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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

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1 May 1986

Prospects for West European Assistance
in Further US Military Moves Against Libyan Terrorism

SUMMARY

The continuing absence of harsh official criticism of the US raid and recent EC actions to reduce the number and restrict the activities of Libyan diplomats indicate that European leaders are coming to grips with three new factors:

- A growing recognition of Libyan sponsorship of international terrorism.
- An emerging private consensus that toppling Qadhafi may now be the only way to deal with this problem.
- Mounting concern that more negative US public attitudes toward Western Europe may jeopardize US support for the Alliance. [Redacted]

3.5(c)

Each government weighs these factors differently, producing important variations in the private attitudes of key allies toward US requests for support in combatting Libyan terrorism. Although opposition to a tit-for-tat cycle of reprisals for terrorist attacks remains strong, some West European governments such as France and Italy have promised to react militarily if Libya were to follow through on threats to attack NATO bases in Southern Europe. There are, moreover, a number of hints that several Allies would offer at least passive support to a strategy aimed specifically at bringing down Qadhafi. This would be

This memorandum, requested by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, National Security Council, was drafted by members of the Libya Working Group of the Office of European Analysis. Questions and comments are welcome and may be addressed to

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[Redacted] Chief, West European Division, [Redacted]

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
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3.5(c)

unlikely to involve anything more dramatic in most cases than turning a blind eye to US overflights and allowing US tankers to fly from bases in their countries, but France--if persuaded that a combined operation would actually topple Qadhafi--might go so far as to launch a simultaneous assault on Libya's southern battle line in Chad. In any of these cases, turning around one or two key Allies such as West Germany or France could create a momentum that would encourage other countries to be more cooperative.



3.5(c)

Short of massive Libyan attacks in Western Europe or strong US pressure, the West European governments are likely to confine their efforts to amplifying diplomatic sanctions and police actions now under way. They have been working hard to solidify the EC consensus in order to limit opportunities for US pressure at the Economic Summit in Tokyo.



3.5(c)

Reaction to US Raid

West European governments continue to believe that retaliatory raids against Libya will simply goad Qadhafi and other radical Arabs into further terrorist actions. They worry that their support for US reprisals would not only call down the wrath of the terrorists but would also jeopardize lucrative economic ties with Libya and, more importantly, the rest of the Arab world. In every country but France, moreover, domestic public opinion strongly opposes retaliation against Libya (despite widespread public acceptance that Libya is deeply involved in terrorism), and some leaders--notably Prime Minister Craxi in Italy and Chancellor Kohl in West Germany--must reckon that open support for the US could endanger their own political standing and even their hold on office.



3.5(c)

These concerns make the West European governments' tepid response to the US raid on 14 April all the more striking. Official statements were generally couched in terms of disagreement or disapproval rather than condemnation. Kohl went so far in public as to note his "understanding" for the US position.



The absence of harsh criticism reflects, in our judgment, West European leaders' growing recognition that Libya is up to its elbows in international terrorism generally and specifically responsible for the Berlin attack that provoked the raid. We believe there is also a developing tacit consensus

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among these leaders that Qadhafi's removal from the scene would be a beneficial development--although they are still a long way from accepting a share of the responsibility for doing it.

[REDACTED] West 3.3(b)(1)
 Europeans are anxious to play down differences with the US in order to halt adverse trends in American public attitudes toward Western Europe that might jeopardize US support for the Alliance. 3.3(b)(6)

3.5(c)

The relatively mild response of West European leaders to the recent US raid also owes much, in our estimation, to the perception that Moscow has so far shied away from direct support of Qadhafi. We believe, in fact, that the vehemence of West European opposition to future US military actions is likely to increase in direct proportion to any evidence suggesting a Soviet commitment to rescue Tripoli. For this reason, we also think that almost all West European governments would strongly oppose US military strikes against terrorism-sponsoring Arab states such as Syria that are more highly valued by Moscow--no matter what the provocation. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

Impact of Further Libyan Terrorism

We doubt that isolated terrorist incidents, even if solidly linked to Tripoli, would be sufficient by themselves to prompt West European governments to facilitate US military retaliation against Libya. These governments already acknowledge Libyan complicity in terrorism but see tit-for-tat reprisals as counterproductive. Publishable evidence further implicating Tripoli might help to solidify anti-Qadhafi sentiment in Western Europe and could improve the chances that governments will eventually close down Libyan Peoples Bureaus. It would not be likely, however, to alter government or public opposition to military reprisals. Polls taken by the USIA in the UK, France, and West Germany have shown simultaneous majorities agreeing that Libya supports terrorism but opposing military action against Tripoli. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

A wave of particularly bloody terrorist incidents linked to Libya would probably harden attitudes toward Libya in the countries worst hit and encourage them to consider seriously further economic sanctions and severing diplomatic relations with Tripoli. It could, however, also lead to resentment against the US, which would be blamed for provoking Qadhafi. Skillfull fanning of this resentment could produce large anti-American demonstrations and calls for greater distancing from US policies toward Libya. [REDACTED]

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Libyan military attacks against targets in Southern Europe or even in North Africa would be a different story. Craxi has warned publicly that any repeat of the Libyan attack on Lampedusa or any other Libyan military assault on Italy would meet with a military response. Italy would almost certainly press for a joint NATO response to such provocation. France, meanwhile, has assured Italy, Spain, and Tunisia that it would come to their aid if they were attacked by Libya. Spain temporarily withdrew its Ambassador when Libya threatened military reprisals, and we think Madrid at the very least would assist a US retaliation if Spanish territory were violated by Libyan forces. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

Prospects for Leverage

Most European governments will be particularly hard to budge on the issue of open involvement in US military actions because they are convinced that this would expose them to grave security risks and economic setbacks--not to mention vocal public opposition. But we believe they might respond in varying degrees to certain types of US pressure, particularly if they could demonstrate to their publics that they were fully consulted and that proposed actions had a good chance of succeeding without provoking further terrorist reprisals. Some might be moved by high-level US appeals and most would be more likely to give support if they could take cover behind a joint European decision.

