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Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 11/17/2010

File Folder TERRORISM: LIBYA [1984-1985]

FOIA

F95-023/9

Box Number 105

WILLS

23

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
101050	MEMO	SAYRE THRU ARMACOST/SPIERS TO DEPUTY SECRETARY RE COUNTERING LIBYAN TERRORISM <i>R 2/28/2017 M1104/1</i>	1	5/18/1984	B1
101051	PAPER	RE COUNTERING LIBYAN TERRORISM <i>R 2/28/2017 M1104/1</i>	7	5/17/1984	B1
100778	REPORT	LIBYA: QADHAFI'S NEXT STEPS <i>R 2/28/2017 M1104/1</i>	7	11/21/1984	B1
100869	MEMO	TO POINDEXTER RE LIBYA <i>PAR 1/25/2017 M1104/1</i>	1	12/6/1984	B1 B3
100870	REPORT	RE LIBYA <i>PAR 1/25/2017 M1104/1</i>	13	12/3/1984	B1 B3
100871	CABLE	051455Z NOV 85	5	11/5/1985	B1 B3
100872	CABLE	052132Z NOV 85	3	11/5/1985	B1 B3
100873	PAPER	RE LIBYA <i>D 1/25/2017 M1104/1</i>	7	11/7/1985	B1 B3
100874	PAPER	FURTHER MEASURES AGAINST QADHAFI <i>R 2/28/2017 M1104/1</i>	2	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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File Folder TERRORISM: LIBYA [1984-1985]

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23

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100875	REPORT	RE LIBYA	1	ND	B1 B3
100876	CABLE	122149Z NOV 85 <i>D 1/25/2017 M1104/1</i>	3	11/12/1985	B1 B3
100877	MEMO	TO NORTH RE LIBYA W/COVER SHEET <i>D 1/25/2017 M1104/1</i>	2	11/18/1985	B1 B3
100878	MEMO	TO NORTH RE QADHAFI W/COVER SHEET <i>D 1/25/2017 M1104/1</i>	2	11/19/1985	B1 B3
100879	MEMO	TO NORTH RE LIBYA W/COVER SHEET	2	12/30/1985	B1 B3

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101050

Department of State



ACTION MEMORANDUM

'84 MAY 18 P3:04S/ScH 5/18

May 18, 1984

IST.
718

SECRET/SENSITIVE

TO: The Deputy Secretary
THRU: P. Michael H. Armacost
THRU: M. Ronald I. Spiers
FROM: M/CT - Robert M. Sayre
SUBJECT: Countering Libyan Terrorism

MR. DAM HAS SEEN

MAY 19 1984

/CT
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IST.
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Issue for Decision:

Whether we should undertake interagency coordination on options and actions to deal with the upsurge in Libyan terrorism.

/CT
/S
/S-I

Essential Factors:

There has been a significant upsurge in Libyan directed terrorism, the most notable recent case being the attack from the Libyan Embassy in London against dissident demonstrators resulting in the death of a British policewoman and injury to several of the demonstrators.

We had been working on an overall paper on the subject for several weeks before that event because of Libyan terrorist activities in Africa, Europe and the Middle East. We are also concerned about Libya's capability to engage in such activity in the United States.

Because of the events in London, the British have approached us on the matter, and among other things, are seeking a declaration at the upcoming Summit meeting in London on international terrorism in general and the misuse of diplomatic premises in particular.

We believe that we should move ahead as promptly as possible on interagency coordination to improve intelligence, consider the options, and seek a policy decision on courses of action. The next step in this process is consideration of the issue and options in the NSC Terrorist Incident Working Group.

Recommendation:

That you approve submission of the attached paper on Libyan terrorism to the NSC Terrorist Incident Working Group for further consideration and action.

Approve RWD Disapprove _____

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NLRM 11104 # 101050
BY RW NARA DATE 2/28/17

101051

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SUBJECT: Countering Libyan Terrorism

The Problem

In the past few weeks there has been growing evidence of a renewed terrorism campaign by Libya. While a user and supporter of terrorist activities for most of the past fifteen years, in 1982-83, Qadhafi appeared to moderate his actions in favor of pursuing political goals. Many acts in his terrorism revival, e.g., the firing from the Libyan People's Bureau on demonstrators in London, have been against Libyan dissidents.

Recent evidence also indicates that Libya has been responsible for:

--a bomb explosion in the baggage room of Kinshasha airport,

--bombing of a French airliner at N'djamena,

--planning of anti-Habre dissident attacks against US and French embassies in N'djamena,

--detonating a bomb at Heathrow Airport during the incident at the Peoples' Bureau in London, and

Although Qadhafi has been pursuing anti-dissident terrorist activity for four or more years, the incidents in London suggest that he is becoming increasingly bold, even careless about the exposure of his hand in terrorist incidents. Moreover, his determination to topple the regimes of leaders such as Habre and Nimeiri has led him to overtly provocative acts such as the bombing of the radio/television station in Omdourman.

