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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

**Withdrawer**

SMF 11/23/2010

**File Folder** TERRORISM: LIBYA [06/01/1986-06/30/1986]

**FOIA**

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**Box Number** 105

WILLS

35

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
101062	CABLE	ANKARA 06052 <b>R 1/4/2017 M1116/1</b>	5	6/5/1986	B1
101063	REPORT	RE LIBYA	2	6/5/1986	B1 B3
101064	MEMO	FORM MEMO TO NORTH RE REPORT	1	6/10/1986	B1 B7(D) B7(E)
101065	REPORT	RE LIBYA	1	5/27/1986	B1 B7(D) B7(E)
101066	MEMO	TO MACDANIEL RE LIBYAN TERRORISM <b>D 1/4/2017 M1116/1</b>	1	6/4/1986	B1 B3
101067	REPORT	RE LIBYAN TERRORISM <b>D 1/4/2017 M1116/1</b>	5	6/2/1986	B1 B3
101068	LIST	OF ATTENDEES FOR CPPG MEETING <b>R 1/4/2017 M1116/1</b>	1	ND	B1 B3
101069	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO GREGG ET AL RE CPPG MEETING <b>R 1/4/2017 M1116/1</b>	1	6/13/1986	B1 B3
101070	AGENDA	FOR CPPG MEETING <b>R 3/1/2018 M1116/1</b>	1	6/18/1986	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

**Withdrawer**

SMF 11/23/2010

**File Folder** TERRORISM: LIBYA [06/01/1986-06/30/1986]

**FOIA**

F95-023/9

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101071	LIST	OF ATTENDEES TO CPPG MEETING (ANNOTATED) <i>R 1/4/2017 M1116/1</i>	1	ND	B1 B3
101072	COVER SHEET	<i>D 1/4/2017 M1116/1</i>	2	ND	B1 B3
101073	MEMO	TO BOHN RE LIBYA <i>D 1/4/2017 M1116/1</i>	1	7/3/1986	B1 B3
101074	REPORT	RE LIBYA <i>D 1/4/2017 M1116/1</i>	4	6/23/1986	B1 B3

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C E

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

File: Libya/Turkey

PAGE 01 ANKARA 6052 DTG: 051402Z JUN 86 PSN: 005003  
EOB681 AN007644 TOR: 157/0454Z CSN: HCE050

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IMPLICATED DIPLOMATS. THE TURKS HOPE THAT THIS RECALL WILL ALSO INCLUDE THE SECRETARY OF THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU IN ANKARA, MUHAMMED ABDULMALIK.

101062

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3. COMMENT: IN REPRESENTING U.S. INTERESTS IN THIS COMPLEX AND SENSITIVE EQUATION, THE EMBASSY HAS LEFT NO ROOM FOR TURKISH DOUBT ABOUT THE PAST AND PRESENT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OF ABDULMALIK AND HIS PEOPLES' BUREAUS, AND HAS FIRMLY URGED THE GOT AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS "TO DO THE NECESSARY." AT THE SAME TIME, THE EMBASSY HAS MAINTAINED A SCRUPULOUS PUBLIC POSTURE OF NON-INVOLVEMENT IN ORDER TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION OF U.S. INTERFERENCE. THE WISDOM OF THIS APPROACH WAS CONFIRMED BY THE TRANSPARENTLY BASELESS ATTEMPTS OF THE BOMBERS AT THE MAY 13 SESSION OF THEIR TRIAL TO IMPLICATE THE U.S. IN THEIR ARREST AND INTERROGATION--ALLEGATIONS THAT ARE EVEN LESS CREDIBLE BECAUSE OF THE PUBLIC IMPRESSION THAT THE CASE AGAINST THEM IS A TURKISH CASE, UNDER TURKISH LAW. WIDESPREAD "LEAKING" OF THE INDICTMENTS, WHICH ACCUSE THE OFFICIAL LIBYANS AS DEFENDANTS, AND CONDEMN THEIR ACTIONS, ARE FURTHER INDICATIONS THAT WE HAVE BEEN ON THE RIGHT TRACK. THIS OVERVIEW OF THE GOT'S HANDLING OF THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE AFFORDS WASHINGTON ANALYSTS ANOTHER GLIMPSE OF THE TURKISH WAY OF DEALING WITH TICKLISH PROBLEMS, AND THE INTERPLAY OF VARIOUS ELEMENTS THAT INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF EVENTS. (SEE FURTHER COMMENT BEGINNING IN PARA 20.). END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

ROUTINE  
STU5979  
DE RUEHAK #6052/01 1561454  
R 051402Z JUN 86  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2329

INFO AMCONSUL ADANA 5302  
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 8043  
AMCONSUL IZMIR 6145  
AMEMBASSY LISBON 0085  
USMISSION USNATO 2493  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 06052

NOFORN

TERREP

LISBON PASS AMB. STRAUSSZ-HUPE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PINS, ASEC, KPRP, TU, LY, US  
SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF THE GOT'S HANDLING OF THE  
- ATTEMPTED LIBYAN BOMBING OF AN AMERICAN  
- FACILITY IN ANKARA

REFS: A) ANKARA 5698 B) ANKARA 5513 C) ANKARA 5291  
-- D) ANKARA 5192, E) ANKARA 5174

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT: THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING OF THE ANKARA AMERICAN OFFICERS' OPEN MESS ON APRIL 18 BY TWO LIBYANS, AND THE COMPLICITY IN THAT ATTEMPT OF OFFICIAL LIBYANS, DIRECTLY LINKING THE INCIDENT TO THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAUS IN ANKARA AND ISTANBUL, HAVE CREATED WHAT TURKISH OFFICIALS DESCRIBE AS "A DELICATE SITUATION." ON THE ONE HAND, THE TURKS DO NOT WANT TO OFFEND THE U.S. AND ARE FIRMLY COMMITTED IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM. ON THE OTHER, THE GOT HAS IMPORTANT ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN LIBYA, AND IS RELUCTANT TO BE PERCEIVED BY ARAB AND ISLAMIC SYMPATHIZERS (OR POTENTIAL SYMPATHIZERS) OF LIBYA AS SERVING AMERICAN INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES VIS-A-VIS QADHAFI. IN DEALING WITH THIS DILEMMA, THE TURKS HAVE CHOSEN TO APPROACH THE INCIDENT AS A LEGAL ISSUE, ALLOWING THE INDEPENDENT JUOICIARY TO IDENTIFY THE GUILTY AND PROSECUTE THOSE SUBJECT TO TURKISH LAW, WHILE ALLOWING (AND PRIVATELY PRESSURING) THE OFFICIAL LIBYANS DIRECTLY INVOLVED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. IN THIS WAY, THE TURKS HOPE TO AVOID A DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH LIBYA BY GIVING THE LIBYANS TIME TO CLEAN UP THE MESS BY RECALLING THEIR

