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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

**Withdrawer**

DLB 6/7/2005

**File Folder** NSDD ON VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE (10 OF 13)

**FOIA**

F99-008/2

**Box Number** 34

WILLS

54

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
13661	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 39 <b>R 10/1/2008 NLRRF99-008/2</b>	1	ND	B1
13663	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 40 <b>R 10/1/2008 NLRRF99-008/2</b>	1	ND	B1 B3
13664	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 42 <b>R 10/1/2008 NLRRF99-008/2</b>	2	ND	B1
13665	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 45 <b>R 2/2/2012 F1999-008/2</b>	2	ND	B1
13666	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 46 <b>D 10/1/2008 NLRRF99-008/2</b>	4	ND	B1
13668	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 47	2	ND	B1
13671	CABLE	#180233Z OCT 85 <b>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</b>	2	10/18/1985	B1
13672	MEMO	RB BENTLEY TO ROBERT OAKLEY, RE: COMMENTS ON ISSUES PAPERS OF VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM <b>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</b>	3	11/7/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
13674	MEMO	NORTH TO JOHN POINDEXTER, RE: MEETING OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATting TERRRORISM <b>R 10/1/2008 NLRRF99-008/2</b>	2	11/12/1985	B1
13677	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (ALTERNATIVE VERSION) <b>R 10/1/2008 NLRRF99-008/2</b>	1	ND	B1
13679	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 7 <b>R 2/2/2012 F1999-008/2</b>	1	ND	B1
13681	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 11 <b>R 10/1/2008 NLRRF99-008/2</b>	1	ND	B1
13682	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 14 <b>R 10/1/2008 NLRRF99-008/2</b>	2	ND	B1
13684	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 16 <b>R 2/2/2012 F1999-008/2</b>	1	ND	B1
13685	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 17 <b>R 10/1/2008 NLRRF99-008/2</b>	1	ND	B1
13687	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 21 <b>R 10/1/2008 NLRRF99-008/2</b>	1	ND	B1
13689	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 22 <b>D 10/1/2008 NLRRF99-008/2</b>	1	ND	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
13691	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 24 <b>R 10/1/2008 NLRRF99-008/2</b>	1	ND	B1
13692	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 25 <b>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</b>	1	ND	B1
13694	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 30 <b>R 5/16/2006 F99-008/2</b>	1	ND	B1
13695	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 45	1	ND	B1

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 35

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, CIA, JCS

SUBJECT: Country Team Briefings

ISSUE: A terrorist incident often forces an Embassy Country Team to deal with the variety of resources the USG has committed to combat terrorism. All USG employees need to be better aware of the terrorist threat overseas. At present only employees of State, AID and USIA are required to take the FSI course on coping with terrorism. Some agencies offer their own training, but most do not. In many posts a majority of employees are not from these agencies and therefore may not have had any briefing on terrorism before arriving at post.

The Ambassador may be required to present potential options or describe our capabilities to the host nation. Prior knowledge of USG policies, resources, and capabilities will ensure a quick transition to the necessary crisis management.

PROPOSAL: The State Department should move ahead with plans to expand the coping with terrorism course from one to two days. The course should cover the policies, resources and capabilities committed to combatting terrorism, as well as security matters, and be given to employees before departing for post.

The NSC should direct that this course become mandatory for all USG employees, whose agencies do not offer equivalent alert training.

The State Department should require all posts to establish their own briefing program for newcomers, which includes risk assessment and other country specific situations. Furthermore, counter-terrorism exercises at post should be combined with a detailed briefing on U.S. counter-terrorist policies and capabilities.

The State Department should proceed with its plans for a special high level briefing on security and terrorism for Ambassadors, DCM's and Chiefs of Mission conferences. State, working with DOD and CIA should put together a briefing paper on crisis support capabilities which can be sent to Chiefs of Mission when a crisis is anticipated or immediately after it has begun.

STAFF CONTACT: Mr. B. Hutchings, 395-4950

ISSUE PAPER NO. 36

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: NSC, FBI, TREASURY

SUBJECT: U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

ISSUE: Several recognized authorities have indicated that the U.S. infrastructure is extremely vulnerable to acts of terrorism or sabotage. Examples include the computerized banking system, power grids, and communications networks. Sources claim what is needed is a long-term program of security enhancement to minimize the effects of terrorism or sabotage against these facilities. Most sources agree that while there does not appear to be an immediate threat, the ease with which infrastructure targets can be attacked with potentially catastrophic results make them lucrative for terrorists in peacetime and vulnerable during open hostilities.

PROPOSAL: NSC should direct FEMA to take the lead in an interagency study to identify the extent to which these infrastructure assets are vulnerable and propose near- and long-term programs to rectify what appears to be a potentially serious national security problem.

