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File Folder TERRORISM ACTIONS: PENDING (3/1/1985-3/15/1985)

FOIA

M11-441

Box Number 49

HAENNI

15

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
136603	CABLE	PARIS 08757 R 9/15/2017 M441/1	3	3/2/1985	B1
136604	MEMO	NORTH TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE TERRORISM R 9/15/2017 M441/1	1	3/8/1985	B1
136605	MEMO	ROBERT KIMMITT TO NICHOLAS PLATT ET AL RE TERRORISM R 11/27/2012 M441/1	2	ND	B1
136606	PAPER	RE TERMS OF REFERENCE R 11/27/2012 M441/1	1	ND	B1
136607	MEMO	AL KEEL TO NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RE TERRORISM (INCLUDES ATTACHED SUMMARY)	5	3/7/1985	B1
136609	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO MCFARLANE RE REQUEST	2	12/31/1994	B1
136611	LETTER	PETER BAHNSEN, DOD, AND GLENN HAMMOND, DOE, TO OAKLEY RE TERRORISM (INCLUDES ATTACHED SUMMARY) (SAME AS 136514) R 9/15/2017 M441/1	3	12/5/1984	B1
136621	CABLE	LONDON 05989 D 9/15/2017 M441/1	4	3/15/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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136603

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 8757 DTG: 021151Z MAR 85 PSN: 020250
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EXDIS

DEPT PASS TO JUSTICE; NSC FOR POINDEXTER

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PREL, ASEC, FR, IT, US
SUBJECT: EXTRADITION -- PROPOSAL FOR INTERNATIONAL
INITIATIVE BY THE USG

REFS: A) 84 PARIS 21566, B) PARIS 5582, C) LONDON 3906

1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)~~

2. SUMMARY.
AS PART OF THE EFFORT TO COMBAT TERRORISM, EMBASSY STRONGLY REITERATES ITS SUGGESTION THAT A CABINET-LEVEL U.S. OFFICIAL PROPOSE AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO MODERNIZE EXTRADITION TREATIES. EITHER THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OR THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE SPONSOR FOR SUCH AN INITIATIVE. THE EXTRADITION OF TERRORISTS IS MUCH MORE ON PEOPLE'S MINDS THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE RECENT PAST IN EUROPE, AND ATTENTION MAY NOT REACH THIS LEVEL AGAIN SOON. THE TIME IS RIPE TO FOCUS THIS INTEREST ON CONCRETE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE EXTRADITION MECHANISM, WHICH IS A SINE QUA NON FOR AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-TERRORIST CAMPAIGN. IN A BILATERAL CONTEXT, WE ALSO RECOMMEND A MESSAGE FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO JUSTICE MINISTER BADINTER TO SPUR PROGRESS ON THE U.S.-FRENCH EXTRADITION TREATY NEGOTIATION (SEE PARA 7).
END SUMMARY.

3. EMBASSY HAS SUGGESTED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS (REFS A AND B) THAT THE SECRETARY, AS PART OF THE USG'S COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORT, SPONSOR AN INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE TO MODERNIZE EXTRADITION CONVENTIONS. AS WE HAVE NOTED, MANY EXTRADITION CONVENTIONS BETWEEN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES ARE WOEFULLY OUTDATED AND INEFFECTIVE IN CASES INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. EXTRADITION IS A BASIC TOOL IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, YET NATIONALISTIC ATTITUDES, BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA, AND (IN THE CASE OF

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NLRR M441/1 #136603
BY lw NARA DATE 9/15/17

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 PARIS 8757

DTG: 021151Z MAR 85 PSN: 020250

EXDIS

FRANCE, FOR EXAMPLE) POLITICAL QUALMS HAVE PREVENTED THE CONSTRUCTION OF A UNIFORM, EFFICIENT, AND JUST INTERNATIONAL MECHANISM FOR EXTRADITIONS. SCARCELY A MONTH PASSES WITHOUT A TERRORIST SOMEWHERE ESCAPING TRIAL AND JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE LEGAL MECHANISMS BETWEEN THE COUNTRY OF ARREST AND THE COUNTRY WHERE HIS ALLEGED CRIMES WERE COMMITTED ARE INADEQUATE. WITH CRIMINALS ABLE TO MOVE FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY WITH EXTREME EASE DUE TO MODERN TRANSPORTATION AND OPEN BORDERS, SUCH PROBLEMS CAN BE DISASTROUS. THE DEMORALIZING EFFECT ON GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR SECURITY FORCES -- AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COMFORT AFFORDED TERRORISTS -- CAN EASILY BE IMAGINED.

