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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 11/17/2010

File Folder LIBYA: TERRORISM (3)

FOIA

F95-023/9

Box Number 54

WILLS

21

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100735	MEMO	LIBYAN-SPORSORED TERRORISM PAR 6/1/2018 M1096/1	7	6/20/1985	B1 B3
100736	MEMO	LIBYAN-SPORSORED TERRORISM PAR 6/1/2018 M1096/1	6	9/12/1985	B1 B3
100737	TALKING POINTS	RE IRAN'S INTERNAL SITUATION R 6/1/2018 M1096/1	2	9/10/1985	B1 B3
100738	TALKING POINTS	RE IRAQ'S DOMESTIC SITUATION R 6/1/2018 M1096/1	2	ND	B1 B3
100739	REPORT	RE SUDAN PAR 6/1/2018 M1096/1	3	9/12/1985	B1 B3
100740	PAPER	RE LIBYA/CHAD PAR 6/1/2018 M1096/1	2	ND	B1 B3
100741	PAPER	RE SOVIET-SYRIAN RELATIONS PAR 6/1/2018 M1096/1	4	9/10/1985	B1 B3
100742	REPORT	LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM-1985 PAR 6/1/2018 M1096/1	4	1/13/1986	B1 B3
100743	REPORT	LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM W/COVER SHEET D 6/1/2018 M1096/1	9	1/14/1986	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

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SMF 11/17/2010

File Folder LIBYA: TERRORISM (3)

FOIA

F95-023/9

Box Number 54

WILLS

21

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100744	REPORT	TERRORISM REVIEW <i>PAR 6/1/2018 M1096/1</i>	3	1/13/1986	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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144735
EO 13526 3.5(c)

20 June 1985

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism and Subversion

Objectives and Motives

Qadhafi's aggressive foreign policy is focused on undermining US and, to a lesser extent, French interests and policies.

- Libya's commitment of political, economic, and military resources in pursuit of these objectives worldwide is surpassed only by the Soviet Union, its East European allies, and possibly North Korea.
- At the root of Qadhafi's hostility toward the United States is Washington's increasing support of Israel and his view of the US as the center of world imperialism. His antagonism toward Washington is intensified by his belief that US political and economic sanctions on Libya and US naval operations in the central Mediterranean are intended to destabilize his regime. Qadhafi also believes that exiled Libyan dissidents are tools of the US.
- Qadhafi's opposition to France, on the other hand, stems largely from his belief that French political predominance in its former African colonies is limiting Libyan opportunities to promote revolution there and to achieve his broader leadership aims in the Third World. (S NF)

Qadhafi's aggressive tactics include a mixture of threat and support for terrorism and subversion, offers of cooperation and economic incentives and intimidation.

3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(6)
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NLRR M1096 #100735

BY RW PARA DATE 6/1/88

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Qadhafi's other priority targets are Libyan dissidents in exile who are strengthening their capabilities for attacks on the regime.

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
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Qadhafi's fear of US retaliation traditionally has made him reluctant to target US personnel and facilities directly in terrorist operations. This reluctance may be diminishing.

[redacted] 3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(6)
3.5(c)



-- Qadhafi warned publicly last year that he would export terrorism to the US in retaliation for what he claimed was

" the US inspired attack on his headquarters by Libyan dissidents last May. The Libyan General People's Congress passed a resolution last March calling support for the dissidents "an aggressive act" which calls for a "response."

[redacted]

3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(6)
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-- Also worrisome is Qadhafi's increasing willingness to use conventional military means for terrorist operations,

[redacted]

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3.5(c)

Radicalism in the Arab World

Qadhafi is exploiting the removal of Sudanese President Nimeiri last March to gain a foothold in Sudan. Qadhafi wants to use an enhanced Libyan presence in Sudan as leverage on Egypt to abrogate the Camp David accords. He also wants to permanently deny Sudan as a staging point for US military exercises and as a base for Libyan dissidents.


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
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Qadhafi also is working to expand his influence in Maghreb affairs.



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
Qadhafi is promoting other radical causes in the region.



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3.3(b)(6)
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Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa

Tripoli views Black Africa as a principal arena for creating a group of nonaligned, "progressive" states that will strengthen Libyan influence in international forums and confer upon Qadhafi status as world leader. Principal targets of Libya-sponsored subversion are moderate African governments with close ties to the United States and/or with Israel. Chadian President Habre and Zairian President Mobutu head the list.