Prospects

Chances for any moderating influence on Qadhafi appear slim. He has reached his current state of mind via extreme reaction to failure to induce dissidents to return home. Other provocations include assassination of a Libyan diplomat in Rome, as well as bombings and other incidents in

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Libya, including an unsuccessful attack on Qadhafi on May 8. The pattern of dissidence appears to be mounting. His recent foreign policy successes, e.g., military success in northern Chad, appear incomplete and potentially reversible. He also appears perturbed by a loss of influence over the PLO.

The British decision to break diplomatic relations appears to have been taken by Qadhafi as an affront to his prestige. He blames the British, supported by the United States, for the recent incident in London; his reaction is likely to be to increase terrorist activity against dissidents in Western Europe; and to initiate bombings and assassination attempts against Western, including US targets. Recent intelligence shows that he is plotting moves to harrass the British in various locations worldwide. Moreover, if the pattern of dissident activity against him continues to grow, it can be expected that his recent lack of caution will become more pronounced.

Qadhafi's Approaches

Qadhafi's support of insurgency and terrorist activities since his rise to power has been a function of his own political ambitions. Since his successful coup in 1969, he has come to see himself as the successor to the mantle of Gamal Abdel Nasser, with a Libyan, an African, an Islamic, and in some respects a global circle of political/personal influence objectives. Initially setting out to revolutionize Libyan society, he has succeeded mainly in substituting his own brand of one man rule for the monarchy. Having thoroughly alienated countries both east and west, he has focused south and southeast, seeking to dominate events in the Northern Chad, eventually to overthrow Habre, and working to secure the fall of Nimeiri in the Sudan.

Qadhafi has sought to foment instability in several other countries through support for dissident groups. He has supported distant Islamic insurgencies such as the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines. He can be expected to exploit Pan Arab sentiment to the disadvantage of governments such as Bourgiba's in Tunisia. Recent intelligence indicates that he is refurbishing his Latin connections, even though the primary objective of this effort is not yet clear.

It has become evident in all these instances, that in pursuit of any or all these ambitions Qadhafi is prepared to use national treasure to support insurgencies that

destabilize and overthrow his enemies. He has used terrorism, either against foreigners or against Libyan dissidents, in support of all of his primary goals.

Qadhafi's immediate preoccupation is with Libyan dissidents at home and abroad. If and when he proves able to contain Libyan dissidence, however, his other long-term goals will remain the driving forces of support for insurgency and revolution. His willingness to use and to sponsor terrorism for these purposes or to avoid the development of serious future sources of opposition is likely to remain undiminished.

Potential For Sanctions

Libya's strategic location and command of energy resources mean that it is by no means isolated and that it would be possible to isolate the country only with concerted agreement among ourselves and European allies to do so. . Libya's current population of 2.5-3.0 million, with a per capita income of about \$8,000, offers a modest but relatively well endowed market for consumer goods.

The economy appears vulnerable, because the structure is very shallow and foreign trade dependent. Hydrocarbons are almost the unique export; well over half of Libya's GDP is derived from oil exports. Its central Mediterranean location gives it a cost advantage on oil shipments that is unequalled except for Algeria, and its known reserves of over 25 billion barrels give it the clout to dominate the regional market.

The United States imposed an embargo on use of Libyan oil and on the flow of US dollars to Libya in 1982. We advised American citizens involved in Libyan oil exploration and production to leave the country at that time and many of them did; it is estimated, however, that between 500 and 1000 Americans remain in the country.

Unilaterally the United States has imposed export controls on Libya which are the strongest now in effect. We have periodically approached our European allies to join us in this program, but with little success. The United States also has invalidated US passports for travel to Libya, but the Americans presently there obviously have found ways to overcome this.

Libya's response to our past efforts immediately was to reroute its oil exports to other markets, develop sources of supplies, e.g., spares for C-130s, in countries such as

Belgium, and largely neutralize the effect of US sanctions. Recently, Libyan students have sought covertly to obtain weapons and spares for C-130s in the United States. Libya's current economic difficulties stem mainly from adverse oil market conditions, not from the effects of sanctions.

Possible Avenues of Influence

It may be that recent Libyan terrorism has provided an opportunity for more effective, closer cooperation with other governments than has prevailed in the past. We are seeing signs of such an opportunity in British reactions, but the premise needs to be tested in several different bilateral contexts as well as in the course of the June Economic Summit.

It is possible that a few states, e.g., Morocco, Saudi Arabia, have enough influence with Libya to convince Qadhafi to return to his political influence tack of the past two years. It is clear, however, that the dominant influences on Qadhafi's decisions respecting use of terrorism have been personal with him and calculated in terms of his own goals. This does not bode well for outsiders persuading him to stop, unless Qadhafi himself sees advantage in doing so.

Economic sanctions, if pursued in a concerted way at this time by Libya's leading trading partners, could have severe effect. Mainly they could further strain the limited resilience of Libya's economy in a period of reduced oil income. That sort of opportunity would not exist, or would be greatly weakened in a tight oil market. Despite Qadhafi's recent flagrant behavior, we doubt that Europeans would be willing to impose severe economic sanctions.

Success has been mixed with previous efforts to reduce the flow of military items from Western Europe to Qadhafi. There has been some clear disagreement (e.g., France still sells Mirages) and much less cooperation on military spare parts or related services (e.g., Greek training of Libyan fighter pilots). This may be nonetheless a better option for future use than broader sanctions.

