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CAS 5/14/2012

File Folder TERRORISM ACTIONS: PENDING (3/16/1985-3/31/1985)

FOIA

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16

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
136626	MEMO	ROBERT OAKLEY TO RICHARD BURT RE TERRORISM <i>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	3	3/19/1985	B1
136627	CABLE	STATE 063836 <i>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	1	3/2/1985	B1
136629	CABLE	BONN 07451 <i>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	2	3/13/1985	B1
136631	CABLE	BONN 07386 <i>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	1	3/12/1985	B1
136633	CABLE	BONN 07527 <i>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	1	3/13/1985	B1
136634	DRAFT DECLARATION	RE TERRORISM <i>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	1	ND	B1
136674	COVER SHEET		1	ND	B1
136659	PAPER	RE DECISIONS	3	ND	B1
136661	LETTER	RE QUESTIONS	2	11/13/1984	B1

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136665	PAPER	RE REQUIREMENTS	4	ND	B1
136669	PAPER	RE REQUIREMENTS	5	ND	B1

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136026
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 19, 1985

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

TO : EUR - Mr. Richard R. Burt
FROM : M/CTP - Robert B. Oakley *RO*
SUBJECT : Discussion of Terrorism at the Summit

In all of the discussions in which I have participated to date, there has been an explicit or implicit position by State Department representatives (see Tab A) and those from other agencies (including NSC) that there would be a serious, well prepared, detailed discussion of terrorism at the Summit, focussed upon practical measures to be taken and specifically including civil aviation hijacking and sabotage, accompanied by a strong, but brief, general statement noting this fact. The Secretary has made clear upon several occasions, and most recently to Sir Geoffrey Howe, his desire to have a serious discussion of terrorism at the Summit. He has not specifically addressed the question of a statement, although he and all of us believe the emphasis should be on action rather than rhetoric.

The substantive preparations for serious discussions are coming along well as a result of the two meetings in Bonn March 7-8 and 12-13. We dissuaded the FRG Ministry of Interior and the other four governments (France sent no representative) at the first Bonn meeting from recommending a very detailed statement for use by the Summit (TAB B). At the second Bonn meeting, we made clear the view approved by the Secretary on revitalizing the Bonn Declaration and lifting Ariana sanctions, that there should be agreement at the Summit on a set of principles outlining how to move to a more active mode against hijacking, accompanied by a brief statement saying that this had been agreed (TAB C). The French, as expected, reserved their position. It is unclear whether FRG Foreign Minister Genscher is prepared to confront the French on their standard argument that such issues as terrorism do not belong on the agenda of the Summit.

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BY *fw* NARA DATE 9/15/17

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The emphasis at the Summit on terrorism, assuming French objections are overcome, must be on serious discussion and agreement on practical measures. It should not be on a detailed public statement such as the one issued last year. However, given this past years increase in terrorist activity against vital interests of the Seven, and given the number of strong public political-level statements they have all made on this subject over the past year, there is really no way for the Summit to be silent on a subject addressed last year in such a long declaration. It would convey the impression to domestic public and political opinion of each of the Seven, as well as to foreign opinion, that the Seven are backing away in face of the terrorist threat.

Given what we know about the evolving attitudes of the French government, I can not imagine that at this years Summit Mitterand would be tougher in opposing discussion of the subject and a public statement than he was last year; very likely he will be more amenable, particularly if there is to be only a brief but firm statement. He will probably reassert the standard French positions of principle, reserve his position somehow, and then allow nature to take its course (and secretly be pleased since he is under political pressure at home for having been too soft on terrorism).

My suggestion is that we try for a brief statement along the lines of that at TAB D, either alone or as part of a broad catch-all political statement. Soon we shall probably need to do a message from the Secretary to Genscher concerning terrorism at the Summit, as he will be working on the agenda.

The UK delegation currently in Washington agrees that Genscher, whom the UK also may soon approach, is the key to dealing with France. They underscored the difficulty of enlisting French participation in multilateral generalized counter terrorism initiatives, noting that in the Summit context the French were prepared only to look at civil aviation terrorism. We emphasized that while we are looking for expanded cooperation, we are only looking for a multilateral showing of political will, while the actual cooperative steps would and should remain in established bilateral channels. The UK suggested it might be useful to have the Summit give an explicit mandate to the "experts on terrorism" to cooperate in other areas in addition to that of terrorism against civil aviation.

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I also suggest that we try for a brief but firm public statement on Afghanistan, and that this issue be discussed at the Summit with a view to how the tougher Soviet public line and stiffer pressure on Afghanistan can best be continued. Given the sensitivity displayed last week by the FRG and French representatives on appearing publicly to stand firm against the Soviets in Afghanistan and for the support of Pakistan, this should meet a relatively positive response. There may even be possibilities for agreement on some practical measures such as more humanitarian assistance. Again, a public statement is not the main purpose and it could be included in a catch-all political statement rather than being treated separately. NEA can give you suggested language, should you want it.

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OUTGOING
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~~SECRET~~ STATE 063836

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER
SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH FRG MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
OFFICIAL DR. RUPPRECHT

REFERENCE: A) BONN 04459, B) STATE 054784

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY - IN MEETINGS FEBRUARY 25 AND 26 WITH RUPPRECHT AGREEMENT, CONTINGENT ON COMMENTS BY OTHER DELEGATIONS, WAS REACHED ON AGENDA AND GOALS OF MARCH 7 AND 8 MEETING OF TERRORISM EXPERTS HOSTED BY FRG MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MOI). RUPPRECHT STATED MOI BELIEF THAT A STATEMENT DEMONSTRATING POLITICAL WILL TO ENHANCE THE EFFORTS OF ACTION MINISTRIES (SUCH AS MOI VICE MFA) SHOULD BE MADE BY THE SUMMIT. USG SIDE RESPONDED THAT IMMEDIATE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON STRENGTHENED COOPERATION ON PRACTICAL MEASURES; QUESTION OF PUBLIC DECLARATION SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY POLITICAL DIRECTORS AND FOREIGN MINISTERS RATHER THAN BY EXPERTS. USG STRESSED NEED TO HAVE AGREEMENT BY EXPERTS ON PRACTICAL ACTION PROPOSALS FOR SUBMISSION TO THE SUMMIT. END SUMMARY

3. FRG MINISTRY OF INTERIOR MINISTERIALDIRIGENT RUPPRECHT MET FEBRUARY 25 WITH M/CTP DIRECTOR OAKLEY AND ON FEBRUARY 26 IN MORNING SEPARATELY WITH CIA. AT NOON A JOINT MEETING WITH STATE, CIA, FBI, AND NSC FOLLOWED BY LUNCH, AND IN AFTERNOON SEPARATELY WITH FBI.

4. AGENDA FOR MARCH MEETING WAS PROVISIONALLY AGREED AS FOLLOWS: MORNING OF MARCH 7 DISCUSSION OF TERRORIST THREAT, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO DRAFT STUDY RECENTLY COMPLETED BY FRG ON QUOTE TERRORISTS, VIOLENT, AND EXTREMIST MOVEMENTS IN THE WORLD UNQUOTE, WITH COMMENTS THEREON BY OTHER DELEGATIONS. RUPPRECHT HOPES THAT ALL DELEGATIONS WILL BE ABLE TO STATE GENERAL CONSENSUS ON FRG REPORT ON NATURE OF TERRORIST THREAT. EACH DELEGATION WILL ALSO PRESENT A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF ITS NATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT (FI) USG WILL FOCUS ON POTENTIAL CONNECTIONS BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL TERRORIST THREATS AND GROUPS AS TERRORISM IN THE US PROPER IS FORTUNATELY LIMITED, OF LITTLE THREAT AND LIKELY OF LITTLE INTEREST TO THE OTHER DELEGATIONS), AND AN INTERNATIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT IS TO BE PRESENTED BY THE FRG DELEGATION.

5. AFTERNOON OF MARCH 7 WILL CONSIDER AND ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY PRACTICAL MEASURES THE SEVEN AND OTHER CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS MAY TAKE TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COUNTER-TERRORIST EFFORT. MEASURES SUCH AS THOSE SUGGESTED IN REFTEL 8, WITH WHICH RUPPRECHT HAD NO BASIC DISAGREEMENT, AND SIMILAR MEASURES WHICH MAY BE SUGGESTED BY OTHER DELEGATIONS, ARE WHAT THE USG WOULD LIKE TO SEE IDENTIFIED AS PRACTICABLE IN COMMON BY THE SEVEN. RUPPRECHT DESCRIBES THIS AS DRAWING PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS OF FRG REPORT ON NATURE OF TERRORIST THREAT. WE HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH SUCH A FORMULATION. WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THERE BE SET ON PAPER A SERIES OF POINTS OR PRINCIPLES OR CONCLUSIONS AS GUIDELINES FOR FOLLOW-UP ACTION; AND THAT THIS PAPER BE SUBMITTED TO SUMMIT FOR CONSIDERATION.

6. MORNING OF MARCH 8 WILL EXAMINE WAYS TO IMPLEMENT THOSE PRACTICAL MEASURES WHICH THE DELEGATIONS HAVE AGREED SHOULD BE EFFECTED.