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3.3(b)(6)
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[redacted]

3.3(b)(1)
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Meddling in Central America and the Caribbean

Qadhafi's determination to strike at US interests and to spread his personal philosophies of revolution in what he refers to as Washington's "backyard" is behind a more aggressive Libyan posture in Latin America. Libya also is targeting French interests in the region.

[redacted]


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-- Qadhafi recently sponsored a meeting of Caribbean Muslims in Curacao to promote anti-US and anti-French sentiment in the region. [redacted]

3.5(c)

South and Southeast Asia

The Libyan People's Bureau and cultural center in Malaysia are the focal point of expanding Libyan activities in the region. Kuala Lumpur serves as a transit point for regional insurgents travelling to and from Libya for training, and a convenient location for disbursing of funds.



3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(6)
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12 September 1985

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism and Subversion

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- Libya's commitment of political, economic, and military resources in pursuit of these objectives worldwide is surpassed only by the Soviet Union, its East European allies, and possibly North Korea.
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Qadhafi's aggressive tactics include a mixture of threats and support for terrorism and subversion, offers of cooperation, and economic incentives and intimidation.

3.3(b)(1)
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Support for Terrorism

Qadhafi maintains his longstanding policy of supporting and training radical groups which use terrorist tactics 3.3(b)(1)


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
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


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


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Qadhafi's fear of US retaliation has made him reluctant to target US personnel and facilities directly in terrorist operations. We believe that this reluctance may be diminishing, however.



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3.5(c)

Qadhafi also is increasingly willing to use conventional military means for terrorist operations. 


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Radicalism in the Arab World


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
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
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
the United States and/or with Israel. Chadian President Habre and Zairian President Mobutu head the list.



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
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(6)
3.5(c)

-- Qadhafi and other Libyan officials use their periodic meetings with Caribbean Muslims to promote anti-US and anti-French sentiment in the region.

3.5(c)

South and Southeast Asia

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100737
3

Talking Points

Iran's Internal Situation

10 September 1985

A deteriorating economy, the continuing war with Iraq, and Khomeini's uncertain mental and physical health pose serious problems for the regime and could produce instability in Iran before Khomeini dies.

Anti-war sentiment has increased significantly over the past year.

--The heavy casualties Iran suffered in its failed offensive last spring--15,000 killed, another 15,000 wounded--and Iraqi air raids produced large anti-war demonstrations in most major cities, including the slums of south Tehran, a key element of regime support.

--The government has only succeeded in stifling overt expressions of antiregime sentiment by resorting to harsh repression.

--The regime nevertheless appears determined to continue the war. It has temporarily adopted a strategy of launching small-scale attacks to minimize casualties and keep Iraq off balance, but may launch further large offensives.

The regime's economic troubles stem in large part from sharply reduced oil income.

--The soft oil market has reduced oil revenues by 30 per cent since August 1984. The government cut spending 5 percent last year and is trying to cut another 10 percent this year while raising taxes 30 percent and increasing heating oil and gasoline prices.

--Iran's foreign currency reserves are below \$3 billion. As a result Tehran has reimposed strict foreign currency controls and cut imports by half.

Economic austerity has led to widespread dissatisfaction, including strikes and anti-government demonstrations early this year, and there are signs a coordinated opposition is emerging.

--Strikers in several Iranian cities last winter timed their actions to support each other. A secret labor organization claimed responsibility for strikes in the industrial center of Esfahan last December.

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BY lw NARA DATE 6/1/88

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The failure of Iran's offensive this spring intensified infighting within the Revolutionary Guard, which suffered 90 percent of the casualties.

--All factions within the regime recognize the ~~Guard~~ Guard is crucial to clerical control and are trying to line up support. There were reports of clashes between rival Guard factions in Tehran last winter and spring.

The deterioration in Khomeini's health has reduced the regime's ability to rally the populace and establish policy guidelines.

--Khomeini suffers from symptoms of senility, which occasionally result in memory loss and confusion. He reportedly has gone through periods in which he has no communication with his staff for up to ten days a month.

Despite its problems, the regime possesses several assets.

--No organized opposition capable of exploiting popular dissatisfaction has emerged.