--West Germany's reliance on the US for its security guarantee provides an additional factor that may create an opening for US leverage. Even more than the other Allies, Bonn worries about factors that could weaken US resolve to defend Europe and might be motivated to grant overflights, refueling by US tankers staging out of bases in West Germany, and use of medical facilities by forceful indications from Washington that Congress and the American people regard the issue as crucial to the Alliance. If Bonn did decide to cooperate with Washington, it would almost certainly urge other Allies to join in, and this could strongly influence Italy, Spain, and Portugal.

--Lisbon might also be susceptible to a high-level appeal from the US for the use of Lajes Air Base because of Portugal's broadly pro-American views and its desire to be taken seriously as a partner in the Alliance. We believe the odds of obtaining Portuguese approval for overflights, transits of Lajes, and refueling from tankers brought into mainland Portugal would be better than 50-50 if Lisbon

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believed that the proposed US action either enjoyed appreciable Allied support or was likely to deal a definitive blow to Middle Eastern terrorism.

--British Prime Minister Thatcher, despite strong domestic opposition, continues to support US policies, and we believe she would allow at least one more raid to be launched from British bases in reprisal for terrorism clearly laid at the Libyan doorstep. Given the strong public opposition in the UK, however, she would be even more anxious for publishable evidence of Libyan complicity.

--Although Italian Prime Minister Craxi [redacted] heads a government that is badly divided over Middle East policy and is not likely to be able to offer any more direct assistance beyond what Italy already provides in hosting the 6th Fleet. 3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(6)

--Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez is in a stronger position politically, but Spain has some of the greatest reservations of all the West Europeans about alienating the Arab world; we believe he would be unlikely to offer support unless it could be done under the umbrella of joint European action. [redacted] 3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(6)

--The French, for their part, will be loath to follow the American lead unless they can demonstrate clearly that it is in France's national interest. Although toppling Qadhafi would remove a thorn from their side in Chad, small-scale strikes against him, in their view, might cause him to lash out at France or at French interests in Africa. [redacted]

3.5(c)

Support for Toppling Qadhafi

The effectiveness of leverage against the West Europeans will, of course, depend to a large extent on what they are being asked to do. European leaders draw a clear distinction between selective reprisals for specific terrorist attacks--which, in their view, do not get at the root cause of the problem and can only make matters worse by provoking further terrorist retaliations--and a comprehensive strategy for overthrowing Qadhafi and containing terrorism in Europe. Although they are highly resistant to any involvement in small-scale assaults on Libya, several West European countries [redacted]

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
3.3(b)(6)

[redacted] hinted that they would look more favorably on an operation that had a good chance of overthrowing the Qadhafi regime. [redacted]

3.5(c)

Mindful of the historical precedents of Italy's 20-year struggle earlier this century for domination over Libya and France's losing battle for Algeria, however, the Europeans will tend to be skeptical about the feasibility of any plan to overthrow Qadhafi quickly and cleanly. If they could be convinced that the US, rather than responding to individual provocations, has a carefully conceived plan of action for removing Qadhafi and containing Middle Eastern terrorism, European leaders may become more receptive to US requests for assistance. [redacted]

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
The British, too, would probably prefer decisive US action against Qadhafi, especially if it could be justified under international law. Thatcher would probably view this course as less damaging over the long run to her government's domestic standing and links to the Arab world than a drawn-out series of retaliatory raids from British bases or US aircraft carriers. [redacted]

3.5(c)



Reporting from the US Embassy in Madrid leads us to believe that Spanish officials also would welcome a swift and clean solution to Libyan terrorism. We suspect that Prime Minister Gonzalez might be inclined at least to turn a blind eye to

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


3.5(c)

overflights or US tankers taking off from Spanish air bases if he believed it would lead to Qadhafi's ouster. Given the same understanding, we believe the Portuguese would be even more amenable than the Spanish to allowing overflights, transits through Lajes, and refueling from tankers brought into mainland Portugal. In both cases, the willingness to lend support would be enhanced by the participation of other Europeans.

3.5(c)

Italian



3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(6)

Italy can probably be counted on to continue hosting the US 6th Fleet and allowing use of Sigonella for emergency aircraft landings and logistical flights to the Fleet. Rome has been flying in Alitalia planes to evacuate foreign nationals from Tripoli and would provide naval transport as well, should it become needed.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(6)

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The West Germans, on the other hand, would probably oppose a massive strike at Libya, arguing that it was out of all proportion to the Libyan provocations. Bonn's worries about the US resolve to defend Western Europe, however, make it vulnerable to pressure focused on the importance of cooperation to Alliance solidarity.