STAFF CONTACT: CAPT L. H. Boink, 395-6177

Issue Paper No. 37

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: JUSTICE, STATE, DEFENSE, CIA

SUBJECT: Interference with the Movement of Nuclear Material

ISSUE: Domestically, there is increasing evidence of organized interference directed against Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear material shipments. Organized surveillance, demonstrations and actual harassment of shipments by antinuclear groups are increasing steadily in numbers and militancy. Most of the protestors being arrested for illegal acts of interference are not being prosecuted, primarily because of budget and manpower constraints. Protest organizations openly state that future DOE shipments will attract even larger demonstrations and increased civil disobedience because of the reduced threat of prosecution. Present Federal statutes do not provide for criminal penalties unless acts of violence occur or if trucks, trains or other government property is damaged.

Overseas, similar, if not necessarily affiliated, protest organizations such as Greenpeace or the "Greens" in the FRG harass movements from port-of-entry to military installation and between installations. In several instances they have broken through the perimeter fencing, entered installations and caused damage. While none of these activities have, as yet, actually prevented movement of materials or damage to them, the increasing stridency of the movements and their apparent frustration with their present inability to shape events argues that they may pursue extralegal means to impede or stop movement of U.S. nuclear materials.

PROPOSAL: Existing legislation should be reviewed against a potential terrorist threat to movements of nuclear materials to see whether any loopholes to prosecution exist.

Internationally, additional emphasis should be placed on all-source intelligence collection on known antinuclear groups. Consideration should be given initiating bilateral talks with selected host countries on standards of protection for shipments and for active prosecution under the law for criminal acts.

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13661	PAPER  ISSUE PAPER NO. 39	1	ND	B1

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13663	PAPER ISSUE PAPER NO. 40, PARTIAL CLOSURE	1	ND	B1 B3

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
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ISSUE PAPER NO. 40

This issue paper is classified Top Secret and will be distributed separately to cognizant activities.

Staff Contact: CAPT D. L. McMunn, USN, [REDACTED]

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 38

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Improved Security for Nuclear Reactor Facilities

ISSUE: Most background checks by nuclear power reactor licensees are limited to State and local files. These files do not include information about an individual's criminal record, if any, in other parts of the country.

The Security of nuclear power facilities is critical to the prevention of a nuclear terrorism incident. At the present time, power reactor licensees only have access to State and local files. These licensees need access to certain information in FBI criminal history files to assist in screening prospective nuclear facility employees. Additionally, there are no current provisions calling for a background investigation on any individual having unescorted access to nuclear reactor facilities.

A commission report indicated that between 1974 and 1982 there were 32 possible deliberate acts of damage at 24 operating reactors and reactor construction sites. A 1983 Commission memorandum concluded that the major threat of sabotage to a nuclear plant is associated with the insider. By giving the nuclear power reactor licensee access to FBI criminal history files and thus give the Bureau the authority to help screen individuals having unescorted access to sensitive areas of the nuclear plant, we will greatly aid in preventing sabotage from within. Legislation has been introduced (Anti Nuclear Terrorism Act of 1985, S274).

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has considered various means of controlling insider sabotage, including security clearance procedures, psychological testing, and implementation of a two-man rule in all vital areas of nuclear power reactors.

PROPOSAL: New procedures should be implemented to improve security for nuclear power reactors, including new legislation if required. Before pursuing new legislation, the results of the NRC study of this question should be reviewed and the reasons why NRC has failed to seek such legislation should be evaluated.

STAFF CONTACT: COL D. L. Cole, 395-4950

ISSUE PAPER NO. 41

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Adequacy of the International Legal System to Deal  
with Terrorism

ISSUE: The international legal system, judging by every recent terrorist incident, has both the legal means and the legal obligation to bring the offenders to justice in some manner. The legal system can be improved, but it is already adequate.

Nevertheless, various private initiatives, in the U.S. and abroad, should be encouraged to work out closer international legal cooperation. The usefulness of these endeavors also lies in establishing personal contacts between U.S. and foreign government officials and scholars working on international legal problems.

The immediate problem area is to encourage governments to implement fully the legal obligations that they have already accepted.

PROPOSAL: The Departments of State and Justice should seek every opportunity to improve the international consensus for governments to act in counter-terrorist events to the full extent of the authority available to them. To this end, State and Justice should continue government to government contacts and should continue to stimulate appropriate initiatives from the private sector.

