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**Collection:** North, Oliver: Files  
**Folder Title:** Terrorism: Libya [05/02/1986-05/08/1986]  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

**Withdrawer**

SMF 11/22/2010

**File Folder** TERRORISM: LIBYA [05/02/1986-05/08/1986]

**FOIA**

F95-023/9

**Box Number** 105

WILLS

32

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
101015	MEMO	MORTON TO FORTIER RE LIBYA <i>R</i> 3/22/2017 M1113/1	2	5/2/1986	B1
101019	COVER SHEET	<i>D</i> 3/28/2017 M1113/1	2	5/2/1986	B1 B3
101020	NOTE	TO NORTH RE ASSESSMENT <i>D</i> 3/28/2017 M1113/1	1	5/6/1986	B1 B3
101021	CABLE	021740Z MAY 86 <i>D</i> 3/28/2017 M1113/1	12	5/2/1986	B1 B3
101030	BIO	<i>D</i> 3/28/2017 M1113/1	1	5/7/1986	B1 B3
101031	MEMO	SULLIVAN TO TEICHER ET AL	5	5/22/1986	B1
101032	REPORT	RE ABU ABBAS <i>D</i> 3/28/2017 M1113/1	2	5/7/1986	B1 B3
101033	COVER SHEET	<i>R</i> 1/20/2017 M1113/1	1	ND	B1 B3
101034	MEMO	CANNISTRARO TO POINDEXTER RE TALKING POINTS ON COUNTERTERRORISM <i>D</i> 1/20/2017 M1113/1	1	5/7/1986	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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101035	TALKING POINTS	RE COUNTERTERRORISM <i>D 1/20/2017 M1113/1</i>	1	ND	B1 B3
101036	PROF NOTE	CANNISTRARO TO POINDEXTER RE COUNTERTERRORISM <i>D 1/20/2017 M1113/1</i>	1	5/6/1986	B1 B3
101037	PROF NOTE	RE TALKING POINTS <i>D 1/20/2017 M1113/1</i>	1	5/7/1986	B1 B3
101038	REPORT	RE TERRORISM <i>D 3/28/2017 M1113/1</i>	3	5/2/1986	B1 B3
101039	CABLE	080001Z MAY 86	3	5/8/1986	B1 B2 B3
101040	CABLE	ACCRA 03489 <i>R 1/24/2017 M1113/1</i>	2	5/8/1986	B1

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URGENT ← ?

North       
Earl   ✓    
Coy   ✓  

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

May 2, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD R. FORTIER

FROM: Elaine L. Morton *EL*

10/015

SUBJECT: Libya Target Priorities

*Why does she have access - need to know?*

You have received separately a paper from Jim Stark, Ollie North, and Howie Teicher setting forth the concepts that should govern targetting strategy toward Libya. I would like to raise some questions that focus on the difference between the symbolic and concrete objectives that are expected to be achieved if the concepts as set forth are followed.

Stated Goals. The paper asserts that a change in Libyan support for terrorism and subversion can be achieved by:

- o attacking Qadhafi's "terrorist infrastructure"
- o weakening Qadhafi's "internal mechanisms of control"
- o encouraging internal opposition to his policies.

Specific examples given include: the Praetorian Guard; command and control facilities; and politically important locations like Qadhafi's personal headquarters. The specific target list includes columns for "terror" and "government control" along with other, more traditional, attributes of identification.

Will They Be Achieved? These abstractions may be useful as a means of explaining to U.S. and other publics why a stronger, more punishing bombing raid is, in fact, linked to the broader purposes of our stated policy against terrorism and subversion. Whether they will achieve the concrete objectives adduced is problematic for the following reasons:

- o Terrorist Infrastructure is more a matter of informal, person-to-person networks and cash flows through external bank accounts than what goes on at the Al Marafiq headquarters. If the raid occurs at night, few of the "commanding" operatives would be killed; if during the day, others could take their place because the very nature of a clandestine operation like terrorism is to have compartmentalization and interoperability. It isn't as though the networks are there listed on a central computer that would be destroyed by the blast of a TLAM-C.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M1113 #10/015  
BY *FW* NARA DATE 3/22/17

- o Internal Control in Libya is achieved by an organization of "People's Committees" that penetrates the society down to the block level. As in any well-developed totalitarian system, the networks of control are pervasive and communication does not depend on single sources like the Tripoli radio station. Qadhafi's security forces, his Praetorian Guard, probably aren't likely to conveniently locate all of themselves in the barracks to be targeted.
- o Internal Opposition is not likely to be stimulated by the destruction of Qadhafi's personal headquarters. In fact, the reverse may occur. The notion that humiliating a leader will cause his support to falter is appealing. Imagine if an adversary bombed the White House and Camp David. Assuming the President escaped injury or death, would demolition of these targets cause people to fall away from the present leadership -- or rally round?