EXDIS

4. THE FACT THAT THE U. S. HAS FAILED IN THE PAST TO OBTAIN EXTRADITION FROM FRANCE OF ACCUSED TERRORISTS (AND THAT THIS PROBABLY WILL OCCUR AGAIN) UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF GIVING HIGH PRIORITY TO THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR MODERNIZING THE U. S. -FRENCH EXTRADITION CONVENTION. SIMILAR PROBLEMS EXIST, HOWEVER BETWEEN MANY OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. THE FRENCH, WHO HAVE USUALLY RESISTED CHANGING THE STATUS QUO ON EXTRADITION, HAVE NOT BEEN CONFRONTED BY OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE THE DIFFICULT LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC LABOR NECESSARY TO PRODUCE IMPROVEMENTS. MOREOVER, MANY BILATERAL EXTRADITION TREATIES OUTSIDE THE FRENCH CONTEXT ARE ALSO WEAK AND/OR OUTDATED. AN INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE BY A KEY U. S. OFFICIAL WOULD CHALLENGE GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAVE COMPLAINED ABOUT THE LACK OF COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION TO DO SOMETHING PRACTICAL ABOUT THE PROBLEM.

EXDIS

5. THIS ANALYSIS IS REINFORCED BY THE FACT THAT WEST

EUROPEAN INTEREST IN THE EXTRADITION OF TERRORISTS MAY BE AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH. THE MOMENT IS PROPITIOUS FOR BOLD INITIATIVES ON EXTRADITION BECAUSE RECENT TERRORIST ACTIONS HAVE CREATED INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE FOR ACTION. WE NOTE, FOR EXAMPLE, LONDON'S REPORT (REF C) THAT THE U. K. INTENDS TO PUSH THE EXTRADITION ISSUE IN EC DISCUSSIONS, AND HAS BEEN DISCUSSING IMPROVING ITS EXTRADITION TREATY WITH ITALY. IN FRANCE, GOF OFFICIALS INCLUDING PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAVE TREATED EXTRADITION MATTERS FREQUENTLY IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN RECENT WEEKS. CLEARLY, LEADERS ARE TALKING TO ONE ANOTHER ABOUT EXTRADITION, NEW IDEAS ARE BEING RAISED AND PUBLIC DECLARATIONS MADE. THIS WAVE OF INTEREST, HOWEVER, IS UNLIKELY TO LAST INDEFINITELY.

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3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01 PARIS 8757 DTG: 021151Z MAR 85 PSN: 020253
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EXDIS

DEPT PASS TO JUSTICE; NSC FOR POINDEXTER

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PREL, ASEC, FR, IT, US
SUBJECT: EXTRADITION -- PROPOSAL FOR INTERNATIONAL

TO PROFIT FROM IT, WE SHOULD ACT QUICKLY.
-

6. AN INITIATIVE ON EXTRADITION BY THE USG NEED NOT ORIGINATE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE. INDEED, IN MANY WAYS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WOULD BE THE LOGICAL SPONSOR. SUCH A PROPOSAL ON HIS PART WOULD HELP SET A TONE OF ACTIVISM FROM THE BEGINNING OF HIS TENURE, WHILE MAKING A CONTRIBUTION IN AN AREA CENTRAL TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. WE HOPE THAT MR. MEESE WILL CONSIDER THIS IDEA IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

7. ON THE BILATERAL FRONT, EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SEND A LETTER TO GOF JUSTICE MINISTER ROBERT BADINTER EXPRESSING STRONG PERSONAL INTEREST IN CONCLUDING NEGOTIATIONS ON A MODERNIZED U.S.-FRENCH EXTRADITION TREATY. THE FRENCH RESPONSE TO OUR LATEST NON-PAPER HAS BEEN RETURNED BY THE QUAI D'ORSAY TO THE JUSTICE MINISTRY FOR FURTHER WORK. WHETHER THIS HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE SECRETARY'S RAISING THE ISSUE WITH FONMIN DUMAS AT THEIR MEETING IN WASHINGTON, WE CANNOT TELL. BUT IN THIS CASE AS WELL, THE MOMENT IS OPPORTUNE FOR STIRRING UP HIGH-LEVEL FRENCH POLITICAL INTEREST.
GALBRAITH
BT

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North
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90258
136604

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CODEWORD~~ attached

March 8, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Improving Counter-Terrorism Capabilities

Attached at Tab I is a memo from Bob Kimmitt to the Executive Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Energy, OMB, CIA, and JCS regarding next steps we can take to improve our ability to combat terrorism. Bob's memo forwards Terms of Reference (TOR) (Tab A) for the group which will implement Phase II of NSDD-138.

The NSDD-138 (extract at Tab II) calls for convening an interagency group to develop recommendations for improving the management of our counter-terrorist (CT) program. The memo at Tab I directs that this group be formed by March 22 to complete the requirements in the NSDD and to assess certain additional issues identified by the State Department in their memo at Tab III. State has, for example, asked for a specific funding line for CT research and development (R&D). OMB has also identified R&D funding as a requirement in their analysis at Tab B.