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
A major operation against Libya would almost certainly cause West European public opinion to turn sharply against US policy, and we would expect large demonstrations in most of the major cities. This negative reaction would be dampened if France or other Allies openly participated in the action. If the US succeeded in removing Qadhafi and putting the lid on terrorism in Western Europe, we would expect the major repercussions to die down by the end of the year. Any upsurge in terrorism in the wake of such an attack would, of course, be blamed on the US and would feed the anti-US movement.

3.5(c)

The Price for Support

To the extent that West European governments openly support US military action--and especially where this is perceived to be in response to US pressure--there will be a price to pay. In France the government would probably find considerable public support for turning up the heat on the Libyans, but Mitterrand and Chirac would have to convince Frenchmen that they were acting out of purely French interests and


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A slip by either leader could upset the delicate

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balance of power in France between the Socialist President and the conservative government. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

In Britain Thatcher is already under siege from public opinion, the media, the opposition, and a few Tory mavericks for her support to the US raid. Nevertheless, we believe she will allow US planes at least one more sortie in retaliation for Libyan terrorism--not only because of her own convictions, but also because reversing course now would look like caving in to the opposition. [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(6)

This damage could be limited by US support for British positions on issues like the pending US-UK extradition treaty, the ABM Treaty, SALT II, and SDI contracts. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

Any cooperation in a future strike against Libya could have severe political repercussions for the West German government. Although it would probably not provoke a Cabinet crisis, it could contribute to major Christian Democratic losses in the state election in Lower Saxony on 15 June. [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(6)

3.5(c)

The Italian Cabinet is badly split on Middle East policy. Open support for US attacks could trigger a government crisis similar to the one that shook Rome last fall over the release of Abu Abbas and lead to new elections, possibly returning a new majority less sympathetic to US policies. It would also be likely to renew pressure on the government to establish more control over US military activities on Italian bases. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

The conflict with Libya comes at a critical time in the evolution of Spain's security relationship with the West, as well as during the runup to the national election on 22 June. Any missteps by Gonzalez would almost certainly increase pressure for reducing the US military presence and for limiting Spain's role in NATO. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

If Portuguese backing for the US results in terrorist attacks in Portugal, support might decline for security cooperation with the US--including construction of the GEODSS deep space satellite tracking station in southern Portugal. [REDACTED]

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Conclusions

We believe the West Europeans will hope to hold the line at the diplomatic measures they are now pursuing to limit the Libyan presence in Europe. In our view, the factor most likely to move them beyond this posture would be some further dramatic terrorist incidents clearly linked to the Libyans. In that case, we think most European leaders would seriously consider adopting limited economic sanctions and severing diplomatic relations with Tripoli. To the extent that they are seen to be yielding to US pressure, however, some of our strongest allies among West European leaders could be seriously damaged domestically, and US-European security ties could be strained. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

Calculations of self-interest will continue to be the overriding factor in West European responses to US policy toward Libya. West European leaders remain deeply worried about the security and economic implications for them of further US military action against Tripoli. They will be particularly alert for signs that the US is wedded to a tit-for-tat strategy that European leaders fear will alienate their electorates and produce a spiral of violence on their soil. The more convinced European leaders are that the US has a comprehensive and multifaceted plan for containing Libyan terrorism--and getting rid of Qadhafi--the more likely they are to respond positively to requests for some form of support. Realistically speaking, we believe this support is most likely to take the shape of quietly allowing overflights and use of US tankers and other logistical support stationed on European bases. In our view, a more public show of support by certain key Allies--especially the French and West Germans--would encourage others to be more cooperative. With the exceptions of the UK and France, the Allies would clearly feel freer to endorse US actions if they could do so under the umbrella of a united European response. [REDACTED]

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UNITED KINGDOM

Government Position

Prime Minister Thatcher continues her strong support for Washington's military action despite numerous opinion polls showing nearly 70 percent of Britons disagreeing with her decision to allow US use of UK bases. Among the factors steeling the Prime Minister's resolve are her personal concern for protecting the US-UK "special relationship," her conviction that US retaliation was justified, the broad Tory approval for the UK's role in the Libyan raid, and the damage to her political image from backsliding. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

Although the press is claiming there is some Cabinet and backbench dissatisfaction with the Prime Minister's decision, the Tories -- with the prominent exception of former Prime Minister Heath -- are supporting her solidly. Indeed, even Thatcher's would-be successor and former Defense Secretary Michael Heseltine backed the Prime Minister in the aftermath of the US raid. We also believe that Thatcher's position was somewhat strengthened on 17 April when Foreign Secretary Howe mended some fences with Britain's EC partners--apparently with the help of US intelligence supplied to justify the raid. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

In our opinion, Thatcher intends to continue supporting Washington and will do so for the immediate future despite adverse polls and the invective of the opposition leaders. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

Winning Greater Flexibility

In our opinion there is little more London can do at this point to boost support for the US. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Her 3.3(b)(1)
[REDACTED] 3.3(b)(6)
government, however, cannot afford any perception that Washington has open-ended use of the bases. Indeed, both Thatcher and her ministers have publicly asserted that the US does not have carte blanche and must provide convincing evidence if and when Washington wants to use the bases again. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

We also believe Thatcher's ability to hold her ground would be improved if she received whatever evidence Washington can supply that links Libya to terrorist incidents as they occur, and, just as importantly, material detailing Tripoli's plans for the future. Evidence tying Libya to terrorist attacks on British installations and nationals, of course, would be particularly helpful, especially if some of the material could be used in the public debate. If Thatcher is unable to turn British public

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opinion around through her parliamentary expositions of London's intent to "defeat terrorism," and particularly if British casualties keep mounting, we believe that it will become increasingly important to provide UK authorities with evidence that can be given to the British media. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

The Cost to the UK

Thatcher is clearly under seige at the moment from public opinion, the media, the opposition, and--though to a lesser extent--fellow Allies in Western Europe. Although we believe the Prime Minister intends to stand by her present policy and probably would authorize a second use of UK bases if Washington presented another convincing case, there are several events that could deal her--and Tory reelection chances--a serious political blow.

