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**Collection:** North, Oliver: Files  
**Folder Title:** Terrorism: Libya [04/19/1986-  
04/23/1986]  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

**Withdrawer**

SMF 11/19/2010

**File Folder** TERRORISM: LIBYA [04/19/1986-04/23/1986]

**FOIA**

F95-023/9

**Box Number** 105

WILLS

26

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100899	CABLE	CAIRO 09291	3	4/19/1986	B1
100900	CABLE	CAIRO 09293	7	4/19/1986	B1
100901	CABLE	ALGIERS 02057 <i>R 9/25/2017 M1107/1</i>	6	4/20/1986	B1
100902	ROUTING SLIP		1	4/21/1986	B1 B3
100903	REPORT	SITUATION REPORT <i>R 9/25/2017 M1107/1</i>	2	4/21/1986	B1
100904	REPORT	SITUATION REPORT <i>R 9/25/2017 M1107/1</i>	1	4/21/1986	B1
100905	CABLE	CAIRO 09583 <i>R 9/25/2017 M1107/1</i>	2	4/21/1986	B1
100906	CABLE	212100Z APR 86	5	4/21/1986	B1 B3
100907	MEMO	SITUATION ROOM NOTE RE LIBYA	3	4/21/1986	B1 B3
100908	ROUTING SLIP		1	4/21/1986	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100909	MEMO	TO FORTIER RE QADHAFI	1	4/21/1986	B1 B3
100910	TALKING POINTS	RE QADHAFI (W/ANNOTATION ON BACK OF 2ND PAGE)	3	4/21/1986	B1 B3
100911	CABLE	TUNIS 03942 <b>PAR 9/27/2017 M1107/1</b>	5	4/23/1986	B1
100912	CHART	RE LIBYA	1	4/23/1986	B1 B3
100913	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE POSSIBLE SOVIET RESPONSES TO US ACTIONS IN LIBYA <b>R 9/25/2017 M1107/1</b>	2	4/23/1986	B1

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100899	CABLE CAIRO 09291	3	4/19/1986	B1

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100900	CABLE  CAIRO 09293	7	4/19/1986	B1

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PAGE 02 OF 07 ALGIER 02057 00 OF 03 201731Z C04/04 004159 NOD422  
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E.O. 12356: DNG: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, AG, LY, US  
SUBJ: ALGERIAN REACTION TO EVENTS IN LIBYA

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I SAW GENERAL BELKHEIR APRIL 20 AT MY REQUEST TO GET GOA READING ON EVENTS IN LIBYA AND EFFECTS ON U.S. -ALGERIAN RELATIONS.

3. ALGERIAN REACTION:

-----  
BELKHEIR STARTED AND ENDED SESSION BY REMINDING ME THAT OFFICIAL ALGERIAN REACTION WAS TO BE OPPOSED TO U.S. MILITARY STRIKES AGAINST LIBYAN PEOPLE (NOT LIBYAN STATE). HE SAID THAT ALGERIA COULD NOT SANCTION MILITARY ATTACKS ON REGION NO MATTER WHAT THE CAUSE. HE UNDERLINED THIS POINT IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT WE DID NOT MISINTERPRET ALGERIA'S MILD PUBLIC REACTION.