INTRODUCTION

4. WE BELIEVE THAT THE MOST USEFUL WAY OF APPROACHING AND ANALYSING THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING INCIDENT, AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS, IS TO CONSIDER THEM IN PHASES. THE FIRST PHASE INCLUDES THE INCIDENT ITSELF, WHEN THE TURKISH SECURITY AUTHORITIES APPREHENDED TWO LIBYANS WHO WERE ABOUT TO BOMB AND THROW GRENADES AT THE U.S. FACILITY, AND THE AMBASSADOR'S DEMARCHES TO THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER JUST BEFORE AND AFTER THE ATTEMPT AND THE WOULD-BE ASSAILANTS' ARREST. PHASE TWO WAS THE PERIOD OF OFFICIAL SILENCE ON THE PART OF THE GOT WHILE IT FIGURED OUT WHAT TO DO. PHASE III WAS THE ACTION  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLR # 101062

BY RW NARA DATE 1/4/17

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 ANKARA 6052 DTG: 051402Z JUN 86 PSN: 005006  
EOB690 AN007643 TOR: 157/0456Z CSN: HCE051

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AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 8044  
AMCONSUL IZMIR 6146  
AMEMBASSY LISBON 0086  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 06 ANKARA 06052

NOFORN

TERREP

LISBON PASS AMB. STRAUSZ-HUPE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PINS, ASEC, KPRP, TU, LY, US  
SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF THE GOT'S HANDLING OF THE PERIOD IN WHICH THE REPUTATION OF THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU (LPB) IN ANKARA AND ITS ISTANBUL OFFICE WAS PUBLICLY BESMIRCHED AND A NUMBER OF LIBYAN DIPLOMATS LEFT THE COUNTRY. PHASE IV OF OUR SCHEMA COULD BE CALLED THE "ADJUDICATION PHASE", IN WHICH THE CASES AGAINST THE ATTEMPTED BOMBERS AND THEIR OFFICIAL LIBYAN ACCOMPLICES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO COURT, WHERE THEIR TRIALS ARE IN PROCESS. DURING THE LATTER PHASE, WHICH STILL CONTINUES, THE HEAVY PUBLICITY SURROUNDING THE TRIAL, AND THE WIDESPREAD "LEAKING" OF THE INDICTMENTS ARE NO DOUBT INTENDED TO ENCOURAGE THE LIBYANS TO SHIP THEIR IMPLICATED OFFICIALS HOME. ALL IN ALL, THE TURKS HAVE HANDLED THE SITUATION IN A GENERALLY EFFECTIVE, ALBEIT TYPICALLY TURKISH, FASHION. WE HAVE GONE INTO SOME DETAIL IN OUR DESCRIPTION OF THESE EVENTS BECAUSE, FIRST, THE INCIDENT APPEARS TO BE THE MOST BLATANT DIRECT LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN A TERRORIST ACT, AND, SECOND, THE TURKS' HANDLING OF IT ALSO DEMONSTRATES HOW THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT DEALS WITH SUCH "DELICATE" SITUATIONS--THE KIND OF AMBIVALENT SITUATIONS WHICH THE TURKS, BY VIRTUE OF THEIR GEOGRAPHY AND OFTEN CONTRADICTORY CULTURAL TRADITIONS, FREQUENTLY CONFRONT. END INTRODUCTION.

PHASE I  
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5. THIS PHASE BEGAN WHEN, ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 18 THE AMBASSADOR CALLED ON MINISTER OF STATE AND ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER, MESUT YILMAZ (ANKARA 4224), TO

REMINDED HIM, INTER ALIA, THAT THE LIBYAN AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY, MUHAMMED ABDULMALIK, HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM BOTH THE U.S. AND SWITZERLAND FOR INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT DURING THE PREVIOUS TWO WEEKS, THE TURKISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (MIT) HAD BEEN MADE AWARE OF TWO SEPARATE SITUATIONS WHERE ABDULMALIK HAD BEEN DIRECTLY AND PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN PLANNING FOR TERRORIST ACTION AGAINST U.S. FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL IN TURKEY; THAT WASHINGTON HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED AT THE GOT RESPONSE WHICH HAD FAILED TO INDICATE THAT IT PLANNED TO TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST ABDULMALIK AND HIS ACTIVITIES; AND, THAT WE BELIEVED THAT THE GOT SHOULD TAKE SOME DIRECT ACTION AGAINST THE LPB AND ABDULMALIK IN LIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS PLANNING TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST U.S. FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL IN TURKEY. YILMAZ WOULD NOT BE DRAWN INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE AMBASSADOR'S COMPLAINTS ABOUT ABDULMALIK, BUT ASSURED HIM THAT THE GOT HAD TAKEN ALL POSSIBLE SECURITY MEASURES, AND THAT PRIMIN OZAL HAD GIVEN SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS REGARD BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR THE OECD MEETING IN PARIS.

6. ABOUT ONE HOUR AFTER THE AMBASSADOR LEFT YILMAZ'S OFFICE, TURKISH SECURITY FORCES NABBED TWO LIBYANS WHO HAD BEEN ABOUT TO ATTACK THE AMERICAN FACILITY, AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER PICKED UP TWO OTHER LIBYANS, ONE OF WHOM WAS A TEACHER AT THE LIBYAN SCHOOL IN ANKARA. THAT EVENING AND THROUGHOUT THE NEXT DAY OR SO WE RECEIVED DIRECTLY FROM LIAISON SOURCES AND FROM OTHER SECURITY SOURCES SOME LIMITED INFORMATION ABOUT THE INCIDENT. WE ALSO NOTED VERY STRONG SECURITY MEASURES THAT THE TURKS HAD APPLIED TO PROTECT U.S. FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. (THESE REMAIN LARGELY IN PLACE AS OF EARLY JUNE.)