The United States has potentially one major economic shot at Libya remaining to it. That would involve ordering US companies to disassociate themselves from Libyan connections and withdraw entirely from the Libyan market. The effect of this step would be an immediate disruption of Libya's economy, but those effects, while severe in a short to medium time frame, could eventually be overcome. The effects could only be made enduring with the full

cooperation of our European allies, because others could move in to fill any gaps created by our withdrawal. Realization that this move would require invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, could have severe effects on international financial markets, and would raise thorny questions of extraterritoriality with US firms as well as our allies caused us to resist the idea in the past.

If we choose to make use of a paramilitary or military option, we are aware of Libyan terrorist training facilities which could be targeted, assuming that new intelligence verifies their occupation and use for this purpose, but we would have to consider the risks of killing or injuring third country nationals who may also be present for various reasons in these facilities. Unless we can refine our appreciation of who is actually in these facilities, they may not be the most productive of targets. Military targets, e.g., bases and facilities such as supply dumps may be best.

Any direct attack on Qadhafi, with or without the participation of other countries, can be expected to provoke very mixed reactions from the Arab world, which on balance will probably be unfavorable. Qadhafi has been able to use such events as the Gulf of Sidra exercise to paint himself as the victim of "great power" harrassment, and he is currently mounting a major effort to transfer guilt for his recent excesses to the United States and Britain.

Respecting any military/paramilitary option, we must weigh carefully the Soviet response. Over a period of several years we have had conversations with Gromyko and Dobrynin in which we have raised Qadhafi's bad behavior. Soviets have responded in essence that Qadhafi is an independent freelancer outside their control. The USSR has invested a great deal in Libya, as a market for military equipment and other goods, as a forward deployment base for war materiel, as a nuisance to the western world in general--presuming that Libya's destabilizing activities in various localtions are seen by the Russians to be in their interest. Military or paramilitary actions that had significant effect in either destroying equipment or supplies pre-positioned for possible

Soviet use, or facilities in which they feel they have an investment, would no doubt cause a Soviet reaction. We believe that the probable Soviet reaction would be limited to loud public condemnation (perhaps including a UN resolution), resupply of any military equipment lost by Qadhafi, but not a direct military threat aimed at any US or European assets.

It is very likely that Qadhafi would order attacks against US targets, if we mounted any significant campaign against him. Possible Qadhafi reactions may include use of students in the United States to carry out terrorist attacks. At present, there are about 15,000, many of whom have been organized and supported by Qadhafi through the Libyan Mission to the United Nations.

It is very doubtful that Qadhafi can be persuaded by other governments to stop using terrorism. Given his mindset, especially his various senses of mission, he sees no moral or legal barriers to use of terrorism, only practical ones.

Possible Options

If the foregoing assessment is correct, and there is much to support it, we are moved toward a limited and hard set of choices including:

Do nothing more than is already in the record on grounds that what we might do could be unsuccessful as well as provocative and make matters worse.

Work with Summit Seven, other NATO and key Middle East countries to get agreement on the importance of cooperative efforts to deal with Libyan terrorism.

Work with NATO and key Middle East countries to see what can be done to eliminate the flow of western arms and related equipment to Libya.

In the event a high order of cooperation can be achieved with other countries, cut off remaining US economic connections to Libya.

Unilaterally cut off remaining US economic relations with Libya to demonstrate leadership and dramatize Qadhafi's pariah status.

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Seek intercession with Qadhafi by Arab leaders likely to have some influence to get him to stop his use and support of terrorism

In addition to the foregoing get US businessmen to act as intermediaries in an effort to get Qadhafi to stop.

Establish a pattern of directly reacting to Libyan terrorism by going after carefully selected Libyan targets, timing those actions to relate without any doubt to specific Libyan acts.

Mount a program of covert actions to preempt, disrupt or frustrate Libya's plans for terrorist acts, including sabotage of Libyan facilities known to be involved in terrorist preparations.

Seek a regime change.

Drafted: M/CT - TEArnold
5/17/84 28541

Clearances:

3ms | NEA - ARaphel
INR - HMontgomery
PM - AKanter
EUR - JKelly
S/P - EMorton

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(U) LIBYA: QADHAFI'S LIKELY NEXT STEPS

Summary

Libyan leader Col. Mu'ammarr Qadhafi's increasing domestic and personal isolation and his alienation from the other Arabs makes him at least as dangerous to his immediate neighbors as he has ever been. He is likely to engage in flamboyant acts of terror or disruption as a means of punishing those who oppose him and of underlining the seriousness of his calls for Arab and African unity. His priority objective, however, remains the elimination of his opponents, both inside the country and abroad. In the near term he is likely to concentrate his energies on this task.

Qadhafi is not a strategic threat to the United States, although he does continue to threaten US interests in several areas of the world. He does pose a strategic threat to his weaker neighbors, although the capabilities of his stronger neighbors--Egypt and Algeria in particular--serve to restrain his activities. Neither his recent apparently improved ties to Europe nor the union with Morocco have served significantly to moderate his behavior. Qadhafi's apparently enhanced relations last fall with several European states now appear considerably less significant. The Europeans remain highly suspicious of Qadhafi, even more so following his failure to live up to a public commitment to withdraw his forces from Chad. It is likely, moreover, that Qadhafi will continue his attempts to assassinate Libyan exiles, including those in Europe.