STAFF CONTACT: CAPT. D.J. McMunn, 395-4950

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13664	PAPER  ISSUE PAPER NO. 42	2	ND	B1

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 43

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: U.S. Presence Abroad

ISSUE: The threat posed by terrorism to U.S. interests, personnel and property abroad, and acceptance of its likely continuation, has lead to a number of actions designed to harden the target and/or reduce it in size. Those efforts have not been fully coordinated, nor have all agencies fully participated.,

In a few high-threat posts, the difficult decision to remove dependents has been made and implemented. On occasion, only children have been sent home, a measure which automatically removes some parents as well. When matters become quite serious, major staff reductions have taken place. All of these actions are in response to actual or anticipated terrorist acts, usually after the fact, and are intended to limit the exposure. This reaction may represent partial achievement of the terrorist's goals, but the costs and consequences, real or perceived, of successful attacks on employees and/or dependents are probably and potentially far greater, particularly if nothing significant was done in advance to lessen the danger by, for example, cutting back wherever possible.

The "bricks and mortar" approach, making U.S. installations and residences more difficult to attack, is very expensive. Further, its effectiveness is limited to the extent that not all threatened agencies or persons are, can be, or are willing to be included in the protected building/area. Since terrorists will seek soft targets, successful efforts to protect one facet of the U.S. presence may result in increased danger for another in the same city.

PROPOSAL: The Department of State should direct Ambassadors in all designated high-threat areas to institute a thorough review of the personnel requirements of all Agencies represented, in-country, in order to reduce the exposure of personnel and facilities to terrorist attacks to the minimum consistent with effectiveness. The review should carefully examine the question of hardening all Embassy-related facilities, or including them within a security perimeter, regardless of practices prevailing elsewhere. The Department of Defense should direct the appropriate CINCS to undertake similar reviews for their commands.

NSC should create an interagency committee of all agencies with representation abroad to report to the NSC the results of each agency review, so that appropriate reductions of personnel abroad can be ordered.

STAFF CONTACT: LTCOL Robert Earl, 395-4950

ISSUE PAPER: 44

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, CIA

SUBJECT: International Research, Development, and Acquisition  
(RD&A) Initiatives

ISSUE: A review of current RD&A programs indicates that while there has been occasional interaction between the U.S and foreign combatting terrorism RD&A communities, these ad hoc exchanges could be much more productive than is now realized.

PROPOSAL: The State Department, through the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), should continue to pursue bilateral arrangements for RD&A exchanges with selected foreign counterparts such as we are already carrying out with the UK and the Israelis. We recognize how difficult it is to structure formally bilateral relationship on a matter as sensitive as counter-terrorism defensive capabilities and technologies. We need to keep pressing for greater cooperation, while understanding that progress, which will be based on mutual trust, will develop slowly.

STAFF CONTACT: CAPT L. H. Boink, 395-4950

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 45

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, TREASURY

SUBJECT: Protection of Foreign Dignitaries in the United States

ISSUE: The Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (Inman Report) noted fragmentation of responsibilities and duplication of effort in the protection of foreign dignitaries and missions in the United States. Noting the advantages of centralization, the report recommended "...the ultimate transfer of protective responsibilities of all foreign officials to the Diplomatic Security Service." However, the principle of reciprocity has been firmly established in the protection of visiting heads of state for the past 15 years -- they recognize protection from the same service as does the President of the United States. For political rather than security reasons, this system may not be reversible. Moreover, the liaison relationship benefits of discharging this duty are extremely helpful to the Secret Service in their primary function of protection the President and Vice President during trips abroad.

More fundamentally, two points should be noted. First, almost all terrorism directed against the United States occurs abroad; we obtain greater security benefits to our leaders by adequate protection abroad than to foreign leaders when they visit the United States. Second, centralization of protective responsibility for all visiting foreign dignataries will do more than provide the appearance of reciprocity -- it will significantly enhance security to a level significantly superior to the existing system.

PROPOSAL: The current system in which the Secret Service provides protection for visiting heads of state should continue. However, in order to reduce the fragmentation and duplication problems identified (correctly) by the Inman Panel, the Secret Service responsibility should be broadened slightly to include visiting heads of state "and the accompanying party." This addition would preclude the

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egregious duplication that exists now in which, for example, the head of state is protected by the Secret Service but the head of state's spouse is protected by the State Department. A motorcade, as another example, would become wholly a Secret Service responsibility whenever the visiting head of state was part of it. If the visiting foreign minister or other foreign dignitary were to break off from the motorcade or head of state's party for separate business elsewhere, protection responsibility would revert to the State Department.

