

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: North, Oliver: Files
Folder Title: Terrorism Actions: Pending
(02/01/1985-02/10/1985)
Box: 49

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 5/14/2012

File Folder TERRORISM ACTIONS: PENDING (2/1/85-2/10/85)

FOIA

M11-441

Box Number 49

HAENNI

11

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
136529	NOTE	FOR NORTH RE BRIEFING PAPER <i>D 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	1	2/1/1985	B1
136530	COVER SHEET	<i>PAR 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	2	2/1/1985	B1
136532	BRIEFING PAPER	RE TERRORISM <i>PAR 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	4	1/31/1985	B1
136534	PAPER	<i>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	1	2/4/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

2/5

Olliv,

Let me know if this
should go into sys IV.

Ju

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 5/14/2012

File Folder

TERRORISM ACTIONS: PENDING (2/1/85-2/10/85)

FOIA

M11-441

HAENNI

Box Number

49

11

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
136529	NOTE FOR NORTH RE BRIEFING PAPER	1	2/1/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)

136530

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Lt.Col. Oliver North		
2	Deputy Director for Political-		
3	Military Affairs		
4	National Security Council Staff		
ACRONYM	392 DTD	DATE	REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	PREPARE REPLY
COMMENT		FILE	RECOMMENDATION
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	RETURN
SIGNATURE			
REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Charles E. Allen, NIO/CT-NARC			1 Feb 1985

CONTROL NO. _____
SERIES B, CY 1 of 1 of Copy 10



3.5(c)

COPY _____ OF _____

EXEMPTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT
ARE BASED ON EO 13526

3.5(c)

3.5(c)



NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLR # M4411 #136530

BY *fw* NARA DATE 9/15/17

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)

136530

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL...-	This Information has been Authorized for Release to ...

136532

~~TOP SECRET~~



EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

31 January 1985

State Supported Terrorism by Iran, Syria, and Libya

Middle Eastern based terrorist groups and states are major perpetrators of terrorism that can ultimately be described as "state sponsored". In fact, terrorism of the Middle East origin accounted for about 40 percent of all international terrorism in 1984, and two thirds of that was conducted with the active support and encouragement or at a minimum with the acquiescence of three states--Iran, Syria, and Libya.

I. Iran the most dangerous state sponsor of terrorism:

- It has developed the greatest capability to conduct terrorist operations.
- It is the most vehemently anti-Western.
- It is motivated by a philosophical commitment to export its form of fundamentalist revolution and to attack anyone it perceives as standing in the way.
- Its primary targets are the US, France, Iraq, and the moderate Arab states

Iranian sponsored attacks in 1984:

Anti-US: 19 (18 in Lebanon)

Anti-French: 22 (19 in Lebanon)


Anti-Moderate Arabs: 21

Frightening new trends:

- Increased activity in Western Europe.
- Efforts to expand Iranian influence in areas of primary US security interests--i.e. Latin America.

Series B, C, 1 of 8

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs



EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M441/1 #136532

BY AW NARA DATE 9/15/17

~~TOP SECRET~~



136532

~~TOP SECRET~~ 

- Elements within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Revolutionary Guard, and the Prime Minister's Office all play a role.
- The Iranian Ambassador in Damascus has been key coordinator for Iranian-sponsored terrorism in Lebanon and the Persian Gulf.

Longer term prospects: Iran will expand its capability, become more "professional" in committing terrorism, and will broaden its activities geographically.

In the long term, Lebanon is likely to become increasingly dominated by Islamic Shia fundamentalism with Christian elements in a greatly reduced role. Shia extremists will continue to endeavor to expel all vestiges of Western influence. Lebanon could become a base for terrorist activity throughout the Middle East.

II. Syria: Sees use of terror as tool of statecraft--a way to extend its foreign policy reach.

- The most professional user/sponsor of terrorism and the most difficult to penetrate.
- The centralized control of the Syrian regime enables terrorism to be turned on or off like a faucet.
- Less direct involvement than Iran. Works through surrogates. Either direct terrorist groups such as radical Palestinians to act or "enables" them to do so by providing weapons and other support.

Primary Syrian targets in 1984:

- Jordan: Nine attacks, including five on or near US facilities.
- Moderate Palestinians: Seven attacks; those who might try to work toward a resolution of the Arab--Israeli dispute.
- Israel: Seven attacks.
- Other moderate Arab states, e.g. the UAE two attacks

In Syria, too, various elements of the government play a role in terrorism, including the chief of military intelligence. The exact relationship between Syria and Iran with regard to terrorist activity is not clear and probably changes as Damascus has different goals in mind.