7. ON APRIL 19, THE AMBASSADOR CALLED ON MESUT YILMAZ ONCE AGAIN, TO THANK THE GOT FOR ITS VIGILANCE IN APPREHENDING THE WOULD-BE BOMBERS AND THUS PREVENTING A TERRIBLE TRAGEDY (THERE HAD BEEN A WEDDING RECEPTION AT THE U.S. FACILITY WHEN THE TWO LIBYANS WERE CAUGHT IN ITS VICINITY). HE ALSO URGED THE GOT TO CONSIDER EXPELLING ABDULMALIK, GIVEN HIS  
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# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 ANKARA 6052 DTG: 051402Z JUN 86 PSN: 005009  
EOB732 AN07642 TOR: 157/0457Z CSN: HCE052

BELIEVE, WERE SYSTEMATICALLY PLANNED "LEAKS."

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AMCONSUL IZMIR 6147  
AMEMBASSY LISBON 0087  
USMISSION USNATO 2495  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 06 ANKARA 06052

NOFORN

TERREP

LISBON PASS AMB. STRAUSSZ-HUPE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PINS, ASEC, KPRP, TU, LY, US  
SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF THE GOT'S HANDLING OF THE

OBVIOUS CONNECTION WITH THE TERRORIST INCIDENT, AND  
THUS "SEND A SIGNAL TO ABDULMALIK'S MASTERS THAT THEY  
SHOULD NOT TRY SOMETHING LIKE THAT IN TURKEY." THE  
AMBASSADOR ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE BOMBING INCIDENT  
AFFORDED THE GOT AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE THE  
TURKISH PEOPLE WITH A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE DESPICABLE  
ACT THAT QADHAFI HAD BEEN TRYING TO PERPETRATE IN  
TURKEY. YILMAZ AGREED TO SHARE WITH THE EMBASSY THE  
RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT, BUT  
MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON THE AMBASSADOR'S  
SUGGESTIONS.

8. DURING THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE  
INCIDENT THE POLICE PROVIDED SOME INFORMATION, BUT  
THIS WAS QUICKLY SHUT OFF. ✓

PHASE II  
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9. THE BEGINNING OF PHASE II COINCIDED ROUGHLY WITH  
PRIME MINISTER OZAL'S RETURN TO TURKEY ON THE EVENING  
OF APRIL 20. THE CUT OFF IN THE FLOW OF INFORMATION  
FROM TURKISH AUTHORITIES ABOUT THE INCIDENT AND THEIR  
INVESTIGATION OF IT CONTINUED DURING THIS PHASE.  
DESPITE THIS APPARENT OFFICIAL BLACK-OUT ON  
INFORMATION REGARDING THE INCIDENT, THE POLICE  
CONTINUED THE NORMAL FLOW OF INFORMATION ON SECURITY  
DEVELOPMENTS TO U.S. OFFICIALS. INFORMATION  
REGARDING THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING CAME THROUGH, WHAT WE

10. WE INTERPRET THE OFFICIAL SILENCE OF PHASE II  
AS REFLECTING THE TURKISH ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH THE  
EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND DIFFICULT DILEMMA CREATED BY  
THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING, AND THE OFFICIAL LIBYAN  
INVOLVEMENT IN IT. THE FOLLOWING ARE AMONG THE  
FACTORS THAT PRIMIN OZAL HAD TO WEIGH IN DECIDING HOW  
TO ACT:

-- THE IMPORTANT ECONOMIC-COMMERCIAL STAKES THAT  
TURKEY HAS IN LIBYA (ARREARAGES OWED BY LIBYA TO  
TURKISH FIRMS, THE FATE OF TURKISH BANKS AND HOLDING  
COMPANIES--SOME OF WHICH HAVE BEEN FINANCIAL BACKERS  
OF OZAL AND HIS RULING MOTHERLAND PARTY, BILLIONS OF  
DOLLARS OF PENDING CONTRACTS IN LIBYA, SOME 30,000  
TURKISH WORKERS STILL IN LIBYA, AND OIL IMPORTS FROM  
LIBYA).

-- THE FACT THAT A SIZABLE SEGMENT OF THE TURKISH  
POPULACE SYMPATHIZED WITH LIBYA IN THE WAKE OF THE  
APRIL 15 U.S. AIRSTRIKES ON TERRORIST AND MILITARY  
TARGETS IN THAT COUNTRY-- WHETHER MOTIVATED BY  
FEELINGS OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY, RECOLLECTIONS OF  
LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TURKEY AT THE TIME OF THE 1974  
CYPRUS CRISIS, OR BY LOVE-HATE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE  
U.S.

-- PRESSURE FROM THE TURKISH MILITARY AND MANY OTHER  
KEMALISTS, NOT EXCLUDING PRESIDENT EVREN, TO TAKE  
ACTION AGAINST THE LIBYANS HERE.

-- USG EXPECTATIONS THAT ACTION BE TAKEN AGAINST THE  
LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU, AND OZAL'S AWARENESS THAT THE  
U.S. WAS FULLY COGNIZANT OF THE LPB'S INVOLVEMENT IN  
THE ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ATTACK.

-- TURKEY'S STRONG OPPOSITION AGAINST INTERNATIONAL  
TERRORISM, SPURRED ON BY ARMENIAN TERRORISTS' ATTACKS  
ON TURKISH DIPLOMATS.

-- DOMESTIC POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE, WHICH  
OZAL HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT LEST HE GIVE HIS  
OPPONENTS POLITICAL AMMUNITION TO USE AGAINST HIM.