7. HANDLING TERRORISM AT THE BONN ECONOMIC SUMMIT: MAKING THE POINT STRONGLY THAT A DEMONSTRATION OF POLITICAL WILL TO COMBAT TERRORISM IS CALLED FOR, RUPPRECHT PRESENTED A DRAFT STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED AT THE SUMMIT. QUOTE THE PROBLEM IS TOO SERIOUS TO ALLOW OURSELVES TO BECOME PARALYZED UNQUOTE HE CONTINUED. OAKLEY RESPONDED THAT THE USG IS LOOKING FOR EFFECTIVE WORK, BUT AGREED THAT AN INCREASE OF POLITICAL WILL AND POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING IS NECESSARY SO OPERATIONAL LEVELS MAY FUNCTION MORE EFFECTIVELY. THERE IS A NEED TO REMOVE OBSTACLES, IMPROVE COORDINATION ON OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES, AND SEEK NEW IDEAS. EUR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DOBBINS ALSO UNDERSCORED THE NEED TO FOCUS INITIALLY ON PRACTICAL COOPERATION AND SUGGESTED THE QUESTION OF WHAT KIND OF PUBLIC STATEMENT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED LATER BY POLITICAL DIRECTORS OR FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE SEVEN. NOT IN MARCH BY THE EXPERTS AT BONN. IF THE EXPERTS START OFF WITH DISCUSSION OF WHAT SHOULD BE SAID PUBLICLY, THE FRENCH WILL BE PROVOKED AND DISCUSSION WILL BE DIVERTED FROM REACHING AGREEMENT UPON A SERIES OF PRACTICAL MEASURES.

8. RUPPRECHT APPEARED TO AGREE TO THIS APPROACH AND ASKED WHETHER FIRST FOUR POINTS OF FRG PROPOSED DRAFT PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH IS BEING SENT SEPTELY COULD FORM BASIS FOR EXPERTS REPORT TO THE SUMMIT, SETTING FORTH A CONSENSUS ON COMMON ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT. OAKLEY REPLIED THAT THIS SEEMED AN EXCELLENT WAY TO HANDLE IT. REMAINDER OF POINTS IN FRG DRAFT STATEMENT PLUS SOME OF THOSE SUGGESTED BY USG (REFTEL B) COULD FORM BASIS FOR CONSENSUS ON PRACTICAL ACTION PROPOSALS. RUPPRECHT AGREED. ARMACOST

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ACTION MSG 02

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TERREP EXCLUSIVE

EO 12958: DECLASS

TAGS: PTER, GE

SUBJ: SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS ON TERRORISM MEETING

REF: BORN 7014

1. ~~SECRET~~ - INITIAL TEXT

2. SUMMARY: THE SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS MEETING ON TERRORISM MARCH 5 AND 6, 1984, HOSTED BY THE FRG INTERIOR MINISTRY, COMPLETED PAPERS ON (1) A SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM, (2) CERTAIN PRACTICAL MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO COMBAT TERRORISM, AS WELL AS (3) LANGUAGE WHICH MIGHT BE USED BY INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS IN A STATEMENT ON TERRORISM AT THE SUMMIT (REFTEL). FRANCE DID NOT ATTEND, EXCUSING ITSELF FROM THE PROCEEDINGS AT THE LAST MINUTE IN A LETTER TO FRG INTERIOR MINISTER ZIMMERMANN. CERTAIN PARTICIPANTS -- THE CANADIANS, ITALIANS, AND JAPANESE -- MADE IT CLEAR THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSIONS THAT THEY HAD NO AUTHORITY TO MAKE FORMAL AGREEMENTS WHICH WOULD BE BINDING ON THEIR GOVERNMENTS. NONETHELESS, THE COMPLETED PAPERS -- ALTHOUGH CHARACTERIZED AS "MINUTES OF THE MEETING" TO STRESS THEIR NON-BINDING CHARACTER -- REPRESENT A MINIMUM CONSENSUS OF THE EXPERTS IN ATTENDANCE. END SUMMARY.

3. FRG INTERIOR MINISTRY INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION CHIEF, DR. GERHARD HEUER, OPENED THE MEETING MARCH 7 BY NOTING THE ABSENCE OF THE FRENCH. HE CITED A LETTER FROM FRENCH INTERIOR MINISTER JOXE TO FRG INTERIOR MINISTER, RECEIVED BY THE GERMANS MARCH 6, WHICH GAVE AS A REASON FOR FRENCH NON-PARTICIPATION THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT AT THE LONDON SUMMIT FOR THE CONVENING OF SUCH A SECURITY EXPERTS MEETING (CIC). JOXE REFERRED TO BILATERAL MEETINGS BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND FRG IN FEBRUARY WHERE FRENCH POSITIONS ON TERRORISM HAD BEEN LAID OUT (SPECIALLY THEREBY MAKING FRENCH PARTICIPATION AT THE MEETING UNNECESSARY).

4. EACH DELEGATION WAS ASKED TO PROVIDE A SHORT SUMMARY OF ITS PERCEPTIONS OF THE CURRENT TERRORIST THREAT:

-- FRG: WHILE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TERRORIST ACTS IN THE FRG HAD DROPPED FROM 1983 TO 1984 (400 TO 250), THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE DONE HAD NOT. THE FRG NOTED THAT THE RED ARMY FACTION (RAF) HAD IMPROVED ITS MATERIAL FOUNDATION, THROUGH NEW RECRUITS AND ROBBERIES. AFTER THREE YEARS WITHOUT A SERIOUS ATTACK, THE TWO RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS -- OBERAMMERGAU AND THE ZIMMERMANN

ASSASSINATION -- WERE EVIDENCE THAT THE RAF INTENDS TO CONTINUE ITS ACTIVITIES. THE FRG EMPHASIZED THE INTERNATIONAL TIES THE RAF MAINTAINS WITH OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS IN FRANCE, BELGIUM, SPAIN, ITALY, AND IRELAND, ALL DIRECTED AGAINST "WESTERN IMPERIALISM," AND, IN PARTICULAR, NATO. NONETHELESS, THE FRG NOTED AN INCREASINGLY EXTRA-EUROPEAN ASPECT OF TERRORISM, AS EXTREME SHIITE AND PALESTINIAN GROUPS, AS WELL AS KADDAFI-DIRECTED LIBYAN GROUPS, EXERCISE WHAT THEY CONSIDER THEIR "RIGHTS" TO LIQUIDATE THEIR OPPONENTS ABROAD.

-- UNITED KINGDOM: THE BRITISH NOTED THAT SINCE THE UK HAD SUFFERED MUCH IN THE PAST FROM INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, IT SET THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE ON THE GOAL OF FIGHTING IT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. AS TO THE SITUATION WITH THE IRA AND IRAISH IN NORTHERN IRELAND, THE UK NOTED THAT THE DECREASE IN DEATHS IN THE LAST YEARS HAD BEEN OFFSET BY THE MURDER OF THREE OF OFF-DUTY POLICEMEN. THE NUMBER OF TERRORIST BOMBS EXPLODED HAD NOT BEEN AS HIGH AS FORMERLY BELIEVED (1982-TWO, 1983-TWO, 1984-ONE). THE UK SUSPECTED BUT HAD NO INTELLIGENCE TO CONFIRM IRISH INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY OUTSIDE OF THE UK, NOR OF IRA CONNECTIONS WITH THE RAF. THE UK MENTIONED ATTACKS ON UK PERSONNEL IN ATHENS AND INDIA, AS WELL AS LIBYAN ATTACKS ON DISSIDENT OPPONENTS IN THE UK. OTHER AREAS WHICH CONTINUED TO CONCERN THE UK WERE ATTACKS ON SIKHS AND BATTLES BETWEEN TAMILS AND SRI LANKANS IN THE UK, AS WELL AS LOW-LEVEL VIOLENCE FROM WELSH AND SCOTTISH ANARCHIST GROUPS.

-- CANADA: THE CANADIAN DELEGATION SAW ITS TERRORISM PROBLEM AS A CROSS BETWEEN U.S. AND EUROPEAN PROBLEMS. THEY FELT VERY FORTUNATE THAT THEY HAD RECENTLY HAD TWO MAJOR VISITS, THE POPE AND QUEEN ELIZABETH, WITHOUT MAJOR TERRORIST INCIDENT. NONETHELESS, WITH THE UPCOMING OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION MEETING, AND THE OLYMPICS IN 1988, CANADA MUST BE PREPARED. CANADA'S INTENSELY ETHNIC NATURE MIGHT RESULT IN ATTACKS AGAINST THE SOVIETS AT THE ABOVE EVENTS. THE DELEGATION SAW TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN CANADA AS DIVIDED INTO FOUR MAJOR CATEGORIES:

- (1) AN IRANIAN LIBYAN NEXUS, CLAIMING A RIGHT TO SUPPORT MUSLIM REVOLUTIONS OUTSIDE THE INTERNATIONAL LAW;
- (2) MID-EAST COMPLEX OF ISSUES, WHICH HAD THUS FAR BEEN MORE RESTRAINED IN CANADA THAN IN OTHER AREAS;
- (3) MARCO-TERRORISM, SIMILAR TO THE U.S. PROBLEM; AND
- (4) ETHNIC TERRORISM, ALTHOUGH IN CANADA IT HAD NOT REACHED THE EXTENT THAT ETHNIC (IN PARTICULAR ARMENIAN) TERRORISM HAS REACHED IN THE U.S.