Please note that the chairman of this group (Mike Ledeen) is not identified in the memo at Tab I. Once we have agreement on the TOR, we will announce his appointment.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to sign and transmit the memo at Tab I with attachment. NOTE: Remove Keel cover memo at Tab B before dispatching.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

cc: Ed Hickey

Attachments

- Tab I - Kimmitt Memo to Departments/Agencies
 - Tab A - Terms of Reference (TOR)
 - Tab B - OMB Analysis of Response to NSDD-138 Initiatives
- Tab II - Extract from NSDD-138
- Tab III - Hill Memo to McFarlane of December 31, 1984

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CODEWORD~~ attached
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NLRR M4411 #136604
BY fw NARA DATE 9/16/17

TAB

I

~~TOP SECRET~~

136605

SYSTEM II
90258

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET~~
CODEWORD attached

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. EDWARD J. STUCKY
Acting Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COLONEL R. J. AFFOURTIT
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. STEPHEN H. GALEBACH
Special Assistant to the Attorney General
Department of Justice

MR. WILLIAM VITALE
Executive Secretary
Department of Energy

DR. ALTON KEEL
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. JOHN H. RIXSE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE JOULWAN
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Improving Counter-Terrorism (CT) Capabilities (C)

National Security Decision Directive 138 (NSDD-138) calls for convening an interagency group to develop further recommendations on how we can improve the USG counter-terrorist effort. In accord with the directive, this group will be chaired by an official appointed by the National Security Advisor. A draft of

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CODEWORD attached
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NLR/MII-441 #136605

BY RW NARA DATE 11/27/12

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~~TOP SECRET~~
CODEWORD attached

2

the Terms of Reference (TOR) for this interagency group is attached at Tab A. Departments and agencies are requested to review the TOR prior to a meeting of the Terrorist Incident

Working Group (TIWG) on Friday, March 15, at 4:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room (WHSR). The purpose of this TIWG meeting is to:

- finalize the TOR for the interagency study;
- determine interagency group membership/representation for the conduct of this study; and
- review the OMB analysis (Tab B), focusing particularly on:
 - centralized funding for counter-terrorism research and development; and
 - responsibility for chemical/biological threat detection and response. (TS)

Would you please confirm the name of your TIWG representative to Oliver North, NSC Staff, secure KY-3/7000. (C)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachments

- Tab A - Terms of Reference (TOR)
- Tab B - OMB Analysis of Response to NSDD-138 Initiatives

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CODEWORD attached

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TAB

A

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136606

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

In accord with National Security Decision Directive 138 (NSDD-138), an interagency group is convened to:

- recommend improvements in the overall national management of counter-terrorist programs; and
- recommend required changes in the planning, integration, and oversight for countermeasures.

In particular, the interagency group convened hereby shall:

- Review the structure of interagency committees and working groups. Where necessary, the group shall recommend structural changes to streamline coordination and oversight.
- Analyze the reactive and pre-emptive apparatus and assets available to the USG. Where appropriate, the group should recommend ways to improve reaction times and to improve response capacity.
- Review the assignments of responsibility to executive agents as specified in the NSDD-138 in order to:
 - evaluate performance to date; and,
 - recommend revisions as required.
- Evaluate individual initiatives submitted by agencies and departments in response to the Directive; integrate these into a coherent National Initiative which includes:
 - specified, clearly established priorities; and
 - a recommendation on appointing a National Manager to reevaluate the priorities yearly.

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BY RW NARA DATE 11/27/12

TAB
B

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TERRORISM ACTIONS: PENDING (3/1/1985-3/15/1985)

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136607	MEMO AL KEEL TO NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RE TERRORISM (INCLUDES ATTACHED SUMMARY)	5	3/7/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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II

TAB

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SENSITIVE

Extract from NSDD-138:

Phase II

A second phase of this national program to combat terrorism shall commence on January 1, 1985. This phase is designed to improve capabilities, organization, and management that will further protect U.S. interests, citizens, and facilities from acts of terrorism. (S)

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will convene an interagency group comprised of representatives of the departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, the DCI, OMB, and White House Office of Special Support Services to develop recommendations on improving the overall management of national programs for assessing, combatting, and countering international terrorism. This group shall also recommend any changes that should be made in the planning, integration, and oversight arrangements for terrorism countermeasures. These recommendations to improve the program during Phase II should be presented for review by the NSPG by July 31, 1984. (S)

Ronald Reagan

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SENSITIVE

III

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136609	MEMO CHARLES HILL TO MCFARLANE RE REQUEST	2	12/31/1994	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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COMMAND, CONTROL,
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AND
INTELLIGENCE

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



Department of Energy
Washington, D.C. 20545

DEC 5 1984

DECLASSIFIED

Honorable Robert B. Oakley
Director, Office for Counter-Terrorism
and Emergency Planning
Department of State
Washington, DC 20520

NLRR M441/1 # 134611
BY fw NARA DATE 9/15/17

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Following, per recent discussions of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), is a summary of the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) recommendations for a program of counterterrorism research and development (R&D).

In recognition of the increasing level of terrorist activity and sophistication and in accordance with National Security Decision Directive 138, the TSWG, at the direction and on behalf of the IG/T, has prepared a 5 year R&D program designed to capture the benefits of emerging technology for the nation's efforts to combat terrorism. The program structure comprises four tasks: Threat and Technology Assessment, Defensive Countermeasures R&D, Incident Response R&D, and Technology Transfer. An outline of the structure and associated funding are given in the enclosed table; more details are available in the R&D Action Plan as transmitted to Ambassador Sayre on May 16, 1984. Revisions in the proposed funding reflects incorporation of explosives ordinance countermeasures. Program structure is designed to be comprehensive, according to current perceptions of threats and technologies, yet flexible enough to accommodate the changing nature of the terrorism environment. The program includes those elements that are necessary to carry out stated policy objectives.