11. OZAL PRESUMABLY CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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EOB733 AN007641 TOR: 157/04592 CSN: HCE054

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 06 ANKARA 006052

NOFORN

TERREP

LISBON PASS AMB. STRAUSZ-HUPE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PINS, ASEC, KPRP, TU, LY, US  
SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF THE GOT'S HANDLING OF THE

WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SWEEP THE TERRORIST ATTEMPT UNDER THE RUG AND THAT, THEREFORE, HE HAD TO TAKE ACTION. IN AN ATTEMPT TO LIMIT DAMAGE TO TURKEY'S INTERESTS VIS-A-VIS BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND LIBYA, AND TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT VARIOUS DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RAMIFICATIONS, WE BELIEVE THAT OZAL DEVELOPED AN APPROACH WHICH HE HOPED WOULD SATISFY THOSE (INCLUDING THE U.S.), WHO WERE URGING HIM TO ACT, WHILE NOT ALIENATING LIBYA AND THAT PART OF HIS CONSTITUENCY, WHICH SYMPATHIZED WITH, OR HAD ECONOMIC STAKES IN, LIBYA. THAT PLAN, IF OUR ANALYSIS IS CORRECT, INVOLVED MOVES WHICH WOULD KEEP THE GOVERNMENT'S HAND OUT OF SIGHT AS GOT ORCHESTRATED REVELATIONS IN THE TURKISH NEWS MEDIA ABOUT JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE TURKISH COURTS PUT PRESSURE ON THE LIBYANS.

PHASE III  
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12. THE FIRST VISIBLE INDICATION OF A SHIFT TO WHAT WE HAVE CALLED PHASE III OCCURRED FOLLOWING AN EXTRAORDINARY MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY BOARD ON SUNDAY, APRIL 27. (THE BOARD COMPRISES PRESIDENT EVREN, PRIMIN OZAL, THE CHIEF OF THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF, ALL FORCE COMMANDERS AND KEY MINISTERS.) WE SUSPECT THAT THE SUBSEQUENT EVENTS WHICH CHARACTERIZED THIS PHASE OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE INCIDENT WERE RATIFIED AT THAT MEETING. ON APRIL 28, THE TWO SUSPECTS ARRESTED AT

THE SCENE OF THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING, TWO OFFICIALS OF THE LIBYAN PEOPLES' BUREAU IN ANKARA, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF LIBYAN AIRLINES IN ISTANBUL WERE ARRAIGNED BEFORE THE ANKARA STATE SECURITY COURT. (ONE OF THE LPB OFFICIALS AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF LIBYAN AIRLINES WERE INDICTED "IN ABSENTIA" WHILE THE OTHER REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LPB WAS ALLOWED TO REMAIN FREE PENDING TRIAL.) AT THE SAME TIME, THE MFA ISSUED A CAREFULLY WORDED STATEMENT THAT CONDEMNED TERRORISM, WARNED THAT TURKEY WOULD NOT TOLERATE TERRORIST ACTS ON ITS SOIL, AND CLAIMED THAT "THERE IS NO INFORMATION OR PROOF" CONNECTING LPB SECRETARY ABDULMALIK TO THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING.

13. IN AN UNUSUAL MOVE FOR TURKISH COURT OFFICIALS, THE ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR GAVE EXTENSIVE DETAILS OF THE CHARGES AGAINST THE FIVE LIBYANS TO THE PRESS AND "LEAKED" COPIES OF THE OFFICIAL INDICTMENT. BOTH THE PUBLIC STATEMENT AND THE INDICTMENT ITSELF (ANKARA 5513) ESTABLISHED DIRECT COMPLICITY OF LPB OFFICIALS IN THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING.

14. A THIRD DEVELOPMENT DURING THIS PERIOD WERE UNOFFICIAL, INFORMAL COMMUNICATIONS TO EMBASSY OFFICERS CAUTIONING THE U.S. NOT TO BECOME OPENLY INVOLVED IN THE CASE AGAINST THE LIBYANS. THE CLEAR IMPLICATION WAS THAT THE TURKS WOULD DO "THE NECESSARY," BUT FELT THAT THEY HAD TO PROJECT AN IMAGE OF INDEPENDENCE FROM THE U.S. AND HAD TO AVOID ANY INDICATION THAT THEY WERE REACTING TO U.S. PRESSURES IN THEIR PROSECUTION OF THE LIBYAN DEFENDANTS, WE INTERPRET THE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO

ABDULMALIK IN THE MFA STATEMENT AS A SUBTLE WAY OF ASSOCIATING ABDULMALIK WITH TERRORISM OFFICIALLY, WHILE CLAIMING THAT "NO EVIDENCE" HAD BEEN FOUND TO LINK HIM DIRECTLY TO THE SPECIFIC BOMBING ATTEMPT. THUS, THE GOT COULD ALSO PLAUSIBLY ARGUE THAT IT HAD NOT CAVED TO U.S. PRESSURES TO HIT AT ABDULMALIK. THIS SAME THEME WAS REFLECTED IN A WASHINGTON-DATELINED REPORT IN MAY 3 "CUMHURİYET," WHICH CITED U.S. OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON AS DESCRIBING THE DILEMMA WHICH THE ATTEMPTED BOMBING REPRESENTED FOR TURKEY. THESE UNNAMED OFFICIALS HAD REPORTEDLY ORDERED THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN ANKARA TO "AVOID ANY ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE THE TURKISH  
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# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

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LISBON PASS AMB. STRAUSSZ-HUPE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PINS, ASEC, KPRP, TU, LY, US  
SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF THE GOT'S HANDLING OF THE

GOVERNMENT IN THIS CASE." (N.B.: THERE HAD BEEN NO SUCH INSTRUCTIONS.)

15. MEANWHILE, THE LIBYAN OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT BEGAN RETURNING TO LIBYA FOR "PERSONAL REASONS," AND PERSISTENT RUMORS BEGAN CIRCULATING IN ANKARA TO THE EFFECT THAT ABDULMALIK WOULD ALSO BE RETURNING TO LIBYA IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WHETHER HE GOES OR NOT, WE WOULD NOTE THAT HE SEEMS TO HAVE DROPPED FROM PUBLIC SIGHT SINCE HIS APPEARANCE AT A DIPLOMATIC RECEPTION ON APRIL 28.

PHASE IV  
-----

16. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS PHASE, IN WHICH THE TURKS HOPE TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE, WILL SEE A CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT OFFICIAL SILENCE REGARDING THE CASE AS THE TURKS ALLOW "THE INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY" TO TRY THE TWO LIBYANS ARRESTED AT THE SCENE. MOST OF THE REMAINING MEMBERS OF THE LPB BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE CASE HAVE QUIETLY LEFT TURKEY. THUS, THE GOT WILL MAINTAIN A CORRECT OFFICIAL POSTURE OF NON-INVOLVEMENT, WHICH IT HOPES WILL PROTECT THEIR ECONOMIC STAKES IN LIBYA, WHILE ALLOWING THE "INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY" TO AIR THE DETAILS OF THE LIBYAN CONNECTION AND HAND DOWN APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT TO THE ATTEMPTED BOMBERS.