4. SITUATION IN LIBYA:

-----  
BELKHEIR SAID HE HAD BEEN SLEEPING IN HIS OFFICE DURING THE CRISIS HANDLING THE UNENDING CALLS FROM

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BY RW NARA DATE 9/25/17

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QADHAFI. HE SAID QADHAFI HAD BEEN VERY UNSETTLED, EVEN PANICKY, AT THE BEGINNING, BUT THAT IN THE LAST TWO DAYS HE HAS SETTLED DOWN AND IS NOW ACTING AS A MAN IN CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. BELKHEIR'S PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT BOTH THE INITIAL ATTACKS AND SUBSEQUENT INDICATIONS OF UNHAPPINESS IN LIBYAN ARMED FORCES HAD RATTLED QADHAFI. THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN BELKHEIR'S MIND THAT THE RAIDS HAD TRIGGERED SOME DISSENSION WHICH LED TO A SHOOTOUT IN THE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS AND THAT AT ONE POINT TWO ARMORED UNITS HAD MOVED AGAINST QADHAFI'S APPARENT WISHES, ONLY TO BE CONFRONTED BY THE AIR FORCE. BELKHEIR ALSO BELIEVED THAT THE AIR FORCE HAD REFUSED, AT ONE POINT, TO DEPLOY AIRCRAFT WHEN ORDERED TO DO SO BY QADHAFI. IN HIS PHONE CALLS, QADHAFI HAD CLAIMED TO BE UNDER CONTINUING ATTACK. BELKHEIR LOOKED TO ME TO REASSURE HIM THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE, WHICH I DID. IN ANY CASE, BELKHEIR THOUGHT THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING THESE INTERESTING SIGNS OF DISSENT IN LIBYAN MILITARY, QADHAFI WAS CLEARLY BACK IN CONTROL AND PROBABLY ENJOYED SUBSTANTIALLY MORE POPULAR SUPPORT THAN PREVIOUSLY. HE TOOK NOTE, HOWEVER, OF THE INEVITABLE DISTRUST (MEFIANCE) WHICH WOULD BE LEFT WITHIN THE LIBYAN MILITARY AFTER THE ATTACK AND THE POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITIES THIS IMPLIED FOR REMOVING QADHAFI. BELKHEIR LEFT NO DOUBT THAT THIS REMAINED THE PREFERRED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM PROVIDED, HE HASTENED TO ADD, QADHAFI WAS NOT REPLACED BY KHOMEINI (YET ANOTHER MANIFESTATION OF ALGERIA'S CONCERN OVER FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE REGION).

5. LIBYAN REQUEST FOR SUPPORT:

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 BELKHEIR SAID THAT QADHAFI HAD CALLED BOTH

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PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY FOR ALGERIAN MILITARY  
SUPPORT AND IMMEDIATE UNION. BOTH, OF COURSE, WERE  
REJECTED. BELKHEIR GOT IN A POKE AT MOROCCO,  
NOTING THAT THE ONLY PROMISE QADHAFI HAS EVER KEPT  
WAS TO THE MOROCCANS. HE SHOOK HIS HEAD OVER THE  
FACT THAT QADHAFI HAD SAID ON TELEVISION THAT  
MOROCCO COULD BE EXCUSED FOR NOT SENDING MILITARY  
AID BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T HAVE MUCH OF A MILITARY  
CAPACITY. HE ALSO RAISED AN EYEBROW OVER THE HASSAN  
LETTER TO QADHAFI.

6. FUTURE U.S. ACTION:  
-----

BELKHEIR WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WE WOULD DO NEXT.  
I SAID I WAS THERE TO SOLICIT HIS ADVICE AND VIEWS.  
I DID NOTE THAT OUR ACTIONS WOULD BE PREDICATED ON  
QADHAFI'S OWN ACTIONS AND THAT WE HAD NO PLANS TO  
TAKE FURTHER ACTION IF QADHAFI BEHAVED HIMSELF.  
I OPINED, HOWEVER, THAT EVEN STRONGER U.S. ACTIONS  
COULD WELL BE POSSIBLE IF QADHAFI CONTINUED TO  
ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTIONS. BELKHEIR GROANED,  
SAYING THAT HE COULD NOT BELIEVE THIS WOULD SERVE  
U.S. INTERESTS. HE SAID QADHAFI WAS ONCE AGAIN  
TRYING TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE U.S. HE HAD  
ASKED ALGERIA (AGAIN) TO CONTACT US ON HIS BEHALF.  
BENDJEDID HAD DECLINED. THE ALGERIANS UNDERSTAND  
THE MALTESE FOREIGN MINISTER NOW IS SEIZED OF THE  
ISSUE. I OPINED THAT WE HAD NOTHING TO TALK ABOUT.  
OUR OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM WAS NON-NEGOTIABLE AND  
AGREEMENTS WITH QADHAFI WERE WORTHLESS. ACTIONS  
WOULD SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. I WAS SURE THAT WE  
WOULD POSE NO RISK TO QADHAFI IF HE BEHAVED IN A  
CIVILIZED WAY.

7. ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT:  
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BELKHEIR THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY TO TAKE PLACE SOON.  
HE SAID ALGERIA WOULD HOST IT ONLY IF OTHERS WERE  
UNANIMOUS IN ASKING FOR THIS.

8. TUNISIA:  
-----

BELKHEIR WAS PREOCCUPIED BY EVENTS IN TUNISIA. THE  
TUNISIANS, HE THOUGHT, WERE NERVOUS AND ENGAGED  
IN ALTOGETHER TOO MUCH FRATRICIDAL POSITIONING FOR  
THE SUCCESSION. HE HAD BEEN DISTURBED BY TUNISIAN  
ALLEGATIONS OF AN IMMINENT LIBYAN ATTACK WHICH  
APPEARED TO BE BASED PURELY ON HYSTERICAL  
SPECULATION.

9. TERRORISM:  
-----

BELKHEIR EXPRESSED CATEGORIC DISAPPROVAL OF TERRORISM  
(AS DISTINCT FROM PALESTINIAN ACTIONS IN OCCUPIED  
TERRITORIES OR ISRAEL -- A DISTINCTION WHICH MEANS  
EVERYTHING HERE). HE NOTED THAT PARTY PERMSEC  
MESSAADIA HAD BEEN SENT TO TRIPOLI TO WARN QADHAFI  
ON THE ISSUE JUST BEFORE THE U. S. STRIKES. QADHAFI  
FLATLY DENIED HIS INVOLVEMENT AND ALGERIANS, ALTHOUGH  
TOTALLY DISBELIEVING, ARE HAMSTRUNG BY THE LACK OF  
PROOF AT THEIR DISPOSAL. (I ASKED TO MY REGRET) IF  
THE ARAB WORLD WOULD NOW BRING PRESSURE ON QADHAFI  
TO END HIS SUPPORT OF TERRORISM. BELKHEIR WENT ON AT  
SOME LENGTH ON THE LACK OF ANY SUCH THING AS AN ARAB  
WORLD, NOTING THAT NO GROUP COULD HAVE MORE DIVERSE  
AND INCOMPATIBLE OBJECTIVES. HE RETURNED TO THE  
ISSUE BY EXPRESSING HOPE THAT AT LEAST SOME ARAB

STATES, CERTAINLY ALGERIA, WOULD TACKLE QADHAFI ON  
THE ISSUE IN THE STRONGEST TERMS. POSSIBLY THIS,  
COUPLED WITH INTERNAL VOICES CARRYING THE SAME  
MESSAGE, COULD HAVE AN EFFECT. HE ASKED IF I  
THOUGHT THE U. S. WOULD TALK TO QADHAFI IF HE WOULD

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GIVE ASSURANCES THAT HE WOULD END SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM. I OPINED THAT A QADHAFI ASSURANCE WASN'T WORTH THE TIME OF DAY WHEREAS A QADHAFI MORATORIUM ON TERRORIST ACTS IN EFFECT FOR SOME TIME COULD NOT HELP BUT IMPROVE THE CLIMATE. BELKHEIR SAID HE THOUGHT THE EFFORT BY SOME ARAB STATES TO COOL QADHAFI WOULD BE MADE BUT HE APPEARED SKEPTICAL AS TO RESULTS.

10. PUBLIC OPINION:

-----  
IN CLOSING, BELKHEIR GAVE ME THE USUAL LINE ABOUT BUILDING UP QADHAFI BY OVERT CONFRONTATION. HE SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS STRONG ANTI-QADHAFI OPINION WITHIN THE ALGERIAN PUBLIC, NEWS OF THE STRIKES HAD MOBILIZED THE PUBLIC ON HIS SIDE. I USED THE OPPORTUNITY TO POINT OUT THAT THE PRESS HAD PRESENTED A TOTALLY DISTORTED VIEW OF EVENTS, THEREBY UNDERMINING THE GOA'S OWN EFFORTS AT MODERATION. I ASKED HOW HE COULD TOLERATE THIS. BELKHEIR AGREED THAT THE PRESS HAD BEEN HYSTERICAL AND SAID HE HAD PERSONALLY BANNED FURTHER TV COVERAGE OF FOREIGN DEMONSTRATIONS, FEARING THAT SUCH FOOTAGE WOULD PROVOKE PROBLEMS HERE. I POINTED TO A MULTITUDE OF OTHER PRESS SINS. HE SAID HE WAS SEIZED OF THE PROBLEM AND THAT THE PRESS WOULD CALM DOWN.