Who is this person!

An Alternative Approach would be to strike only economic targets or military targets. Economic targets, if destroyed, would send a message to Qadhafi about his support for terrorism and subversion while at the same time making it more difficult to govern by increasing an already austere internal economic environment. Military targets would be consistent with Secretary Shultz's statements about increasing the cost to countries that support terrorism. They could also be justified by pointing out that Libyan support of terrorism against U.S. targets is warfare through surrogates, hence a military-to-military response is appropriate. Dealing in abstractions like "terrorist infrastructure" and "mechanisms of internal control" could well prove to be non-productive in the best instance and counter-productive in the worst.

The last thing we need/mind.

Give al Manafiq of the Jamahiyah barracks a free ride....

and requires War Powers declaration....

- cc: Peter Rodman  
 Rod McDaniel  
 Ron St. Martin  
 Jim Stark  
 Ollie North  
 Howard Teicher  
 Vince Cannestraro

A horrible, off-base, naive paper. Hope it doesn't leak!

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101019	COVER SHEET	2	5/2/1986	B1 B3

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101020	NOTE TO NORTH RE ASSESSMENT	1	5/6/1986	B1 B3

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101021	CABLE 021740Z MAY 86	12	5/2/1986	B1 B3

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<SOURCE>AP

<DATE>06-MAY-1986 17:43

<TEXT>N109RW

ABBAS INTERVIEW  
BY HENRY GOTTLIEB

WASHINGTON (AP) -- THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON TUESDAY ACCUSED NBC  
OF

ENCOURAGING TERRORISM BY TELEVISIONING AN INTERVIEW WITH MOHAMMED ABUL  
ABBAS, THE SUSPECTED MASTERMIND OF THE ACHILLE LAURO SHIP HIJACKING.

IN THE INTERVIEW, ABBAS SAID PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS BECOME ENEMY NO.  
1 AND THAT OPERATIONS ON AMERICAN SOIL ARE ENVISIONED.

OBVIOUSLY TERRORISM THRIVES ON THIS KIND OF PUBLICITY, STATE  
DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN CHARLES E. REDMAN SAID OF ABBAS APPEARANCE MONDAY  
ON THE NBC NIGHTLY NEWS. THIS IS THE KIND OF INTERVIEW THAT GIVES  
TERRORISTS THE PLATFORM THEY SEEK.

SUCH PUBLICITY IN FACT ENCOURAGES THE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WERE  
ALL SEEKING TO DETER, REDMAN ADDED.

IN TOKYO, ROBERT OAKLEY, HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENTS COUNTER-TERRORISM  
SECTION, SUGGESTED THAT WHEN NEWS MEDIA MAKE DEALS TO INTERVIEW  
TERRORIST FUGITIVES THE NEWS ORGANIZATIONS BECOME ACCOMPLICES.

HE CALLED THE INTERVIEW REPREHENSIBLE.

AT NBC, MARY LOU OCALLAGHAN, DIRECTOR OF NEWS INFORMATION, SAID THE  
STATE DEPARTMENTS ATTACK WAS VERY DISAPPOINTING AND THAT THE  
NETWORK HAD NO REGRETS ABOUT AIRING THE INTERVIEW.

WERE NOT HERE TO HINDER OR ENHANCE ANYBODYS CASE; ITS SIMPLY TO  
REPORT ALL ASPECTS OF A MAJOR STORY -- TERRORISM, SHE SAID. WE HAVE  
A FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION IN THIS COUNTRY, FORTUNATELY.

SHE SAID SHE DOUBTED VIEWERS WOULD BE INCLINED TO ACCEPT ABBAS  
VERSION OF EVENTS ABOARD THE ACHILLE LAURO, BUT HAD A RIGHT TO HEAR  
ALL  
ASPECTS OF THE STORY.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARENT STUPID, THE SPOKESWOMAN SAID. I  
THINK ITS IMPORTANT FOR PEOPLE TO SEE WHAT HE (ABBAS) STANDS FOR.

AT A TIME WHEN THE UNITED STATES IS CRITICIZING THE SOVIET UNION  
FOR  
WITHHOLDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR DISASTER, U.S.  
OFFICIALS SHOULDNT BE CRITICIZING OPEN DISCUSSION OF TERRORISM,  
WHICH AFFECTS ALL OUR LIVES, TOO, SHE SAID.