17. THUS FAR, TWO SESSIONS OF THE TRIAL HAVE BEEN HELD, ON MAY 13 (ANKARA 5192), AND MAY 21 (ANKARA 5513). A FURTHER SESSION IS SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 5. THE ALLEGATIONS, MADE BY THE DEFENDANTS AT THE MAY 13 SESSION, THAT THEY HAD BEEN INTERROGATED BY AMERICANS WERE TRANSPARENTLY FICTITIOUS, AND EVEN LESS CREDIBLE BECAUSE OF THE OFFICIAL HANDS-OFF POLICY FOLLOWED BY THE U.S.G.

18. THE SECOND SESSION OF THE TRIAL SAW THE INTRODUCTION BY THE PROSECUTOR, OF A SUPPLEMENTAL INDICTMENT ANKARA 5698) AGAINST THE LIBYAN COUNSEL GENERAL IN ISTANBUL, ZAYYANI. THE INDICTMENT, PROMPTLY "LEAKED" TO THE PRESS, CONTAINED A STRONG CONDEMNATION OF TERRORISM, CLAIMING THAT TERRORIST ACTS, AS "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY", CANNOT BE COVERED BY DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY. THE SUPPLEMENTAL INDICTMENT CITED THE TOKYO SUMMITS' ANTI-TERRORIST AGREEMENT AS A COMPELLING REASON FOR REJECTING ZAYYANI'S CLAIM OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY AND TRYING HIM AS AN ACCOMPLICE. (JUST PRIOR TO THE INDICTMENT, THE AMBASSADOR HAD PASSED A COPY OF THE AGREEMENT TO FOMMIN HALEFOGLU AND USED THE OCCASION TO AGAIN URGE ACTION AGAINST THE LPB (REF E).)

19. THE COURT IS SCHEDULED TO MAKE A DECISION ON THE NEW INDICTMENT AT ITS JUNE 5 SESSION. WHILE WE DO NOT EXPECT THE COURT TO TRY ZAYYANI, THE SUPPLEMENTAL INDICTMENT IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF TURKISH PRESSURE ON THE LIBYANS "TO DO THE NECESSARY."

20. COMMENT: GIVEN THE DELICACY OF THE SITUATION AND THE UNENVIABLE POSITION IN WHICH THE TURKS FIND THEMSELVES, IT APPEARS THAT THE INCIDENT WILL BE RESOLVED IN A MANNER NOT UNSATISFACTORY TO U.S. INTERESTS. THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAUS IN ANKARA AND ISTANBUL HAVE BEEN DIRECTLY IMPLICATED IN AN ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ACT ON TURKISH SOIL, SOMETHING THAT FEW TURKS, REGARDLESS OF THEIR POLITICAL SYMPATHIES, WOULD CONDONE. THE FACT THAT THE LPB'S HAVE BEEN THUS PUBLICLY DISCREDITED SHOULD MINIMIZE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS AS VEHICLES FOR ANTI-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS HAVE DULLED THE ARDOR OF THOSE, LIKE MR. ERBAKAN (LEADER OF THE NOW BANNED RELIGIOUS PARTY, NSP) AND MR. ECEVIT (FORMER PRIME MINISTER AND LEADER OF THE DEFUNCT RPP), WHO HAD GONE OUT OF THEIR WAY TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE LPB AND LIBYA  
BT

~~SECRET~~



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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101063	REPORT RE LIBYA	2	6/5/1986	B1 B3

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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
101064	MEMO  FORM MEMO TO NORTH RE REPORT	1	6/10/1986	B1 B7(D) B7(E)

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
101065	REPORT RE LIBYA	1	5/27/1986	B1 B7(D) B7(E)

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ROUTING

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	O. North	6/10	
2	H. Teicher	6/10	
3			
4			
5			
6			

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	FILE
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:  
Please match with Treasury memo of June 9, 1986.

*Cal*  
~~TOP SECRET~~


UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. 40243

COPY NO. 1 OF 2

HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY

# NSC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT

  
Warning Notice  
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved  
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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101066	MEMO  TO MACDANIEL RE LIBYAN TERRORISM	1	6/4/1986	B1 B3

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
101067	REPORT  RE LIBYAN TERRORISM	5	6/2/1986	B1  B3

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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NORTH

Libya Q's and A's

Q: Does it appear that the threat of Libyan-backed terrorism is increasing?

A: There have been recent terrorist incidents in several geographic locations which could have a Libyan connection. We are following developments carefully but have no further comment about the degree of Libyan official culpability.

Q: Are we sending an envoy to Europe to talk about Libya?

A: We have had a continuing dialogue regarding Libyan terrorism since late last year. We intend to continue these consultations in an effort to realize our objective of convincing Libya to desist from its support of terrorism.

Q: Who would consult? When would these consultations take place?

A: I will not confirm at this time when such consultations would take place or who would undertake them.

Q: Are the U.S. and France planning to cooperate against Libya in Chad?

A: The U.S. has been assisting the Chadian government to strengthen its armed forces for several years, as has the Government of France. We intend to continue to cooperate with France in Chad.

Q: Why was General Lawson in Chad?

A: Lawson visited Chad to assess first-hand the value of U.S. security assistance to Chad.

Q: Is the U.S. planning pre-emptive military strikes against Libya?

A: Our policy toward Libyan-backed support for terrorism is well known, unequivocal and unchanged. We will employ all appropriate measures to cause Libya to cease its terrorist policies. We are currently undertaking a series of such measures. As the President said on April 14, we will act again with force if necessary.



June 16, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL *Bob*

SUBJECT: Draft Form Letter for Support of U.S. Military  
Action Against Libya

The NSC concurs in proposed draft form letter at Tab A prepared to respond to correspondence regarding U.S. military action against Libya (Tab B).

Attachments

Tab A - Draft Form Letter

Tab B - Pelavin ltr to the President of April 15, 1986

04771

NYAUN/AD / [Signature]  
C... ..

