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Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 11/26/2010

File Folder LIBYA: TERRORISM II [TERRORISM: LIBYA 09/06/1986-09/24/1986]

FOIA

F95-023/9

Box Number 105

WILLS

43

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
101130	CABLE	102059Z SEP 86 D 3/28/2017 M1124/1	5	9/10/1986	B1 B3
101131	REPORT	RE QADHAFI	2	9/11/1986	B1 B7(D) B7(E)
101132	MEMO	WEINBERGER TO POINDEXTER RE MEDITERRANEAN CARRIER PRESENCE	4	9/11/1986	B1
101133	CABLE	151908Z SEP 86	3	9/15/1986	B1 B3
101134	CHART	WESTERN EUROPEAN ATTITUDES D 3/28/2017 M1124/1	1	ND	B1 B3
101135	REPORT	RE LIBYA D 3/28/2017 M1124/1	1	ND	B1 B3
101136	CABLE	232221Z SEP 86 D 3/28/2017 M1124/1	4	9/23/1986	B1 B3
101137	CABLE	241958Z SEP 86 D 3/28/2017 M1124/1	6	9/24/1986	B1 B3

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


National Security Council
The White House

System # IV

Package # 40321

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North
Coy
Earl

DRAFT

9/10/86

TERRORISM

Att: Libya II
+ Pub Dip

NSIC's September poll occurred in the wake of the Pan American airline hijacking in Karachi, Pakistan. Standard questions on terrorism asked in previous NSIC polls were reworded at the last minute to take into account this latest terrorist incident. Attitudes on retaliation, evidence linking terrorists to sponsor states, revealing intelligence sources to justify retaliation, and when to conduct rescue attempts were measured along with other factors relating to terrorism, including approval and effectiveness of the military strike against Libya in April.

Retaliation

Respondents were asked which of the following retaliatory options should the US select if it were determined that a foreign national helped the terrorists who hijacked the Pan Am plane:

- The US should not retaliate militarily.....37%
- The US should retaliate against any economic, military or terrorist target.....10%
- The US should retaliate against just military or terrorist targets.....19%
- The US should retaliate against terrorist facilities only.....33%

62%

Hence, overall, 62% favored some sort of military retaliation, differing only over the target. These results closely approximate those from a more generic question asked in June where 59% favored some sort of military retaliation against various targets in a sponsor country and 39% opposed any military retaliation.

Sentiment favoring retaliation seems to have reached a plateau since achieving its highest point in June. This can also be seen in the responses to the question which pitted two opposing views on whether to respond militarily to terrorism. Since July 1985, people have been asked which of the following opinions they felt was most like their own:

- We should not use military force against terrorism because...violence begets violence and innocent people would be killed....Such action would only make us no better than the terrorists.....42%

OR

Several governments have actively created the

conditions...that have led to attacks on Americans. Therefore, we should not hesitate to use military force against these countries to punish them...by not punishing violence, we encourage it to spread.....58%

Results of polls which asked this question over the past 15 months appear in Figure __. These data coupled with the other questions on retaliation indicate that generic support for retaliatory operations will not likely exceed the mid-60% range, while opposition will probably remain in the high-30% range. Also, support is clearly related to target, with military and terrorist facilities the most approved.

Opposition to retaliation comes from predictable quarters: women and minorities who are largely isolationists. The well educated liberals who are accommodationists.

Because other nations, most notably European ones, have not always supported US retaliatory measures, fear has been expressed that the American public, which favors military retaliation will respond to foreign opposition by suggesting that we withdraw some or all of our defense commitment to them. To test this, respondents were asked the following:

Let's say that the US decides to bomb Libya (a country¹) because of its terrorist activities. And let's also suppose that our European allies disagree with us, just as most of them did the last time it happened. Which of these statements comes closest to your opinion?

We should cut back our commitment to Europe's defense because if they won't help us, why should we help defend them.....38%

OR


We should not cut back our commitment to Europe's defense because this is not a big enough issue to affect our relationship with our European allies.....58%

Attitudes are this are definitely affected by one's basic outlook on international affairs. Unilateralists and isolationists coalesce to make up most of the group wishing to cut back our commitments. Internationalists and accommodationists form the majority block.

¹Half the sample was asked "Libya," the other half "a country," and no difference emerged in the response pattern.

tho it might be less if they said "Syria"

FIGURE 1
**USE OF MILITARY FORCE
AGAINST TERRORISM**



Smith=no military force--innocents might be killed
Jones=use military force against sponsors

DRAFT

Evidence

Two issues are of concern here. First, how much evidence should be required indicating a link between the hijackers and a foreign country before military retaliation is justified. Second, should the evidence be revealed to justify the retaliation if such would compromise the source of the information and make future intelligence more difficult to obtain.