The TSWG, which comprises experts from across the counterterrorism community, provides the focal point for program direction and oversight. To achieve the necessary level of expertise and promote the proper interchange of information while addressing concerns over sensitive and classified information, the TSWG is divided into seven subgroups: Threat and Technology Assessment, Defensive Countermeasures R&D, Conventional Incident Response R&D, Chemical and Biological Incident Response R&D, Nuclear Incident Response R&D, Explosives Ordinance Disablement, and Technology Transfer. The TSWG cochairmen from the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, the subgroup chairmen, and the TSWG executive officer form the TSWG executive committee, whose functions are to insure program cohesion, develop overall program direction, and maintain appropriate channels for dissemination of technology.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to criminal and administrative sanctions
Derivative Classifier: Glenn A. Hammond
Chief, TD&I Br. (Name)

Declassify on: OADR (Title)
Derivatively Classified by: Multiple Sources

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
2

The TSWG has strongly recommended that funding for this program be placed in a single department or agency, most probably the Department of Defense. With the State Department as the spearhead for obtaining the funds, the selected agency will incorporate a line item in its budget to supplement existing program funds in the counterterrorism community. The program is not intended to replace or subsume existing efforts, but to build on them. The agency hosting the line item will be expected to parcel out the funds, as determined by the TSWG, to designated lead agencies and contractors. This arrangement will serve to prevent fragmentation of R&D monies and allow effective single-point program focus and initiative.

Sincerely,



Peter F. Bahnsen
TSWG Cochairman
Department of Defense



Glenn A. Hammond
TSWG Cochairman
Department of Energy

Enclosure

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM R&D PROGRAM SUMMARY (\$K)

<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Task I: Threat and Technology Assessment					
Counterterrorism R&D Data Base	350	385	420	460	510
Vulnerability Analysis	500	550	600	660	720
Behavioral Effects	<u>1000</u>	<u>1100</u>	<u>1200</u>	<u>1350</u>	<u>1500</u>
Task Total	1850	2035	2220	2470	2730
Task II: Defense Counter-measures R&D					
HE Detection	5600	6100	6300	6600	7200
C/B Detection	6650	7100	6600	6600	7200
Nuclear Agent Detection	1000	1100	1200	600	--
Human-Based Agent Detection	2000	2200	2400	1500	500
Low-Profile Def. Countermeasures	<u>2000</u>	<u>2200</u>	<u>1200</u>	<u>400</u>	<u>--</u>
Task Total	17250	18700	17700	15700	14900
Task III: Incident Response R&D					
Portable Diagnostics and Disablement	3600	4000	4400	3000	2000
Surveillance	500	500	600	200	--
Incapacitation	500	550	600	300	100
Rapid Entry	250	280	100	--	--
C/B Response	2000	2200	2400	2600	2900
Crisis Management	<u>500</u>	<u>550</u>	<u>600</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>--</u>
Task Total	7350	8130	8700	6300	5000
Task IV: Technology Transfer					
Training	500	550	600	675	725
Technological Response Cadre	<u>500</u>	<u>550</u>	<u>600</u>	<u>675</u>	<u>725</u>
Task Total	1000	1100	1200	1350	1450
Program Total	<u>27450</u>	<u>29965</u>	<u>29820</u>	<u>25820</u>	<u>24080</u>

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SYSTEM I
2087

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 13, 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Speech before the National Strategy Information Center, Inc. (NSIC) on March 25, 1985

Attached at Tab I is a first draft of your speech before the Defense Strategy Forum of the NSIC on March 25, 1985. The forum has provided an agenda as follows:

- 5:30 p.m. Reception
- 6:00 p.m. Presentation, plus Questions and Answers
- 7:30 p.m. Adjournment

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the attached draft and provide guidance for changes as necessary.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cc: Donald Fortier

Attachment
Tab I - First Draft

CONFIDENTIAL
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Sec 2.4(b) E.O. 13526, 13527
White House Guidelines, Dec 11, 2006
BY NARA CU, DATE 5/19/17

T
I

Initial Draft
March 14, 1985

DRAFT

TERRORISM:
The Challenge of Low Level Warfare
to National Security

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.

It is a pleasure for me this evening to present a current perspective of national policies on terrorism, and to outline the kinds of approaches we believe must be seriously pursued over the next few years in redressing what must be regarded as a terrible scourge against civilized society.

I consider it a special privilege to speak before this particular forum. NSIC calls itself an educational organization, and it is. It is non-partisan, and the people who work in it and with it cover our full political spectrum and reflect the thought in all major sectors of our society: business, labor, academia, and the media. The force that holds NSIC together is a commonly shared unwillingness to countenance isolationism, pacifism, or any of the other defeatist approaches to the challenges facing the United States in the late years of this century. Defense of the United States is NSIC's overriding concern, and its approach, over more than two decades, has been to encourage effective partnership between government and private sector, between civil and military components of government. NSIC considers an informed public to be the key to a viable U.S. national security

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system. I share and applaud that belief. Another major characteristic of NSIC is a willingness to take on some of the difficult subjects, those fraught with political and other sensitivities. In the 1960's and 1970's, when ROTC programs were abandoned by many universities, NSIC worked with professors of naval and military science to bolster the content and credibility of our vitally important military officer procurement programs. In the late 1970s when U.S. intelligence was under attack in many quarters, NSIC moved into the intelligence arena when no one else in the educational world would touch it. Very coolly and calmly, NSIC set out to define the proper place for intelligence activities in American society and in American national security policy.