ABBAS IS UNDER INDICTMENT BY A FEDERAL GRAND JURY IN CONNECTION WITH  
THE MURDER OF LEON KLINGHOFFER, A WHEELCHAIR-BOUND NEW YORKER TRAVELING  
ON THE ACHILLE LAURO WHEN IT WAS HIJACKED LAST OCTOBER IN THE  
MEDITERRANEAN.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WHICH SAID ABBAS MASTERMINDED THE HIJACKING,  
IS OFFERING A +250,000 REWARD FOR INFORMATION LEADING TO HIS ARREST  
AND  
PROSECUTION.

NBC SAID IT AGREED NOT TO REVEAL THE ARABIC-SPEAKING COUNTRY WHERE  
ABBAS WAS INTERVIEWED BY LONDON-BASED CORRESPONDENT HENRY CHAMP, A  
CONDITION CRITICIZED BY OAKLEY.

WHEN A MEDIA OUTLET MAKES DEALS WITH A TERRORIST NOT TO DIVULGE  
HIS  
WHEREABOUTS, THE NEWS ORGANIZATION IS SAYING, IN EFFECT, WEVE BECOME  
HIS ACCOMPLICES IN ORDER TO GIVE HIM PUBLICITY, OAKLEY SAID IN AN  
INTERVIEW WITH CABLE NEWS NETWORK.

AP-WX-05-06-86 1750EDT



# Federal Emergency Management Agency

Washington, D.C. 20472


Lieutenant Colonel Robert Earl  
U.S. Marine Corps  
National Security Council  
Old Executive Office Building  
1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Colonel Earl:

As you requested, the one-page summary of the electric power transmission system vulnerability assessment is enclosed. This is my own summary and has not been coordinated with the Department of Energy who prepared the assessment.

As soon as the complete assessment has been finalized, we will be submitting it to the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism with a copy to the National Security Council.

Sincerely,

  
John R. Lilley, II  
Chief, Mobilization  
Resources Division

Enclosure

*6 May*

*Ollie —*

*A week ago you said JAMP had a question on electrical power vulnerabilities.... This is in response to my request to FEMA --- not very good, I'm afraid....*

SUMMARY  
OF  
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF ELECTRIC POWER GRID

1. Scope of System. The electric power systems of the world are of strategic value to the nations which they serve and upon which the infrastructure of those nations is established. Thus these systems are fundamental to their national security. Electricity must be manufactured and delivered, through highly complex technological systems, at the instant of demand. Electric systems are constructed and operated to withstand the stresses imposed upon them by nature and by equipment failure. Restoration of service from these hazards is accomplished in a relatively short period of time, resulting in relatively minor inconvenience to the areas being served. Most utilities are geared to handling a single contingency outage. They are not capable of reliable performance however, when their major components are severely damaged on a widespread basis by deliberate acts of man. Virtually none are equipped or staffed to mitigate the consequences of multiple attacks against major components.

2. Elements of the System. Electric systems consist of five basic elements: (a) generation, (b) bulk transmission, (c) distribution, (d) the load [users], and (e) a means of system control.

3. Identification of Choke Points. Lucrative choke points of electric power systems are: (a) generators, (b) step-up transformers, (c) bulk transmission step-down transformer substations, and (d) the system control center. While damage to other components can cause great harm and moderate-term disabling of system elements, losses among these four elements produces long-term and widespread consequences.

4. Vulnerability Assessment of Choke Points. The identified lucrative choke points are easily located. They can be damaged or destroyed by a number of techniques which are well known to terrorists, surrogate agents, and to special military forces.

Failure of equipment at each type of choke point can be caused by short-circuiting or by causing mechanical failure, employing means such as sand in bearings, removal of oil, explosive blast, stand-off rifle, a wrench dropped into a maintenance port, or denial of start/restart power. Electromagnetic pulse from a high altitude nuclear detonation can also cause significant failures.

System control centers represent a special vulnerability problem. Highly qualified and experienced system operations personnel are clustered, together with highly technical control and communications equipment, at these centers. Any attack which would destroy such a center would significantly impair the operation or restoration of a system by eliminating vital command, control and communications capabilities and functions.

Generation facilities are relatively easy to defend against outsiders with local security forces once such forces are emplaced. Bulk transmission substations present the most accessible targets for the attacker. System control centers can easily be sabotaged by insiders either to effect C3 loss or to support a broader system attack by outsiders.