-- ITALY: THE ITALIAN DELEGATION NOTED THAT TERRORISM IN ITALY HAS BEEN ON THE WANE SINCE 1983 DUE TO EFFECTIVE LEGISLATION AND POLICE MEASURES UNDERTAKEN TO STOP IT. WHILE 132 PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN 1982, ONLY 23 DIED IN 1984. DESPITE THESE FIGURES, TERRORISM HAD NOT BEEN DEFEATED; IN FACT, 1984 HAD SEEN A SLIGHT RESURGENCE. WHILE ITALY HAD UP TO NOW BEEN LARGELY UNAFFECTED BY ANTI-NATO AND ANTI-AMERICAN GROUPS, THE RED BRIGADES HAD NOW APPARENTLY TURNED TO INTERNATIONAL TERROR. THE ITALIANS NOTED THE DANGER ITALY (AND OTHERS) NOW FACED FROM NON-ITALIAN INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS, NAMING MID-EAST (SHIITE LEBANESE AND OTHER ISLAMIC GROUPS), LIBYAN, AND ARMENIAN ACTIVITY, AND CALLED, THEREFORE, FOR FURTHER MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO COORDINATE COUNTER-TERRORIST ACTIVITY.

-- JAPAN: THE JAPANESE DELEGATION REPORTED THAT THE JAPANESE RED ARMY HAD NOT ENGAGED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN JAPAN SINCE 1977, AND WAS NOW BASED IN LEBANON WHERE IT WAS ENGAGED IN TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE U.S.,

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ISRAEL, AND JAPAN. THE DELEGATION BROUGHT WITH THEM ON TERRORISM THAT IS NOT COVERED BY THE CONVENTION. THE ISSUE OF WHICH RELEVANT DELEGATIONS SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE EXPERTS MEETING WAS DISCUSSED AND IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE 1978 MEETING SHOULD BE OPEN TO ALL DELEGATIONS WHOSE MEMBERS OR A FEW OF THEM, INSTEAD OF ALL MEMBERS, HAD BEEN A PART OF THE CONVENTION MEETING. THE CHAIRMAN AGREED THAT GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE WOULD NOT BE A FACTOR IN PREVENTING MEMBERS OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE EXPERTS MEETING. AS TO WHETHER THE MEETING SHOULD BE HELD IN JAPAN, SEVERAL COUNTRIES HAD EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN THE MEETING. FOR THE LAST FIVE YEARS, THEY HAVE NO LINKS TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM OR RIG.

5. AFTER EACH DELEGATION'S PRESENTATION, THE CHAIRMAN NEVER ASKED THE DELEGATIONS WHETHER THEY WOULD LIKE TO PRODUCE AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT REPORT ON TERRORISM (PRESENTED IN WASHINGTON DIRECTLY TO THE DEPARTMENT BY THE INTERIOR MINISTER DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE POLICE AFFAIRS SECTION (RUMRECHER)). AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION, THE EXPERTS GROUP DECIDED (RATHER, DUE TO TIME CONSTRAINTS) TO PROCEED WITH DRAFTING OF THE DRAFTS OF PAPERS ON AN ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM, METHODS TO BE TAKEN TO CONDUCT IT, AND LANGUAGE WHICH INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES COULD USE IN STATEMENTS ON TERRORISM AT THE COMMITTEE. WORK ON THESE DRAFTS CONTINUED THROUGH THE END OF THE MEETING ON MARCH 9, RESULTING IN PAPERS CITED IN REFTEL.

6. WHILE ALL DELEGATIONS MADE IT CLEAR DURING THE DISCUSSIONS THAT THE PRODUCT OF THE EXPERTS MEETING WAS NOT INTENDED TO SET A POLITICAL OR LEGAL OBLIGATION FOR EACH COUNTRY, THE CHAIRMAN, ITALIAN, AND JAPANESE DELEGATIONS WERE AWARE THAT THEY WERE NOT AUTHORIZED TO AGREE TO DOCUMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE SEEN AS BINDING BY THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS. FOR THIS REASON, AS LAID OUT IN REFTEL, THE EXPERTS CHOSE TO REFER TO THE THREE PAPERS AS "MINUTES OF THE MEETING" AND NOT EVEN AS RECOMMENDATIONS. NONETHELESS, THESE "MINUTES" DO REFLECT A MINIMUM CONSENSUS OF THE EXPERTS IN ATTENDANCE. IT WAS, HOWEVER, ALSO THE CONSENSUS THAT NOTHING WOULD PREVENT GOVERNMENTS FROM IMPLEMENTING BILATERALLY OR AS POSSIBLE MULTILATERALLY (PERHAPS THREE OR FOUR IF NOT ALL SEVEN GOVERNMENTS) SOME OF ALL OF THE MEASURES DISCUSSED AS POSSIBLY DESIRABLE IN THE COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORT. NORMAL ESTABLISHED LIAISON CHANNELS WOULD BE USED TO THIS END, AND, AS NOTED IN REFTEL, THIS PROCESS WOULD NOT DEPEND ON COMMITTEE DELIBERATION AND COULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS THAT AGREED IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH MEASURES WOULD BE USEFUL.

7. COMMENT BY RICHIE DIRECTOR ORFELY: BASED UPON WHAT HAS BEEN OBSERVED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE MARCH 12-13 EXPERTS MEETING, WHERE FRANCE WAS PRESENT, AND WHAT ENVOY HAS HEARD INDEPENDENTLY FROM HIS OFFICES, THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE HOPE FOR AN ACTIVE ROLE ON TERRORISM COORDINATION BY THE FBI FOREIGN OFFICE UNLESS THE FRENCH AGREE. THIS IS NOT UNLIKELY. THEREFORE, IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE SIX GOVERNMENTS ENDORSE AND IMPLEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED AT THE MARCH 7-8 MEETING.
BURNS

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Department of State

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BONN 07386 121936Z
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, EAIR
SUBJECT: ARIANA SANCTIONS, MEETING OF SUMMIT SEVEN
- EXPERTS ON TERRORISM, BONN, MARCH 12 AND 13.

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE -- ACTION REQUEST PARA 6.
3. AT 12 MARCH SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS MEETING DELEGATIONS AGREED, UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM THE FRG AND UK, THAT THE ARIANA BAN SHOULD BE ENDED, BUT ONLY IN CONNECTION WITH A LETTER OR STATEMENT (PRIVATE OR PUBLIC) FROM THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT INDICATING WILLINGNESS TO COMPLY WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS RE HIJACKING THAT COULD BE MADE PUBLIC (EITHER BY THE AFGHANS OR BY THE SEVEN); THAT THE SEVEN SHOULD NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THE GOA ON THIS BUT WOULD INFORM THE LATTER PRIVATELY OF THEIR INTENTION TO END THE BAN IN THIS CONTEXT; AND THAT THE GOA WOULD BE SO INFORMED IN JUNE OR JULY, WITH THE ACTUAL LIFTING OF THE BAN TO OCCUR NOT BEFORE THE END OF JANUARY 1986. THE AFGHANS WOULD BE INFORMED IN JUNE THAT THE FINAL ACTION OF THE SEVEN TO LIFT SANCTIONS WOULD BE REVIEWED JUST PRIOR TO THE PROPOSED DATE, AND THAT AFGHAN ACTION DURING THE INTERIM WOULD BE CLOSELY WATCHED. ANY BACKSLIDING BY AFGHANISTAN ON ITS COMMITMENT AFTER THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS WOULD RESULT IN AN IMMEDIATE RE-IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS. THE U.S. TOOK THE POSITION THAT SOMETHING SUITABLE FROM THE AFGHANS WHICH CAN BE MADE PUBLIC IS A PRECONDITION FOR LIFTING THE BAN; OTHER DELEGATIONS, HOWEVER, WERE LESS CLEAR ON THIS.
4. THE GROUP ALSO AGREED THAT THE SEVEN SHOULD ISSUE A STRONG STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE CURRENT AFGHAN REGIME AND THE SOVIET INVASION, IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY IMPRESSION THAT THE LIFTING OF THE ARIANA BAN SIGNIFIED ACCEPTANCE OF THE GENERAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. HOWEVER, WHETHER THIS STATEMENT WOULD BE ISSUED AT THE MAY SUMMIT, AS THE U.S. DELEGATION PROPOSED, OR IN SOME OTHER CONTEXT, WAS NOT AGREED UPON AS DELEGATIONS OTHER THAN ITALY (WHICH AGREED) DODGED THE ISSUE.
5. RE. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN LIFTING THE ARIANA BAN AND AGREEMENTS ON A SET OF PRINCIPLES TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BONN DECLARATION, THE POSITIONS OF THE DELEGATIONS WERE MIXED, WITH THE U.S., THE ITALIANS, AND THE CANADIANS IN FAVOR, THE FRENCH

APPARENTLY OPPOSED, AND THE UK, THE FRG AND JAPAN NOT TAKING A CLEAR STAND. AS TO TIMING AND CONTEXT, THE U.S. EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE MAY SUMMIT MEETING SHOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT ON THIS, WITH WHICH THE ITALIANS AGREED; THE CANADIANS, HOWEVER, WHILE AGREEING IN SUBSTANCE, WERE LESS FIRM ON THE QUESTION OF THE SUMMIT MEETING ISSUING THE STATEMENT ON STRENGTHENING THE APPLICATION OF THE BONN DECLARATION.