Tonight, as your guest, I want to turn to another issue that finds people on many different sides--an issue which tends to promote as much controversy as constructive inquiry. The issue is terrorism.

In less than two years, a growing number of governments have come to realize that terrorism is no longer an isolated act by a few radicals bent on a media event. Terrorism has new and frightening dimensions of frequency and indiscriminate violence that cannot be ignored. These characteristics are evidenced in:

- the bombings of our embassies in Beirut and Kuwait;
- the attacks on U.S. and French forces in Beirut;
- the vicious attack on the South Korean Cabinet at a shrine in Rangoon, Burma;
- the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi; and
- the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Thatcher in Brighton.

These terrorist attacks have given us the chilling feeling that the world is somehow at war, even though there is no single declared enemy in all these cases. In short, we are engaged in a form of low intensity conflict against an enemy that is hard to find and harder still to fix and destroy in the common military sense we are used to. I know you are all well informed about the facts and trends of low level conflict and that this group has been giving a great deal of thought to a national response. What I would like to do for the next few minutes is outline the thinking we have been doing on this problem in the Administration, give you some idea of where we are at this point, and proffer some thoughts for where we need to go.

Since the beginning of President Reagan's first Administration, we have given high priority to several different aspects of the international terrorism problem. First, we developed a long term estimate of the threat that terrorism poses to our national security. This required a detailed review of a large body of existing intelligence information and the issuance of new taskings to the Intelligence Community to fill a number of gaps we found in the course of our review, as well as in the after-action reports on major terrorist attacks. Our judgment, unfortunately, is that terrorism poses an enduring threat and that effective means have not yet been found to control it. Second, we gave a great deal of thought to what U.S. national policies and the U.S. national response should be and we have weighed our options carefully in several specific cases. Third, we took a close look at appropriate organizational structures for responding to this challenge, on both international and domestic levels. As a result of this process, we have significantly strengthened the capacities of the Executive agencies concerned. They are today better able to both assess and respond to terrorist threats. And fourth, we have a continuing effort to address different aspects of the terrorism problem in cooperation with several friendly governments whose leadership shares our concerns. In the context of the European Summit Seven meetings, we have made considerable progress toward a common understanding of the seriousness of the problem and on a number of steps that can be taken in concert to combat the terrorist threat.

Despite these efforts, the trend of international terrorist attacks has been increasingly disturbing, not only to us but to our friends and allies. The history is well-known to you. For several years, the number and the intensity of terrorist attacks had remained relatively constant. But in the past two years, important changes occurred in the pattern of terrorism. In April 1983, our embassy in Beirut was practically destroyed by a vehicle bomb. It was not the first such attack, but it was the first such event directed against us. In October 1983, there were devastating attacks against our Marine barracks and the French Multinational Force headquarters in Beirut; and in December 1983, another attack with a vehicle bomb almost succeeded in destroying our embassy in Kuwait. These attacks represented a sudden and severe rise in the violence of individual terrorist acts. Since that time, other acts of aircraft sabotage, bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings have revealed an increased willingness for groups and states to use terrorism as a means to further their causes. These attacks also demonstrate a terrifying disinterest by terrorists for the lives of innocent bystanders.

For civilized people everywhere, it has been difficult to accept the idea that this form of political madness might be enduring. We have been reluctant to address it--except when it strikes us directly. Its utter brutality, its mindless disregard for the rights of innocent bystanders, have stunned us. Because we

respect the rights of others, because we are an amazingly free and open society, few of us have much experience in dealing with this kind of extremism. We are being forced to learn.

During 1984, the number of terrorist attacks rose sharply. For some years, the average number stayed around 500 or so, but last year the number rose by about 25% to well over 600. Until 1984, U.S. citizens and property received the brunt of these attacks. Then last year, a large number of attacks were directed at the French. The Middle East remains a fertile ground for terrorism, but in 1984, the number of attacks in Europe, against both European and third country targets, greatly increased. There were also more attacks directed against private citizens and businessmen. This trend has continued on into 1985.

The attacks in Western Europe are indicative of a number of tendencies in international terrorism that must concern us. With increasing frequency, terrorist groups and individuals are leaving their own countries and committing terrorist attacks abroad--sometimes in concert with one another--like those last month among the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, and Direct Action in France. Such travel gives the terrorist much wider latitude on target selection, as well as the opportunity to meet, train, and cooperate with other terrorist groups in different countries. It also makes the itinerant terrorist harder to find.

While most terrorist attacks remain fairly conventional (the resort to bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations), terrorist methods clearly are becoming more sophisticated. Explosives enhanced with cylinders of gas--the weapon often used in attacks claimed by the so-called Islamic Jihad--and remotely detonated or set off by a fanatical, suicidal vehicle driver are examples of both technical and tactical sophistication.