STAFF CONTACT: LTCOL R. L. Earl, 395-4950

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13666	PAPER ISSUE PAPER NO. 46	4	ND	B1

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13668	PAPER  ISSUE PAPER NO. 47	2	ND	B1

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IIR-00 A-01 USSS-00 SYC-00 FEIE-00 /009 R

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APPROVED BY: M/GIP:BOAKLEY

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TAGS: PTER

SUBJECT: SUMMIT SEVEN: COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO DR. GERHARD HEUER, DIRECTOR, INTERNAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR DR. HEUER:

THE EXCELLENT SET OF PROPOSALS FOR INTENSIFYING COUNTER-TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AMONG THE SEVEN, CONTAINED IN YOUR LETTER OF JULY 24, HAS GIVEN US A GREAT DEAL TO WORK ON. MY REPLY, REVED TO YOUR PROPOSALS FOR ACTION, REFLECTS THE VIEWS OF THE VARIOUS CONCERNED AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

1. AND 2. THE STANDARD EUROPEAN REPORTING FORMATS ON TERRORIST GROUPS AND INCIDENTS FOUND BROAD SUPPORT AMONG

UNITED STATES AGENCIES. SOME CHANGES AND ADDITIONS WERE SUGGESTED, AS OUTLINED BELOW, IN ORDER TO MAKE THESE FORMATS AS COMPATIBLE AS POSSIBLE WITH THOSE BEING USED BY OUR AGENCIES AND TO MAKE THEM AS COMPLETE AS POSSIBLE. THIS SHOULD FACILITATE EXCHANGES AMONG US. ADDITIONALLY, WE SUGGEST EXPANDING THE SECTION ON INDIVIDUAL TERRORISTS. THESE FORMATS COMPLEMENT AND REINFORCE INITIATIVES ALREADY UNDERTAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO DEVELOP THE COUNTERTERRORISM MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (CMAP) AND RELATED TWO-WAY COMPUTERIZED EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION WITH LIAISON SERVICES OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE SEVEN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT.

WE HAVE TRIED TO BALANCE BETWEEN THE NEED FOR COMPLETENESS, SO THE FORMATS WILL BE USEFUL TO SPECIALIZED CONSUMERS, AND SIMPLICITY, SO THAT THEY WILL BE SUITABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS WHO ARE TO RECEIVE THEM. THE SUGGESTED

FORMATS ARE AT TAB A.

TO BE USED AS CORRECTED, AND TO BE USED BY YOU TO REPORT TO US, OPEN, ABOUT WHICH PARTIES HAVE RECEIVED SUCH INFORMATION TO PROTECT SOURCE REPORTS AND TO WHAT USES THEY WILL BE PUT. OUR CONCERN STEMS FROM THE NEED TO PROTECT METHODS AND SOURCES, MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY, NOT DEGRADIZE POSSIBLE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, AND STILL DISSEMINATE THE INFORMATION AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE.

WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST QUESTION, WE BELIEVE THAT THE REPORTS SHOULD BE EXCHANGED THROUGH ESTABLISHED INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS, AND, IN OUR CASE, WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO APPROPRIATE INTELLIGENCE AND ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. THEY WOULD NOT BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OR THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. HOWEVER, THIS INFORMATION WOULD BE REVIEWED CLOSELY TO SEE WHETHER IT MIGHT BE OF USE TO THESE OR OTHER AGENCIES. IN OUR VIEW, THE REPORTS ESSENTIALLY SHOULD BE AN INTELLIGENCE TOOL. FOR EXAMPLE, WE DO NOT ENVISAGE THEM BEING USED, IN THIS FORM, TO SUPPORT LEGAL PROCEEDINGS OR IN ANY WAY WHICH COULD BECOME PUBLIC. SHOULD IT BECOME NECESSARY TO USE THIS INFORMATION IN SUCH WAYS, PERMISSION OF THE ORIGINATING STATE MUST BE OBTAINED IN ADVANCE.

3. ON CONTROLLING THE TRAVEL OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, WE SUPPORT THE ARRANGEMENTS WORKED OUT BY THE SEVEN GROUP.

THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA SHARE A VERY CLOSE TIE AND ARE WORKING ON SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS BILATERALLY. BEYOND THESE ARRANGEMENTS, AS CAN BE SEEN FROM OUR PROPOSED ADDITION TO THE STANDARDIZED REPORTING FORMATS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DATA BANK ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS WOULD BE A USEFUL AREA FOR COOPERATION.

4. WITH REGARD TO A GREATER EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS BY OR FOR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO SUBMIT SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS AT THE NEXT MEETING.