6. ACTION REQUEST: WASHINGTON APPROVAL/COMMENTS ON SCENARIO AND POINTS CONTAINED PARAS 3-5.

BURNS

BONN
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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BONN 07527 00 OF 02 140820Z 5142

ACTION MCT-03

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	CTAE-00	DODE-00	H-01	IO-16	NEA-06	NSC-01	NSAE-00
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USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER
SUBJECT: CONCLUSION OF MARCH 12-13 EXPERTS MEETING
ON TERRORISM

REF: BONN 7386

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE CONSENSUS ON CONCLUSIONS FOR THE MARCH 12-13 MEETING, AS SUMMARIZED BY FRG CHAIRMAN REDIES, FALL INTO THREE CATEGORIES:

-
A) ARIANA SANCTIONS; B) MINUTES OR CONSENSUS REPORT WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY GOVERNMENTS IN PREPARATION FOR BONN SUMMIT; AND
C) GUIDANCE FOR URGENT WORK BY ICAO EXPERTS OF SEVEN GOVERNMENTS, WHO ARE TO PREPARE A REPORT FOR THE EXPERTS GROUP WHICH WILL MEET AGAIN IN EARLY JUNE.

-
3. ON ARIANA, THE CONSENSUS WAS THAT THE SANCTIONS SHOULD BE LIFTED PROVIDED THERE WAS SOMETHING FROM AFGHANISTAN "WHICH CAN BE MADE PUBLIC" ON ITS COMMITMENT TO RESPECT HAGUE AND MONTREAL CONVENTIONS, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN BE INFORMED/CONSULTED (WITHOUT GIVING GOP A VETO). THE DISCUSSIONS WITH AFGHANS AND PAKS WOULD TAKE PLACE SOMETIME AFTER THE SUMMIT AND WELL BEFORE THE UNGA, PROBABLY LATE JUNE. THE TIME FOR LIFTING OF SANCTIONS, SHOULD THEY BE FINALLY APPROVED, WOULD BE SOMETIME IN THE FIRST FEW MONTHS OF 1986, WITH A MORE PRECISE DATE TO BE DECIDED LATER. THE GOF DELEGATION REPEATEDLY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS DOES NOT INDICATE ANY WEAKENING OF POSITION BY THE SEVEN GOVERNMENTS ON THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. OAKLEY REPEATED THE USG POSITION EXPLAINED THE PREVIOUS DAY, NAMELY THAT THE USG AGREEMENT ON ARIANA DEPENDED NOT ONLY UPON SOMETHING SUBSTANTIAL FROM AFGHANISTAN WHICH CAN BE MADE PUBLIC, BUT ALSO UPON DECISIONS AND SUITABLE PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY THE SEVEN GOVERNMENTS REAFFIRMING THEIR OPPOSITION TO SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN, AS WELL AS

STATING THEIR DETERMINATION, AS PART OF THEIR BROADER COOPERATIVE EFFORT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE, STRONGER POLICY IN ACTING AGAINST THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHO SUPPORT OR CONDOLE CIVIL AVIATION HIJACKING AND SABOTAGE. THE USG BELIEVES BOTH STATEMENTS COULD BE MADE AND SHOULD BE MADE AT THE BONN SUMMIT.

4. ON A RECORD OR MINUTE OF COSENSUS OR CONCLUSIONS REACHED ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF A NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE BONN DECLARATION, REDIES PROMISED TO HAVE A PAPER CIRCULATED "BY EASTER" FOR APPROVAL OR COMMENT BY THE OTHERS. HE DID NOT ACTUALLY PUT ANYTHING ON PAPER, NOR COULD HE BE PUSHED INTO SUMMARIZING VERBALLY WHAT THIS MIGHT CONTAIN. HOWEVER, IN PRIVATE TALK WITH OAKLEY HE INDICATED IDEAS THAT ACCORD WITH MINIMAL USG POSITION. (THE ONE POINT IN USG PAPER WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY OTHERS AND WHICH REDIES WILL OBVIOUSLY NOT INCLUDE IS CUT OFF OF SPARE PARTS.) REDIES SAID THAT THE MINUTES OR RECORD SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR USE BY THE "SHERPAS" IN PREPARING THE SUMMIT. THE FRENCH DELEGATE INSISTED THIS BE DONE BY EACH DELEGATION RATHER THAN COLLECTIVELY. OAKLEY NOTED, AGAIN, THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION ON THIS AND OTHER TERRORIST ISSUES AT THE SUMMIT.

6. OAKLEY PROPOSED THAT WHEN THE EXPERTS GROUP MEETS AGAIN IT CONSIDER THE POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS TO GOVERNMENTS FLAGRANTLY VIOLATING THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HAGUE AND MONTREAL CONVENTION, PARTICULARLY IRAN. THE CANADIAN DELEGATION EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THIS IDEA, ASSUMING THAT A STATEMENT AT THE SUMMIT SIGNALS A NEW DETERMINATION BY THE SEVEN TO APPLY THE BONN DECLARATION AND THEREBY PUTS GOVERNMENTS ON NOTICE. NO OTHER DELEGATION RESPONDED TO THIS PROPOSAL. BURNS

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NLR # 136633
BY RW NARA DATE 9/5/17

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D R A F T

1985 BONN DECLARATION ON TERRORISM

The following statement on terrorism is suggested for use as a declaration by the heads of state and government at the May 1985 Summit meeting in Bonn, Germany. It could be made part of a broader statement or issued separately as an addendum to any other statements made at the Summit:

THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT NOTE THE INCREASE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES DIRECTED PARTICULARLY AGAINST DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND NATIONS; THE INCREASING EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH ATTACKS ARE DIRECTED AGAINST PERSONS AND FACILITIES COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE; THE USE BY STATES OF TERRORISM IN INTER- GOVERNMENTAL CONFLICTS OR FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF OPPONENTS OF POLITICAL REGIMES; AND THE RESURGENCE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS INIMICAL TO CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY.

THEY MOST STRONGLY CONDEMN ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; CONFIRM THEIR DETERMINATION TO COUNTER THESE THREATS JOINTLY AND RESOLUTELY; AND REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE BONN DECLARATION OF 1978 ON CIVIL AVIATION..

IN REFERENCE TO THE DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM OF THE LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT OF 7/9 JUNE 1984, THEY HAVE AGREED TO INSTRUCT THE COMPETENT AGENCIES OF THEIR COUNTRIES TO CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY, IF NECESSARY, THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THREATS EMANATING FROM TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND CONTINUE TO COOPERATE IN THE ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL THREATS.

THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT CALL UPON OTHER LIKE-MINDED NATIONS TO WORK TO THIS SAME END; AND OFFER THE ASSISTANCE OF THEIR GOVERNMENT'S EXPERTS TO OTHER CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS IN PREVENTING ACTS ENDANGERING CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY AND OTHER TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST THE COMMON WELFARE OF PEOPLES AND NATIONS.

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136659	PAPER RE DECISIONS	3	ND	B1

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136661	LETTER RE QUESTIONS	2	11/13/1984	B1

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136669	PAPER RE REQUIREMENTS	5	ND	B1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 22, 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Speech before the National Strategy Information Center, Inc. (NSIC) on March 25, 1985

*Good
please read
in exhibit &
re-run
Jed*

Attached at Tab I is the second draft of your speech before the Defense Strategy Forum of the NSIC on March 25, 1985. It incorporates changes made by Mike Ledeen, Ken deGraffenreid, Vince Cannistraro, and Don Fortier.

The forum has provided an agenda as follows:

- 5:30 p.m. Reception
- 6:00 p.m. Presentation, plus Questions and Answers
- 7:30 p.m. Adjournment
- 7:30-9:00 p.m. Dinner w/20 select guests

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the attached draft and provide guidance for changes as necessary.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cc: Don Fortier
Vince Cannistraro
Ken deGraffenreid

Attachment
Tab I - Second Draft

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Declassify: OADR

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFICATION MARKING(S)
CW 5/14/12

MARCH 25, 1985

TERRORISM:
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
AND THE FUTURE OF FREE SOCIETY

GOOD EVENING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

IT IS A PLEASURE FOR ME THIS EVENING TO PRESENT A CURRENT PERSPECTIVE ON TERRORISM, AND TO OUTLINE THE APPROACHES WE BELIEVE MUST BE SERIOUSLY PURSUED OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS IN DETERRING THIS SCOURGE AGAINST CIVILIZED SOCIETY.