--The clerics and their secular allies appear to understand the consequences of unbridled competition and faction leaders have held negotiations over how to cope with Iran's problems after Khomeini.

--A significant segment of the populace--primarily the lower classes of Tehran and other major cities, and the rural poor--still retain a powerful desire for a government guided by Islamic principles.

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100738

Talking Points for George Harris

Iraq's Domestic Situation

Iraq's President Saddam Husayn still has a firm grip on power but the regime is showing signs of brittleness as the public and military grow more weary from the five-year-old war that has left at least 60,000 dead and caused numerous economic sacrifices.

--The Iraqis are increasingly frustrated by their inability to end the war. The stalemate on the battlefield, chemical warfare, bombings of Iranian cities, and, so far, air strikes against Iranian oil shipping and Khark Island itself, have not stopped Iran from pursuing its war of attrition.

--This frustration is translated into noticeably lower civilian morale and confidence in the regime's policies.

--Civilians are telling more anti-regime jokes and Ba'thists and citizens alike appear to be exhibiting less enthusiasm for the war or government policies.

--Thus far, however, we have noted no significant decline in military morale.

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BY fw NARA DATE: 6/1/98

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Saddam, a ruthless survivor, has been unequalled in Iraqi politics in his ability to manipulate the ruling Ba'th Party, the government, and the military.

No opposition group or alignment has enough strength or unity to unseat Saddam during the next year, barring a dramatic setback in the war or drop in oil revenues.

--Kurdish rebels, estimated to number 7,000, have increased guerrilla activity in northern Iraq over the past year, but the government maintains control over the major cities in Kurdistan. Divisions among the dissidents and limited support from Iran, Syria, and Libya prevent the Kurds from being more than a major irritant.

--Iraq's security services, among the most effective and brutal in the Arab world, have arrested or deported most Shia activists. Tehran has been unable to unify the exiled dissidents, who are splintered on ideological, leadership, and strategic issues.

--Repression of the highly factionalized Communist Party of Iraq has reduced its numbers to 2,500, of whom 1,000 are abroad.

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EO 13526 3.5(c)

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Harris Briefing

12 September 1985

Sudan

Khartoum's interim government began building the necessary political consensus needed for elections to take place next year when they reached agreement on an interim constitution last month. Still, plotting continues at all levels in the military, and a coup could be triggered by an outbreak of civil unrest in Khartoum over economic grievances or fighting in the south.

Military-civilian squabbling within the government appears to have temporarily been resolved but new divisions are likely to surface as the regime faces hard decisions on the economy, the south, and formulating laws for future elections.

The unions have remained quiescent in the past month, largely because the government has met most demands for pay increases. If the regime is pressed by the IMF this


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BY LW NARA DATE 6/1/88

fall to rescind pay increases or decrease subsidies substantially, unions probably will become more militant.

Mid-level officers are disgruntled over slow promotions, forced retirements, poor pay, and fighting in the south. ~~They~~ ^{They} are colluding against the regime with younger generals on the Military Council and several former officials.



3.3(b)(1)
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Fighting continues in the south, and the military faces the real prospect of a disastrous defeat. Insurgent leader John Garang recently rebuffed a major overture by the regime, stressing he would send representatives to a national conference only if run by the parties, unions, and the Army.

Government forces have incurred heavy losses in the south in the past two months. The regime, however, appears prepared to seek a military solution to the insurgency and continues to send additional men and

equipment south for a planned offensive.

Garang has been successful in finding a replacement for Libyan arms. Ethiopia, moreover, shows no signs of abandoning the southern insurgents.

3.5(c)

Khartoum's pursuit of a nonaligned foreign policy and its preoccupation with ending the southern rebellion has presented Tripoli and Moscow an opening to weaken US and Egyptian influence in Sudan.

Libya has just delivered the first tranche of equipment promised in the protocol signed by Khartoum in July. In addition, Tripoli has delivered some of the food and oil assistance promised earlier, and continues to appear actively working to persuade Ethiopia to end its support for Garang.

Khartoum reportedly has sent Moscow proposals to improve relations and renew economic and military ties-- specifically acquisition of spare parts for old Soviet equipment. Moscow is likely to give a favorable response. Khartoum also believes Moscow may be able to pressure Ethiopia to end support for the southern rebels.