11. HAMDANI:

-----  
BELKHEIR ATTACHED CONSIDERABLE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE IMPENDING HAMDANI VISIT TO WASHINGTON -- A SIGN, HE IMPLIED, OF ALGERIA'S WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE BUSINESS A LA STATUS QUO ANTE.

12. COMMENT:

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PAGE 07 OF 07 ALGIER 02057 00 OF 03 201731Z C04/04 004159 NOD422  
BELKHEIR IS CLEARLY MORE UPBEAT ON DIVISIONS WITHIN  
LIBYA THAN IS HIS MILITARY SECURITY CHIEF. THIS  
MAY BE DUE TO GENUINE DIFFERENCES OF INTERPRETATION  
OF EVENTS OR DIFFERENT SHADING OF EVENTS FOR OUR  
BENEFIT. IN ALL OUR CONVERSATIONS HERE, IT IS CLEAR  
THAT OUR ACTION IN LIBYA HAS HIGHLIGHTED FOR THE  
ALGERIANS THE MENACE POSED BY QADHAFI FOR THE REGIME,  
BUT IT HAS ALSO RECONFIRMED THEIR VIEW THAT ALGERIA'S  
INTERESTS ARE BEST SERVED BY CONSTANT CONTACT WITH  
QADHAFI AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE OTHER PRINCIPAL  
PLAYERS IN THE LIBYAN POLITICAL/MILITARY STRUCTURE.  
CONTINUED PUBLIC CONTACT WITH, AND PRIVATE ANTI-PATHY  
TOWARD, THE LIBYANS IS LIKELY.

13. ADDITIONAL POINTS CONTAINED SEPTEL. DEPARTMENT  
PLEASE PASS TUNIS AND RABAT.  
JOHNSTONE

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100902	ROUTING SLIP	1	4/21/1986	B1 B3

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**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**  
**ANTI-TERRORISM CENTER**  
**SITUATION REPORT #5**  
**SITUATION REPORT #5 EST, APRIL 21, 1986**

An Abu Dhabi newspaper is reporting that Libyan forces have salvaged the wreckage of the downed F-111 and intends to release it to the Soviet Union. Additionally, Libya claims to have recovered the bodies of the two crewmen and have moved them to Tripoli. DOD has no information other than the press statements.

The Japanese police have discovered a bomb factory 170 miles west of Tokyo which is believed to be operated by the ultra leftists (Chukaku-Ha) who are dedicated to disrupting next month's Summit Seven Meeting in Tokyo. The find included 88 lbs of gunpowder, steel pipe and timing devices. Chukaku-Ha has claimed responsibility for the truck/rocket explosion which occurred last week outside of Yokota Air Base.

The USCG Loran Station Lampedusa received two telephone threats today. The Station is requesting communication equipment to enable the contact with the local Italian military commander. USNAVEUR is working the request.

The AnEmbassy Sanaa requests permission to pass information contained in State 120330 (ATTF Sitrep #1, details of Turkey arrests) to the YAR Foreign Minister in light of a possible Arab Summit.

John Mullien ATTB contacted RSO Beirut to determine status of relocation of USCits from West Beirut. RSO advised that relocation would take place on April 22, and only a small number (20-30) were expected to report for movement to East Beirut.

0515 EST the RSO Lima, Peru telephoned a report to the Ops Center, that a car bomb had exploded outside of the Ambassador's residence. Some damage to the wall, but no injuries. A cable is to follow with more details.

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
BY fw NARA DATE 9/25/17

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Anti-U.S. demonstrations continue in Europe, Australia and Hong Kong, protesting the U.S. attack on Libya.

  
Pat Daly  
Anti-Terrorism Task Force  
Director

  
Laurie Tracy  
Senior Watch Officer

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OPERATIONS CENTER  
ANTI-TERRORISM TASK FORCE  
SITUATION REPORT #6  
AM OF 1700 EST, APRIL 21, 1986

Posts Dhaka and Jeddah received threats. Lagos, Jerusalem, Monterrey, Rota, Edinburgh and Dhaka reported non-violent demonstrations.