IT IS A SPECIAL PRIVILEGE TO SPEAK BEFORE THIS PARTICULAR FORUM. NSIC CALLS ITSELF AN EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATION, AND IT IS. IT IS NON-PARTISAN, AND THE PEOPLE WHO WORK IN IT AND WITH IT COVER OUR FULL POLITICAL SPECTRUM AND REFLECT THE THOUGHT IN ALL MAJOR SECTORS OF OUR SOCIETY: BUSINESS, LABOR, ACADEMIA, AND THE MEDIA. THE GLUE THAT HOLDS NSIC TOGETHER IS A SHARED ANTI-PATHY TOWARD ISOLATIONISM, PACIFISM, OR ANY OF THE OTHER DEFEATIST APPROACHES TO THE CHALLENGES FACING THE WEST IN THE LATE 20TH CENTURY. DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES IS NSIC'S OVERRIDING CONCERN, AND ITS APPROACH, OVER MORE THAN TWO DECADES, HAS BEEN TO ENCOURAGE EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR, BETWEEN CIVIL AND MILITARY COMPONENTS OF GOVERNMENT. NSIC CONSIDERS AN INFORMED PUBLIC TO BE THE KEY TO MAINTAINING AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE AND THEREBY KEEPING THE PEACE SYSTEM. THE PRESIDENT AND I SHARE AND APPLAUD THAT BELIEF. ANOTHER MAJOR

CHARACTERISTIC OF NSIC IS A WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ON SOME OF THE DIFFICULT SUBJECTS, THOSE FROUGHT WITH POLITICAL AND OTHER SENSITIVITIES. IN THE 1960'S AND 1970'S, WHEN ROTC PROGRAMS WERE ABANDONED BY MANY UNIVERSITIES, NSIC WORKED WITH PROFESSORS OF NAVAL AND MILITARY SCIENCE TO BOLSTER THE CONTENT AND CREDIBILITY OF THESE VITALLY IMPORTANT OFFICER PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS. IN THE LATE 1970S WHEN U.S. INTELLIGENCE WAS UNDER ATTACK IN MANY QUARTERS, NSIC MOVED INTO THE INTELLIGENCE ARENA WHEN NO ONE ELSE IN THE EDUCATIONAL WORLD WOULD TOUCH IT. VERY COOLY AND CALMLY, NSIC SET OUT TO DEFINE THE PROPER PLACE FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY AND IN AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.

TONIGHT, AS YOUR GUEST, I WANT TO TURN TO ANOTHER ISSUE THAT FINDS PEOPLE ON MANY DIFFERENT SIDES--AN ISSUE WHICH TENDS TO PROMOTE AS MUCH CONTROVERSY AS CONSTRUCTIVE INQUIRY. THE ISSUE IS TERRORISM.

IN LESS THAN TWO YEARS, A GROWING NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS HAVE COME TO REALIZE THAT TERRORISM IS NO LONGER AN ISOLATED ACT BY A FEW RADICALS BENT ON A MEDIA EVENT. TERRORISM HAS NEW AND FRIGHTENING DIMENSIONS OF FREQUENCY AND VIOLENCE THAT CANNOT BE IGNORED. THESE CHARACTERISTICS ARE EVIDENCED IN:

-- THE BOMBINGS OF OUR EMBASSIES IN BEIRUT AND KUWAIT;

- THE ATTACKS ON U.S. AND FRENCH FORCES IN BEIRUT;
- THE VICIOUS ATTACK ON THE SOUTH KOREAN CABINET AT A SHRINE IN RANGOON, BURMA;
- THE ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTERS BASHIR GEMAYEL, AND INDIRA GANDHI; AND
- THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER THATCHER IN BRIGHTON AND POPE JOHN PAUL II IN ST. PETER'S SQUARE.

THESE TERRORIST ATTACKS HAVE GIVEN US THE CHILLING FEELING THAT THE WORLD IS SOMEHOW AT WAR, EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE NO FORMAL DECLARATIONS AND NO FIXED FORCES OR FRONTS. WE ARE ENGAGED IN A FORM OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AGAINST AN ENEMY THAT IS HARD TO FIND AND HARDER STILL TO FIX AND DESTROY IN THE COMMON MILITARY SENSE. I KNOW YOU ARE ALL WELL INFORMED ABOUT THE FACTS AND TRENDS OF LOW LEVEL CONFLICT AND THAT THIS GROUP HAS BEEN GIVING A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO A NATIONAL RESPONSE. WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO DO FOR THE NEXT FEW MINUTES IS OUTLINE THE THINKING WE HAVE BEEN DOING ON THIS PROBLEM IN THE ADMINISTRATION, GIVE YOU SOME IDEA OF WHERE WE ARE AT THIS POINT, AND PROFFER SOME THOUGHTS FOR WHERE WE NEED TO GO.

SINCE THE BEGINNING OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FIRST TERM, WE HAVE GIVEN HIGH PRIORITY TO SEVERAL DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM PROBLEM.

FIRST, WE DEVELOPED A LONG TERM ESTIMATE OF THE THREAT THAT TERRORISM POSES TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. THIS REQUIRED A DETAILED REVIEW OF A LARGE BODY OF EXISTING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND THE ISSUANCE OF NEW TASKINGS TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO FILL A NUMBER OF GAPS WE FOUND IN THE COURSE OF OUR REVIEW, AS WELL AS IN THE AFTER-ACTION REPORTS ON MAJOR TERRORIST ATTACKS. ONE OF THE MORE CHILLING JUDGMENTS OF THIS EFFORT WAS THAT TERRORISM WILL POSE AN ENDURING THREAT AND THAT, AS OF YET, WE HAVE NO EFFECTIVE MEANS PREVENT IT.

SECOND, WE EVALUATED U.S. NATIONAL POLICIES AND WE HAVE WEIGHED OUR OPTIONS CAREFULLY IN SEVERAL SPECIFIC CASES.

THIRD, WE TOOK A CLOSE LOOK AT APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR RESPONDING TO THIS CHALLENGE, ON BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEVELS. AS A RESULT OF THIS PROCESS, WE HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHENED THE CAPACITIES OF THE EXECUTIVE AGENCIES CONCERNED. THEY ARE TODAY BETTER ABLE TO BOTH ASSESS AND RESPOND TO TERRORIST THREATS.

AND FOURTH, WE HAVE A CONTINUING EFFORT TO ADDRESS DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THE TERRORISM PROBLEM IN COOPERATION WITH SEVERAL FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS WHOSE LEADERS SHARE OUR CONCERNS. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN SUMMIT SEVEN MEETINGS, WE HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS TOWARD A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE

SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM AND ON A NUMBER OF STEPS THAT CAN BE TAKEN IN CONCERT TO COMBAT THE TERRORIST THREAT.

DESPITE THESE EFFORTS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS HAVE PERSISTED AGAINST AMERICANS AND OUR ALLIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE HISTORY IS WELL KNOWN TO YOU. FOR SEVERAL YEARS, THE NUMBER AND THE INTENSITY OF TERRORIST ATTACKS HAD REMAINED RELATIVELY CONSTANT. BUT IN THE PAST TWO YEARS, IMPORTANT CHANGES OCCURRED IN THE PATTERN OF TERRORISM. IN APRIL 1983, OUR EMBASSY IN BEIRUT WAS PRACTICALLY DESTROYED BY A VEHICLE BOMB. IT WAS NOT THE FIRST SUCH ATTACK, BUT IT WAS THE FIRST SUCH EVENT DIRECTED AGAINST US. IN OCTOBER 1983, THERE WERE DEVASTATING ATTACKS AGAINST OUR MARINE BARRACKS AND THE FRENCH MULTINATIONAL FORCE HEADQUARTERS IN BEIRUT; AND IN DECEMBER 1983, ANOTHER ATTACK WITH A VEHICLE BOMB ALMOST SUCCEEDED IN DESTROYING OUR EMBASSY IN KUWAIT. THESE ATTACKS REPRESENTED A SUDDEN AND SEVERE RISE IN THE VIOLENCE OF INDIVIDUAL TERRORIST ACTS. SINCE THAT TIME, OTHER ACTS OF AIRCRAFT SABOTAGE, BOMBINGS, ASSASSINATIONS, AND KIDNAPPINGS HAVE REVEALED AN INCREASED WILLINGNESS FOR GROUPS AND STATES TO USE TERRORISM AS A MEANS TO FURTHER THEIR CAUSES. THESE ATTACKS WERE, IN MOST CASES, CONDUCTED WITHOUT REGARD FOR THE LIVES OF INNOCENT BYSTANDERS.

FOR CIVILIZED PEOPLE EVERYWHERE, IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY THIS FORM OF VIOLENT CONFLICT HASN'T BEEN CURBED.

THE TRUTH IS THAT WE HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO ADDRESS IT--EVEN WHEN IT STRIKES US DIRECTLY. ITS UTTER BRUTALITY, ITS WANTON DISREGARD FOR THE RIGHTS OF INNOCENT BYSTANDERS, HAVE STUNNED US. BECAUSE WE RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS, BECAUSE WE ARE A UNIQUELY FREE AND OPEN SOCIETY, FEW OF US HAVE MUCH EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH THIS KIND OF EXTREMISM. WE ARE BEING FORCED TO LEARN.

DURING 1984, THE NUMBER OF TERRORIST ATTACKS ROSE SHARPLY, BUT LAST YEAR THE NUMBER ROSE BY ABOUT 25% TO WELL OVER 600. UNTIL 1984, U.S. CITIZENS AND PROPERTY RECEIVED THE BRUNT OF THESE ATTACKS. THEN LAST YEAR, A LARGE NUMBER OF ATTACKS WERE DIRECTED AT THE FRENCH. THE MIDDLE EAST REMAINS A FERTILE GROUND FOR TERRORISM, BUT IN 1984, THE NUMBER OF ATTACKS IN WESTERN EUROPE, AGAINST BOTH EUROPEAN AND THIRD COUNTRY TARGETS, GREATLY INCREASED. THERE WERE ALSO MORE ATTACKS DIRECTED AGAINST PRIVATE CITIZENS AND BUSINESSMEN. THIS TREND HAS CONTINUED INTO 1985.