5. AND 6. WE ARE FULLY PREPARED TO COOPERATE AT THE LEVEL OF OUR DIPLOMATIC POSTS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO COUNTER TERRORIST THREATS. WE AGREE THAT A SENSIBLE WAY TO PROCEED IS FOR EACH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO INSTRUCT ITS POSTS OF THE EXISTENCE OF THIS COOPERATION, AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO MEET, EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE THREAT AT POST, AND REPORT BACK ON MEASURES FOR ONGOING COOPERATION AND FOR EMERGENCIES. THE SECURITY OFFICE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WILL BE THE LEAD ON THIS ACTIVITY FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

HOWEVER, INFORMATION INVOLVING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND INTELLIGENCE LIAISON RELATIONS SHOULD REMAIN IN INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS.

WE APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR LIST OF THE TERRORIST THREATS EXISTING AT YOUR VARIOUS DIPLOMATIC POSTS. I WILL SEND YOU SEPARATELY A LIST OF OUR DIPLOMATIC POSTS ABROAD WHERE THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREAT. IT MAY WELL BE USEFUL FOR ALL PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS TO EXCHANGE THESE LISTS. OBVIOUSLY, EACH GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE ITS OWN CRITERIA AND ITS OWN VIEWS ON THE DEGREE OF THREAT TO ITS CITIZENS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.

7. WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT ON THE MEASURES YOU SUGGEST TO IMPLEMENT THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONS, SPECIFICALLY IN SUPPORTING THE EFFORTS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, INCREASED CONSULTATION ON

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BY 101 3/5/07

FROM THE SEVEN ON DIPLOMATS BELIEVED TO BE ENGAGED IN TERRORIST RELATED ACTIVITIES, AND INCLUDING THIS OPERATION IN OUR CONVERSATIONS AT P. 05.

WITH RESPECT TO REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ANY PERSON AS A DIPLOMAT WHO HAS BEEN EXPELLED FROM ANOTHER COUNTRY FOR TERRORIST RELATED ACTIVITIES, WE SUGGEST THAT, AS A FIRST STEP, THIS BE ACCEPTED AS AUTOMATIC AMONG THE SEVEN, AND THAT A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO THIS EFFECT BE INCLUDED IN

THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE HEADS OF STATE AFTER THE TOKYO SUMMIT. WITH RESPECT TO DIPLOMATS EXPELLED BY OTHER COUNTRIES, WE PROPOSE THAT PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS CONSULT FIRST BEFORE DECIDING ON WHETHER TO REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE PERSON.

8. WITH REGARD TO YOUR POINT ABOUT INTENSIFYING AND REDEMING COOPERATION TO FIGHT TERRORISM TO OTHER STATES, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A SPECIFIC SUGGESTION.

BEFORE THE END OF 1985 WHEN JAPAN ASSUMES THE SUMMIT SEVEN CHAIRMANSHIP, I WOULD URGE YOU TO CALL A FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO THAT HELD LAST MARCH IN BONN. PERHAPS A PRACTICAL WAY TO PROCEED WOULD BE TO CALL A ONE-DAY MEETING OF THE SEVEN, WITH THE GOAL OF OBTAINING THE AGREEMENT OF PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS ON THE STANDARDIZED REPORTING FORMAT AND ON THE VARIOUS MEASURES WE HAVE DISCUSSED.

THIS MEETING COULD BE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY A SOMEWHAT LARGER ONE DESIGNED TO EXPLORE THE EXTENT TO WHICH OUR AGREEMENTS COULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS THAT SHARE THE APPROACH SUGGESTED, ARE THREATENED BY SOME OF THE SAME TERRORIST GROUPS AS THREATEN THE SEVEN AND WITH WHOSE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO COOPERATE SATISFACTORILY. COUNTRIES I WOULD PROPOSE FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION AS INVITEES TO SUCH A LARGER MEETING ARE SPAIN, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS AND DENMARK.

I LOOK FORWARD TO GETTING TOGETHER WITH YOU SOON.

SINCERELY,

ROBERT B. OAKLEY  
DIRECTOR  
OFFICE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM AND EMERGENCY PLANNING

TAB A

PART I (INCIDENT)

1. COUNTRY/OFFICE/DATE
2. TYPE OF INCIDENT (BY CODE)
3. COUNTRY/PLACE/ DATE AND TIME OF INCIDENT
4. TERRORIST GROUP (BY CODE)

PART II (INCIDENT)

1. DATE/TIME  
PLACE/PROVINCE  
METHOD OF OPERATION  
PERSONS INVOLVED  
GROUPS INVOLVED
2. MEANS USED (WEAPONS / SUPERTECHNICAL MEANS)  
WEAPONS  
EXPLOSIVES (INCLUDING TIMING DEVICES, ETC.)  
MEANS OF TRANSPORT  
MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, IF ANY (RADIOS, ETC.)