--If the US became locked in a tit-for-tat battle with Libya that required repeated use of UK bases, Thatcher almost certainly would be attacked--and probably with telling effect in parliamentary byelections and local elections set for 8 May and perhaps in the general election expected in 1987 [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

[REDACTED] In our opinion, London probably would prefer a US attempt to knock Qadhafi out in one or two large-scale blows rather than a protracted series of "surgical" strikes.

3.3(b)(6)

--Paradoxically, Thatcher could also be exposed to political damage if the US had to carry out another mission against Libya and did not use UK bases. Thatcher and her ministers have both quoted Pentagon sources to drive home the point that UK bases were essential to the raid on 14 April. If Washington were to stage another successful raid without using British bases, the opposition almost certainly would claim that she had been duped by Washington into allowing actions that were contrary to the wishes of a large majority of Britons; it would further charge that she had thereby isolated the UK from the rest of Western Europe.

3.5(c)

[REDACTED]

In our opinion, Thatcher fully anticipated these short-term political problems but expects to gain over the long-term by contrasting her decisiveness with the tepid response of others at home and abroad and by receiving something in return for defending US policy. In this vein, the Prime Minister almost certainly approved of Tory Party chairman Tebbit's speech on 22 April calling for speedy Senate passage of the US-UK Extradition Treaty and for exempting British trade from US extraterritorial laws. We also believe that Thatcher expects Washington to avoid

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
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
decisions that could undercut her government's positions on issues such as the ABM Treaty, SALT II, SDI contracts, and the treatment of British and French nuclear forces in US-Soviet negotiations. London may also attempt to limit damage to its political and economic interests in the Middle East by arguing to moderate Arabs -- especially during Britain's EC presidency in the second half of 1986 -- that British aid to the US has placed the UK in a stronger position to influence Washington.

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FRANCE

Government Position

Paris opposed the US raid on Tripoli and refused permission for US Flls flying out of England to overfly France on their way. The government's official statement on the US raid, repeated personally by Prime Minister Chirac in the National Assembly, "deplored" the escalation of terrorism that had led to US reprisals and called on both Washington and Tripoli to stop the "cycle of violence." [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

The decision to deny overflight was probably based primarily on longstanding French concerns--fear of drawing terrorist reprisals against France, French nationals still resident in Libya, and French hostages held in Lebanon; fear of disrupting profitable commercial relations with Arab nations; and traditional reluctance to become involved in any initiative that France does not control. The decision, however, was made more difficult because it had to be agreed to by two men from opposing political camps--Socialist President Mitterrand and neo-Gaullist Prime Minister Chirac. Both men are still maneuvering to dominate French policymaking, and both want to appear tough on terrorism. Chirac, in particular, has talked tough on dealing with terrorism, but his Gaullist constituency would be leery of any action that smacked of subservience to the United States. [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(6)

[REDACTED] Once made public, the decision weakened Chirac's coalition with the Centrists by pitting him against former President Giscard d'Estaing and other Centrist leaders who sharply criticized the government's position in the National Assembly. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

Chirac has reportedly assured Italy, Spain, and Tunisia that France will come to their aid militarily if they are attacked by Libyan forces. French officials have also hinted that they would support a serious effort by the United States to topple Qadhafi. Although there is inevitably a certain amount of posturing in all this, we believe that France might be willing to consider military support for the struggle against Qadhafi's terrorism under certain circumstances, particularly given that French forces already confront Libyan troops across the 16th parallel in Chad. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

Winning Greater Flexibility

The Chirac government, which rests on a slim two-seat majority in parliament, finds itself in a bind. If Chirac were to support a US operation, he might risk an open confrontation with Mitterrand over control of foreign and defense policy; he would also leave his government open to Socialist criticism for any terrorist retaliation. On the other hand, his "Gaullist" neutralism has generated ugly divisions in conservative ranks--most Centrists probably agree with Giscard, and National Front leader Le Pen's approval of US actions completes the Gaullists' isolation on the right. In the short term, Chirac can probably smooth ruffled feathers in his coalition, especially by putting out the line that he actually would have supported a tougher US response but could not sign on to half-measures. He may eventually find it necessary, however, to adopt this position publicly--a move that could reduce his maneuvering room with Mitterrand. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

For the time being, Mitterrand and Chirac have both found it useful to leak hints that they would support a more concerted US effort to oust Qadhafi. This may simply be an attempt to divert US pressure, based on the assumption that Washington will not call their bluff. In any case, it is a useful stance for them because it maintains the foreign policy consensus, and neither probably now finds it in his domestic political interest to start an open row with the other, especially over France's attitude toward US policy. On balance, this course carries risks for both men in their maneuvering with each other, but they would be encouraged by the apparent drift of French public opinion toward support for bold action. In our judgment, therefore:

--France would continue to deny support for reprisals of the kind already carried out (barring major Libyan terrorist activities in France).

--French cooperation in an effort to deal a decisive blow against Qadhafi is achievable, but probably only on the basis of an agreement on broad strategy.