At times Qadhafi may temporarily back down under threat of strong retaliation, but he will not give up his goals of regional dominance and an expanded international sphere of influence. He is highly motivated to take revenge upon those who oppose and humiliate him and, therefore, will

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Declassify: OADR (Harris, G.)

Report 958-CA (rev.)
November 21, 1984



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continue to do all he can both overtly and covertly to oppose US influence in North Africa and elsewhere.

The threat of Libyan-sponsored terrorism and of attempts to subvert other governments is likely to grow. Increased political or economic pressures have not in the past served permanently to modify his behavior. On the other hand, concessions are likely to be seen by Qadhafi as weakness and therefore as incitement to continue his internationally unacceptable activities.

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Motivation and Perceptions

Qadhafi's probable future course of action can be projected best in the context of his basic motivations. The Libyan leader is propelled by two conflicting drives: the desire to play a commanding role in Africa and the Islamic world; and the parallel compulsion to revenge himself upon those who oppose him and those who have caused the Arabs to suffer shame and disadvantage. Mixed with both these motives is a large ingredient of fear--the fear of failure and the fear of counterattack.

These two main motivations led Qadhafi to moderate his involvement in terrorism and pull back from Chad in late 1981. This retreat was abetted as much by Libya's declining economy and Qadhafi's perception of loss of international prestige as a result of involvement in terrorism as by the perception of a US military threat against him. But Qadhafi's drive for revenge and his fear of ultimate failure will not let him rest for long, especially if he believes he is facing new threats--e.g., the threat perceived since early 1984 from his internal and exiled opponents.

The deliberate deception of the French over withdrawal from Chad in late 1984 probably arose from Qadhafi's perception that improved ties to Europe provided him with opportunity for a bold move for which there would be no retaliation. However, his action may reflect an increased disregard for international opinion. Qadhafi's actions thus are intricately tied to his perceptions of present threat and opportunity. But they also relate to his unchanging goals of regional dominance and international significance.

Increasing Potential for Radical Behavior

Qadhafi--now 42 and looking back at 15 years of failure to consolidate his revolution at home or significantly extend it abroad--is becoming more impatient to achieve his objectives. Signs of this during 1984 include an increased indulgence in such flamboyant acts as the March bombing of Omdurman, the summer mining of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez, and the effort to disrupt the Hajj. Dramatic actions have marked Qadhafi's course in past years, but not at such frequent intervals. Impatience for achievement and the sting of international rejection and isolation have spawned his current need for highly visible gestures.

In the past, a coterie of close advisers frequently was able to dissuade Qadhafi from some of his more aggressive and imaginative designs. For example, his orders in 1980 and 1981 to shoot

down US planes were on several occasions countermanded by senior officers. But Qadhafi's increased personal isolation during the past two years--including decreased reliance on his military in favor of his family, his tribe, and a retinue of loyal but often incompetent advisers--has reduced the scope of governmental influence on Qadhafi's actions. The rise in importance of the Revolutionary Committees--which function as parallel sources of authority at all levels of government and society--underscores the growing lack of control over internal and external actions by a central Libyan Government.

Qadhafi is likely to engage in outrageous international behavior during coming months. Although the public relations benefits of recent efforts to improve ties with several European countries may tempt him to be somewhat on his good behavior toward them, he will not be able to resist the compulsion to continue his operations against Libyan exiles in Europe. European vigilance will combine with Libyan general ineptitude, however, to restrict both the success of these attacks and the level of the targets reached. But Qadhafi's priority objective remains the elimination of his political opponents, and Libya itself can expect to experience even harsher measures of internal repression.

Qadhafi's new relationship with Morocco will not be effective in moderating his international behavior. Qadhafi temporarily may temper his activities to make immediate gains, but he will not modify his long-term objective of regional dominance.

Relations with the Arab States

Libya can expect to experience continuing isolation from most other Arab states on a variety of issues in coming months, a position that could tempt Qadhafi to acts of extremism in order to regain center stage. Signals from several Arab states that they eventually will follow Jordan's lead and reestablish ties with Egypt are seen by Qadhafi as direct betrayal of the Arab cause. His attitudes and actions on this issue--including efforts to counter Egypt in international organizations and calls for boycott of Jordan--will contribute to his isolation.

The successful Egyptian sting operation in November was a source of considerable embarrassment to Qadhafi which he will certainly seek to revenge. On November 16 Tripoli radio announced that "the traitor, hireling and stray dog" former Prime Minister Abdel Hamid Bakkush had been "liquidated" when in fact Egyptian intelligence had arrested the Libyan-sponsored hit team and duped Tripoli with fake photos of an apparently slain Bakkush. A subsequent but relatively brief rise in border tensions between Egypt and Libya reflected mutual fears of attack. Qadhafi is more likely to search for a clandestine method of revenge and Egyptian

authorities have increased their vigilance. Use by Libya of foreign assassins--British and Maltese in the Bakkush case--underscores the difficulties of protection against Libyan operations.