Finally, all the risks normally associated with terrorism by small groups are greatly enhanced by the involvement of certain states in planning, financing, providing training, documentation, and safehaven for terrorist groups.

State support, on the scale we are now witnessing, has greatly altered the dynamic of terrorism as we saw it in the 1960s and 1970s. With the help of a sponsoring state, small groups of terrorists can achieve extraordinary destructive power. They are able to use more sophisticated techniques, drawing on state-funded training programs and amassed equipment. They can avail themselves of state resources to improve their intelligence gathering and their planning. They have the immense advantage of official travel documents and sometimes the use of diplomatic cover to mask their true identities, movements, and munitions deliveries. They are able to find safehaven in the sponsoring state after an attack and their chances of getting away with their attack are greatly enhanced as a result. Thus, while terrorist groups pay a

price in the form of varying degrees of state direction and control and target selection, they also reap great benefits from state sponsorship.

As a result of the foregoing trends, terrorism has come to pose a new and different challenge to our national security. Terrorism, as an instrument of various insurgent groups, traditionally has been directed largely against the leadership of the government being attacked. Our people and facilities, and those of third countries, were as a rule only incidental targets to such terrorist attacks.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, insurgent groups and outright terrorists discovered that playing to the international media could mobilize public opinion in countries such as the United States, and could bring moral, economic and political pressure to bear against the targeted state leadership. This discovery was really the spawning ground for international terrorism as we are witnessing it today, because it was an easy step to realizing that attacking another country's citizens and facilities was a sure way to get the attention of that country's media, public, and decisionmakers.

The clincher, the development that has made international terrorism the security threat that it now poses, has been the conclusion reached by several small and relatively weak states

that terrorism may have potential for obtaining concessions from other states that could not be obtained across the bargaining table. This is a tempting logic that obviously is driving the patterns of state support for international terrorism that we are now experiencing.

Seeing international terrorism in this perspective should make it clear that we can no longer look upon small scale outbreaks of violence in remote places as events beyond our interests. What we are facing is more serious than isolated and singular bursts of violence. It poses a graver threat to society as a whole than the anger of individuals and groups directed narrowly against their own leaders. It involves us all in a common web of risk. Thus the open, pluralistic, and democratic societies of the west have been forced to reassess their view of terrorism, to face it now, not as a long term festering sore, but as an acute condition.

- Our citizens and facilities are being damaged and threatened by it.
- The judgments of our people about the rightness of policies and the implications of events are being confused by it.
- Decision processes are being disrupted by it.
- Confidence in the workability of our institutions is being eroded by it.

What we are witnessing is a terrible irony. The success story of our time is that strategic deterrence works. The concept of deterrence has served us well for 40 years. As a strategy it will go on working, if we keep ourselves strong.

Our problem for the future is that below the threshold where deterrence works to prevent major outbreaks of violence we face an insidious new threat. This threat is not war as we have known it, but it is nonetheless warfare as we must come to understand it. The cumulative effect of the pattern of low-level violence is a slow attrition of national security. The response by some is to propose that we withdraw from those places where we are most threatened--that we simply "get out." In effect, this thinking goes; we can all come back to fortress America and live here in peace and harmony. Nothing would make our adversaries happier than to have us adopt such a form of neo-isolation. When it hurts--get out!

I have no intention to pose this gradually emergent threat of low-level violence as a centrally directed conspiracy. Our problems in coping with this threat stem not from a single "puppet master" in contro, but rather the small scale of the individual incidents, complex motives, and the varied sources of support for the many different players involved.

As some of your members have said, the rising preference for small scale violence to express discontent is the most dangerous social virus of our time. This virus has several qualities that must concern us.

- It feeds on many different kinds and sources of discontent.
- It is a frequent rallying point for other causes, many of them expressed most often in non-violent ways.
- It is an attractive medium for the ambitions of small, weak and unscrupulous states.
- It is a natural focus for disinformation and other forms of deceit.
- It intensifies and polarizes emotions.
- And, finally, it is a tempting instrument for seeking to accelerate social, political, and economic change.

The will to violence that is often expressed in terrorism is also rooted to a number of different tendencies in late 20th century society.

- The desire for dramatic change.
- The impatient urge for instant redress of injuries.

- Suspicion of government and the motives of power.
- Compassion for the weak and the unjustly treated.
- Many deep, well-intentioned urges toward political, economic and social reform.
- The desire for power and wealth, which produces linkages among ordinary criminal activity, narcotics crime, and terrorism.
- Efforts to influence the strategic balance without provoking a strategic response.

It is easy to see in all of this why a good working definition of terrorism is hard to come by. Some people walk around this need for definition by saying that "terrorism is what the bad guys do." Others seem to become quite thoroughly confused about the differences between terrorism and insurgency. Yet, a legitimate insurgency, openly using armed conflict as a means for seeking movement or concessions from a government that has denied other forms of redress can readily be distinguished from a secretive group that takes and holds hostages, or puts a suitcase full of explosives on board an airliner full of unknowing and innocent people. Somehow we must cut through this definitional problem, because effective public policy demands clarity of understanding. It is essential that we spell out, in clear language for the

terrorists, for their state sponsors, and for our friends and allies the terms of our policy. It is not essential, by that same token, to spell out the steps in our planning or the specifics of our response for each eventuality. The element of surprise is an advantage we cannot relinquish. In due course, our actions should speak for themselves.