In our view, if Paris were to agree to support a major US assault on Qadhafi, it would be in the context of a joint military operation in which French and Chadian forces attacked from the south, through northern Chad and the Aozou Strip--making crystal clear to all French political actors that the government was acting from French interests. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

It will not be easy to convince France that a plan to oust Qadhafi is likely to succeed. French experiences in Algeria and Lebanon and the struggle against Libya in Chad have left Paris cynical about "quick fixes" to Middle East problems. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

Meanwhile, Paris supports a European consensus on scaling back drastically the freedom of movement accorded to Libyan diplomats and on cutting back Libyan representation. Chirac has already announced that he wants to renegotiate portions of the Vienna treaty establishing diplomatic privileges for embassies, and he has already shown a willingness to expel Libyans from France at any provocation. He does not appear to have encountered any resistance from Mitterrand on this issue. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

Although France is a strong proponent of maintaining open channels of communications--even with enemies--Chirac and Mitterrand might be willing to go along with closing all Libyan Peoples Bureaus in Western Europe if there were a clear EC consensus. Unity with Bonn would be a prime concern on this issue, and the German position could tip the balance. A wave of Libyan terrorist attacks on French soil or a renewed Libyan offensive in Chad might push France in the direction of severing relations, but we do not believe unilateral US pressure would be very effective. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

The Costs to France

Chirac is likely to have considerable public support if he turns up the heat on Libyans in France, and we believe he and Mitterrand could commit French military forces against Libya without encountering major opposition from a public inured to an on-again off-again war with Libya in Chad. Recent opinion polls indicate that the French public--far more than either the Germans or the British--would approve (56 percent) US military action against Qadhafi, if there were good evidence of Libyan responsibility for terrorism. According to the US Embassy in Paris, a strawpoll taken by a Paris radio station the morning after the US attack showed 80 percent support for Washington and a strong current of shame that the French government had refused to accommodate US overflights. Assuming that Paris could paint a convincing picture of pursuing French objectives, we believe there might be little political cost for the government to bear. The cost would, of course, go up if the operation failed dismally or if it provoked a bloodbath of terrorist retaliations in France and against French interests abroad. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.5(c)


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3.5(c)

Potential Support Facilities for Operations Against Libya

Could provide airspace fly-over permission. No US/NATO bases--only French.



3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~



3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

WEST GERMANY

Government Position

Chancellor Kohl clearly has been in a quandry in responding to the US attack on Libya. He publicly expressed understanding for the airstrike while questioning its effectiveness. [REDACTED] 3.3(b)(1)

[REDACTED] 3.3(b)(6)

[REDACTED] Kohl is strongly pro-US and publicly accuses Libya of supporting terrorism, but he probably fears the airstrike will provoke further violence and damage Western ties to the Arab world. In addition, Kohl almost certainly wants to avoid giving the opposition further grounds to accuse him of subservience to Washington. [REDACTED] 3.5(c)

The government and coalition parties are divided over the US airstrike. [REDACTED]

Winning Greater Flexibility

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(6)

We believe the only means of inducing Bonn to lend support a future strike against Libya would be forceful indications from Washington that Congress and the American people regard the issue as crucial to the Alliance. The West Germans--especially the Christian Democrats--probably would be concerned that a blanket refusal to cooperate would lead to inexorable domestic pressure in the United States to reduce forces in the Federal Republic. And Bonn probably would be concerned that the perception of a major defeat for the United States could undermine the credibility of the US security guarantee to Western Europe. [REDACTED] 3.5(c)

A positive response probably would be more likely if Washington avoided putting public pressure on the West Germans, gave the appearance of close consultations, and expressed strong

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

support for the renewed EC-Arab dialogue promoted by Foreign Minister Genscher. Even more important for Bonn's decision, in our opinion, would be a clear delineation of US military objectives, a high probability of achieving them, proportionality of US attacks to Libyan provocations, and assurances that reprisals against Libya will not continue indefinitely. Bonn probably would be more likely to agree to US requests if they were strongly backed by Paris and London. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

If Bonn did agree to some form of cooperation against Libya, it almost certainly would insist on limiting it to US overflights, refueling of aircraft from tankers staging to bases in West Germany, and use of medical facilities. The West Germans almost certainly would resist bombing missions originating from bases in the Federal Republic and the use of US forces assigned to NATO. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

In addition, the West Germans almost certainly would try to prolong consultations as long as possible and to conduct them in a NATO framework. [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(6)

[REDACTED] We believe the Chancellor also would prefer that any action be perceived publicly as a joint Alliance decision. He has stated repeatedly--most recently regarding the expulsion of two Libyan officials from Bonn--that he prefers a coordinated response among the West Europeans, especially the French, British, and West Germans. Thus, if Bonn did decide to cooperate with Washington, it almost certainly would strongly urge other Allies to do so also. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

The Costs to West Germany

Any cooperation in a future strike against Libya could have severe political repercussions for the Kohl government, in our judgment. [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(6)


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3.5(c)

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3.5(c)



3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(6)
3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~



3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~



3.5(c)

ITALY

Government Position

Rome, believing that it is more vulnerable to economic and military retaliation from Libya than other NATO Allies and that it has the most to lose from further escalation, publicly condemned the US raid. At the same time, however, government leaders worry increasingly that Italy and Europe cannot afford to become further estranged from the US. Thus Rome will probably continue to walk its narrow policy tightrope, maintaining distance from the US in public to avoid provoking Qadhafi and domestic opposition, while quietly trying to facilitate Washington's efforts.

