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**Collection:** North, Oliver: Files  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

**Withdrawer**

SMF 11/22/2010

**File Folder** TERRORISM: LIBYA [04/28/1986]

**FOIA**

F95-023/9

**Box Number** 105

WILLS

28

| ID     | Doc Type   | Document Description  | No of Pages | Doc Date  | Restrictions |
|--------|------------|---|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 100930 | PAPER      | RE LIBYA/QADHAFI<br><b>PAR 12/28/2017 M1109/1</b>             | 2           | 4/28/1986 | B1 B3        |
| 100931 | MEMO       | ST. MARTIN TO POINDEXTER RE<br>SIMULATION OF LIBYA            | 5           | 4/28/1986 | B1 B3        |
| 100932 | OUTLINE    | LIBYA OBJECTIVES  | 4           | ND        | B1           |
| 100933 | OUTLINE    | ADDENDUM FOR OBJECTIVES                                       | 1           | ND        | B1           |
| 100934 | MEMO       | RE LIBYAN TERRORIST INTENTIONS<br><b>D 12/28/2017 M1109/1</b> | 2           | 4/11/1986 | B1 B3        |
| 100935 | PAPER      | RE LIBYA TERRORIST INTENTIONS<br><b>D 12/28/2017 M1109/1</b>  | 3           | 4/11/1986 | B1 B3        |
| 100936 | PROF NOTES | RE LIBYA<br><b>R 12/28/2017 M1109/1</b>                       | 1           | 4/28/1986 | B1 B3        |

**The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing**

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ON  
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100930

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28 April 1986

Subject: A Brake On Qadhafi Bashing

My limited observations of our policy and actions toward Libya suggest considerable confusion within our government in general and the NSC in particular as to precisely what our objectives and our strategy for obtaining them are. While confusion is useful in keeping our adversaries off balance, it doesn't help the formulation or prosecution of consistent policy when it's internal to the policymaking apparatus.

What is the objective? Two candidates are:

1. To stop Libyan direction and support of international terrorism.
2. To overthrow Qadhafi.


These two objectives may be but are not necessarily the same. There may be no other way of stopping Libyan direction and support of terrorism than by overthrowing Q. However, even though U.S. policymakers may conclude this last assertion to be true, the probability tha others in the world might not yet be prepared to go that far -- e.g. most EC countries, the U.S. media, perhaps even the U.S. Congress and U.S. public opinion -- suggests that rather careful consideration of our policy objective is in order.

Confusion on the subject can be further compounded by adoption of a variation in the statement of the objective:  
3. To change Qadhafi's direction and support of international terrorism.

The problem with this third formulation of the objective is that it allows confusion within the Administration on the objective that is being pursued -- some believe #1 and others believe #2. (Do we mean changing Qadhafi's mind or changing Qadhafi, as in replacing him?)

Compounding all of this confusion is the danger of leaks within our beloved government. Anything written down runs the risk of being leaked to the press. Therefore, adoption of Objective #2 as, say, a covert objective (except as a Finding) could never be risked in current memos and directives regarding the 15 April airstrikes and subsequent plans/actions.

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NLRM1109 #100930  
BY RWS NARA DATE 12/28/17

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To the extent that there is EC and U.S. media support for our 15 April airstrikes -- even the Wash Post continues to support what was done, even though some civilian casualties resulted -- it is because these supporters accept our objective (i.e. #1) and our last resort, proportional, self-defense means to obtain it. Much of this support would evaporate if our actions demonstrated that Obj #2 was actually our goal.

Actions Required

We must ensure that the people in the chain who need to know objective(s) do so, and that [redacted] distinctions between them (if any) are clear. [redacted] 3.3(b)(1)

Policymakers within the compartment (if there is one) have to be sensitive to the frustrating paradox that just because a proposed action supports Obj #2 doesn't necessarily mean that it can be adopted. To wit, targetting Jamahiriyah barracks makes perfect sense in support of Obj #2; it is somewhat less convincing if merely in support of Obj #1. Unless we are at this point prepared to acknowledge publicly that our goal is to overthrow Q, we must accept a certain amount of inefficiency and indirectness of some of the targetting that we can do in our continuing counterterrorist (CT) campaign.

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|-----------|--|------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|
| 100931    | MEMO<br><br>ST. MARTIN TO POINDEXTER RE SIMULATION<br>OF LIBYA | 5                            | 4/28/1986       | B1<br>B3                        |

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| 100932    | OUTLINE<br><br>LIBYA OBJECTIVES                     | 3                            | ND              | B1                              |

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| 100933    | OUTLINE<br><br>ADDENDUM FOR OBJECTIVES              | 1                            | ND              | B1                              |

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|-----------|---|------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|
| 100934    | MEMO<br><br>RE LIBYAN TERRORIST INTENTIONS          | 2                            | 4/11/1986       | B1<br>B3                        |

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|-----------|---|------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|
| 100935    | PAPER<br><br>RE LIBYA TERRORIST INTENTIONS          | 3                            | 4/11/1986       | B1<br><br>B3                    |

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From: NSHRT --CPUA Date and time 04/28/86 18:13:00  
To: NSRBM --CPUA DONALD FORTIER NSWRP --CPUA DONALD FORTIER