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 25, 1986

RRLIBYA

Dear ///:

I want to thank you and the members of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council for your letter of support for our recent actions to counter and deter international terrorism. Your words of encouragement are most welcome.

Our response puts on notice those who openly advocate and carry out acts of violence against the United States. We Americans are slow to anger and reluctant to use force. By tradition and temperament, we seek to resolve even the most intractable conflicts by the steady application of diplomacy and reason. But where these fail, and a government targets this Nation or its citizens for terror, our love of peace must never be mistaken for fear to act. We will do what is necessary, unilaterally or in concert with others, to defend our people and our way of life.

Again, thank you for your message. You and all the members of your organization have my heartfelt appreciation.

# National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council

443 Park Avenue South, New York, N.Y. 10016

(212) 684-6950

April 15, 1986

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House Office  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D. C. 20500


Dear Mr. President:

The National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council applauds your decision last night to attack the bases from which Muammar Khadafy has launched terrorist attacks against innocent Americans and the nationals of other countries. We join you in saluting the courageous members of our armed forces who carried out your policy of a measured, firm, and unambiguous response to the outrage of international terrorism.

We commend this action, not only because it is incumbent on the United States as a principle target of such violence to demonstrate that terrorists cannot, henceforth, act with impunity, but even more importantly, for the United States, as the champion of democracy and individual liberty to defend these freedoms in behalf of her own citizens and, indeed, everyone seeking the right to live freely and without fear.

As the national planning and coordinating body for the field of Jewish community relations consisting of the 13 national and 111 community member agencies listed on the reverse of this letterhead, we have long recognized the need for a forceful reaction to international terrorism. Please be assured of our continued and most enthusiastic support for the difficult, dangerous, but essential measures you have undertaken in the battle against international terrorism.

Sincerely,



Michael Pelavin  
Chairman

MP:bp

3471

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 28, 1986

MEMORANDUM

TO: NSC / Van Eron  
FROM: CHUCK DONOVAN *[Signature]*  
Office of Correspondence

The attached draft form reply is submitted for review by the appropriate staff member. This issue is running in current mail and the volume justifies use of a form response. I can be reached at x7610 if any information on the incoming mail regarding this issue is required by your office.

Thank you very much.

*Large volume of incoming, but this will be sparingly used in similar cases.*

cc: Pending File

THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: APRIL 18, 1986

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. MICHAEL PELAVIN

SUBJECT: WRITES IN SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY ACTION  
TAKEN AGAINST LIBYA

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
MAX GREEN	ORG	86/04/18		C 86/04/21
<i>Anne Huggen</i> REFERRAL NOTE: <u>COHIGG</u>	R	86/04/21		<del>86/04/21</del>
REFERRAL NOTE: _____				
REFERRAL NOTE: _____				
REFERRAL NOTE: _____				
REFERRAL NOTE: _____				

COMMENTS: Presidential Response if possible

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: \_\_\_\_\_ MEDIA: L INDIVIDUAL CODES: \_\_\_\_\_  
PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

- \*\*\*\*\*
- |                          |                      |                      |   |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES:           | *DISPOSITION         | *CUTTING             | * |
| *                        | *                    | *CORRESPONDENCE:     | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION    | *A-ANSWERED          | *TYPE PESP=INITIALS  | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM         | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER          | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE        | *C-COMPLETED         | * CODE = A           | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET    | *S-SUSPENDED         | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* |                      | * OUTGOING           | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * |                      |                      | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE *       |                      |                      | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY *       |                      |                      | * |
- \*\*\*\*\*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 13, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Draft Form Letter re Support of U.S. Military  
Action Against Libya

Attached at Tab I is memo from you to Anne Higgins forwarding NSC concurrence in the draft form letter (Tab A) prepared for responding to mail regarding USG actions against Libya (Tab B).

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Anne Higgins at Tab I.

Approve

OLN

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I - McDaniel Memo to Higgins
- Tab A - Draft Form Letter
- Tab B - Pelevin ltr to the President  
of April 15, 1986

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4620

NOT H

June 17, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID CHEW

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL *Bob for*  
SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Rep. Glenn Anderson

This memorandum forwards the proposed Presidential letter to Rep. Glenn Anderson regarding our recent actions in Libya. The NSC approves the attached draft.

Attachment

Tab A Presidential reply

T  
A  
B  
A



# WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 6/13/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 3:00 TODAY

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO REP. GLENN ANDERSON RE: LIBYA

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	MASENG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WALLISON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LACY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



REMARKS: Please give your comments by 3:00 Friday afternoon. Thanks.

RESPONSE:

David L. Chew  
Staff Secretary  
Ext. 2702

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Glenn:

I want to thank you for your thoughtful message of support for our recent actions against Libya's terrorist-related installations.

Our response puts on notice those who openly advocate and carry out acts of violence against the United States. We Americans are slow to anger and reluctant to use force. By tradition and temperament, we seek to resolve even the most intractable conflicts by the steady application of diplomacy and reason. But where these fail, and a government targets this nation or its citizens for terror, our love of peace must never be mistaken for fear to act. We will do what is necessary, unilaterally or in concert with others to defend our people and our way of life.

Again, thank you for your statement of support. It meant a great deal to me. ~~God bless you.~~

Sincerely,

*defend ourselves*

The Honorable Glenn Anderson  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 13, 1986

**SIGNED**

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: DENNIS ROSS *DR*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Rep. Glenn Anderson

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memo to David Chew, forwarding a proposed Presidential letter to Rep. Glenn Anderson regarding our recent actions in Libya.

Ron ~~Sable~~ *HT*, Howard Teicher and Ollie North concur. *ON*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve *WAP* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to David Chew
- Tab A Proposed Presidential reply

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARY REFERRAL

TIME STAMP

86 JUN 13 11:06 AM

SYSTEM I LOG NUMBER: 4620

(FIRST DRAFT OF REMARKS)

ACTION OFFICER: [REDACTED] *ok* DUE: 13 June TODAY

- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Speakes
- Prepare Memo \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

## IMMEDIATE

\*\*\* PUT RESPECTIVE STAFF OFFICER'S NAME IN MARGIN BESIDE CHANGES.