3. CIRCUMSTANCES:

IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS  
MOTIVES AND  
HOSTAGES

4. CLAIMS AND MOTIVES (MESSAGES)

PLACE/DATE/DISTRIBUTION  
DEGREE OF CREDIBILITY  
WARNINGS GIVEN BEFORE INCIDENT  
MOTIVES

5. NEGOTIATIONS:

DEMANDS/RESPONSE TO DEMANDS  
DEADLINES/ RESPONSE TO MISSED DEADLINES  
THREATS

6. TARGET

PERSONS (INCLUDE DETAILS OF POSITION)  
PROPERTY (INCLUDE DETAILS ON TYPE OF TARGET)  
PROTECTION OF TARGET

7. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

IDENTITIES (REAL AND FALSE) TRAVEL DOCUMENTS  
(INCLUDING VISAS, REAL AND FALSE)  
OTHER DOCUMENTS  
ROUTES AND PLACES STAYED AT  
ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES  
SUPPORTERS AND CONTACTS

8. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

ARREST WARRANTS  
LEGAL ACTIONS AERDAD  
SENTENCES  
RELEASES (EXTRADITION OR DEPORTATION)  
OTHER

9. REMARKS

PART III (PERSONS)

1. NAME (INCLUDING KNOWN ALIASES)

2. BIOGRAPHIC DATA

DATE OF BIRTH  
PLACE OF BIRTH  
HEIGHT  
WEIGHT  
COLOR: EYES/HAIR/SKIN  
DISTINGUISHING MARKS OR CHARACTERISTICS  
BUILD  
CURRENT AND PAST ADDRESSES/TELEPHONE NUMBERS  
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND  
EMPLOYMENT, PAST AND PRESENT  
CRIMINAL RECORD: DATES/ OFFENSE/LOCATION/DISPOSITION  
IDENTIFYING NUMBERS  
HENRY CLASSIFICATION

3. ROLE OR POSITION IN GROUP/ACTIVITIES OF GROUP  
SUSPECTED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY OF INDIVIDUAL

4. KNOWN TRAVEL: DOMESTIC/FOREIGN  
CONTACTS WITH OTHER GROUPS

5. KNOWN SOURCES OF INCOME


6. PHOTO (3"X5" GLUE-SY), IF AVAILABLE (MULTI)

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

John/Ollie  
- maybe there should be  
an individual who serves as  
Executive Director of both the  
TIWS and the IG/T. -

- alternatively, one could  
try the double-hat idea  
with the Ambassador at large  
under both State & NSC -

- plus more staff for both  
NSC/TIWS and State/IG/T -



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NLS F99-008/2#13672

BY HT, NARA, DATE 3/5/07

~~SECRET~~

November 7, 1985

TO: Robert B. Oakley

FROM: RBBentley

SUBJECT: Comments on Issues Papers of Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism

I have divided the papers into three categories:

A. Issues on which State and the Task Force agree. (20 papers)

B. Issues on which State and the Task Force disagree, but where State's views are properly represented (14 papers).

C. Issues on which State and the Task Force disagree, but where State's position is misrepresented. (1 papers).

Issue Paper

1. National program - B

2.. National Policy - A

█ National Coordinator - C

4. Definition of Terrorism - B (but State's views are stronger than TF indicates)

5. Coordination of Public Diplomacy/Statements during an Incident - A (Virtual adoption of State's paper)

6. Policy for Active Response to Terrorist Threats and Incidents - B

█ International Agreements for Combatting Terrorism - B

8. Extradition Treaties - A (adoption of State's position)

9. Response Options to Terrorism - B

10. Counter-terrorism Exercises and Simulations - B (but understates State's View)

█ Intelligence Fusion Center for Terrorism - B (final State proposal, submitted late, is that NIO/CT coordinate other agencies; fusion center overshoots the mark)

12. Hostage Family Liaison - B

Foreign and Domestic Public Awareness - C (repeats most of State's paper, but adds some -- see marked areas)

14. Government-Media Relations During a Terrorist Incident - C (marked portion is a section State rejected in the original proposal)

15. Murder of U.S. Citizens Abroad - A

16. Deployment of Counterterrorist Forces - C (State disagreed strongly with the original draft, which argued for the deployment and use of CT forces at the outset of an incident. State proposed readiness, but quick deployment of EST)

17. Operational Security of JSOC/DELTA - A (DOD must have weighed in)

18. Prohibition of Training and Support/Counter-terrorist/Mercenary Training Camps - A (State position adopted)

19. Congressional Oversight of Counter-Terrorist Operations - A (State position adopted)

20. Expanded HUMINT Capability Against Terrorism - A

21. Paramilitary Terrorist Response Capability - A

22. Multilateral CT Strike Force - A

23. (TS) - B (but State views not reflected)

Increased Coordination with Law Enforcement Elements Domestically and Overseas - C (State's disagreement understated. The bottom line of State's proposal is to give greater attention to coordinating with police, but retain the Ambassador's current authority to decide how best to get the job done in our missions.)