THE ATTACKS IN WESTERN EUROPE ARE INDICATIVE OF A NUMBER OF TENDENCIES IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT MUST CONCERN US. WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY, TERRORIST GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS ARE LEAVING THEIR OWN COUNTRIES AND COMMITTING TERRORIST ATTACKS ABROAD--SOMETIMES IN CONCERT WITH ONE ANOTHER--LIKE THOSE LAST MONTH AMONG THE GERMAN RED ARMY FACTION, THE ITALIAN RED BRIGADES, AND THE FRENCH DIRECT ACTION. SUCH TRAVEL GIVES THE

TERRORIST MUCH WIDER LATITUDE ON TARGET SELECTION, AS WELL AS THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET, TRAIN, AND COOPERATE WITH OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. AND, OF COURSE, THE ITINERANT TERRORISTS ARE HARDER TO FIND THAN THOSE WHO REMAIN IN A SINGLE COUNTRY.

WHILE MOST TERRORIST ATTACKS REMAIN FAIRLY CONVENTIONAL (THE RESORT TO BOMBINGS, KIDNAPPINGS, AND ASSASSINATIONS), TERRORIST METHODS CLEARLY ARE BECOMING MORE SOPHISTICATED. EXPLOSIVES ENHANCED WITH CYLINDERS OF GAS--THE WEAPON OFTEN USED IN ATTACKS CLAIMED BY THE SO-CALLED ISLAMIC JIHAD--AND REMOTELY DETONATED OR SET OFF BY A FANATICAL, SUICIDAL VEHICLE DRIVER ARE EXAMPLES OF BOTH TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL INNOVATION.

FINALLY, ALL THE RISKS NORMALLY ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORISM BY SMALL GROUPS ARE GREATLY ENHANCED BY THE INVOLVEMENT OF CERTAIN STATES IN PLANNING, FINANCING, AND PROVIDING TRAINING, DOCUMENTATION, AND SAFEHAVEN FOR TERRORIST GROUPS.

STATE SUPPORT, ON THE SCALE WE ARE NOW WITNESSING, HAS GREATLY ALTERED THE DYNAMIC OF TERRORISM AS WE SAW IT IN THE 1960s AND 1970s. WITH THE HELP OF A SPONSORING STATE, SMALL GROUPS OF TERRORISTS CAN ACHIEVE EXTRAORDINARY DESTRUCTIVE POWER. THEY ARE ABLE TO USE MORE SOPHISTICATED TECHNIQUES, DRAWING ON STATE-FUNDED TRAINING PROGRAMS AND AMASSED EQUIPMENT. THEY CAN AVAIL THEMSELVES OF STATE RESOURCES TO IMPROVE THEIR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND

THEIR PLANNING. THEY HAVE THE IMMENSE ADVANTAGE OF OFFICIAL TRAVEL DOCUMENTS AND SOMETIMES THE USE OF DIPLOMATIC COVER TO MASK THEIR TRUE IDENTITIES, MOVEMENTS, AND MUNITIONS DELIVERIES. THEY ARE ABLE TO FIND SAFEHAVEN IN THE SPONSORING STATE AFTER AN ATTACK AND THEIR CHANCES OF GETTING AWAY WITH THEIR ATTACK ARE GREATLY ENHANCED AS A RESULT. THUS, WHILE TERRORIST GROUPS PAY A PRICE IN THE FORM OF VARYING DEGREES OF STATE DIRECTION AND CONTROL AND TARGET SELECTION, THEY ALSO REAP GREAT BENEFITS FROM STATE SPONSORSHIP.

ALL THIS TO THE POINT THAT TERRORISM IS ESTABLISHED AS A FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES.

IN THE LATE 1950S AND EARLY 1960S, INSURGENT GROUPS AND OUTRIGHT TERRORISTS DISCOVERED THAT PLAYING TO THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA COULD MOBILIZE PUBLIC OPINION IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES, AND COULD BRING MORAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURE TO BEAR AGAINST THE TARGETED STATE LEADERSHIP. IT WAS AN EASY STEP TO REALIZING THAT ATTACKING ANOTHER COUNTRY'S CITIZENS AND FACILITIES WAS A SURE WAY TO GET THE ATTENTION OF THAT COUNTRY'S MEDIA, PUBLIC, AND DECISIONMAKERS.

BUT, THE DEVELOPMENT THAT HAS MADE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THE SECURITY THREAT THAT IT NOW POSES, HAS BEEN THE CONCLUSION

REACHED BY SEVERAL STATES THAT TERRORISM HAS THE POTENTIAL OF OBTAINING CONCESSIONS FROM OTHER STATES THAT COULD NEVER BE OBTAINED BY TRADITIONAL DIPLOMATIC MEANS. THE ADVANTAGEOUS POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TERRORISM IS WHAT HAS GIVEN IT SPECIAL APPEAL AND ACCELERATED ITS OCCURRENCE IN RECENT YEARS.

WE CAN, THEREFORE, NO LONGER LOOK UPON SMALL SCALE OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE IN REMOTE PLACES AS EVENTS BEYOND OUR INTERESTS, FOR WE ARE FACING A THREAT MORE SERIOUS THAN ISOLATED AND SINGULAR BURSTS OF VIOLENCE. TERRORISM TODAY POSES A GRAVER THREAT TO SOCIETY AS A WHOLE THAN THE ANGER OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS DIRECTED NARROWLY AGAINST THEIR OWN LEADERS. IT INVOLVES ALL CIVILIZED SOCIETIES IN A COMMON WEB OF RISK:

- OUR CITIZENS AND FACILITIES ARE BEING DAMAGED AND THREATENED BY IT.
- THE JUDGMENTS OF OUR PEOPLE ABOUT THE RIGHTNESS OF POLICIES AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF EVENTS ARE BEING CONFUSED BY IT.
- DECISION PROCESSES ARE BEING DISRUPTED BY IT.
- CONFIDENCE IN THE WORKABILITY OF OUR INSTITUTIONS IS BEING ERODED BY IT.
- AND, UNLESS WE DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH IT, OUR INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY WILL BE SERIOUSLY WEAKENED--AS HAPPENED AT THE TIME OF THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS.

- IT FEEDS ON MANY DIFFERENT KINDS AND SOURCES OF DISCONTENT.
- IT IS A FREQUENT RALLYING POINT FOR OTHER CAUSES, MANY OF THEM EXPRESSED MOST OFTEN IN NON-VIOLENT WAYS.
- IT IS AN ATTRACTIVE MEDIUM FOR THE AMBITIONS OF SMALL, WEAK AND UNSCRUPULOUS STATES AND GROUPS.
- IT IS A NATURAL FOCUS FOR DISINFORMATION AND OTHER FORMS OF DECEIT.
- IT INTENSIFIES AND POLARIZES EMOTIONS.
- AND, FINALLY, IT IS A TEMPTING INSTRUMENT TO ACCELERATE SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC CHANGE.

THE SUCCESS STORY OF OUR TIME IS THAT STRATEGIC DETERRENCE WORKS. DETERRENCE HAS SERVED US WELL FOR 40 YEARS--SO WELL, IN FACT, THAT OUR ENEMIES HAVE HAD TO FIND UNCONVENTIONAL WAYS TO ATTACK US.

OUR PROBLEM FOR THE FUTURE IS THAT BELOW THE THRESHOLD WHERE DETERRENCE WORKS, WE FACE AN INSIDIOUS NEW THREAT. THIS THREAT IS NOT WAR AS WE HAVE KNOWN IT, BUT A NEW FORM OF WARFARE. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THIS PATTERN OF LOW-LEVEL VIOLENCE IS A SLOW

ATTRITION OF NATIONAL SECURITY. THE RESPONSE BY SOME IS TO PROPOSE THAT WE WITHDRAW FROM THOSE PLACES WHERE WE ARE MOST THREATENED--THAT WE SIMPLY "GET OUT." IN EFFECT, THIS THINKING GOES; WE CAN ALL COME BACK TO FORTRESS AMERICA AND LIVE HERE IN PEACE AND HARMONY. NOTHING WOULD MAKE OUR ADVERSARIES HAPPIER THAN TO HAVE US ADOPT SUCH A FORM OF NEO-ISOLATION. WHEN IT HURTS--GET OUT!

I DON'T ASSERT THAT TERRORISM IS A MANIFESTATION OF A CENTRALLY DIRECTED CONSPIRACY, EVEN THOUGH, AS SECRETARY SHULTZ HAS SAID, THE ROLE OF OUR PRINCIPAL ADVERSARY IS CLEAR. OUR PROBLEMS IN COPING WITH THIS THREAT STEM, NONETHELESS, NOT FROM A SINGLE "PUPPET MASTER" IN CONTROL, BUT RATHER THE SMALL SCALE OF THE INDIVIDUAL INCIDENTS, COMPLEX MOTIVES, AND THE VARIED SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR THE MANY DIFFERENT PLAYERS INVOLVED.