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS\*

DUE: \_\_\_\_\_

\*PHONE to action officer at ext. \_\_\_\_\_

- |  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks        | <input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski       | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sable   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt     | <input type="checkbox"/> Levine           | <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro   | <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard          | <input type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Childress     | <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley           | <input type="checkbox"/> Small              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb          | <input type="checkbox"/> Major            | <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky     | <input type="checkbox"/> Mandel           | <input type="checkbox"/> Soos               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid | <input type="checkbox"/> Matlock          | <input type="checkbox"/> Stark              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky    | <input type="checkbox"/> May              | <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donley        | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> North | <input type="checkbox"/> St Martin          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass      | <input type="checkbox"/> Perry            | <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar        | <input type="checkbox"/> Platt            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Teicher |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes        | <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi       | <input type="checkbox"/> Thompson           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hanley        | <input type="checkbox"/> Raymond          | <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly         | <input type="checkbox"/> Reger            | <input type="checkbox"/> _____              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer       | <input type="checkbox"/> Ringdahl         | <input type="checkbox"/> _____              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Laux          | <input type="checkbox"/> Ross             | <input type="checkbox"/> _____              |

INFORMATION

McDaniel

Pearson

Secretariat

Rodman

\_\_\_\_\_

Exec. Sec. Desk

Poindexter (advance)

Fortier (advance)

~~SECRET~~

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90451

CRISIS PRE-PLANNING GROUP

Room 208 - Old EOB  
Wednesday, June 18, 1986  
2:00 - 3:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

WHITE HOUSE

Rodney B. McDaniel

Peter Rodman

OVP

Donald Gregg

NSC

Elaine L. Morton

Oliver North

Howard Teicher

STATE

Michael H. Armacost

Richard Murphy

Robert Oakley

TREASURY

Robert M. Kimmit

Russell Monk

CIA

Richard Kerr

Charles Allen

DOD

Richard Armitage

JCS

LTG John H. Moellering

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NLRR #101068  
BY rw NARA DATE 11/4/16

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Earl E  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II  
90451

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June 13, 1986

101069

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MS. SHERRIE COOKSEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of the Treasury


COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN H. RIXSE  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

REAR ADMIRAL JOHN BITOFF  
Executive Assistant to the Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: CPPG Meeting on Libya, Wednesday, June 18, 1986,  
2:00 p.m. (S)

A CPPG meeting will be convened on Wednesday, June 18, 1986 at 2:00 p.m. in Room 208, OEOB to review next political and economic steps toward Libya. An agenda is attached at Tab A. A list of participants is at Tab B. (S)

  
Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A - Agenda  
Tab B - List of Participants

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NLR # 101069  
BY RW NARA DATE: 1/4/87

Tab A

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CRISIS PRE-PLANNING GROUP

CORDELL HULL CONFERENCE ROOM  
ROOM 208 - OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING

Wednesday, June 18, 1986 - 2:00 p.m.

LIBYA

Agenda

- I. Introduction Chairman
- II. Intelligence Update CIA
  - o Internal situation/stability
  - o Intentions/preparation for further terrorist activity
- III. Political and Diplomatic Setting State
  - o Status of joint efforts with allies to combat terrorism (in the field) ? Do they mean "operationally"?
  - o Cooperation of allies on economic sanctions
- IV. Economic Sanctions Treasury ← No attendees from Treasury...
  - o Implementation of June 30 deadline
  - o Implementation of refined product ban
  - o Implementation of residual supplier initiative (Libyan oil boycott) State
  - o Follow-up of Tokyo Summit initiatives Treasury/State  
(financial transactions; closing People's bureaus, etc.)
- V. Summary/Tasking Chairman

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NLR/MIL/6/1 #101070

BY RW NARA DATE 3/1/18





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CRISIS PRE-PLANNING GROUP

Room 208 - Old EOB  
Wednesday, June 18, 1986  
2:00 - 3:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

WHITE HOUSE

Rodney B. McDaniel

OVP

Donald Gregg

NSC

Elaine L. Morton

*1st among equals, perhaps....*

Oliver North

Howard Teicher

STATE

Michael H. Armacost

Richard Murphy

Robert Oakley

CIA

Richard Kerr

Charles Allen

DOD

Richard Armitage

JCS

LTG John H. Moellering

*RBM on't NSC anymore?*

*No Ross?  
No Rodman?*

*Treasury?*

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NLRR # 101071

BY FW NARA DATE 1/4/17

Italy

July 86

## Italian Assault on Terrorism and Narcotics Trafficking

Italy is in the forefront of Western efforts to counter international narcotics trafficking and terrorism. It has been particularly forthcoming in efforts to isolate Libya in response to its policy of exporting terrorism. Following the 27 December 1985 terrorist attack on Fiumicino Airport, Italy reevaluated its security program and emplaced extensive security measures at all major ports of entry. But this was only one of Italian efforts to thwart the growing terrorist plague.

Being no stranger to terrorism, Italy emerged from the experience of widespread domestic terrorism in early 1980 convinced that it must take firm action against terrorists. It instituted extraordinary legal measures, broadening police power, mandating stiff penalties and permitting lengthy detention of terrorist suspects as well as initiating a program of encouraging imprisoned terrorists to repent. Italian authorities see these actions as fruitful in decreasing domestic terrorism.

Throughout 1986, Italy has been especially aggressive in joining the US and other nations in combatting international terrorism and narcotics trafficking. In January, mandatory visa requirements were reinstated for citizens of Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria in an effort to stop transit of Middle Eastern terrorists who have a penchant for carrying forged passports of these countries. An agreement to strengthen political and technical cooperation on, among other issues, international terrorism, narcotics, and organized crime was signed by the Italian and Greek governments in February.

Following revelation of the Libyan role in the Berlin "La Belle" disco bombing and the 15 April US retaliatory raid on Tripoli, Italy joined its European Common Market partners in backing the US campaign against Libyan terrorism by decreasing the number of Libyan diplomats in Europe and tightening controls on their movement. Nineteen Libyan diplomats were expelled from Libya in May for "participating in activities inconsistent with their diplomatic status."