Baghdad 1636 reported that Iraqi opinion continues to be favorable to the US attack on Libya. Iraq, faced with Libyan support of Iran, rejected Libya's call for an Arab summit. Ambassador Newton reports favorable reception to the attack by Arab ambassadors at a private party.

Ankara 4339 reported that USG personnel continue low profile in Turkey; both the embassy and US military commands continue to be in a high state of alert. High GOC officials reported to be seized with dealing with the link between the Libyan People's Bureau and the plot to blow up the American officers' club in Ankara. Turkish national police were "unusually reticent and uncommunicative" on the report of arrests in Izmir of two to four Libyans suspected of terrorist activities.

CNN and wire services reported the arrest of a former Libyan diplomat in Rome in connection with alleged plot to assassinate...

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BY RW NARA DATE 9/25/17

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PAGE 01 OF 02 CAIRO 9583  
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REF: CAIRO 9495

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SINCE MY MEETINGS YESTERDAY (APR 20) WITH BOUTROS GHALI AND OSAMA EL BAZ I HAVE HAD SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE ABU GHAZALA WHO ASSURES ME THAT A POSITIVE RESPONSE WILL BE FORTHCOMING. IN MY MOST RECENT TALK WITH HIM AT 1315 HOURS LOCAL APR 21 HE TELLS ME THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL MAKE A POSITIVE DETERMINATION WITHIN 48 HOURS.

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NLRR M1107 # 100905  
BY fw NARA DATE 9/25/17



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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 CAIRO 9583

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100906	CABLE 212100Z APR 86	5	4/21/1986	B1 B3

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100907	MEMO  SITUATION ROOM NOTE RE LIBYA	3	4/21/1986	B1  B3

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100908	ROUTING SLIP	1	4/21/1986	B1 B3

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100909	MEMO TO FORTIER RE QADHAFI	1	4/21/1986	B1 B3

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100910	TALKING POINTS  RE QADHAFI (W/ANNOTATION ON BACK OF 2ND PAGE)	3	4/21/1986	B1 B3

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PAGE 01 OF 04 TUNIS 3942  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, LE  
SUBJECT: U.S. HOSTAGES IN LEBANON; SYRIAN LINKS TO  
TERRORISM

REF: TUNIS 3321

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1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY.

[REDACTED] STOPPED BY APRIL 22 TO BRIEF  
DCM AT HOME ON RECENT CONTACT WITH HIZBALLAH REGARDING  
A POSSIBLE TAPE OF U.S. HOSTAGES. [REDACTED] COMMENTED  
ON INDICATIONS HE HAD PICKED UP IN DAMASCUS OF SYRIAN  
LINKS TO VARIOUS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. END SUMMARY.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
BY *fw* #100911  
DATE 9/22/17

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 OF 04 TUNIS 3942

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3. CONTACT WITH HIZBALLAH.

██████████ HE HAD SPENT THREE HOURS WITH HIZBALLAH REPRESENTATIVES IN THE BEKAA ON APRIL 15, ARRIVING FROM DAMASCUS. THEY HAD OFFERED TO PROVIDE NBC WITH AN UNDATED VIDEO TAPE, PRESUMABLY NOT YET FILMED, OF THE U.S. HOSTAGES. ██████████ INSISTED ON DATING OF TAPE, FOR EXAMPLE BY HAVING A LEBANESE NEWSPAPER IN THE PICTURE. ██████████ FELT HIZBALLAH WOULD PROBABLY FURNISH SUCH A TAPE, AND HE WOULD NEED TO RETURN TO LEBANON TO PICK IT UP. HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THREE HOSTAGES WERE INVOLVED. HE ALSO CONTINUED TO FEEL THAT THE THREE MIGHT WELL BE IN TEHRAN, BUT HE HAD NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE, ONLY INTUITION. ██████████ FELT HIZBALLAH'S MOTIVATION WAS PUBLICITY. HE SAID NO PAYMENT TO HIZBALLAH WAS ENVISAGED ██████████