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
Libya in Chad

Tripoli is attempting to revitalize its military position in northern Chad by resupplying its ground forces and improving military airfields there. Oaudi Doum airfield is now operational and capable of handling all transport and light ground attack aircraft in the Libyan inventory. Tripoli also is rebuilding the military capabilities of Chadian dissidents, which have deteriorated over the past year as a result of rebel infighting and lack of Libyan logistical support. In other attempts to ease tensions between the Libyans and rebels, Tripoli is providing Chadian rebels initial training on tanks and sponsored a unity conference of rebel factions in Benin.

These developments come during a period of mounting ethnic tensions in the Chadian government and armed forces and make President Habre's regime increasingly vulnerable to Libyan machinations. Tensions in the military recently led to several bloody clashes, and southern soldiers are threatening to return to rebel ranks if Habre does not curb indiscriminating attacks by northern soldiers against the civilian population in the south. Despite the likelihood of growing southern opposition, Habre will move slowly on ethnic issues to avoid alienating his key northern backers. Meanwhile, Libyan-backed rebel activity in the south and central regions is on the rise, partially as a result of Libyan resupply efforts through western Sudan, Congo, and Central African Republic.

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1) > 25Yrs
3.3(c)

10 Sept 1985

SOVA [Redacted]

SOVIET-SYRIAN RELATIONS I. Syria remains the lynchpin of the Soviet position in the Middle East

A. The relationship remains one based on mutual need--Moscow, for entree into the Middle East, Damascus for military assistance.

B. The Soviets have successfully refurbished the Syrian military since its defeat at Israeli hands in Lebanon in the summer of 1982, restoring Moscow's credibility in the process.

C. The Soviet military assistance remains the bedrock of the relationship.

1. After high volume deliveries in 1982-1983 to offset losses from the war in Lebanon, 1984 deliveries dropped.

2. However, during President Assad's October 1984 visit to USSR, Soviets reportedly agreed to provide more SA-5 and SS-21 missiles, MIG-29 advanced fighter aircraft, and advanced tanks.

3. Soviets have finalized turnover of SA-5s to Syrians; most of the Soviet personnel attached to the SA-5s have returned; there are still 3000 Soviet military advisers in Syria, however.

4. A recent increase in Soviet deployments of TU-16 naval reconnaissance aircraft suggests Damascus may be more flexible on Soviet requests for more permanent access to Syrian air and naval facilities.

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/1/88

- D. Mutual Soviet-Syrian opposition to the 11 February Arafat-Hussein initiative has also served to keep the two sides together on a fundamental Middle East issue--despite differing goals on PLO issue
- E. Moscow's involvement in Syria has not necessarily led to greater Soviet influence. For example, on issues of key importance to Damascus, the Soviets are usually to follow Assad's lead, even when they do not share a similar objective, as in Lebanon.
 - 1. In addition, Moscow's relationship with Syria sometimes undercuts Soviet efforts to cultivate relations with other Arab states, particularly those who are generally at odds with Syria--such as Iraq and Jordan.
 - 2. Conversely, Soviet moves to improve or expand ties with Arab moderates, such as Egypt or Jordan, can raise suspicions and strains in Soviet-Syrian relations.

II. Soviet and Syrian differences include:

- A. The Palestinian Issue: While both sides oppose PLO involvement in a US- brokered settlement, Moscow--thus far--has resisted Assad's efforts to undercut or oust Arafat. The USSR does not want a Syrian-dominated PLO.
 - 1. During Assad's June 1985 visit to Moscow, Soviets expressed their unhappiness over the apparently Syrian-backed war of the Palestinian war of the camps in Lebanon in May-June 1985.

2. Nonetheless, if the Arafat-Hussein initiative makes further progress the Soviets probably would be more supportive of Assad's efforts to undermine or even oust Arafat.

B. The Peace Process: Despite Syria's public support of Moscow's calls for an international conference on the Middle East, Damascus would be less than enthusiastic as Assad is not willing to make compromises on the basic issues that such a meeting would seek to resolve.

C. Soviet Security Pledge: Since the 1981 announcement of US-Israeli "strategic cooperation", Assad has sought a similar Soviet guarantee from the USSR.

1. The Soviets continue to avoid committing themselves, presumably to maintain freedom of action and to prevent Assad from taking bold moves on the assumption the USSR would back him up.