5. Effects of Loss of Choke Points. Since the entire infrastructure of a modern society is almost totally dependent upon electrical systems, widespread loss of the identified choke points would have a most detrimental effect and is of utmost concern. The effects of loss of isolated choke points would have to be weighed against the specific "downstream" loads being served.

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101031	MEMO  SULLIVAN TO TEICHER ET AL	5	5/22/1986	B1

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To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	VADM J. M. Poindexter		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

X	ACTION	FILE
	APPROVAL	INFORMATION
	COMMENT	PREPARE REPLY
	CONCURRENCE	RECOMMENDATION
	DIRECT REPLY	RETURN
	DISPATCH	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

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
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101034	MEMO  CANNISTRARO TO POINDEXTER RE TALKING POINTS ON COUNTERTERRORISM	1	5/7/1986	B1  B3

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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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101035	TALKING POINTS RE COUNTERTERRORISM	1	ND	B1 B3

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101036	PROF NOTE  CANNISTRARO TO POINDEXTER RE COUNTERTERRORISM	1	5/6/1986	B1  B3

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101037	PROF NOTE RE TALKING POINTS	1	5/7/1986	B1 B3

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ACTION		FILE
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CONCURRENCE		RECOMMENDATION
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DISPATCH		SIGNATURE

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101038	REPORT RE TERRORISM	3	5/2/1986	B1 B3

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101039	CABLE 080001Z MAY 86	3	5/8/1986	B1 B2 B3

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

101040

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BRUSSELS FOR USEC

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, PREL, GH, EC  
SUBJ: LOCAL EC AMBASSADORS RECEIVE THREATENING NOTE  
- FROM LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON MAY 5 THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU IN ACCRA CIRCULATED TO ALL EC MISSIONS THE TEXT OF A DIPLOMATIC NOTE ORIGINALLY GIVEN TO THE DUTCH CHARGE IN TRIPOLI APRIL 29 (IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EC PRESIDENCY CAPITAL). THE NOTE (SEE PARA 3 FOR FULL TEXT) HAS BEEN DISCUSSED AMONG LOCAL EC AMBASSADORS. ACCORDING TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR (PROTECT) THE EC AMBASSADORS WERE UNANIMOUS IN EXPRESSING THE OPINION THAT THIS NOTE, PARTICULARLY ITS LAST SENTENCE, WAS TANTAMOUNT TO A THREAT TO ALL OF THEIR MISSIONS IN ACCRA.

3. TEXT OF LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU NOTE:  
-  
BEGIN TEXT.

FOREIGN LIAISON PEOPLE'S BUREAU SUMMONS DUTCH CHARGE D' AFFAIRES

THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN LIAISON BUREAU HAS SUMMONED TODAY THE DUTCH CHARGE D' AFFAIRES AS HIS COUNTRY IS CURRENTLY CHAIRING THE EEC.

HE HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE HARBOURING ANTI-LIBYA AND ANTI-PROGRESSIVE ARAB COUNTRIES MOVEMENTS AND TERRORIST ELEMENTS, PROVIDING THEM WITH FINANCE, ASSISTANCE AND FACILITIES TO PURSUE THEIR VARIOUS ACTIVITIES.

HE HAS ALSO BEEN INFORMED THAT SUCH A STAND ON THE PART OF THE EUROPEAN STATES IS REGARDED AS HARBOURING, ORGANIZING AND EXPORTING OF TERRORISM COVERED BY BASE-LESS DRIVES AND JUSTIFICATIONS. STILL, THESE COUNTRIES DON'T HESITATE IN ACCUSING OTHERS OF PRACTISING TERRORISM.

SHOULD EUROPEAN COUNTRIES PERMIT THEMSELVES TO PURSUE

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SUCH A CONDUCT, OTHER STATES WILL DO LIKEWISE.

HE HAS, IN THE MEANTIME, BEEN INFORMED THAT THE ZIONIST ENEMY IS A TOOL OF OFFICIAL TERRORISM WITH ALL THE POLICIES OF COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION PRACTICED AND BEING PRACTICED AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. STILL SUCH POLICIES HAVEN'T PREVENTED EEC FROM STRENGTHENING AND ESTABLISHING THEIR RELATIONS WITH IT AND COOPERATING WITH IT IN ALL FIELDS.

THEREFORE, IT IS NO STRANGE THING THAT THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD EXPECT THE EXTENSION OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE WHEREVER THIS ENEMY IS PRESENT.

END TEXT.  
BRIMS  
BT

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