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4. ██████████ COMMENTED THAT THE HIZBALLAH MEMBERS HE SAW WERE IN A STATE OF HIGH EXCITEMENT OVER THE U.S. RAID AGAINST LIBYA. THEIR ANTI-AMERICAN FERVOR WAS TINGED ONLY BY REGRET THAT QADHAFI WAS LEADING THE STRUGGLE, STEALING THE LIMELIGHT FROM IRAN. HE ALSO REPORTED SPECULATION THAT U.S. HOSTAGE KILBURN HAD DIED WELL BEFORE THE RAID, AND MENTIONED THAT HIZBALLAH APPARENTLY INTENDED TO CIRCULATE A REPORT ON INTERROGATION OF BUCKLEY, WHICH HAD PRESUMABLY TAKEN PLACE UNDER TORTURE. ██████████ REITERATED THAT KUWAITIS NOW SEEMED WILLING TO TALK TO HIZBALLAH ABOUT THE DA'WA PRISONERS. HE AGAIN INDICATED HIS INFORMATION CAME VIA ABU IYAD.

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5. REGARDING FRENCH HOSTAGES, ██████████ BELIEVED THAT

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PAGE 03 OF 04 TUNIS 3942

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THEIR RELEASE HAD BEEN AGREED, WITH ONLY DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT. THERE WAS SOME POSSIBILITY HIZBALLAH MIGHT TURN OVER FRENCH HOSTAGES TO SYRIA, THEREBY ALLOWING SYRIA TO REAP FAVORABLE PUBLICITY. CURRENT SEVERE TENSIONS BETWEEN HIZBALLAH AND DAMASCUS WOULD THEREBY BE EASED.

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6. SYRIAN LINKS TO TERRORISM.

[REDACTED] FREQUENTLY REFLECTS THE PLO'S ANTI-SYRIAN VIEWS, MENTIONED HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ABU NIDHAL REPRESENTATIVES IN DAMASCUS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN AN INTERVIEW WITH ABU NIDHAL [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] SAID THAT ABU NIDHAL WAS CURRENTLY IN DAMASCUS, WHERE HE HAD A HOUSE. [REDACTED] HAD BEEN TOLD THAT ABU NIDHAL HAD A VERY YELLOW COMPLEXION, BUT WAS APPARENTLY ALL RIGHT OTHERWISE.

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7. [REDACTED] IN MID-APRIL HAD REPORTED THAT FOUR ABU NIDHAL TERRORISTS HAD PROCEEDED FROM DAMASCUS TO EUROPE FOR AN UNSPECIFIED OPERATION. HE UNDERSTOOD THE FOUR WERE STILL IN EUROPE. [REDACTED] ALSO SAID HE HAD LEARNED THAT MAY ELIAS MANSOUR, WHO HAD PLANTED THE BOMB ON THE TWA ROME-ATHENS FLIGHT, HAD LINKS TO SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE, SPECIFICALLY GHAZI KANAAN. HE ALSO THOUGHT THERE WERE TIES BETWEEN SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE AND THE "ARAB COMMANDO CELLS," THE PRO-LIBYAN GROUP WHICH CLAIMED TO HAVE MURDERED THE BRITISH HOSTAGES AND KILBURN. IN ADDITION, [REDACTED] STATED THERE WERE SYRIAN HIT SQUADS CURRENTLY IN EAST BEIRUT TO ASSASSINATE AMIN GEMAYEL. FINALLY, HE HAD HEARD IN SYRIA THAT THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECENT EXPLOSIONS ABOARD BUSES

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 TUNIS 3942

DTG: 231259Z APR 86 PSN: 076868

IN NORTHERN SYRIA. THE BUSES HAD REPORTEDLY BEEN CARRYING MILITARY CADETS.