Libya's previous close ties with some of its few Arab friends also have been weakened in recent weeks. Relations with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen have suffered as the result of differences over Palestinian leadership and delinquent Libyan aid contributions. Even links to Syria have been strained by the Morocco-Libya union agreement. If this gap between Libya and other Arab states broadens significantly, Qadhafi's mood will darken and he can be expected to expand efforts to reverse this course through subversion. Even if the present conditions of wary but correct ties prevail, Qadhafi will continue his efforts to undermine several Arab governments, including those of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, and Iraq.

Libyan relations with Algeria are more strained than at any time in the past few years. Despite recently improved informal contacts between Algiers and Cairo, however, rivalry for regional, African, and nonaligned leadership positions probably will prevent united action to counter Qadhafi. Algiers blames Qadhafi for contributing to regional polarization and destabilization and disagrees with him specifically over support for Palestinian leadership, relations with Egypt, and the treaty with Morocco. Although the Algerians will continue to maintain contacts with Libya as part of a policy of seeking to monitor Qadhafi, Libyan-Algerian relations could deteriorate further, and at least small-scale Algerian military posturing cannot be ruled out. Qadhafi is fearful of such measures and will continue his present efforts to mollify Algiers diplomatically. But, again, his subversive operatives will take advantage of any openings they find.

Nor is Qadhafi likely to resist the temptation to overplay his hand in Morocco. A rupture of the Moroccan-Libyan union is almost certainly only a matter of time--several months to 2-3 years. Libya already has indicated dissatisfaction with King Hassan's failure to condemn the Jordanian reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Egypt. Most Arabs anticipate a dissolution of the Libyan-Moroccan union, under circumstances that Qadhafi will exploit to vent his sense of betrayal.

Relations With the Soviet Union and the US

Libyan ties to the Soviet Union will not change appreciably over the short term. The relationship remains a mutually wary one with decided differences in long-term regional and ideological objectives. Nonetheless, Qadhafi finds the Soviet connection a convenient foil to the West and a symbol of his international

position. Moscow's hopes--in addition to a lucrative arms market--are clearly for enhanced influence in a strategic area.

If Qadhafi feels greater isolation from the Arabs and increased threat from the US, he may seek to enhance his ties to Moscow by pressuring the Soviets into signing the friendship treaty that was agreed to in principle in 1983. The Soviets will be cautious in dealing with Qadhafi but will exploit any opportunity to expand their already growing access to his military facilities. Qadhafi has expressed willingness to allow the Soviet military basing privileges--a position founded on his sense of vulnerability because of a perceived threat from the US.

The Military Stair Step exercises conducted during the past three years have exacerbated tensions between Libya and the US. Qadhafi remains certain to react to US freedom of navigation operations in the Mediterranean, although he may not actively seek military confrontation. His reaction will be directly related to how far US aircraft and ships penetrate into what he considers Libyan territorial waters and, as in past years, likely will take the form of retaliation against US diplomatic and military personnel abroad.

US economic sanctions have served the moral purpose of demonstrating that the US will not economically support or cooperate with a regime that does not adhere to minimal standards of international decency. This demonstration has been incomplete, however, and has not made a significant impact on Qadhafi. Although unavailability of certain types of technology has hampered the Libyan economy, the effect has been one of annoyance rather than crisis. Moreover, European and other business concerns are ready to take up any slack created by diminished US economic relations with Libya. Qadhafi remains determined to continue his course of action despite US pressures. Indeed, his determination and sense of self-righteousness has been increased by US failure to isolate him from the Europeans.

Limits of Qadhafi's Reach

Should Qadhafi survive the efforts of his growing number of opponents, the threat he poses to US interests and to his Arab and African neighbors could increase in coming years. But Libya is not now a strategic threat to the US. Qadhafi's ability to operate inside the US remains extremely limited and his record against US diplomatic and military missions abroad has been unimpressive, despite a series of attempts to assassinate personnel and to attack facilities. Qadhafi has neither a nuclear weapons capability--thanks in part to US efforts--nor the expertise or military capability to mount a significant threat to US NATO allies. The main Libyan threat to international peace is the threat of covert and

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subversive activity, the ability to destabilize, and the resources to supply aid to dissidents and rebels.

Libya nonetheless constitutes a limited threat to US military interests. The early 1984 Omdurman bombing underscored Qadhafi's willingness to use conventional weapons for terrorist purposes. An outsized arsenal of ill-operated but relatively modern weapons gives Qadhafi potential for doing damage to US rear-echelon assets in wartime and poses a problem to military resource allocation. It is possible, furthermore, although not certain, that Qadhafi would ally himself with the Soviet Union in wartime.

Moreover, Libyan policy constitutes a threat to US interests and to US friends and allies in several areas of the world. Qadhafi's attention remains focused on Africa and the Arab world, his chosen spheres for influence. He will not change his anti-US and anti-Israel policies--which he uses as vehicles to seek support for his radical philosophies. He will continue and perhaps enhance his efforts to attack those he perceives as "puppets of Zionism and imperialism."