100936

NOTE FROM: Howard Teicher  
SUBJECT: impact of mining

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i spoke with bob gates re analysis of economic impact of mining and ability of libyans to offset imports/exports/foreign exchange earnings. bob commented that whitehead had called earlier in the day to ask them to examine our ability to monitor tanker traffic from libya to european ports. apparently, some europeans suggested to whitehead last week that rather than putting an embargo on libyan oil, european port authorities be instructed to refuse permission for tankers that call in libyan ports to dock in european ports. at the moment, 2-5 tankers per day carry oil from libya to european ports. on the mining analysis, bob will try to have it midweek.

cc: NSVMC --CPUA NSJRS --CPUA  
NSOLN --CPUA

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NLR M1109 #100936

BY RW NARA DATE 12/28/17

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 04632

E. O. 12356: N/A -  
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, US, TU, LY  
SUBJECT: TWO LIBYANS FORMALLY CHARGED AND ARRESTED  
- FOR BOMBING ATTEMPT

1. SUMMARY: ON APRIL 28 THE TURKISH PRESS REPORTED THE FORMAL ARREST OF TWO LIBYANS IN CONNECTION WITH THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING OF THE ANKARA AMERICAN OFFICERS CLUB ON APRIL 18. THE PRESS --WITH THE EXCEPTION OF "HURRIYET"--ALSO REPORTED THAT TWO OTHER LIBYANS IMPLICATED IN THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING WERE RELEASED FOR "LACK OF PROOF". "HURRIYET" REPORTED THAT THE LATTER TWO SUSPECTS ARE STILL IN CUSTODY, AND THAT THREE OTHER LIBYANS, INCLUDING TWO FROM THE LIBYAN EMBASSY

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IN ANKARA, HAD BEEN IMPLICATED BUT WERE PLACED UNDER ARREST "IN ABSENTIA" BECAUSE THEY HAD FLED TURKEY AFTER THE INCIDENT. MEANWHILE, SEVERAL PAPERS OVER THE WEEKEND REPORTED ON THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE LIBYAN AMBASSADOR IN ANKARA, MUHAMMED ABDULMALIK. END SUMMARY.

2. ALL TURKISH PAPERS OF APRIL 28 REPORTED THAT THE TWO LIBYANS ARRESTED WHILE ATTEMPTING TO BOMB THE AMERICAN OFFICERS CLUB IN ANKARA ON APRIL 18 HAD BEEN FORMALLY CHARGED AND ARRESTED BY THE STATE SECURITY COURT ON THE PREVIOUS DAY. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, THESE TWO, ALI EL ECEFLI RAMADAN, AND RECEP MUHTAR ROHOMA TARHUNI WILL BE TRIED FOR "PLANNING A MASSACRE, BRINGING BOMBS INTO THE COUNTRY AND POSSESSING BOMBS", ACCORDING TO A STATEMENT BY PROSECUTOR ULKU COSKUN. "HURRIYET" REPORTED, IN ADDITION, THAT BOTH WERE BORN IN 1956, THAT RAMADAN WORKS AT A SUPERMARKET IN LIBYA, AND THAT TARHUNI, WHO IS PRESENTLY UNEMPLOYED, HAD SERVED AS A SERGEANT IN THE LIBYAN ARMY.

3. "CUMHURIYET" REPORTED THAT THE OTHER TWO LIBYANS IMPLICATED IN THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING, ALI ABDULHADI SHAMLI AND BESIR M. IBRAHIM HAD BEEN SET FREE FOR LACK OF PROOF TYING THEM TO THE INCIDENT. THE SAME PAPER, NOTING THAT THERE ARE "RUMORS" TO THE EFFECT THAT THE LATTER TWO WOULD BE EXPELLED FROM TURKEY, CITED AN MFA OFFICIAL AS DENYING ANY KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH ACTION. COURT OFFICIALS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WERE CITED IN "CUMHURIYET" AS SAYING THAT THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO EXPEL FOREIGNERS FROM THE COUNTRY SINCE THAT IS "A DECISION FOR THE GOVERNMENT".

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4. WHILE OTHER PAPERS CONFIRMED THE "CUMHURIYET" VERSION OF THE STORY, "HURRIYET" CARRIED A FRONT PAGE STORY PROVIDING CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON THE ARRESTS PROVIDED BY UNNAMED "OFFICIAL SOURCES". ACCORDING TO THE "HURRIYET" REPORT, RAMADAN HAD ADMITTED BEING GIVEN THE BOMBING ASSIGNMENT IN LIBYA AND HAD FIRST COME TO ISTANBUL IN JANUARY, 1986, AFTER SPENDING TWO DAYS IN SYRIA. DURING THAT FIRST VISIT TO ISTANBUL, RAMADAN HAD MET WITH A LIBYAN AIR FORCE CAPTAIN, ABDULLAH MANSUR AND HAD LATER BEEN INTRODUCED TO MANSUR UMRAN, AN OFFICIAL OF LIBYAN AIRLINES IN ISTANBUL, BEFORE RETURNING TO LIBYA.