~~TOP SECRET~~ 

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

EEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

- Nevertheless, Syria allows Iranian Embassy in Damascus to coordinate terrorist activities and Iranian terrorist training bases to operate in the Bekaa Valley.

III. Libya: Qadhafi uses terror to enhance the power and image of his basically weak regime.

While Libyan terrorist capabilities are mixed, there are signs of improvement in 1984.

Major targets:

- Anti-Qadhafi exiles--13 attacks in 1984. This anti-dissident campaign will continue, even as some exiles are striking back by hitting Libyan officials, such as in Rome.
- Libya's opponents in Africa--France (in early months of 1984--because of French support to Habre in Chad), Zaire, Chad, the Central African Republic.
- Moderate Arabs--Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Sudan.

While US security interests are attacked when Libya strikes at US allies, there have been few instances of Libyan-sponsored terrorism against Western States directly. This probably reflects fear of likely strong Western reprisals should Libyan hand be discovered in any such terrorist operations.

Libya also supports some radical Palestinian groups--PELPG and Abu Nidal--that commit terrorism, some directed against US.

EEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Libya is also likely to expand its activities geographically, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Qadhafi will seek to strengthen regional radicals, particularly the Sandanista regime; promote militant anti-US actions; and build a capability for terrorist operations in the region.

- IV. USSR: In all these countries, state-supported terrorism is a major instrument of policy. Iranian, Syrian, and Libyan attitudes and activities with regard to revolutionary violence and terrorism converge with Soviet interests in that they undermine US, NATO, and other Western interests worldwide. We know that the Soviets at least indirectly have given material support to terrorists; we do not know how much, if any, direct support Moscow has provided to terrorist groups or individuals. As long as terrorist groups identify ideologically with the Soviet Union and continue primarily to attack non-Bloc targets, however, the Soviets benefit from the disruptive and destabilizing effects of terrorism, which partly explains why they do not support international efforts to combat it.

EEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

EEO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

~~TOP SECRET~~

Terrorism: Increasing Violence in Western Europe

We have seen an increase in recent months of terrorist attacks in Western Europe against NATO and Allied military and civilian targets. Current developments foreshadow a further increase in the frequency of such attacks. Of special concern is evidence that the attacks involve some cooperation among the groups.

Involved have been the Communist Combatant Cell (CCC) in Belgium, Direct Action in France, and the Red Army Faction in Germany.

In Belgium a series of bombings have taken place against NATO pipelines and a US NATO support facility in Brussels has been attacked. The latter appeared to be meant to cause loss of life as well as physical damage.

In France, French Brigadier General Rene Audran was assassinated. This is the first involvement of the group Direct Action in execution style murder.

In West Germany there is a hunger strike by imprisoned Red Army Faction hardcore terrorists. As a result, their supporters and sympathizers have perpetrated about twenty bombings and attempted bombings of Allied military facilities.

Our past experience with RAF hunger strikes clearly indicates that if one of the hunger strikers dies, we are in for an intense and dangerous period of terrorist attacks.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

4

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

~~SECRET~~

136534 d

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST

February 4, 1985

~~SECRET~~

Counter Terrorism: Nato Mission Recommends Organizational Change

Our NATO mission proposes the Senior Political Committee (SPC) take charge of ongoing Allied political consultations on terrorism. Our mission believes we must take advantage of heightened concern in Europe towards combating terrorism and make our case at the next North Atlantic Council review on February 6.

- o Reviewing the political aspects of terrorism at the SPC will demonstrate Alliance-wide concern over the problem of terrorism. Our mission believes a strong response from Washington will enable us to capitalize on popular sentiment against terrorism.
- o Our mission sees several problems -- notably French resistance to expand consideration of the terrorist threat beyond the "technical" level; disputes with the U.S. over the character and extent of state-sponsored terrorism; and opposition by Allied intelligence services to political involvement in technical and operational aspects -- which must be overcome.
- o It will be crucial to have the support of key Allies to achieve any consensus. A preliminary vetting of our proposed initiatives in Assistant Secretary Burt's upcoming small group meeting would be very useful, particularly with the French. (S)

USMISSION USNATO 0740, PSN 44179

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
CLASSIFIED BY USMISSION USNATO

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M4411 # 136534
BY RW NARA DATE 9/15/17

~~SECRET~~