SOME HAVE BECOME CONFUSED ABOUT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY. AN INSURGENCY, OPENLY USING ARMED CONFLICT AS A MEANS FOR SEEKING MOVEMENT OR CONCESSIONS FROM A DICTORIAL OR TOTALITARIAN GOVERNMENT THAT HAS DENIED PEACEFUL FORMS OF REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES OR CIVIC CHANGE, CAN READILY BE DISTINGUISHED FROM A GROUP THAT ATTACKS A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY BY HOSTAGE TAKING OR SUITCASES FULL OF EXPLOSIVES ON BOARD AIRLINERS FULL OF INNOCENT PEOPLE. EFFECTIVE PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS CLARITY OF UNDERSTANDING. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SPELL OUT, IN CLEAR LANGUAGE FOR THE

TERRORISTS, FOR THEIR STATE SPONSORS, AND FOR OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES THE TERMS OF OUR POLICY. IT IS NOT ESSENTIAL, BY THAT SAME TOKEN, TO SPELL OUT THE STEPS IN OUR PLANNING OR THE SPECIFICS OF OUR RESPONSE FOR EACH EVENTUALITY. THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE IS AN ADVANTAGE WE CANNOT RELINQUISH. IN DUE COURSE, OUR ACTIONS SHOULD SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES.

WITH THESE ELEMENTS IN MIND, THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN WORKING FROM A SET OF OPERATING PRINCIPLES THAT I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU. THESE ARE INCLUDED IN A PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM AND ARE DESIGNED TO GOVERN OUR POLICY TOWARD THOSE WHO PRACTICE OR SUPPORT TERROR:

- THE PRACTICE OF TERRORISM BY ANY PERSON OR GROUP IN ANY CAUSE IS A THREAT TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.
- THE PRACTICE OR SUPPORT OF TERRORISM MUST BE RESISTED BY ALL LEGAL MEANS.
- STATE SPONSORED TERRORIST ACTS OR THREATS ARE HOSTILE ACTS AND THE PERPETRATORS AND SPONSORS MUST BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE.
- WHENEVER WE OBTAIN EVIDENCE THAT AN ACT OF TERRORISM IS ABOUT TO BE MOUNTED AGAINST US, WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKE MEASURES TO PROTECT OUR CITIZENS, PROPERTY, AND INTERESTS--THE VERY THREAT OF TERRORISM REPRESENTS AGGRESSION AND WARRANTS ACTS OF SELF-DEFENSE.

- IT IS ESSENTIAL TO IMPROVE THE COLLECTION AND ASSESSMENT OF INFORMATION ON GROUPS AND STATES INVOLVED IN TERRORISM IN ORDER TO PREVENT OR COUNTER ATTACKS, WARN OUR CITIZENS, FRIENDS AND ALLIES, AND LOWER THE RISKS OF SUCCESSFUL TERRORIST ATTACKS.

- TERRORISM IS A COMMON PROBLEM FOR ALL DEMOCRATIC NATIONS AND WE MUST WORK INTENSIVELY WITH OTHERS TO ELIMINATE THIS THREAT TO FREE AND OPEN SOCIETIES.

- WE MUST USE EVERY POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL AVENUE TO PERSUADE THOSE NOW PRACTICING OR SUPPORTING TERRORISM TO DESIST AND WE MUST HELP WHEREVER POSSIBLE TO FIND NON-VIOLENT MEANS TO DEAL WITH LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES.

- ACTS OF STATE SPONSORED AND ORGANIZED TERRORISM SHOULD BE APPROPRIATELY EXPOSED AND CONDEMNED IN EVERY AVAILABLE FORUM.

- WHEREVER POSSIBLE, WE SHOULD HELP THOSE FRIENDLY NATIONS SUFFERING INTIMIDATION BECAUSE OF TERRORIST THREATS OR ACTIVITIES.

THIS SET OF NINE PRINCIPLES, I BELIEVE, AMPLY REFLECTS THE COMPLEXITY OF THE CHALLENGE POSED BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, AS WELL AS THE NEED FOR A CAREFULLY CONSIDERED RESPONSE TO IT.

ARTICULATING THOSE PRINCIPLES, HOWEVER, IS ONLY THE BEGINNING OF OUR TASK. IT IS HERE THAT THE DEBATE BEGINS ON THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF OUR RESPONSES.

MOST OF THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO US EXCITE LITTLE, IF ANY CONTROVERSY. OUR GOVERNMENT IS NOW ENGAGED IN LARGE SCALE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND OTHER U.S. FACILITIES ABROAD. TRAINING PROGRAMS ARE NOW MANDATORY FOR SENSITIZING OUR PERSONNEL TO THE NATURE OF THE TERRORIST THREAT AND THE STEPS EVERY INDIVIDUAL CAN TAKE TO IMPROVE PERSONAL PROTECTION FROM TERRORIST ATTACK. WE ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH MANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF THE SECURITY PROVIDED TO OUR PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES ABROAD, AND WE ARE EXPANDING OUR CAPABILITIES TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL PROTECTION TO FOREIGN DIPLOMATS AND DIGNITARIES IN THE UNITED STATES.

FOR THE PAST YEAR, WE HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY ASSISTING THE TRAINING OF FOREIGN CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES INVOLVED IN THE SECURITY AND ANTI-TERRORISM PROGRAMS OF OTHER FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS. WE HAVE MADE A NUMBER OF IMPROVEMENTS IN OUR CAPABILITIES FOR COLLECTING, ASSESSING, AND SHARING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE CONGRESS, WE HAVE OBTAINED LEGISLATION TO STRENGTHEN THE LEGAL ATTACK ON TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND TO PERMIT FULL U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL

AGREEMENTS AGAINST HOSTAGE TAKING AND AIRCRAFT SABOTAGE. IN BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, WE ARE SEEKING AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS THAT WILL FACILITATE EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, TIGHTEN THE INTERPRETATION OF TRADITIONAL AGREEMENTS ON THE STATUS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, ENHANCE THE SHARING OF TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO TERRORIST ACTIVITY, AND IMPROVE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN SUCH COMMON AREAS AS AVIATION SECURITY. ALL OF THESE PROGRAMS ARE WELL UNDER WAY, BUT WE STILL HAVE MUCH TO DO IN SEVERAL OF THEM.

WHILE SOME HAVE DEBATED THE PACE, ADEQUACY, OR PRIORITY ASSIGNED TO THESE MATTERS, THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT ALL SHOULD PROCEED. THIS IS NOT THE CASE WITH THE LAST ISSUE: THE USE OF FORCE TO PREEMPT OR AS A RESPONSE TO TERRORIST ACTS. AS I SAID EARLIER, SMALL SCALE VIOLENCE, INCLUDING TERRORISM, FALLS BELOW THE NORMAL THRESHOLDS FOR INVOKING A MILITARY RESPONSE. BOTH SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WEINBERGER HAVE PLACED A NUMBER OF PROPOSITIONS BEFORE THE PUBLIC ON THE FACTORS INVOLVED IN USE OF THIS OPTION. WHILE THE MEDIA HAVE CHARACTERIZED THESE STATEMENTS AS A DEBATE, THAT IS NOT REALLY THE CASE. SECRETARY SHULTZ HAS STRESSED THE NEED TO CONSIDER THE USE OF FORCE AS A REALISTICALLY AVAILABLE OPTION FOR DEALING WITH CERTAIN TERRORIST ACTS. HE HAS CAREFULLY POINTED OUT THE RISKS AND PROBLEMS WE MUST CONSIDER IN THE USE OF FORCE, INCLUDING THE PROBLEMS OF SECURING THE SUPPORT AND COOPERATION OF

OTHER GOVERNMENTS. SECRETARY WEINBERGER HAS UNDERScoreD THE VERY REAL PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES THAT EXIST FOR THE MILITARY PLANNER IN ATTEMPTING TO APPLY SMALL AMOUNTS OF FORCE, ESPECIALLY AT A GREAT DISTANCE. HE HAS ACCURATELY NOTED THE DIFFICULTY OF ASSURING SUCCESS AND HAS ECHOED THE NEED FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ANY SUSTAINED RESORT TO FORCE BY THE UNITED STATES IN DEFENDING US AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACKS.

I PERSONALLY DO NOT FIND THESE TO BE INCOMPATIBLE LINES OF ARGUMENT. THE USE OF FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE IS LEGITIMATE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. IT IS EXPLICITLY SANCTIONED UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. WHAT WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING IS A SET OF WORKING PRINCIPLES, YOU MIGHT SAY RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, WHICH WILL FACILITATE MEANINGFUL USES OF FORCE IN SPECIFIC CASES WHERE THAT IS CLEARLY WARRANTED. WE WANT THOSE USES OF FORCE TO BE PROPORTIONATE TO THE THREAT; WE WANT THEM TO BE TARGETED AS PRECISELY AS POSSIBLE; WE WANT THEM TO BE JUDICIOUS IN THE SELECTION OF WHERE, WHEN, AND IN WHAT KIND OF CASE; WE WANT THE FULLEST POSSIBLE COOPERATION OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED; AND WE WANT TO SUCCEED.