2. The Soviet dispatching of SA-5 units in 1983 committed Moscow to Syria's defense more than ever before, but the removal of Soviet personnel from the SA-5 sites has diminished Moscow's involvement and makes it less likely the USSR would agree to formalize a security relationship with Damascus.

III. Outlook

A. Soviet-Syrian relations will remain strong, despite continuing differences on various issues, at least as long as Assad is alive. The key element of the relationship--Moscow's military assistance--will insure its staying power. Moreover, if the Arafat-Hussein initiative gains ground, the Soviets and Syrians are likely to cooperate even more closely.

1. The Soviets presumably are cultivating key figures in the political and military leadership to ensure Moscow of a continuing role after Assad is gone from the scene.

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Libyan Support for Terrorism—1985 []

EO 13526 3.5(c)

Libya's terrorist effort this year continued to focus on traditional targets. The assassination campaign against anti-Qadhafi exiles remained a top priority and accounted for the majority of attacks. The governments and leaders of selected moderate, pro-Western countries in the Arab world and Africa are also targets of frequent Libyan plotting, although Libya has yet to score a successful attack against any of these leaders. Libya continues its support for insurgents worldwide but has spent relatively more time this year on efforts in Sudan and the Caribbean. Libya provides training, weapons, money, and other forms of support to about 30 different groups overall.

[]

Libya still devotes considerable resources to its terrorist and subversive activity, yet the number of successful attacks we can definitely link to Libya in 1985 is down—from 25 attacks in 1984 to nine during the first 11 months of 1985. Libyan concentration on subversive activity in North Africa is probably partly responsible for the decline, although the ability of European security services to thwart attacks also has contributed to the slowdown. Libya may be becoming more active in its longstanding relationship with Palestinian radical groups.

[] Libyan cooperation with radical Palestinian groups is deepening—possibly including joint planning for terrorist operations. []

Also of concern is Tripoli's apparent willingness to pursue its exiles within the United States, possibly to embarrass the United States with terrorist activity on its own soil. An ambitious plan to kill several Libyan exiles in the United States was broken up by the FBI last May. Libya also continues low-level activity that could lay the groundwork for anti-US attacks in certain areas of the world: several cases of Libyan surveillance of US installations and personnel—which could lead to contingency plans for such attacks—have been detected. Serious constraints against such attacks remain, however. []

Libyan Antiexile Campaign

Over half of Libya's attacks this year were against its own exiled dissidents. Qadhafi maintains a "hit list" of exiles and pursues these individuals around the world. Some attacks have been planned for months, while others appear to have been spontaneous and opportunistic. Libya runs antiexile operations out of several People's Bureaus in Western Europe: Bonn, Vienna, and Nicosia were particularly active this year. [] Madrid may be a new locus. Qadhafi generally uses Libyans for attacks on dissidents in Europe, although he tends to employ surrogates or mercenaries for attacks in other locations and against other targets. In almost all antiexile operations, the assassins kill their victims with handguns. []

We believe Qadhafi may again step up his pace of activity against dissidents, but internal turmoil may be his highest priority in the near term. Qadhafi is deeply worried about the opposition's ability to topple his regime and will continue to focus his terrorist resources against it. Libyan intelligence uses networks in place in official and unofficial Libyan installations in Europe and supplements them with "traveling terrorist consultants" based in Tripoli. European [] political and economic considerations inhibit many governments from cracking down more effectively.

- Tripoli's antiexile assassination campaign accounted for a greater percentage of attacks this year than in 1984, when Qadhafi reintroduced the tactic after a three-year respite. Anti-Qadhafi exiles have been killed in Greece, West Germany, Cyprus, Italy, and Austria this year.
- The Libyan exile community in Egypt has also been a frequent target, but Egyptian authorities have been effective in thwarting attacks. A four-man Libyan team was arrested in November during an attempted attack against a gathering of exiles near Cairo.