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8. COMMENT. [REDACTED] APPEARS TO BE A WELL-CONNECTED AND INTELLIGENT OBSERVER OF THE MIDDLE EAST SCENE. WE ARE UNABLE TO EVALUATE HIS COMMENTS FROM OUR TUNIS PERSPECTIVE. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FEEDBACK FROM WASHINGTON TO HELP US IN FUTURE CONTACTS.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01  
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TUNIS 3942

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, LE  
SUBJECT: U.S. HOSTAGES IN LEBANON; SYRIAN LINKS TO

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100912	CHART  RE LIBYA	1	4/23/1986	B1  B3

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

April 23, 1986

100913

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Responses to U.S. Actions in Libya

The Soviet response to our retaliatory raids on Tripoli and Benghazi has been sharper than it was to the Gulf of Sidra exercise last month, but Moscow seems to be trying to bound the problem. If our confrontation with Libya intensifies, however, the Soviets have several options to escalate their own response.

Gorbachev's speech to the East German Communist Party Congress, although highly critical of the U.S., seems to signal a desire to keep the problem from knocking the U.S.-Soviet relationship entirely off-track. The Soviets have said privately to us and the British that they want to contain the damage and appear anxious to proceed with the various experts meetings agreed at last fall's summit. The Soviets did put off the Shevardnadze meeting, but may see this as a relatively low-cost measure; it likely rules out a July Summit, but they never were enthusiastic about a summer meeting in any case.

Nevertheless, Gorbachev doubtless sees important interests at stake in the U.S. - Libya confrontation, particularly the Soviet Union's standing with its Third World clients and the credibility at home of his U.S. policy. He will want to avoid the appearance of being pushed around. This concern will be magnified if, as happened after the Gulf of Sidra, western news accounts quote U.S. government officials as portraying the Soviet response as vacillating or weak. Such stories only increase pressure on Gorbachev to take political and/or military steps to defend an embattled client.

Thus, if our confrontation with Libya intensifies, the Soviets likely will react more broadly, and have a number of military and political options to do so:

Postponement or Cancellation of Other Bilateral Meetings

The Soviets could manipulate the timing of U.S.-Soviet meetings. Postponing the NST talks in Geneva would carry heavy political costs and is unlikely. More likely targets for delay would be the regional experts or risk reduction talks, despite their present desire to keep the regional meetings on track.

Cancelling the Summit

Gorbachev conceivably could rule out a 1986 summit, but this could have significant political costs which he might risk only if he senses that Libya has become so divisive in the West

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that the U.S., not the USSR, will be seen as bearing the blame for wrecking the process of dialogue.

#### Military Resupply and Arms Transfers

On the military side, Gorbachev's letter to Qadhafi suggested the Soviets will replace Libyan equipment lost or expended during the U.S. retaliatory strike. The resupply effort could conceivably be massive, like Moscow's Syrian resupply in 1982 and 1983. In addition, the Soviets could significantly expand their qualitative and quantitative supply relationship with Libya. The Libyans, however, could have difficulty absorbing appreciably more or better military equipment than has already been provided.

#### Soviet Naval Deployments

A bolder Soviet policy would be to deploy naval assets in the Mediterranean to bolster Qadhafi. This show of force would match U.S. efforts and could be used to underscore Gorbachev's proposal for a Mediterranean zone of peace. It would complicate U.S. planning for further retaliatory strikes and position the Soviets to provide valuable intelligence support to Libya. The Soviets must realize this would be a major escalation of their role and of the risk of a confrontation. There have been no indications that Soviet naval forces are being prepared for deployment in this manner.

#### Increased Soviet Military Presence in Libya

Libya's poor performance with Soviet air defense equipment could lead to an increased Soviet advisory presence or use of Soviet pilots and crews to handle Libyan air defenses. While the Soviets may increase their ground presence to upgrade Libyan air defense we remain skeptical they would provide pilots since this would risk a direct confrontation with the U.S. A larger Soviet advisory presence might position the Soviets to play a role in internal Libyan political maneuvering.

#### Pressure U.S. in Other Regions

Finally, the Soviets might escalate horizontally by increasing pressure on U.S. clients like Pakistan or increasing military supplies to Nicaragua. Moscow and Kabul have increased pressure on Pakistan in the past month. This may continue or increase incrementally, but we do not expect a dramatic move against Pakistan. Similarly, we believe the Soviets would prefer to keep their profile in Nicaragua low during the continuing Congressional debate on contra aid. After Libya, they cannot be anxious to provide justification for a U.S. move against their clients in this hemisphere.

*Nicholas Platt*

Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary