attitudes and Profiling System | | | 500 | |
| II. Defensive Countermeasures R&D | | | | |
| A. Threat Material Detection | | | | |
| 1. High Explosive (HE) Detection | | | | |
| Advanced Barrier HE Detection Systems | | | 1000 | |
| Ultrasensitive HE Detection Systems | | | | 400 |
| Fast Neutron HE Detection Technology | | | | 500 |
| 2. Chemical/Biological (C/B) Detection | | | | |
| C/B Barrier Detection Technology | | 2000 | | |
| Target Monitoring/Hardening Technology | 1500 | | | |
| Advanced C/B Detection Systems | 3150 | | | |
| 3. Nuclear Detection | | | | |
| Portable Barrier Detection Systems | | | 400 | |
| Advanced Vehicle Mounted Search Systems | | | | 300 |
| Inexpensive Handheld Search Systems | | | 300 | |
| 4. Human-Based Agent Detection | | | | |
| Airborne Intrusion Detection | | | 1000 | |
| Waterborne Intrusion Detection | | 1000 | | |
| B. Low-Profile Defensive Countermeasures | | | | 2000 |
| III. Incident Response R&D | | | | |
| A. Portable Diagnosis and Disablement | | | | |
| 1. Spatial Analysis and Diagnostic Systems | 2000 | | | |
| 2. Active RF Detection and Location Systems | | | 600 | |
| 3. Denied Area Monitor | | 1000 | | |
| B. Barricaded Hostage Situation | | | | |
| 1. Surveillance | | | | 500 |
| 2. Incapacitation | | | | 500 |
| 3. Rapid Entry | | | 250 | |
| C. Chemical/Biological Response | | | | |
| 1. Individual Personnel Protection | 1000 | | | |
| 2. C/B Countermeasures | 1000 | | | |
| D. Crisis Management | | 500 | | |
| IV. Technology Transfer | | | | |
| A. Training | | | | |
| 1. General Training | 200 | | | |
| 2. Field Exercises | | 300 | | |
| B. Technological Response Capability | 500 | | | |
| TOTAL | 9700 | 5300 | 4550 | 4200 |

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