With these elements in mind, this Administration has been working from a set of operating principles that I would like to share with you. These are included in a Presidential directive on combatting terrorism and are designed to govern our policy toward those who practice or support terror:

- The practice of terrorism by any person or group in any cause is a threat to our national security.
- The practice or support of terrorism must be resisted by all legal means.
- State sponsored terrorist acts or threats are considered to be hostile acts and the perpetrators and sponsors must be held accountable.
- Whenever we obtain evidence that an act of terrorism is about to be mounted against us, we have a responsibility to take measures to protect our citizens, property, and interests.

- It is essential to improve the collection and assessment of information on groups and states involved in terrorism in order to prevent or counter attacks, warn our citizens, friends and allies, and lower the risks of successful terrorist attacks.

- Terrorism is a common problem for all democratic nations and we must work intensively with others to eliminate this threat to free and open societies.

- We must use every possible diplomatic and political avenue to persuade those now practicing or supporting terrorism to desist and we must help wherever possible to find non-violent means to deal with legitimate grievances.

- Acts of state sponsored and organized terrorism should be appropriately exposed and condemned in every available forum.

- Wherever possible, we should help those friendly nations suffering intimidation because of terrorist threats or activities.

This set of nine principles, I believe, amply reflects the complexity of the challenge posed by international terrorism, as well as the need for a carefully considered response to it.

Articulating those principles, however, is only the beginning of our task. It is here that the debate begins on the specific nature of our responses.

Most of the options available to us excite little, if any controversy. Our government is now engaged in large scale efforts to improve the physical security of diplomatic missions and other U.S. facilities abroad. Training programs are now mandatory for sensitizing our personnel to the nature of the terrorist threat and the steps every individual can take to improve personal protection from terrorist attack. We are working closely with many other governments to improve the quality and quantity of the security provided to our personnel and facilities abroad, and we are expanding our capabilities to provide additional protection to foreign diplomats and dignitaries in the United States.

For the past year, we have been actively assisting the training of foreign civilian authorities involved in the security and anti-terrorism programs of other friendly governments. We have made a number of improvements in our capabilities for collecting, assessing, and sharing intelligence information on terrorist activities. With the cooperation of the Congress, we have obtained legislation to strengthen the legal attack on terrorist activities and to permit full U.S. implementation of international agreements against hostage taking and aircraft sabotage. In both

bilateral and multilateral discussions, we are seeking agreements and understandings with other governments that will facilitate extradition of suspected terrorists, tighten the interpretation of traditional agreements on the status of diplomatic missions, enhance the sharing of technologies related to terrorist activity, and improve international efforts in such common areas as aviation security. All of these programs are well under way, but we recognize that we still have much to do in several of these areas.

While some have debated the pace, adequacy, or priority assigned to these matters, there seems to be general agreement that all should proceed. This is not the case with the last issue: the use of force to preempt or as a response to terrorist acts. As I said earlier, small scale violence, including terrorism, falls below the normal thresholds for invoking a military response. Both Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger have placed a number of propositions before the public on the factors involved in use of this option. While the media have characterized these statements as a debate, that is not really the case. Secretary Shultz has stressed the need to consider the use of force as a realistically available option for dealing with certain terrorist acts. He has carefully pointed out the risks and problems we must consider in the use of force, including the problems of securing the support and cooperation of other governments. Secretary Weinberger has underscored the very

real practical difficulties that exist for the military planner in attempting to apply small amounts of force, especially at a great distance. He has accurately noted the difficulty of assuring success and has echoed the need for public support for any extensive resort to force by the United States in defending us against terrorist attacks.

I personally do not find these to be incompatible lines of inquiry. The use of force in self-defense is legitimate under international law. It is explicitly provided under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. What we have been seeking is a set of working principles, you might say rules of engagement, which will facilitate meaningful uses of force in specific cases where that is clearly warranted. We want those uses of force to be proportionate to the threat; we want them to be targeted as precisely as possible; we want them to be judicious in the selection of where, when, and in what kind of case; we want the fullest possible cooperation of other governments involved; and we want to succeed.

If this discussion of the use of force is shocking some of you, I urge that a close look be taken at what is really involved. We are not talking about going to war. On the contrary, we are simply posing the possibility of a very selective and discrete employment of force, when and if it is deemed necessary, it is in the national interest, and it is likely to achieve a desired result.

As a nation, we have faced the need for an effective response to small scale violence before. In 1803/4, you may recall, the United States found itself afflicted with a scourge of no mean proportions in the Mediterranean--the Barbary pirates, whose depredations made life precarious for merchantmen along the North African coast. President Jefferson dispatched Stephen Decatur in an overt effort to eradicate the pirate scourge at its source. A parallel endeavor led by a Marine Lieutenant named Presley O'Bannon stuck out in a complimentary effort overland--in what was our first "covert operation." Together, Decatur and O'Bannon carried out an eminently successful counter-terrorist operation, and the civilized world thanked us for it. The anarchic conditions prevailing in that region during Decatur and O'Bannon's time are closely akin to what we face today in some parts of the Middle East.