To determine the first issue, the following was asked:

How much evidence linking the terrorists to a foreign country do you think the US should have before it can militarily retaliate against that country?

It doesn't matter how much evidence there is, the US should not retaliate militarily.....13%

The evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the country helped the terrorists before the US can retaliate.....65%

Since the country and the terrorists will try to hide all such evidence, the US needs only to have some evidence to justify military retaliation.....22%

US jurisprudence values are evident in the responses. Most Americans demand that there be a reasonable amount of evidence. Those who are willing to accept less evidence are poorly educated, low income earners, and minorities where the socialization on rules of evidence has not made significant inroads.

The second issue was measured by asking people what the US should do if evidence that linked the hijackers to a foreign country came from secret intelligence sources.

The US should retaliate militarily and reveal the evidence to justify the retaliation, even if it means compromising the information source and making future intelligence gathering more difficult.....25%

The US should retaliate militarily but do not reveal the evidence to protect the intelligence source, even if it means the US cannot justify retaliation to the world.....44%

The US should not retaliate militarily and do not reveal the evidence.....27%

Liberals favor revealing the source. Conservatives and a coalition of unilateralists and internationalists favor withholding the evidence in favor of protecting the source.

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Rescue

Deciding when to attempt to rescue hostages from terrorists is always a difficult decision. If the decision backfires, then the potential for criticism by the public is high. To put the public in the shoes of the decisionmakers on this issue, they were asked when they thought rescue attempts should occur in cases such as the Pan Am hijacking.

Never, because any rescue attempt will cause more harm to the hostages than good.....5%

Any time after it appears the terrorists have started killing hostages.....24%

As soon as the authorities think they can rescue the hostages without too many of them being hurt or killed.....69%

It appears that the public wants the authorities to have discretion on when best to move. The implication from the responses is that authorities do not have to wait until it looks like the hostages will be killed anyway to mount a rescue attempt. Also, because so few rejected the rescue notion, the public understands that such an option needs to be always available to the authorities.

Respondents were also asked their opinion on what should be done to secure the release of the hostages remaining captive in Lebanon.

Nothing -- there's nothing we can do.....4%

Work quietly behind the scenes without making any major concessions.....47%


Pressure the Kuwaiti government to release jailed terrorists in a swap agreement.....22%

Find out the location of the hostages and send in a rescue force.....26%

Most people favor the path the government is currently following. The response patterns show that the young (under 35) are more aggressive in what they would do. As many indicate they would try for a swap or mount a rescue attempt as say they would work quietly behind the scenes. The older respondents are much more patient.

Other distinctions between the groups are those who favor working quietly are well educated and moderate. Those who favor a rescue attempt are poorly educated whites, conservatives, and unilateralists. The "swappers" are poorly educated minorities and extreme liberals.

Figure 2
HOW SECURE LEBANON
HOSTAGES RELEASE



September 1986

DRAFT

Libya

The September NSIC poll showed approval of the bombing of Libya in April to be as high as it was the days immediately following the strike.


<u>Poll Date</u>	<u>Approval</u>
At time of raid	70-79% range
Late April (ABC/ <u>WP</u>)	76%
Mid-May (ABC/ <u>WP</u>)	75%
Mid-June (NSIC)	75%
Early September (NSIC)	75%

The maintenance of the approval rating for such a high profile action this long is unusual. It reflects the lack of opposition opinion leadership and a concentrated media effort to criticize the action. Research has shown that even when an act during an international crisis is extremely popular when first executed it will lose considerable popularity over time if opposition opinion leadership emerges and the media gives the event substantial critical attention.

Figure ___ shows that even in the wake of the hijacking and the synagogue terrorist attack which occurred during the interviewing for the September survey the public largely maintains that the raid on Libya reduced terrorism.

Responses are clearly associated with raid approval. A majority of those who approve of the raids hold that they reduced terrorism in the intervening time, and one-third say they had no effect. A majority of those who disapprove of the raid claims they have had no effect on terrorism and one-fourth say terrorism has actually increased.

FIGURE 3
**U.S. Raid on Libya:
Reduce or Increase Terrorism?**



PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

In previous reports, the focus has been on identifying the various underlying predispositions Americans have toward national security matters. The major questions addressed have been whether or not America should be involved in international affairs, and if so, what kind of involvement that should be. Furthermore, the use of military force as a vehicle for pursuing American interests abroad has been evaluated.