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- Libya also plotted attacks against exiles within the United States. In May, a Libyan diplomat at the United Nations was declared persona non grata and 16 nonofficial Libyans were subpoenaed to appear before a US grand jury in connection with a plot to kill Libyan dissidents in four different states. [redacted]

Plots gainst Moderate Arab Officials

Qadhafi has long targeted moderate Arab governments for their refusal to continue the military struggle against Israel and for their links to the West. The primary targets of such attacks in 1985 were the Governments of Egypt, Tunisia, and Iraq:

- President Mubarak of Egypt remains a principal target. Moreover, Egypt has captured several teams of Libyan-supported Egyptian dissidents who reportedly planned to destabilize the government with sabotage and other disturbances.
- Tunisia also received special attention from Qadhafi. Tripoli expelled more than 30,000 Tunisian workers from Libya in August and infiltrated terrorist agents among them, hoping to further destabilize Tunisia's shaky economy. A team of Libyan terrorists carrying bombs and planning attacks on several facilities was captured, and the Libyan diplomat running the operation out of Sfax was expelled. Soon thereafter, another Libyan diplomat used the diplomatic pouch to smuggle letter bombs addressed to Tunisian journalists into the country. After two postal workers were injured when several of these bombs exploded, Tunisia severed relations. [redacted]

Support for African Insurgents and Terrorists

Qadhafi usually prefers to ensure plausible denial in acts of terrorism that Libya sponsors. The use of surrogates is one way in which he distances Libya from such attacks. Many of the surrogates belong to dissident groups whom Libya trains, funds, and arms. Libya is particularly active in supporting these groups in Sub-Saharan Africa:

- Tripoli has conducted extensive subversive activity in Sudan since a coup in April ousted longtime Qadhafi enemy President Nimeiri. No terrorist

incidents have occurred to date, despite the plethora of threat rumors. Qadhafi has a network in place, however, that he could quickly activate. We believe Tripoli has held back from terrorism because diplomatic channels have proved so fruitful until recently. A terrorist event cannot be ruled out, however, especially if Libyan-Sudanese relations deteriorate or if a domestic political crisis arises that is too opportune to ignore.

3.5(c)

- [redacted] Libya continues to fund, train, and arm Zairian dissidents in large numbers and send them home on terrorist and subversive missions. Zairian officials claimed in September to have thwarted at least one Libyan-sponsored plot against President Mobutu. The President's effective personal security and the ineptitude of the dissidents have so far stymied all assassination attempts.

3.3(b)(1)

- In February, Chad complained to the United Nations that Libya had attempted to assassinate President Habre in September 1984. Photographs of the Libyan-made attache case bomb that was to be used in the attack were provided as evidence. [redacted]

3.5(c)

Activities in Latin America and Asia

Qadhafi appears increasingly intent on extending his revolution to areas far removed from Libya. He has used Islamic Call Societies and funding for numerous dissident groups in Asia and Latin America to extend his reach. [redacted]

3.5(c)

In the Caribbean, Libya hopes to gather intelligence, gain political influence, and undermine US and French interests. Tripoli's method of operation has been to offer dissidents training and trips to Libya and to promise them money on the condition that they perform acts of violence. Libya has met with virtually no success in the Caribbean to date, and we do not expect any dramatic increase in terrorist activity there in the near term. The more militant French-speaking separatists may be more willing to undertake terrorist activity, but English-speaking leftists are likely to

3.5(c)

continue to reject violence. Cuba is reportedly concerned about the increasing Libyan role in the Caribbean and has warned several groups away from Libyan support:

- People's Bureaus in Caracas and Panama probably coordinate activity in the region. Libya reportedly would like to use unofficial facilities such as the Islamic Call Society in Curacao and a regional newspaper office in Barbados as cover organizations for subversive activity.

- Libya is providing money and some training and arms to dissidents in the Caribbean. Libya seems to be having the greatest success with groups in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana [redacted]

Latin America has also felt the Libyan hand.

[redacted] dissidents in several countries receive aid from Tripoli:

- [redacted] Libya has promised financial support to the Movement for the Revolutionary Left (MIR) in Chile in return for a more visible guerrilla effort. A recent report indicates \$100,000 has been received by the MIR.

- [redacted] a high-ranking member of the M-19 in Colombia recently stated that Libya is the group's main source of arms, training, and money. We doubt, however, that Libya has replaced Cuba as the M-19's main supporter. [redacted]

- [redacted] the Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras has received money from Libya. [redacted]

The Libyan effort in Asia and the Pacific is less substantial but growing. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, serves as a local coordinating center, and Islamic Call Societies are also centers of activity. Most Libyan activity is subversive—the provision of funds and

training to dissidents—but Tripoli occasionally offers support for specific events:

- Tripoli reportedly provided funds to opposition groups in Vanuatu and New Caledonia. The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines received unspecified support following Nur Misuari's meeting with Qadhafi in July.