Rewards - B (TF doesn't agree that it is being done.)

26. International Informal Incentives - A

27. Terrorism as a Crime - A (State's formulation adopted)

28. Death Penalty for Hostage-taking - A (State's formulation adopted)

29. FOIA - C (New recommendation takes State's criticism -- that FOIA adequate -- partially into account, then ascribes a lesser point to State as its dissent.)



30. Terrorism Intelligence Analysts - A

PSYOPS to Combat Terrorism - C (marked portions of recommendations are all new)

32. Controlling Cross Border Travel of Known Terrorists - A (Although TF added a new idea)

33. Review Provisions of Vienna Convention - A (however, TF did an about-face and accepted State's position)

34. Preventing Flyaway of Hijacked Aircraft - A (Issue dropped. State's position adopted)

35. Country Team Briefings - B

36. U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities - A (Note NSC dig at IG/T)

37. Interference with the movements of Nuclear Material - C (but we may agree to drop the issue)

38. Improved Security for Nuclear Reactor Facilities - C (but minor)

39. R&D for Combatting Terrorism - B

40 (TS) - B (but State not asked to comment)

41. Adequacy of the International Legal System to deal with Terrorism - A (State proposal adopted)

Deployment Policy for JSOC - C (The issue in this paper was "automatic deployment"; that has been dropped in the restatement of the issue and of our dissent)

43. U.S. Presence Abroad - A (Additional State idea -- to use the NSC to make reductions work -- is not a dissent, but a suggestion for implementation.)

44. International RD&A Initiatives - B (a question of degree)

Protection of Foreign Dignataries in the U.S. - C (State (SY) feels very strongly that the Secret Service must agree to take on a broader role. In final State version, submitted late, SY wants NSC to resolve the difference)

- - - - -

(additional State papers not taken into consideration by the TF).

46. EST Deployment Policy

47. Use of Intelligence Exchanges for Policy Purposes.



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

PRINCIPALS' MEETING  
OF  
VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM  
NOVEMBER 12, 1985  
4:00 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.  
ROOSEVELT ROOM - WHITE HOUSE

AGENDA

- o Opening Remarks - The Vice President
- o Progress Report - Admiral Holloway
- o Discussion of Draft Recommendations
- o Plans for Final Report

(Note: Draft Recommendation No. 45 should be under Tab 2 to be rewritten vice Tab 3.)



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

List of Participants  
for  
The Third Meeting of the Vice President's  
Task Force on Combatting Terrorism  
12 November 1985  
4:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.  
Roosevelt Room  
White House

THE VICE PRESIDENT

State

Secretary George P. Shultz  
Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead  
Director of the Office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning  
Ambassador Robert B. Oakley

Treasury

General Counsel Robert M. Kimmitt  
Deputy for Security Affairs and Crisis Management J. Robert McBrien

Defense

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Noel Koch

Justice

Attorney General Edwin Meese III

Transportation

Secretary Elizabeth H. Dole  
Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs  
Matthew Z. Scocozza

Office of Management and Budget

Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs  
Dr. Alton Keel  
Deputy Chief of National Security Division Robert Howard

Central Intelligence

Deputy Director John N. McMahon  
National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism Charles Allen

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Crowe, USN  
Director of Joint Special Operations Agency/JCS MG Wesley Rice, USMC

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Judge William H. Webster

Executive Assistant Director of Investigation Oliver B. Revell

White House

Assistant to the President Fred F. Fielding

Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

VADM John Poindexter

Staff Member in Office of National Security Affairs

LCOL Oliver North

Chief of Staff to the Vice President Craig Fuller

Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

Donald Gregg

Executive Director, Vice President's Task Force on Combatting  
Terrorism, Admiral James L. Holloway, III, (Ret.)

Deputy Director of Vice President's Task Force on Combatting  
Terrorism, Ambassador Edward Peck

ADM M. Staser Holcomb, USN, Retired, Consultant to the Vice  
President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

Member of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism  
COL Dave Cole, USA

Member of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism  
LTC Pat Daly, USAF

Member of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism  
LTC Bob Earl, USMC

Member of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism  
LCDR Craig P. Coy, USCG

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13674 MEMO

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NORTH TO JOHN POINDEXTER, RE: MEETING OF  
THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON  
COMBATting TERRORISM

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON  
6 November 1985


MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE VICE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Meeting of Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

Enclosed are the draft recommendations and an agenda for the Task Force meeting at 4:00 p.m., November 12, 1985 in the Roosevelt Room at the White House.