5. "HURRIYET" QUOTED RAMADAN AS GIVING THE FOLLOWING VERSION OF THE SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS: "BEFORE COMING TO TURKEY, MY FRIEND TARHUNI AND I WERE GIVEN THREE MONTHS TRAINING IN LIBYA. ON APRIL 14, 1986, WE WENT TO ISTANBUL. ON APRIL 15 WE MET WITH MANSUR UMRAN. FOR SECURITY REASONS WE TOOK A BUS TO ANKARA INSTEAD OF A PLANE". RAMADAN WENT ON TO DESCRIBE HIS MEETING WITH SABAN MUHAMMED HASAN, AN OFFICIAL AT THE LIBYAN EMBASSY IN ANKARA. AFTER RECONNOITERING THE OFFICERS CLUB, CONTINUED RAMADAN, "ON APRIL 18 WE PUT THE BOMBS INTO A BLUE ZIPPERED BAG AND PROCEEDED TO THE AREA AROUND THE AMERICAN OFFICERS' CLUB. HAD WE NOT BEEN CAUGHT, WE WOULD HAVE ESCAPED BY TAKING A TAXI TO ISTANBUL". "HURRIYET" IDENTIFIED THE BOMBS AS RUSSIAN MADE UZUM FL MODEL HAND GRENADES, AND NOTED THAT THEY WERE THE SAME BOMBS USED IN THE ARMENIAN ATTACK ON THE ESENBAGA AIRPORT THREE YEARS AGO AND ARE ALSO USED BY PKK MILITANTS IN SOUTHERN TURKEY.

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6. IN OTHER RELATED DEVELOPMENTS, BOTH "GUNES" AND "MILLIYET" CARRIED STORIES ON LIBYAN AMBASSADOR TO ANKARA, MUHAMMED ABDULMALIK. IN A STORY DATED BRUSSELS, "MILLIYET" CORRESPONDENT M. ALI BIRAND, CITED "INFORMED SOURCES" AS SAYING THAT THE U. S. HAD  
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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 ANKARA 04632

E. O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, US, TU, LY  
SUBJECT: TWO LIBYANS FORMALLY CHARGED AND ARRESTED

APPROACHED THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IN ANKARA LAST WEEK POINTING OUT ABDULMALIK'S CONNECTION WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE U. S. AND SWITZERLAND AND ASKING THAT HE BE DECLARED "PERSONNA NON GRATA". ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, AMERICAN OFFICIALS HAD ASKED TURKEY TO BE SUPPORTIVE, AS OTHER NATO MEMBERS HAVE BEEN, AND TO EXPEL THE LIBYAN AMBASSADOR. BIRAND QUOTED ANOTHER AMERICAN SOURCE AS CONFIRMING AN OFFICIAL DEMARCHE BY U. S. OFFICIALS WHO REPORTEDLY SAID "WE FEEL VERY UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT THIS MAN'S BEING IN ANKARA".

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7. THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY, ACCORDING TO THE "MILLIYET" REPORT, HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH THE AMERICAN REQUEST "AT THIS STAGE". TURKISH OFFICIALS HAVE INSISTED THAT ABDULMALIK IS A DIPLOMAT CARRYING OUT NORMAL DIPLOMATIC DUTIES AND THAT TURKEY CANNOT EXPEL THE LIBYAN REPRESENTATIVE "JUST BECAUSE THE U. S. SAYS TO DO IT", WROTE "MILLIYET".

8. "MILLIYET" NOTED THAT TURKEY DOES NOT WISH TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE U. S. AND LIBYA, WHILE AMERICAN OFFICIALS INSIST THAT TURKEY, AS "THE COUNTRY WHICH HAS BEEN MOST AFFECTED BY TERRORISM", SHOULD SUPPORT THEIR EFFORTS, AND CALL ANKARA'S STAND ON ABDULMALIK "INSENSITIVE".

9. APRIL 28 "GUNES", IN A FRONT PAGE STORY HEADLINED "DIPLOMATIC HEADACHE", CITED A BBC REPORT THAT THE U. S. HAD ASKED TURKEY TO EXPEL ABDULMALIK. "GUNES" QUOTED BRITISH ANALYSTS AS CLAIMING THAT ABDULMALIK HAD CREATED A CRISIS IN TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS. THE PAPER CARRIED A DETAILED VERSION OF THE BBC REPORT GIVING ABDULMALIK'S PREVIOUS CONNECTION WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, PURPORTED U. S. REQUESTS TO HAVE ABDULMALIK EXPELLED FROM TURKEY, AND PRIMIN OZAL'S ATTEMPT TO DEFUSE AND DRAW ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE SITUATION.

10. COMMENT: AN AP REPORT DATED ANKARA, APRIL 28 QUOTES PROSECUTOR COSKUN AS SUBSTANTIALLY CONFIRMING THE "HURRIYET" VERSION. IN ADDITION, ACCORDING TO AP, COSKUN SAID THE GRENADES WHICH WERE TO BE USED IN THE BOMBING HAD BEEN BROUGHT INTO

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TURKEY BY LIBYAN OFFICIALS VIA THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH.  
STRAUSZ-HUPE  
BT

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