- In June, Bangladeshi police arrested a Libyan-trained Bangladeshi national for plotting to kill President Ershad. This individual had received Libyan support in an earlier coup attempt. [redacted] 3.5(c)

Links to Palestinians

Originally a strong supporter of Yasir Arafat, Qadhafi shifted his support for the Palestinian cause to more radical groups in the early 1970s, when he felt Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization were becoming too moderate. This trend accelerated after Abu Musa's faction broke with Arafat in 1982. Libya since has supported such groups as the PNSF, PFLP, PFLP-GC, and Abu Nidal, offering arms, money, training, and refuge. [redacted] the relationship with Abu Nidal has broadened to include joint operational coordination:

- [redacted] 3.3(b)(1)
- [redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

- [redacted] Libya provided three passports used by the Abu Nidal terrorists in the attack on the El Al counter in Vienna on 27 December. Two of the passports were seized by Libya when it expelled 30,000 Tunisian workers last August. This is the first concrete evidence of Libyan operational support to Abu Nidal. 3.3(b)(1)

- [redacted] Libyan Charge there wrote and secretly distributed statements on behalf of the hijackers of the Egyptair jet in November—an incident claimed by a group using an Abu Nidal covername. [redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

Libya also has been active with other radical Palestinian elements this year:

- A coalition of radical Palestinians formed the Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF) in Damascus amid much publicity last February.

[redacted] Libya provides almost all of the PNSF's funds.

- [redacted] Libya may have plotted to kill a high-level Fatah official in Berlin in August [redacted]

Threat to the United States

Qadhafi fears retaliation for attacks against US targets and has never attacked an American official or facility. There clearly are circumstances, however, in which he is willing to take the risk. We believe Libya is preparing contingency plans to attack US targets, and attribute the failure of Libya to attempt attacks against the United States in the past to lack of pre-operational planning, poor security, and the general incompetence of Libyan agents. [redacted]

[redacted] Libyan agents may be gathering intelligence on US personnel and facilities in Tunisia, Sudan, Somalia, Greece, Italy, and Saudi Arabia. [redacted]

Attacks against US targets in the United States are unlikely, but Libya would like to embarrass the United States with terrorism on its own soil by targeting anti-Qadhafi dissidents here. Tripoli is also forgoing ties to US radical groups. A Libyan attack against the United States elsewhere in the world cannot be ruled out, and some analysts judge that Qadhafi now is especially likely to seek opportunities to attack the United States in an effort to exploit the growing anti-US sentiment in the Arab states. Qadhafi probably believes anti-US attacks would keep him in the forefront of the worldwide revolutionary struggle. Should he elect to take the risks associated with an anti-US attack, he probably will work through surrogates to disguise the Libyan hand. [redacted]

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Terrorism Review

EO 13526 3.5(c)

13 January 1986

Focus

Overview of State-Supported Terrorism in 1985

3.5(c)

State support remained a significant factor in terrorism of Middle East origin in 1985. Armed attacks—principally assassination attempts—and bombings accounted for nearly three-fourths of all incidents. The number of kidnappings more than doubled over 1984. We do not believe Syria, Iran, or Libya have changed their politics or reduced the extent of their support for terrorism, although Libyan and Iranian-sponsored groups carried out fewer attacks this year than last. Syrian-sponsored groups—primarily radical Palestinian factions—accounted for a substantial increase in terrorist activity. State sponsors will continue to target US interests, but the battleground may shift to Europe as targets in the Middle East continue to become less accessible.

3.5(c)

Qadhafi will always target dissident Libyans opposed to him, but recently he appears to be expanding his terrorist activity by becoming more closely involved with such radical groups as Abu Nidal. This group's activities, while under Syrian sponsorship earlier this year, have accounted for much of the increase in Syrian-backed terrorism. Evidence of operational coordination between Libya and Abu Nidal, however, was lacking until the Rome and Vienna El Al attacks.

3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)

Iranian-sponsored activity could increase if, for example, Iran forsakes the attempt begun last spring to influence the Persian Gulf states by diplomatic means and activates the terrorist networks it has continued to develop there. Iranian activity could also rise if its surrogates seek US or French targets outside the Middle East, where bombings and kidnappings have for the most part driven away remaining Western targets. Islamic Jihad threatened on 31 December that further kidnappings and attacks against the United States would take place in 1986. Finally, Syrian-supported activity promises to remain high as long as Damascus is embroiled in the turbulent Lebanese and Palestinian situations and opposes moderate Arab attempts to move forward on the peace process.

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3.3(b)(1)

Cooperation is most likely to continue to be on a bilateral basis, with Iran and Libya the only two states having already discussed terrorist cooperation. Last summer, they issued a communique pledging closer ties on a whole range of issues, but for terrorist activity. The relationship between Iran and Syria remains subject to recurrent strains over the issue of Lebanon, and Libyan-Syrian relations similarly soured during the summer.

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Iran

Iran and Iranian-supported groups remain a major terrorist threat, particularly to US interests, although they were not as active in 1985. In 1984 almost one-fourth of all Middle Eastern attacks were known to involve Iranian or Iranian-supported groups. In the first nine months of 1985, they were responsible for at least 36 attacks. Iraq, France, and the United States remain the principal targets, but the Persian Gulf states face an increasing threat as well. Iranian-sponsored groups active this year include:

- Radical Shia groups in Lebanon, particularly Hizballah, who claim to have killed William Buckley and continue to hold at least four other American hostages. Hizballah also held five of the American hostages during the TWA hijacking last summer, which delayed the resolution of the incident for some time.
- Iraqi dissidents, who this year staged at least two attacks in the hometown of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. We believe Libya and Iran are trying to coordinate the anti-Iraqi activities of these groups.

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)

Tehran also targets Iranian exiles. Last August, a former security official of the Shah's regime was murdered in Turkey, and in September an exiled Iranian tribal leader with close ties to the Shah was gunned down in Pakistan. Iran also attempts to promote subversive activity among the Shia populations in countries as farflung as Nigeria, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines. [Redacted]

3.5(c)

Syria

Syria continued to sponsor terrorist attacks against moderate Arab and Western interests, although Syrian personnel were not directly involved in any incidents. Syrian-supported groups staged some 30 attacks in the first nine months of 1985, including two against US facilities. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)

Syrian-backed radical Palestinian groups have been especially active against Jordanian targets since the Palestine National Council meeting in Jordan in November 1984 and the PLO-Jordan accord in February 1985:

- On a single day in March, three Jordanian airline offices were bombed in three different European countries.
- A rocket fired at a Jordanian airliner in April struck the plane, nearly causing a major loss of life. [Redacted]

3.5(c)

Syrian-supported groups have attacked US facilities, [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)

Libya

Virtually all of Libya's terrorist attacks in 1985 were directed against Qadhafi's favorite targets—his own exiled countrymen:

- Exiles have been gunned down in Greece, West Germany, Cyprus, Italy, and Austria. Egypt twice this year stopped attempts in Egypt on the life of Libya's former Prime Minister.
- Libya's plans to disrupt the annual pilgrimage to Mecca did not bear fruit this year, but Libya almost certainly will plan some activity for the next hajj. (S NF)

Tripoli may be turning away from targeting exiles to concentrate on its activities in the Sudan and on strengthening its longstanding relationship with radical Palestinian groups. [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)

Qadhafi's reach extends far beyond Libya's borders:

- In the Caribbean, Libya has made lavish promises of money and training to leftist groups and tried to promote anti-US and anti-French sentiments.

[redacted]

3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)

Libya also provides training and funds to dissident groups in Latin America, East Asia, and the Pacific, although Qadhafi seems most interested in Latin America—outside his traditional circle of North Africa—as his next target of opportunity. [redacted]

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

Prospects

State-supported terrorism is likely to remain a major feature of Middle East-origin terrorism in 1986. Increased security and the low-key presence of US personnel has made targeting Americans more difficult. Prospects are good, therefore, that state sponsors of terrorism will turn increasingly to Western Europe in particular to continue attacks against the United States. [redacted]

3.5(c)

The three state sponsors will also continue their heavy use of surrogates and will try to exploit the fragmented Palestinian movement to conduct attacks where the state and the Palestinian group have overlapping interests. [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

[redacted] This level of tactical and operational coordination is far more likely than a "terrorist entente," involving a coordination of strategy among Iran, Libya, and Syria [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)