Libya under Qadhafi is a strategic threat only to Chad (which it has invaded twice), Niger (a portion of whose territory it claims), and Tunisia (which is weak and politically vulnerable). Although Qadhafi also has claimed portions of the territory of several other neighbors, Libya is not militarily strong enough to constitute a significant threat to any but the weakest states. Both Algeria and Egypt, moreover, have regionally powerful armies of which Qadhafi is justifiably apprehensive. Algerian guarantees to Tunisia and Egyptian guarantees to Sudan (which is in any case protected from Qadhafi by vast stretches of desert) help further to restrain Libyan adventurism.

Prepared by Lillian C. Harris
632-8418

Approved by George S. Harris
632-8397

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Central Intelligence Agency



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NLRRM1104 #100869

BY FW NARA DATE 11/25/17

6 DEC 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral John M. Poindexter
Deputy Assistant to the President
National Security Affairs

FROM: [Redacted]
Director of Global Issues

EO 13526 3.5(c)

SUBJECT: Libya: Supplying Terrorist Weapons [Redacted]

1. The attached memorandum examines the types and origins of weapons supplied by Libya to its own operatives and to foreign terrorist groups. These weapons include Western and Soviet Bloc pistols, assault rifles, and submachineguns as well as more sophisticated or terrorist-specific ordnance such as man-portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, silenced and concealed firearms, and explosive devices. Our analysis of recovered terrorist ordnance suggests that Tripoli goes to considerable lengths to procure untraceable arms for its own terrorist operations, while providing more easily traceable weapons to foreign terrorist groups. [Redacted]

2. This memorandum was prepared by [Redacted] International Security Issues Division, Office of Global Issues. [Redacted]

3. Your comments and suggestions on this memorandum are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Arms Transfer Branch, OGI, [Redacted]

Attachment:

Libya: Supplying Terrorist Weapons [Redacted]

GI M 84-10221L, December 1984 [Redacted]

Copy 4

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL BY [Redacted]
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Washington, D.C. 20505

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NLR/M1104 #100870

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

3 December 1984

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Libya: Supplying Terrorist Weapons

Summary

Libya provides a wide variety of weapons to groups which commit acts of international terrorism. These weapons include conventional pistols, assault rifles, and submachineguns of both Western and Bloc origin, as well as more sophisticated or terrorist-specific ordnance such as man-portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, silenced and concealed pistols, and explosive devices. Although most of these weapons cannot be traced through successive purchase-to-delivery cycles, an analysis of recovered terrorist ordnance suggests that Tripoli goes to considerable lengths to procure untraceable arms for its own terrorist operations, while providing more easily traceable weapons to foreign terrorist organizations.

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This memorandum was prepared by International Security Issues Division, Office of Global Issues. This analysis is based on information as of 3 December 1984. Comments and queries are welcomed and may be addressed to the Chief, Arms Transfers Branch, OGI, on

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GI M 84-1022 1L
December 1984

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Libya: Supplying Terrorist Weapons [redacted]

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Introduction

Libya's ability to procure arms directly from other governments and indirectly on the international gray arms market ensures Tripoli a wide range of ordnance for use by Libyan as well as foreign terrorist groups. As a result of Tripoli's access to weapons, Libyan hit teams as well as diverse Libyan-supported foreign terrorist groups now possess the weapons necessary to attack:


- o Low flying commercial or military aircraft using man-portable SA-7 surface-to-air missiles.
- o Hardened vehicles--such as armored limousines--using RPG-7 anti-tank weapons.
- o Diplomatic, military, industrial and commercial installations using rocket-launched ordnance and improvised explosive devices.
- o Individuals using a variety of pistols, submachineguns, and assault and sniper rifles.

Given the wide range of terrorist organizations that receive arms from Libya, some of these weapons have been and will continue to be used against American targets. [redacted]

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Small Arms

Conventional Firearms. Weapons traceable to Libya have turned up in the possession of a wide variety of terrorists throughout Europe and the Middle East. In early July 1984, for example, [redacted] confiscated three Italian Beretta 9mm Model 12 submachineguns, seven Belgian Browning 9mm High-Power pistols, five Soviet-type fragmentation grenades, 300 rounds of 9mm ammunition, and one kilogram of nitropenta explosive [redacted]



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GI M 84-10221L
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[Redacted]

[Redacted] Libya provided these arms directly to the Pakistani terrorists, who admitted having undergone small arms training in Libya and India, but claim to have received their weapons from an as yet unidentified party in Rome. [Redacted] all of the recovered weapons [Redacted] were found in new, unfired condition--despite being over eight years old. This suggests that these arms did not pass through many hands between their acquisition by Libya [Redacted]

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Similar Libyan-bought Italian and Belgian weapons also have been discovered in the possession of other terrorist groups:

o [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

This policy stands in sharp contrast with the elaborate means by which Libya seeks to dissociate itself from the weapons it provides to its own terrorists for attacks on Libyan dissidents abroad. These weapons are often acquired through a circuitous network involving one or more gray market arms brokers

[Redacted]

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or firms. The use of such front firms--with no demonstrable link to Libya--suggests that arms procured in this fashion are intended for politically sensitive terrorist actions in countries where they might be recovered

[Redacted]

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Libya has also acquired US-made weapons via the gray arms market.

[Redacted]

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Commercial versus Military Firearms. Although Libya frequently provides military weapons--such as Beretta submachineguns and Browning assault rifles and large caliber pistols--to foreign terrorists, Tripoli seems to prefer non-military, commercially available weapons for its own operatives. The US-manufactured revolvers [redacted]

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[redacted] fall into this category, as do other weapons that Libya has recently sought to acquire. [redacted] a shipment of 16 highly accurate US Remington .22 magnum caliber rifles that was about to be delivered to the Libyan People's Bureau in Vienna, according to press accounts.

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[Large redacted area]

Silenced Weapons. Tripoli also procures specially equipped firearms that by their very nature appear to be intended for use in terrorist operations. [redacted]

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[Redacted area]

Tripoli also supplies silenced weapons to foreign terrorist groups. A generally reliable source reported, for example, that in 1983 Tripoli supplied at least 30 silenced pistols to anti-Arafat Fatah rebels. [redacted]

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² North Korea is extremely active on the international gray arms market, where it acquires Western weapons both for resale and for issuance to its own operatives for use against South Korean targets. [redacted]

[Redacted area]

Special Firearms. Libya also procures other types of exotic firearms on the gray arms market. [redacted]

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[redacted]

Libyan terrorists may have attempted to kill at least one high ranking foreign leader with similar concealed weapons.

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[redacted]

Although details are lacking, it appears likely that Tripoli has acquired other exotic firearms designed for terrorist use. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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
Special Ammunition. In addition to special weapons, Libya has also sought to acquire special purpose metal-piercing ammunition on the gray arms market. [redacted]

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


Other Ordnance

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
[redacted] In addition to small arms, Libya provides more sophisticated weapons to its own overseas operatives as well as to foreign terrorists. Most of this ordnance--such as man-portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, and explosive devices--are ideally suited for terrorist use and clearly not intended for "defensive" purposes. [redacted]

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
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
Anti-Tank Weapons. Another potent weapon frequently provided by Libya to foreign terrorist groups is the Soviet-style RPG-7 rocket-launcher. This man-portable, percussion-fired weapon weighs only 2.25 kilograms (loaded) and fires a high explosive armor-piercing grenade capable of defeating up to 330mm of rolled homogeneous steel plate at zero degrees obliquity. It has a practical range of between 300 to 500 meters and is ideally suited for use by terrorists in attacking hardened vehicles such as the armored limousines used in VIP protection. We believe that Libya has provided this weapon to diverse terrorist and insurgent groups throughout Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and probably Europe.

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Libya may also have been the source of many of the weapons used by the Provisional Irish Republican Army, which conducted

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the greatest number of its RPG-7 attacks on British targets--over one hundred--during 1972-1974. Press reports indicate, for example, that Irish authorities confiscated 5 tons of weapons and arrested several PIRA terrorists aboard a ship discovered in early 1973 off the Irish coast. This vessel--the S.S. Claudia--was owned by two West German gray market arms dealers and had sailed from Tripoli, Libya. [redacted]

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Crew-Served and Artillery Weapons. Libyan support for international terrorists also includes other items of heavy ordnance. [redacted]

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
[redacted] Libya supplied Palestinian guerrillas with North Korean 107mm and 122mm Katyusha rockets. [redacted]

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[redacted] Palestinian groups use Katyusha rockets in attacks on Israeli settlements near the Lebanese, Syrian, and Jordanian borders. ~~(C NF)~~

Libya has continued supplying large quantities of heavy weapons to Palestinian groups even after their 1982 withdrawal from Beirut. Most of this materiel is of Soviet design and probably supplied from Libya's own stockpiles of weapons purchased directly from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and North Korea. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Handgrenades and Explosives. As with firearms, much of the explosive ordnance supplied by Tripoli to foreign terrorists can be [Redacted] Libya. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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In addition to standard military high explosive ordnance, Libya provides terrorists with the components necessary to fabricate their own improvised explosive devices. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Some of the more advanced bomb components supplied to terrorists by Libya are of US origin. [Redacted] in December 1983 Turkish security officials discovered an improvised explosive device in a suitcase about to

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[Redacted]

be loaded on a plane in Istanbul.⁵

[Redacted]

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Tripoli may also have begun supplying foreign terrorists with extremely sophisticated, remote-controlled improvised explosive devices. One such device--believed to have been supplied by Libya--has recently been [Redacted]

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[Redacted] is unlike any device used in the past by terrorist organizations.

[Redacted]

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⁵Although no group has claimed this unsuccessful attack, we believe that the anti-Turkish Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) may have been responsible.