From this has come a six fold typology which permits the categorization of Americans as:

- . hard unilateralists (18%), who favor America pursuing an independent course of action in world affairs and would support the use of military force in doing so;
- . soft unilateralists (7%), who also favor an independent course but do not support the use of military force;
- . internationalists (27%), who favor a cooperative American foreign policy and would support the use of military force should the occasion demand;
- . accommodationists (18%), who favor a cooperative foreign policy but reject the use of military force;
- . belligerent isolationists (14%), who oppose US involvement in foreign affairs but would support the use of military force if the US had to get involved somewhere in the world; and
- . timid isolationists (16%), who oppose both US involvement in foreign affairs and the use of military force.

These groups have been replicated again in the September NSIC poll, and the basic definitions of each group and proportion of the US population remain the same as previously determined.

The major opposing predispositions are the hard unilateralists and accommodationists. Natural allies of the hard unilateralists are the belligerent isolationists, and for the accommodationists it is the timid isolationists. The balance of power rests with the internationalists and the soft unilateralists, who shift from side to side depending on the nature of the issue. Hence, consistency in one's overall policy approach will not necessarily produce consistency in public support, because a major portion of the population will shift in large measure depending on the specifics of any one national security matter.

DRAFT

Public Mood

Figure 1 shows that the recent poll detected a shift in the overall mood of the population regarding whether things in the world are going in the right direction or have gotten off on the wrong track. Previously, those with a more optimistic opinion numbered 35%, but they have dropped to only 27%. Pessimism, on the other hand, has increased from 61% to 68%.

Since the September survey was taken immediately following the Pan American airline hijacking in Karachi, Pakistan, and both the sharp US -- Soviet exchanges over the Daniloff affair and the terrorist attack on the synagogue in Turkey occurred during the interview process, the rise in pessimism is not surprising nor unexpected.

The important feature to learn from this is who is likely to become more pessimistic given dramatic and troubling international incidents. An interesting profile emerges when the data are examined. Older men (over 35) and younger women (under 35), those with less than a college education--particularly those without a high school diploma, low income earners, southerners, and blacks became more pessimistic in light of foreign events.

These are the same demographic groups who were more pessimistic to begin with. In other words, the pessimists became more pessimistic. Those with a more optimistic view of the world maintained their levels of optimism.

The attitudinal predispositions of the group that changed is interesting. Ideological extremists, both of the right and the left, were part of this group. So were Born Again Christians, and those favoring the use of military force in the pursuit of US international interests.

It appears that when events with a foreign origin occur that unsettle things in the world, the first to react attitudinally are the least educated, the least attentive to world affairs, and extremists. This suggests that when events are happening about the world of which the US is not in control, foreign policy leaders should resist initial public reaction, which is not likely to be based on a careful analysis of the situation.


Causes of Wars and Tensions

Building on a question asked in the June survey which sought to determine what Americans thought were the causes of terrorism, the September NSIC poll asked which of the following is the main cause of wars and tensions in the world today?

The ambitions of people who want more power.....40%

The military arms build up.....7%

FIGURE
AMERICAN ATTITUDES ABOUT
DIRECTION OF WORLD AFFAIRS



DRAFT

Nations pursuing their own selfish interests.....26%

The frustrations that come from poverty, injustice
and population pressures.....24%

Simplified, the causes are viewed in terms of people, military arms, the international nation-state system, and the political-economic environment. Responses are based on demographic and attitudinal groupings.

Those who blame world problems on people appear to come from two groups. One is middle-aged women, the poorly educated, and blacks (probably rural southern blacks as opposed to northern urban blacks). The other is conservatives, southerners, born again Christians, and unilateralists. The latter group appears to arrive at its response pattern from a philosophical base which places responsibility for behavior with the individual. The former group probably focuses on "people" as the cause of international tensions because it doesn't have the background to understand the other alternatives.

Military arms build-up as a cause for world problems is the domain of white, liberal Americans with post graduate degrees. They are also more frequently accommodationists in international orientation.

Men, those with a college degree, liberals, internationalists and accommodationists are most likely to place blame for world tensions on the nations themselves.

Environmental circumstances is the choice by a combination of people who can be described in Marxian terms as the intelligentsia and the underclass. Those with a high level of education, middle aged-men, and liberals make up the intelligentsia group. The underclass is made up of older women (over 55), those with a low education, low income earners, hispanics, and isolationists. These two groups predominant among those selecting environmental causes for world problems.

This indicates that behind the international orientation groups listed previously are quite different world views on blame and responsibility for international behavior. This further underscores the problems of building consensus on foreign policy. Not only do Americans differ profoundly on what the US should do internationally, they differ significantly on what causes the national security problems the US faces.