The Senior Review Group met on Thursday, November 7. As a result, the draft recommendations are categorized into four sections: Tab 1 issue still in contention; Tab 2 draft recommendations agreed upon in principle but requiring refinement; Tab 3 issues in basic agreement; and, Tab 4 issues initially raised that are being dropped by consensus of the Senior Review Group.

  
J. L. Holloway, III  
Admiral, USN, (Retired)  
Executive Director  
Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

Enclosures: Agenda  
Tab 1 Issue In Contention  
Tab 2 Issues Agreed Upon in Principle  
Tab 3 Issues Agreed Upon  
Tab 4 Issues To Be Dropped

(Unclassified when enclosures removed)

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

11/12 12/3/05

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

PRINCIPALS' MEETING  
OF  
VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM  
NOVEMBER 12, 1985  
4:00 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.  
ROOSEVELT ROOM - WHITE HOUSE

AGENDA

- o Opening Remarks - The Vice President
- o Progress Report - Admiral Holloway
- o Discussion of Draft Recommendations
- o Plans for Final Report





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ISSUE PAPER NO. 1

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Agencies

SUBJECT: National Program for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The attached appendix should serve as the interim programming document of the national program for combatting terrorism.

(Note: The appendix is currently being prepared by Adm. Staser Holcomb, Terry Arnold, and members of the Working Group, based on the program element information solicited from all agencies in September. The status of this appendix will be briefed to the Task Force Principals on 12 November.)

ISSUE PAPER NO. 2

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: National Policy for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The NSC should promulgate a NSDD (with the policy statements along the lines already expressed in Issue Paper No. 2) as the national policy for combatting terrorism, and NSDDs 30, 138, 179, and 180 should be superseded.

~~SECRET~~

ISSUE PAPER NO. 7

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, NSC, CIA, TRANSPORTATION,  
JUSTICE

SUBJECT: International Agreements for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Department of State should pursue a three-track effort regarding international agreements for combatting terrorism.

1. A multilateral treaty against terrorism should be sought with a large number of participants in order to attain a broad international expression of condemnation for international terrorism. The objective should be one of wide participation in a general statement, that can be achieved quickly.
2. A parallel effort should be undertaken to obtain a series of bilateral agreements with our allied and like-minded nations for the purpose of combatting terrorism. The objective in these bilaterals would be to move quickly to achieve agreements in areas where there is already a concurrence of views on both sides. If where only limited concessions can be gained, these should be accepted and agreements rapidly concluded. This way, a network of bilateral agreements concerning terrorism might be achieved in a relatively short period of time.
3. Efforts to ensure compliance with existing treaties should continue to be pursued aggressively with a view to broadening these where appropriate.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 16

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, NSC

SUBJECT: Deployment of Counterterrorist Forces

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Defense Department, NSC, and State Department should review current deployment criteria and authorization policy with a view toward early deployment of counterterrorist forces. Issues to be considered should include:

1. "Decoupling" of the decision to deploy Emergency Support Teams and Counterterrorist Joint Task Force (CTJTF) components;
2. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff authority to deploy CTJTF assets to appropriate overseas Forward Staging Bases (FSB) to facilitate more expeditious response to terrorist incidents;
3. Political and legal questions relating to base, access and transit rights, including planning to meet eventual contingencies;
4. Forward deployment/prepositioning of CT elements and/or equipment to FSB's near high threat areas. (Note: OJCS currently studying this issue.)

Actual employment of the force would properly remain a decision of the National Command Authorities.

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13692

ISSUE PAPER NO. 25

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE

SUBJECT: Rewards

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Department of State should expedite the authority for payment of rewards authorized under the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, and issue clearly delineated guidance to appropriate U.S. government agencies on how to utilize the provisions of the Act to maximum advantage. Ensure that rewards actually authorized are effectively publicized in both target foreign populations and to the domestic American audience. The full range of aggressive options to include the creative use of rewards for psy-op efforts should be explored so long as the terrorists themselves do not benefit from the payment. Finally recommend consideration be given to obtaining Congressional support for increasing the amount that can be authorized in any one case to \$1 million and to an expanded use of the awards authority, recognizing the practical political constraints that impact on its implementation.

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BY LOJ 3/5/07

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13694

ISSUE PAPER NO. 30

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: DCI, FBI

SUBJECT: Terrorism Intelligence Analysts

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism should establish and oversee an interdepartmental career development program that will encourage a core of intelligence analysts to devote themselves to addressing terrorism as a specialty. Training, plans and resources, interagency rotations, exchanges with friendly governments, and participation in various agency and CINC gaming evolutions should be included in the program.

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