3.5(c)

Prime Minister Bettino Craxi's Cabinet has been seriously divided for several months over foreign policy generally and policy toward Libya in particular. Defense Minister Spadolini has consistently emerged as the strongest advocate of tougher action against Qadhafi and his terrorist allies. During the Achille Lauro hijacking last October, Spadolini argued that Rome must be prepared to use force against the perpetrators, and his resignation over the government's release of Abu Abbas nearly caused the collapse of the coalition. He is clearly unhappy over Rome's public condemnation of the US retaliatory raid.


3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(6)
3.5(c)



Spadolini's views are sharply at odds with those of Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti who insists that Italian and Western interests can best be served by engaging Qadhafi rather than isolating him. Andreotti has frequently expressed reservations about Washington's evidence linking Qadhafi to terrorism. He repeatedly has argued that little progress will be made toward ending Middle East-generated terrorism until there is progress on the Palestinian question.

3.5(c)

Most observers have assumed that Craxi's views on the Middle East are closer to Andreotti's.



3.3(b)(1)
Craxi 3.3(b)(6)
3.5(c)

probably worries that a majority of Italian leaders and the Italian public buy Andreotti's argument that the way to forestall Libyan terrorism is to continue negotiating with Qadhafi.

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~



3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

Craxi is first and foremost a political animal, however, and he will adopt his position to the prevailing political winds. Last weekend he threatened to use military force in response to further Libyan attacks against Italy. This toughening of his position may have been prompted in part by Spadolini's threat to resign. Craxi may also be responding to hints of considerable discontent among Andreotti's Christian Democrats--the largest party of the governing coalition--with the Foreign Minister's line. Moreover, Craxi seems genuinely concerned that the gap developing between the US and Western Europe over Libya could portend serious consequences for the future of the NATO alliance.

[REDACTED] 3.5(c)

Winning Greater Flexibility

Despite the hardening of Craxi's remarks to the public, we do not expect Rome to alter its stand significantly in the weeks ahead. Italy can probably be counted on to continue hosting US ships and allowing surreptitious use of Sigonella for emergency aircraft landings and logistical flights to the 6th Fleet, but the Italians will remain nervous about their role. We believe that Craxi would be hardpressed, at this point, to facilitate aerial refueling or grant transit through Italian airspace in the event of a follow-on airstrike against Libya. Rome has been willing, on the other hand, to take the lead in helping to organize the evacuation of those West Europeans resident in Libya who want to leave.

[REDACTED] 3.5(c)

Although Craxi's ability to maneuver at home seems quite limited, a shift in political trends could free him to be more assertive. A growing number of leaders within the governing coalition, for example, are worried about the gap that has developed between the US and Europe over Libya and have begun to call for Italy to take a more aggressive stand against Qadhafi. A media campaign designed to counter Tripoli's exploitation of the civilian casualties generated by the US raid--one that featured footage of recent Qadhafi-related terrorist attacks and played up Qadhafi's ties to various terrorist groups--in conjunction with further publication of evidence linking Qadhafi to recent events, might turn enough public and political opinion to tip the balance toward more open support for US policies.

[REDACTED] 3.5(c)

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3.5(c)

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
3.5(c)

The Costs to Italy

Craxi's fractious coalition does not have a high tolerance for internal stress and an attempt to apply pressure on Rome or to play various leaders against one another over Libya carries the risk that his government will come unglued. A government crisis at this point--in the wake of disputes over the Achille Lauro affair, the release of Abu Abbas, and this year's budget--could very well lead to a dissolution of parliament and an early national election. The danger of such an election is that it could yield a governing coalition--perhaps dominated by the Andreotti faction of the Christian Democratic Party--that is less sympathetic to US policies than the existing one. Even the current level of support already promises, at a minimum, to focus further attention on US use of NATO installations in Italy and to galvanize support among moderate Italians for leftist calls to restrict US access to military bases.



3.5(c)



3.3(b)(1)

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
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SPAIN


Government Position

Prime Minister Gonzalez publicly "disagreed" with (but did not "condemn") the US raid on the implied ground that it would lead to an increase rather than a decrease in terrorism. In addition to Gonzalez's concern over an upsurge in terrorism from the large resident Arab community in Spain, he is also likely to worry that protracted tension in the Maghreb would strengthen radical elements in the region and ultimately fuel challenges to Spain's hold on its enclaves on the Moroccan coast. 



3.5(c)

Spanish leaders have also indicated publicly--though without closing all doors--that they would deny a US request for overflights, tanker support from bases in Spain, and other forms of direct assistance to US military efforts. At the same time, however, Gonzalez and Foreign Minister Fernandez-Ordonez have made Madrid a leader in the effort to persuade the EC to adopt anti-terrorism measures that would both discourage Qadhafi from striking at Western Europe and the United States from hitting back at Libya. 


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3.5(c)

 the US raid has increased public anxiety about terrorism, and the political costs of cooperation with Washington have gone up. Gonzalez still retains room for maneuver on the issue, but that could shrink if the crisis drags on for long. 

3.5(c)




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
We believe that meeting these various conditions would probably be enough to encourage Gonzalez to brave the adverse climate of public opinion that has developed in Spain since the US raid. If all of them were fulfilled, the prospects would be substantially better than 50-50 that Gonzalez would grant both overflights and tanker support. However, those odds could fall to even or less if he believed the US action would not be a definitive blow to Libyan terrorism. In any event, we believe there is little chance that he would sanction participation by Spanish-based US aircraft in direct combat roles in Libya. Similarly, the chances are virtually nil that Spanish military units would participate in an attack on Libya unless Gonzalez were responding to a direct Libyan military attack on Spain. Even in that case, Gonzalez would probably be reluctant to retaliate against Tripoli without the help of his Mediterranean allies--especially France and Italy.




3.5(c)

The Costs to Spain

The conflict with Libya comes at a critical time in the evolution of Spain's security relationship with the West. Madrid is in the midst of preparations for bilateral talks on the future of the US military presence in Spain, and after the referendum last month Spanish leaders are crystallizing their thinking on the future shape of Spain's participation in NATO. Recent US confrontations with Libya, moreover, have already fueled public misgiving over Spain's security links with Washington, and further US moves against Qadahfi would probably deepen that concern unless they quickly brought an end to the problem. Increased public anxiety, in turn, would almost certainly increase pressure for a reduction in the US military presence and for carefully limiting Spain's role in NATO.



3.5(c)



3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(6)
3.5(c)

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3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

PORTUGAL

Government Position

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva, who leads Portugal's minority Social Democratic government, and Foreign Minister Pires Miranda have been circumspect so far in responding to the US strike against Libya. Both expressed their "surprise" that the raid had taken place and reaffirmed their support for the positions taken by the EC ministers. Cavaco Silva called for "dialogue," rather than "force," to deal with international terrorism. President Soares, who founded the rival Socialist Party, has had little to say. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

The Portuguese position on Libya is more complex than the generally unified picture presented to the public so far. Soares has long been a major supporter of US foreign policy on terrorism and the Middle East. His enthusiasm for championing US policies, however, has almost certainly been dampened by what he perceived as a lack of US support for his presidential campaign earlier this year. Soares is also concerned about establishing good relations with Cavaco Silva, his longtime political rival, and the Prime Minister has made it clear that he would resist "interference" by Soares in the government's conduct of foreign policy. Cavaco Silva, for his part, has a strong pro-western orientation but believes that his country has more to gain as a new EC member by coordinating its diplomacy closely with the rest of Western Europe than by continuing the generally Washington-oriented diplomatic course charted by Soares. Foreign Minister Pires Miranda, who has a significant voice in shaping Portuguese diplomacy, is strongly rumored to have Arab sympathies, which suggests that he is less supportive of US policy. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

Winning Greater Flexibility

In general, public opinion in Portugal is both more pro-American and more apathetic about foreign policy as a whole than in most other Western European countries, making it easier for Portuguese leaders to support Washington. Nonetheless, politicians of virtually every stripe believe that Portugal has received little in return for being one of Washington's staunchest allies since the end of World War II. At least some of the recent prickliness in Portuguese policy toward the United States could be undone by simply demonstrating that Washington takes Lisbon seriously as a partner and values its past contributions to Western security arrangements. [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

3.5(c)

Portuguese receptivity toward support for US out-of-area operations would also increase if Lisbon could be convinced that the US action would bring a quick end to Libyan sponsored terrorism and thereby reduce the threat of retaliation against Portugal. The Portuguese are especially sensitive on this score because they recognize that they do not have the ability to monitor and counter foreign terrorists in their country. [redacted]

3.5(c)

A final factor that would facilitate Portuguese support for US policy would be indications that other allies--especially Spain, France, and Italy--were also on board. Assurances along those lines would reduce Lisbon's fear of being singled out for retaliation and would give the appearance of the sort of coordinated European response that would appeal to Cavaco Silva in particular. [redacted]

3.5(c)

The odds of obtaining Portuguese approval for overflights, transiting Lajes AB, and refueling from tankers brought into mainland Portugal would be better than 50-50 even as long as Lisbon believed that the proposed US action either enjoyed appreciable allied support or was likely to deal a definitive blow to Middle Eastern terrorism. If both conditions were met the odds of obtaining Portuguese support would be high. If neither obtained, there would be little chance of winning Portuguese support. [redacted]

3.5(c)

The Costs to Portugal

The most important current bilateral issue between Washington and Lisbon is expediting construction of the GEODSS deep space satellite tracking station in southern Portugal. Construction could be delayed or--in an unlikely worst case--derailed altogether as a result of Portuguese support for US action against Qadhafi. The Communists are a significant political force that controls about 15 to 20 percent of the electorate and they would almost certainly try to exploit the issue. They could argue that the United States had "forced" Portugal's leaders to back a "reckless" military operation that increased the terrorist threat to Portugal itself. If the US operation were successful, Communist agitation would probably fail to produce a significant reaction. On the other hand, a protracted upswing in Middle Eastern-based terrorism in Portugal following Lisbon's support for Washington would give some credence to Communist charges and make it harder for the government to move ahead quickly on GEODSS. Indeed, a failed operation of any sort would weaken confidence in US judgment, but the reaction would be especially

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
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3.5(c)

adverse if it appeared that Washington had "dragged" Lisbon into it. In that case, support might decline for security cooperation with the United States, and the climate would be less favorable for renegotiating the bilateral agreement governing use of Lajes AB when that accord expires in 1991.



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
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3.5(c)

TURKEY

Government Position

Turkey has been very low-key in its reactions to the US raid on Tripoli. The only explicit intervention by Turkey in NATO meetings has been a request to examine the current operational status and plans for the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (presumably with an eye to keeping it out of any hostile actions against Libya). 

3.5(c)

The Turks have little sympathy for Qadhafi, but their major economic interests in Libya and other Middle Eastern countries and their common borders with Iran and Syria--both outspoken supporters of Libya--make them anxious to avoid any escalation of the US-Libyan conflict. The government has publicly said that US air attacks on Libya are not compatible with international law and that only joint action will be effective against international terrorism.


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Winning Greater Flexibility


Turkey might be more inclined to support US actions that have a NATO imprimatur or at least tacit support from moderate Arab states. In addition, Ankara might tighten restrictions on Libyan diplomatic and cultural activities in Turkey if Turkey were persuaded of a potential internal threat from Libyan officials. It also is possible that a potential security threat can be used to encourage an indefinite extension of the current temporary ban on aircraft and ship movement from Turkey to Libya. Turkish reluctance to support the US might dissipate, however, if Libya were to harm or threaten the 30-40,000 Turkish workers in Libya, or overtly threaten Turkish officials. 

3.5(c)

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(6)

3.5(c)



The Costs to Turkey

Threatening Turkish security assistance carries obvious risks for long-term US interests. It would probably cause serious damage to US relations with the Ozal government and could

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


3.5(c)

undermine the government's standing and stability. It would also play into the hands of the leftist opposition, which regularly accuses the government of being too accomodating to the US. Strenuous US arm-twisting would probably strengthen opposition to US base rights and foment anti-Americanism in Turkey.



3.5(c)



3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(6)

3.5(c)

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3.5(c)

GREECE

Government Position

Foreign Minister Papoulias, speaking for the government, expressed "disapproval" of the recent US operation on the grounds that it would not put an end to terrorism. The ruling Socialist party was more critical--charging that the attack had placed all of Europe in mortal danger. According to Embassy reporting, the Greek public appears genuinely uneasy over the potential consequences for Greece should the present US-Libyan clash escalate. The Greek leadership has repeatedly told the public that the US bases in Greece will not be used in support of US operations against Libya, and there are some indications that it has taken steps to ensure this does not happen.

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(6)
3.5(c)

Winning Greater Flexibility

The Greek government has become increasingly aware of the threat posed to its security and economic interests by international terrorism and has moved to a position of explicit condemnation. The Papandreou government is anxious to protect its commercial and political role in the Middle East, however, and fears terrorist retaliation. Of all the Allies, Greece, in our view, is the least likely to apply sanctions or allow the use of US bases in Greece against Libya.

3.5(c)

Probably the best chance of budging Papandreou would be if he were pressed to act in concert with a firm EC consensus--particularly one supported strongly by fellow Socialists in France, Spain, and Italy.

[Redacted]


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3.5(c)

Cyprus

It is virtually certain that the government of Cyprus would oppose use of the British bases to be used against Libya. The Cypriot government has condemned the US attack on Libya and repeatedly expressed disapproval of possible third party use of the British bases on Cyprus. Cyprus is economically dependent on Arab markets, and its geographic location and large Arab presence make it extremely vulnerable to terrorist attack.




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3.5(c)


3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(6)
3.5(c)



**Attitudes of West European Governments
on Key Issues of Counterterrorism**

| | Libyan responsibility for terrorism, especially West Berlin bombing | US Gulf of Sidra operations and air raids of 14 April |
|----------------|---|--|
| United Kingdom | Publicly blames Libya for terrorism and Berlin bombing; large reservoir of doubt among the population. | Defends fully US actions in both instances, despite strong public opposition and some backbench Tory grumbling. |
| West Germany | Publicly accuses Libya of supporting terrorism and says Tripoli responsible for Berlin bombing. | Endorses US right to maneuver in international waters in Gulf of Sidra. Did not back airstrikes but expressed "understanding." |
| France | Publicly accuses Libya of sponsoring terrorism; [redacted] | Viewed Gulf of Sidra operation as dangerous provocation; "deplored" increase in terrorism but charged that US actions contributed to cycle of violence. 3.3(b)(1) 3.3(b)(6) 3.5(c) |
| Italy | Publicly acknowledges Libyan complicity in and support for terrorism generally. Blames Tripoli for Berlin murders. | Dissociated itself from Gulf of Sidra maneuvers and condemned bombing raid; privately more supportive. Government bitterly divided on Middle East policy. |
| Greece | Publicly claims to be unconvinced by evidence of Libyan involvement in Berlin bombing; [redacted] | Concerned Sidra operations are threat to regional peace. Condemned bombing raid as leading to more terrorism. Says cause of violence—the Palestinian problem—must be addressed. 3.3(b)(1) 3.3(b)(6) 3.5(c) |
| Turkey | Officials and public aware that Libya promotes terrorism. Appear convinced of Libyan responsibility for Berlin bombing, but have not taken public position. | Regards both as justifiable in theory, but concerned they will enhance Qadhafi's standing without reducing his ability to promote terrorism. |
| Spain | Believes Qadhafi is involved generally in terrorism; accepts possibility that Libya was responsible for Berlin bombing. | Regarded Gulf of Sidra operations as unduly provocative and expressed disagreement with bombing raid. |
| Portugal | Recognizes Libyans play active role in international terrorism; says no reason to doubt Qadhafi's complicity in Berlin terrorism incident. | Maintained low profile during Gulf of Sidra operations. Declared "dialogue" rather than "force" is best means of dealing with international terrorism. |

3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(6)
3.5(c)



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