The use of force, as we all know, poses special problems in a society as free and open as ours. We have never exploited force casually or cynically, which places us at a marked disadvantage in responding to those who today have declared themselves to be our adversaries. The United States has not, nor will not, use force indiscriminately--but we must be free to consider an armed strike against terrorists and those who support them where abatement the threat does not appear likely by any other means. Terrorists have been skillful in forcing, or some times persuading, innocent bystanders to shield them from reprisal.

This fact clearly must be a matter of deep concern to us as we determine our courses of action. Yet we cannot permit it to freeze us into inaction. That is exactly what the terrorists now expect. Just as we will not make substantial concessions to terrorists--and that, as you know, has long been our declared policy, we cannot and will not, abstain from forcible action to prevent, preempt, or respond to terrorist attacks solely because there is risk that innocent people may be hurt.

The use of force is dangerous--yes. We aim to avoid it if possible, but not, I repeat not, at all costs. To renounce it as an option in countering terrorism is to invite more, and more ruthless, terrorist attacks.

Here I come to the second irony of the security situation of the United States and other democratic countries. Many countries, including the United States, have the specific forces and capabilities we need to carry out operations against terrorist groups. If we do not use those forces where their use is clearly justified, we get neither the direct benefits nor the deterrent value from having such forces. We need that deterrent; we cannot proceed in such a way that terrorist groups or their sponsors feel they can make free and unopposed use of violence against us.

That deterrent, however, cannot really be made to work unless we demonstrate our will to meet a terrorist challenge with a

measured dose of force. To do that, we must be free to act quickly when the evidence and the situation warrant. Right now, however, a decision to use even a small contingent of special purpose forces--I'm talking about something less than a battalion--gets entangled in the War Powers Resolution. Small scale conflict will almost inevitably fall below the thresholds of Congressional tolerance implied by that act, because it was written to prevent future involvement, without Congressional approval, in much larger conflict on the scale of Vietnam. That resolution needs to be amended, or at least interpreted by the Congress in such a way that we avoid confusion on what the United States can do to respond to terrorist threats. So long as terrorists and their sponsoring states feel that we are legally inhibited from responding, or that our response is going to be bogged down in interminable consultations or debate, we, in fact, do not have a deterrent. The NSIC can be especially helpful in this matter by encouraging legislation which endorses timely, prompt, and effective Presidential decisions that will make the demonstrations we need, give the United States a deterrent that works to reduce low level resort to violence, and, in the final analysis, helps us to limit the number of times and places where force may actually be needed.

Our allies and friends do not wish to see us going off half-cocked on military adventures in any quarter of the globe. They need not worry. We do not intend to. We do, however,

intend to have a capability for the judicious use of force, if force must be used in cooperation with other governments where appropriate.

The backing of public opinion, we all agree, is vital to the conduct of foreign policy in general, and even more so when it comes to the employment of force of any kind in the international arena.

Quite frankly, I think we have that mandate. First and foremost, the President has made his own position crystal-clear. And this dates back to his first day in office when he declared that international terrorism is the ultimate abuse of human rights. I might add that this Administration, through its former and its present Secretary of State, has pointed the finger unequivocally at the Soviet Union as sponsor and supporter of several states and groups involved in international terrorism. We see no indication today that there is reason to modify that charge.

The same can be said of other states which use terrorism as an instrument of policy. In these cases, such as Iran and Libya, we should be prepared to exact a proportional military response against bona fide military targets in a state which directs terrorist actions against us. In making a determination to attack these military targets, we need not insist on absolute evidence that the targets were used solely to support terrorist

activities. Nor should we need to prove beyond all doubt that a particular element or individual in that state is responsible for such terrorist acts. In the case of Iran, there is sufficient evidence that radical Shia terrorists are responsive to Iranian guidance for us to hold Tehran responsible for such attacks against United States' citizens, property, and interests.

Terrorism is a revolting phenomenon, undertaken by people who by choice stand outside the pale of civilized peoples. It is a form of warfare, directed against the very heart of our political and cultural being. We have no realistic choice but to meet it, and that means head on, where nothing else works. The aim of terrorists, and the ultimate objective of those who sponsor, train, and supply them, is to undermine our beliefs, shatter our self-confidence, and blunt our responses.

In the final analysis, however, force is only one instrument in our kit of tools. All the other options--the security, training, diplomatic, institutional, legal, and international agreement approaches I have mentioned--must be applied as rigorously as possible. We must continue to improve our ability to wield all of the elements of national power--economic, diplomatic, military, informational, and covert against the scourge of terrorism. But when other remedies are inadequate--either alone or in combination--force must be an instrument available for coping with low level violence. The legitimacy of that choice

depends on our having made an honest effort to deal with this challenge by means short of force. There is no real debate within this Administration on that basic principle. There should be none among free men who wish to remain so.

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