[Redacted]

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⁷This Czech-made explosive has been used by various terrorist organizations since 1972, when it first appeared in Black September Organization letter bombs. It has also been used by various Armenian terrorist groups and was found [Redacted] in several of the improvised explosive devices used during the 1981 Libyan-backed bombing campaign in the Central African Republic and the Sudan. (S NF)

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[Redacted]

Prospects and Implications

We believe that Libya will continue to acquire large quantities of weapons and to supply some of this ordnance to groups which commit acts of international terrorism. As a recognized government, Libya can purchase most of these arms directly from other nations. We estimate that this year alone Tripoli received nearly one half billion dollars worth of armaments from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China and North Korea. Although we do not know if Moscow and other communist governments use Libya and other patron state supporters of terrorism to funnel arms to specific terrorist groups, we believe that these governments are fully aware that Tripoli provides large quantities of ordnance to such organizations. [redacted]


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Moreover, despite its reputation as a supporter of international terrorism, Tripoli is still able to purchase large quantities of small arms from Western nations. Press reports indicate that during the first half of 1984, for example, Libya purchased over 2200 tons of small arms and ammunition from Spain. Similarly, in mid-1984 the Brazilian government approved the sale of 20,000 9mm Taurus MT-12A submachineguns to Libya.⁸ Even if such official, government-to-government sales could be halted, Tripoli would still enjoy easy access to a variety of ordnance--including silenced pistols and man-portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons--through private arms dealers and brokers on the international gray arms market. [redacted]

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Unconfirmed information also suggests that Tripoli may eventually be able to manufacture a wide range of weapons itself. [redacted]

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Besides the immediate threat of Libya arming international terrorists, the problem is compounded by the longevity of modern small arms, which, when properly cared for, can be cached for long periods or traded from one terrorist group to another. Thus, weapons already supplied by Libya to Palestinian

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⁸This weapon is a Brazilian-made copy of the Italian Beretta M-12 submachinegun. [redacted]

terrorists, for example, may turn up years from now in the possession of a violently anti-American group in Western Europe. As a result, we believe that Libyan arms acquisitions to date already ensure the availability of terrorist weapons for the remainder of the century. [redacted]

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STATEMENT
by
PRESIDENT REAGAN
on
BOMBINGS OF ABORTION CLINICS

In view of the recent spate of bombings of abortion clinics in various parts of the United States and the danger to innocent lives posed by such acts, I feel it is essential to be completely clear about where I and the Federal Executive stand on such violence.

My views on abortion are well known. I believe that the protection of all human rights begins with the preservation of the right to life itself. In our society everyone has the right to speak out for what he or she believes, but we cannot condone the choice of bombings, of violence as the means to express those beliefs. I ask those who would choose this path to desist and to use the instruments of the courts and the Congress to state their views. All Federal agencies involved vigorously are pursuing investigation of these attacks and prosecution of those involved in them.

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100871	CABLE 051455Z NOV 85	5	11/5/1985	B1 B3

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100873	PAPER RE LIBYA	7	11/7/1985	B1 B3

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FURTHER MEASURES AGAINST QADHAFI

Unfinished Business

- no ○ Close the Peoples Committee for Libyan Students (PCLS) in McLean, Va. or restrict its activities.
- yes! ○ Further curtail US travel/residency of Libyans (an important security measure; last year 1000 visas issued to Libyans; 3000 Libyan students still in US; under IEEPA there is a transportation ban but Libyans can still travel to US on non-Libyan carriers).

New Measures: Security-Related and Symbolic

- yes! ○ Air ties: press nations having direct air service to Libya to cut air ties or deny air-worthiness certification to US-origin Libyan planes (which can not be safely maintained because of US restrictions on spare parts).
- Take about but not now ○ Travel advisories: issue travel advisories warning against US travel to countries in Europe that do not take strong measures to counter terrorism.
- yes. ○ Access to CW material: increase controls on Libyan access to CW material, on merits and in connection with potential terrorist use.
- Absolutely ○ Control of diplomatic pouches: request, on multilateral basis, inspection of Libyan diplomatic pouches because of their use in providing logistical and lethal support for terrorism. (Problems include Vienna convention and working level assertion that we would not want to allow reciprocal inspection of our own pouches).
- yes ○ Closure of Libyan People's Bureaus: on ground that they help provide logistical support for terrorism; request can be made in terms of US having already bitten this bullet in May, 1981 closure.

New Measures: Economic Rewards

- G-5 expansion: support Italian and Canadian participation in expanded G-5, on merits, and as reward for Italian and Canadian cooperation on U.S. sanctions initiatives (apart from their early forthcoming public responses, both Canada and Italy are crucial in their ability to withhold needed skills from the Libyan oil sector).

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- o SDI contracts: implicitly or explicitly correlate forthcomingness with whether the countries in question have stood with us or not on the terrorism issue.

New Measures: Economic Punishments

- o Extraterritorial reach: application of extraterritorial reach for existing sanctions under IEEPA.
- o Oil sector-related: enact import ban on all imports from European (or other) refineries that are processing Libyan crude and then exporting to the U.S. market.
- o Denial of access to US public lands: engage in negative application of USG measures that otherwise facilitate operation of European firms in U.S. For example, could punish oil and construction firms that continue to do business with Qadhafi by denying them rights of way across U.S. public lands that are crucial to their ability to do business in the U.S. (particularly in the southwest).

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100875	REPORT RE LIBYA	1	ND	B1 B3

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100877	MEMO TO NORTH RE LIBYA W/COVER SHEET	2	11/18/1985	B1 B3

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100878	MEMO TO NORTH RE QADHAFI W/COVER SHEET	2	11/19/1985	B1 B3

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