AS A NATION, WE HAVE FACED THE NEED FOR AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO SMALL SCALE VIOLENCE BEFORE. IN 1803/4, YOU MAY RECALL, THE UNITED STATES FOUND ITSELF AFFLICTED WITH A SCOURGE OF NO MEAN PROPORTIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN--THE BARBARY PIRATES, WHOSE

DEPREDATIONS MADE LIFE PRECARIOUS FOR MERCHANTMEN ALONG THE NORTH AFRICAN COAST. PRESIDENT JEFFERSON DISPATCHED STEPHEN DECATUR TO ERADICATE THE PIRATE SCOURGE AT ITS SOURCE. A PARALLEL ENDEAVOR LED BY A MARINE LIEUTENANT NAMED PRESLEY O'BANNON STUCK OUT IN A COMPLIMENTARY EFFORT OVERLAND--IN WHAT WAS OUR FIRST "COVERT OPERATION." TOGETHER, DECATUR AND O'BANNON CARRIED OUT AN EMINENTLY SUCCESSFUL COUNTER-TERRORIST OPERATION, AND THE CIVILIZED WORLD THANKED US FOR IT. THE ANARCHIC CONDITIONS PREVAILING IN THAT REGION DURING DECATUR AND O'BANNON'S TIME ARE SIMILAR IN SOME IMPORTANT RESPECTS TO WHAT WE FACE TODAY IN SOME PARTS OF THE WORLD.

THE USE OF FORCE, AS WE ALL KNOW, POSES SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN A SOCIETY AS FREE AND OPEN AS OURS. WE HAVE NEVER EXPLOITED FORCE CASUALLY OR CYNICALLY, WHICH PLACES US AT A MARKED DISADVANTAGE IN RESPONDING TO THOSE WHO TODAY HAVE DECLARED THEMSELVES TO BE OUR ADVERSARIES. THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT, AND WILL NOT, USE FORCE INDISCRIMINATELY--BUT WE MUST BE FREE TO CONSIDER AN ARMED STRIKE AGAINST TERRORISTS AND THOSE WHO SUPPORT THEM WHERE ELIMINATION (OR MODERATION) OF THE THREAT DOES NOT APPEAR LIKELY BY ANY OTHER MEANS. TERRORISTS HAVE BEEN SKILLFUL IN FORCING, OR SOME TIMES PERSUADING, INNOCENT BYSTANDERS TO SHIELD THEM FROM REPRISAL. THIS FACT CLEARLY MUST BE A MATTER OF DEEP CONCERN TO US AS WE DETERMINE OUR COURSES OF ACTION. YET WE CANNOT PERMIT IT TO FREEZE US INTO PARALYSIS. THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT THE

TERRORISTS NOW EXPECT. JUST AS WE WILL NOT BARGAIN WITH TERRORISTS--AND THAT, AS YOU KNOW, HAS LONG BEEN OUR DECLARED POLICY, WE CANNOT AND WILL NOT, ABSTAIN FROM FORCIBLE ACTION TO PREVENT, PREEMPT, OR RESPOND TO TERRORIST ATTACKS WHEN CONDITIONS MERIT THE USE OF SUCH FORCE.

MANY COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, HAVE THE SPECIFIC FORCES AND CAPABILITIES WE NEED TO CARRY OUT OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORIST GROUPS. IF WE DO NOT USE THOSE FORCES WHERE THEIR USE IS CLEARLY JUSTIFIED, WE GET NEITHER THE DIRECT BENEFITS NOR THE DETERRENT VALUE FROM HAVING SUCH FORCES. WE NEED THAT DETERRENT; WE CANNOT PROCEED IN SUCH A WAY THAT TERRORIST GROUPS OR THEIR SPONSORS FEEL THEY CAN MAKE FREE AND UNOPPOSED USE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST US.

THAT DETERRENT, HOWEVER, CANNOT REALLY BE MADE TO WORK UNLESS WE DEMONSTRATE OUR WILL TO MEET A TERRORIST CHALLENGE WITH A MEASURED DOSE OF FORCE. TO DO THAT, WE MUST ACT QUICKLY WHEN THE EVIDENCE AND THE SITUATION WARRANT. SO LONG AS TERRORISTS AND THEIR SPONSORING STATES FEEL THAT WE ARE INHIBITED FROM RESPONDING, OR THAT OUR RESPONSE IS GOING TO BE BOGGED DOWN IN INTERMINABLE CONSULTATIONS OR DEBATE, WE, IN FACT, DO NOT HAVE A DETERRENT. THE NSIC CAN BE ESPECIALLY HELPFUL IN THIS MATTER BY FACILITATING EDUCATION ABOUT REQUIREMENTS FOR TIMELY, PROMPT, AND EFFECTIVE PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS TO ENSURE THAT THE UNITED STATES

HAS A DETERRENT THAT WORKS TO REDUCE LOW LEVEL RESORT TO VIOLENCE, AND, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HELPS US TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF TIMES AND PLACES WHERE FORCE MAY ACTUALLY BE NEEDED.

OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS DO NOT WISH TO SEE US GOING OFF HALF-COCKED ON MILITARY ADVENTURES IN ANY QUARTER OF THE GLOBE. THEY NEED NOT WORRY. WE DO NOT INTEND TO. WE DO, HOWEVER, INTEND TO MAINTAIN A CAPABILITY FOR THE PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE USE OF FORCE, IF FORCE MUST BE USED, IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHERE APPROPRIATE. THE USE OF FORCE IS DANGEROUS--YES. WE AIM TO AVOID IT IF POSSIBLE, BUT NOT, I REPEAT NOT, AT ALL COSTS. TO RENOUNCE IT AS AN OPTION IN COUNTERING TERRORISM IS TO INVITE MORE, AND MORE RUTHLESS, TERRORIST ATTACKS.

THE BACKING OF PUBLIC OPINION, WE ALL AGREE, IS VITAL TO THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY IN GENERAL, AND EVEN MORE SO WHEN IT COMES TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF FORCE OF ANY KIND IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA.

QUITE FRANKLY, I THINK WE HAVE THAT MANDATE. FIRST AND FOREMOST, THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE HIS OWN POSITION CRYSTAL-CLEAR. AND THIS DATES BACK TO HIS FIRST DAY IN OFFICE WHEN THIS ADMINISTRATION DECLARED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM TO BE THE ULTIMATE ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. I MIGHT ADD THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION, THROUGH ITS FORMER AND ITS PRESENT SECRETARY OF STATE, HAS POINTED THE FINGER

UNEQUIVOCALLY AT THE SOVIET UNION AS A PRINCIPAL SPONSOR AND SUPPORTER OF SEVERAL STATES AND GROUPS INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. WE HAVE SEEN NO EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD LEAD US TO MODIFY THESE STATEMENTS.

THE SAME CAN BE SAID OF OTHER STATES THAT USE TERRORISM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY. IN THESE CASES, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DIRECT A PROPORTIONAL MILITARY RESPONSE AGAINST BONA FIDE MILITARY TARGETS IN A STATE WHICH DIRECTS TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST US. IN MAKING A DETERMINATION TO ATTACK THESE MILITARY TARGETS, WE NEED NOT INSIST ON ABSOLUTE EVIDENCE THAT THE TARGETS WERE USED SOLELY TO SUPPORT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. NOR SHOULD WE NEED TO PROVE BEYOND ALL DOUBT THAT A PARTICULAR ELEMENT OR INDIVIDUAL IN THAT STATE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH TERRORIST ACTS. THERE IS, FOR EXAMPLE, SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT RADICAL SHIA TERRORISTS ARE RESPONSIVE TO IRANIAN GUIDANCE FOR US TO HOLD TEHRAN RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH ATTACKS AGAINST UNITED STATES' CITIZENS, PROPERTY, AND INTERESTS.

TERRORISM IS A REVOLTING PHENOMENON, UNDERTAKEN BY THOSE WHO BY CHOICE STAND OUTSIDE THE PALE OF CIVILIZED PEOPLES. IT IS A FORM OF WARFARE, DIRECTED AGAINST THE VERY HEART OF CIVILIZED, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL LIFE. WE HAVE NO REALISTIC CHOICE BUT TO MEET IT, AND THAT MEANS HEAD ON, WHERE NOTHING ELSE WORKS. THE AIM OF TERRORISTS, AND THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF THOSE WHO

SPONSOR, TRAIN, AND SUPPLY THEM, IS TO UNDERMINE OUR VALUES, SHATTER OUR SELF-CONFIDENCE, AND BLUNT OUR RESPONSES.

IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, FORCE IS ONLY ONE INSTRUMENT IN OUR KIT OF TOOLS. ALL THE OTHER OPTIONS--THE SECURITY, TRAINING, DIPLOMATIC, INSTITUTIONAL, AND LEGAL APPROACHES I HAVE MENTIONED--MUST BE APPLIED AS RIGOROUSLY AS POSSIBLE. WE MUST CONTINUE TO IMPROVE OUR ABILITY TO WIELD ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER--ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC, MILITARY, INFORMATIONAL, AND COVERT AGAINST THE SCOURGE OF TERRORISM. BUT WHEN OTHER REMEDIES ARE INADEQUATE--EITHER ALONE OR IN COMBINATION--FORCE MUST BE AVAILABLE. THE LEGITIMACY OF THAT CHOICE DEPENDS ON OUR HAVING MADE AN HONEST EFFORT TO DEAL WITH THIS CHALLENGE BY MEANS SHORT OF FORCE. THERE IS NO REAL DEBATE WITHIN THIS ADMINISTRATION ON THAT BASIC PRINCIPLE. THERE SHOULD BE NONE AMONG FREE MEN WHO WISH TO REMAIN SO.