Even the historically strong Italian economic ties with Libya have been strained by Libya's heinous acts. In February, Rome placed embargos on all arms shipments to Libya and instituted procedures to subject virtually all other goods to close government scrutiny to ensure that no arms were exported. Following the Berlin disco bombing, Italy decreased its purchases of Libyan crude oil.

Not only terrorists are feeling the wrath of an emboldened Italy. Narcotics and organized crime, which in Italy are inextricably linked, are also priority targets for action. The long tradition of joint drug enforcement between the US and Italy has been strengthened by recent initiatives. In 1984 a bilateral extradition treaty was signed and a high level working group on narcotics traffic and organized crime established. Last month terrorism was added to its agenda and an agreement on data base sharing signed.

*it*

Italy has been out front in pushing these subjects as priority topics for international discussion and cooperation and has demonstrated its resolve by actions as well as words. Syrian diplomatic personnel, caught smuggling narcotics into Italy in diplomatic vehicles, were expelled in April. Stepped up domestic drug interdiction efforts and seizure of heroin conversion labs has led to a significant drop in heroin traffic from Italy to the US. In June a bilateral anti-narcotics agreement, patterned after the US-Italian agreement, was signed with Spain and in July a protocol on security cooperation in counterterrorism was signed with Egypt. Only by increased international cooperation such as demonstrated by Italy can the world hope to control the twin evils of terrorism and narcotics trafficking.

23 June 1986

## LIBYA

Public opinion "rally events" are those international crises where the president is involved in specific, direct, dramatic and sharply focused action. Initially, the public invariably rallies 'round the president and his ratings increase, but as time elapses and more information on the event is presented to the public by the media, the public may change its mind about the support it gives the president. For example, the public rallied behind President Ford during the Mayaguez incident in 1975 and stayed there, but the public did not rally for long behind President Johnson during the Pueblo incident in 1968.

The question addressed by the recent (June 1986) NSIC poll was whether or not the bombing of Libya in April was a "rally event" which would receive sustained public support, or was it one where the public would back away from its initial positive reaction.

Before the president ended his April 14 announcement that U.S. planes had carried out bombing missions over Libya, the phones were ringing across America as pollsters sought to determine American reaction to the event. They all (NBC/WSJ, ABC/WP, CBS/NYT, USA Today, Gallup (for Newsweek), and DMI found the same answer. Public approval of the raid ranged between a low of 70% to a high of 79%, depending on the poll consulted.

Has this support been maintained in the months following the raid, given the intense media scrutiny surrounding the bombing and Libya's attempt to focus attention on civilian casualties? In immediate follow up polls ABC/WP found that support was still high (76% in an April 28 poll and 75% in a May 19 survey). NSIC's early June poll revealed that approval for the bombing of Libya remained at the high level (75%) it received when action was first taken.

Not only has the popularity of the raid lasted with the American public, but its affect has been to raise the president's overall job rating higher than it has ever been before as measured in the Gallup poll. A mid-May survey showed 68% of the public approved of the way the president was handling his job. This was the highest rating for any previous president in the second year of his second term since World War II.

While all subgroups approved of the Libya bombing, responses did vary by certain demographic factors. Men, people from upper income families, conservatives, moderates, and "hardliners" or "internationalists" were strongest in their support. On the other hand women, low income earners, blacks, isolationists, and accommodationists were weakest in their support.

One of the reasons for the lasting popularity of the raid on Libya was probably the long and patient campaign conducted by the U.S. to get Libya to stop supporting terrorism and to educate the public about Libya's role in international terrorism. The April CBS/NYT poll reported evidence that indicated Americans were well grounded in their support of the raids:

- . 74% of the population believed Libya was responsible for the bombing of the nightclub in West Berlin;
- . 64% believed that the U.S. had done as much as it could have to deal with Libya through diplomatic means;
- . 57% (up 17 points from a January 1986 poll) felt that if the U.S. made it a policy to take military action against a government that trained or financed terrorists, it would reduce terrorism in the long run.
- . 66% had confidence in President Reagan's ability to deal wisely with difficult international crises.

In a typical media presentation, Barry Sussman of the Washington Post reported "lopsided majorities" backing the raid on Libya and supporting similar ones on Syria and Iran if those nations were found to be sponsoring terrorism, and then qualified the findings with the following:

Only one in five surveyed, however, said they think that the April 15 strike against Tripoli and other Libyan sites will reduce international terrorism or make the world safer. (Emphasis added.)

Various polls reported that between 40% and 50% of the population expected the raids to lead to more terrorism, only between 20% and 30% thought they would help reduce terrorism, and the rest thought they would make no overall difference. To find out whether or not people still felt this way several months after the raids, a similar question was repeated in the June NSIC poll:

Looking back over the last two months, do you think the U.S. bombing of Libya has ... reduced terrorism ... led to even more terrorism ... or ... hasn't had much effect?

Reduced Terrorism	50%
Led to Even More Terrorism	15%
Hasn't Had Much Effect	34%

Despite their initial apprehensions about the bombing raids, the public has perceived the raids to have had an impact on reducing terrorism during the past two months. Responses are clearly associated with approval of the raids. Those who disapproved of the raids saw them as having produced more terrorism over the past two months than those who approved of the raids.

Possibly forgotten during the attention paid to the bombing raids was the March 1986 confrontation between the U.S. and Libya in the Gulf of Sidra. Support was high for U.S. military actions against Libya then, but as the State Department's Office of Opinion Analysis pointed out:

Support for the U.S. military actions stemmed more from a desire to preserve U.S. rights than from a belief U.S. actions would inhibit Libyan support for terrorism.

Whether it is to preserve our right to send ships into international waters or to have our citizens travel and work around the world without fear of attack on their person or property, Americans support taking limited military action and risks. The concept of preserving rights and liberties should be voiced as much as the concept of reducing terrorism when the U.S. is forced to take up arms against terrorist-states.

A final sign that American public patience with Libya and its leader Muammar Khaddafi has worn thin is the change in response rate to questions posed by the media about whether or not the U.S. should see to it that Khaddafi was killed. A March ABC/WP poll showed 76% opposed to this idea. One month later in an April poll (post-bombing), NBC/WSJ reported only 51% opposed, a change of 25 percentage points.

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101073	MEMO  TO BOHN RE LIBYA	1	7/3/1986	B1  B3

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101074	REPORT  RE LIBYA	4	6/23/1986	B1  B3

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