OVERVIEW OF SEPTEMBER SURVEY

DRAFT

General Attitudes

The public was more pessimistic about conditions in the world, which can be explained by the events surrounding the interview process. The Pan Am hijacking, the synagogue attack in Turkey, and the Daniloff story were the major news feature.

The public believes the two major causes of wars and tensions in the world are the ambitions of men who want more power (40%), and the selfish interests of nations (26%). Social problems (24%) and the arms build up (7%) received less attention.

US--Soviet Relations

As in June, people are not too concerned about holding a second summit, and they would blame the Soviets if one doesn't occur. A majority (58%) believe that the US should not make any preliminary concessions in arms control talks and on regional issues to induce the Soviets to the table for the second summit.

A large majority (72%) believe Daniloff was framed by the KGB. Only a few (20%) feel this should not interfere with talks with the Soviets. The rest split on whether to limit talks to the important ones such as arms control (40%) and calling off all talks (37%).

Arms Control and Defense Matters

There is little awareness and knowledge of the Soviet's proposal to ban all nuclear testing. A slight majority (52%) believe the U.S. should continue its nuclear testing.

The first sign that the administration's public support for SDI might begin to deteriorate appeared in this survey. Only 44% said SDI is the best way to avoid war and should not be given up as a bargaining chip, while 54% believed it served best as a bargaining chip. In July 1985, it was 51%, best way to avoid war and 47%, bargaining chip. This should be considered a public diplomacy warning.

People (57%) believe if Congress passes arms control measures that are contrary to administration positions. it will hurt the arms control process by undermining U.S. negotiating positions. The public is fairly evenly divided on the administration's arms control measures: 18% always respond in a pro-administration fashion, 35% usually take a pro-administration position, 30% lean against the administration and 15% are always against it.

The U.S. should cut off military aid to an ally (Pakistan) if it is on the verge of being able to produce a nuclear bomb.

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People are evenly divided over whether to reduce (28%) or increase (27%) defense spending, with most (43%) opting to keep it the same. This is a slight improvement in the pro-spending position since the beginning of the year.

Terrorism

People (61%) feel the U.S. should retaliate militarily against a foreign country that is found to have assisted the terrorists who hijacked the Pan Am airliner.

Most (44%) would prefer that the US retaliate but not reveal the evidence linking the terrorists to the foreign country if it would compromise the intelligence source. An equal number believe the US should retaliate but reveal the information (25%) as believe the US should not retaliate under such circumstances (27%).

The American judicial constraint of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is considered appropriate by most people (65%) in assessing the evidence of a linkage between the terrorists and a foreign country even though the country and the terrorists would do all possible to conceal the connection.

Most people (69%) believe rescue should be attempted in such cases as the Pan Am hijacking "as soon as the authorities think they can rescue the hostages without too many of them being hurt or killed."

Approval of the bombing of Libya is still as high (75%) as it was immediately after the strike, and a plurality (43%) feel it has reduced terrorist acts.

By 59% to 38%, people reject the idea of reducing our commitment to Europe because they do not support our retaliation policy.

Most Americans (47%) support working quietly behind the scenes to free the remaining hostages in Lebanon without making any major concessions. Some (22%) would pressure Kuwait to release terrorists in exchange for the Americans while others (26%) would try to locate and rescue the hostages.

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South Africa

Little has changed in the public's view of the US's position on apartheid. More (48%) think we accept or tolerate it than think we oppose it and are trying to pressure a change (44%). However, people still think a peaceful solution is possible by two to one.

Americans are split on economic sanctions; 47% favor them and 44% oppose.

A slight plurality (37%) thinks the sanctions will have no effect on apartheid, nearly as many (34%) think sanctions will force a change by the white government, and one in five (22%) feel they would cause the downfall of the white government.

If the white government were to fall, most people (62%) believe the new government would be anti-American.

Middle East

As in June, most (56%) believe differences are too great between Israel and the Arab states to permit a lasting peace.

Over the past 5 years, more people (19%) have become less favorably disposed towards Israel than have become more favorably disposed (10%). The negative change has occurred most among the well educated, high income earners, and in the snow belt from the Midwest to New England.

A majority (55%) would favor sending troops to the Middle East if fighting broke out which threatened U.S. access to oil.

International Economics

A slight majority (51%) of Americans are protectionists. They are largely over 55, of moderate education and income, Irish, Catholic, and from the industrial Midwest.

A plurality (41%) of Americans favor subsidizing agricultural sales abroad, but not with sales to potential enemies. Only 27% favor subsidizing such sales. 31% oppose any subsidies.

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