

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Graham, William R.: Files
Folder Title: US-USSR Summit – Reykjavik
10/11/1986-10/12/1986 (1)
Box: RAC Box 2

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name GRAHAM, DR. WILLIAM: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 4/13/2009

File Folder US-USSR SUMMIT- REYKJAVIK OCTOBER 11-12, 1986 (1)

FOIA

F06-043/2

Box Number ~~CF991~~ RAC Box 2

SAROTTE

25

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
68786 PAPER	RE CHERNOBYL	1	11/25/1986	B1 B3
68787 SUMMARY	ICELAND CHRONOLOGY	13	10/18/1986	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

GRAHAM, DR. WILLIAM: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 4/13/2009

File Folder

US-USSR SUMMIT- REYKJAVIK OCTOBER 11-12, 1986 (1)

FOIA

F06-043/2
SAROTTE

Box Number

CF991

25

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
68786	PAPER RE CHERNOBYL	1	11/25/1986	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 18, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: BOB LINHARD *BL*
SUBJECT: Reykjavik Chronology

Attached (Tab I) is the final version of the Reykjavik chronology. It has been reviewed by, and includes comments from, Jack Matlock, Peter Sommer, and those members of the Arms Control Support Group who were present. While there has been editing throughout since you last saw it, please pay particular attention to the final two paragraphs which are totally new.

I have prepared a short cover memorandum for your signature to make it clear this is an authoritative account and to explain the restrictions on its use. I have also made the document FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY to avoid having it handed out to the press, while still making it available for unclassified discussions. There is a good chance that the FOUO marking will not ensure this document stays within the government; either through FOIA procedures or unauthorized distribution it could easily be made public in toto. Thus you should sign it only if you believe we would not be harmed by having the entire document appear in print.

Based on our discussions Friday, I share your doubts that we now need an unclassified chronology, although the information would be useful to arms control players within the agencies. Since this was tasked by Don Regan, I recommend you discuss the subject with him before making any final decision. Should you elect to authorize an unclassified chronology, I propose you send it to Don Regan and have it distributed to agencies. A forwarding memorandum to Don Regan for your signature is at Tab II; one to agencies for Rod McDaniel's signature is at Tab III.

Recommendation

That, after discussing the subject with Don Regan, you return this package without signature for conversion into a classified Reykjavik chronology.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Alternatively, that (1) you sign the cover memorandum at Tab I approving the Reykjavik chronology, (2) you sign the memorandum

sending the chronology to Don Regan at Tab II, and (3) you authorize Rod McDaniel to sign the forwarding memorandum to agencies at Tab III.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I	Reykjvik Chronology
Tab II	Forwarding Memorandum to Regan
Tab III	McDaniel Memorandum to Agencies

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Reykjavik Chronology

Attached is a detailed chronology covering the meeting between President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, held in Reykjavik, Iceland on October 11-12, 1986. This document has been prepared, as a one-time exception to the normal practice of not publishing records of such meetings, in view of the extraordinary nature of the Reykjavik meeting.

The document is a chronology, not a negotiating record. Recipients should be meticulous in characterizing it correctly. The distinction must be maintained since it is imperative not to erode the principle that negotiating records are not distributed.

This document may be disseminated on a limited basis to appropriate officials within the government involved in arms control negotiations. It may be drawn upon in public and media discussions concerning the Reykjavik meeting by those authorized to discuss that meeting. Since the document is considered FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, and to preserve the precedent that records of such meetings are not normally distributed, copies should not be provided, in whole or in part, outside the Executive Branch.

Attachment
Detailed Reykjavik Chronology

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA *anj*, DATE *4/13/07*

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

GRAHAM, DR. WILLIAM: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 4/13/2009

File Folder

US-USSR SUMMIT- REYKJAVIK OCTOBER 11-12, 1986 (1)

FOIA

F06-043/2
SAROTTE

Box Number

CF991

25

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
68787	SUMMARY ICELAND CHRONOLOGY	13	10/18/1986	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Reykjavik Chronology

Attached is the chronology of the Reykjavik meeting you asked for last Tuesday. I have distributed it to the appropriate agencies.

I recommend you consider distributing this within the White House so that we are all working from a common account of the sequence of events in Iceland.

Attachment
Detailed Reykjavik Chronology

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2003
BY NARA *AM*, DATE *4/13/07*

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN H. RIXSE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN JOSEPH C. STRASSER
Executive Assistant
to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. WILLIAM STAPLES
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Reykjavik Chronology

Attached is a detailed chronology covering the Reykjavik Iceland meeting between President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. The document may be given further dissemination as indicated in Admiral Poindexter's cover memorandum.

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Detailed Reykjavik Chronology

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 17, 2006
BY NARA *smf*, DATE 4/13/09

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

-DoD News Briefing.
by Mr. Richard N. Perle, ASD/ISP
at the Pentagon
Tuesday, October 14, 1986 11:30 AM

→ 106 WY → ~~FILE~~ FILE

Col. Marvin L. Braman, USAF, DASD/Public Affairs. Ladies and Gentlemen, we have with us today the Honorable Richard. N. Perle, ASD(ISP), to discuss the recently concluded talks in Iceland.

Mr. Perle: It might be useful if I were to begin with a very brief summary of what by now is widely understood to have been the critical issue as it emerged in the last session in Reykjavik. I've written this down because I want to be sure to get it right. There's a great deal more to talk about, this doesn't attempt to be comprehensive.

We offered the Soviet side an agreement concerning strategic defenses that held the promise of a far safer and more stable world. A world unburdened by offensive ballistic missiles in which defenses would serve to insure us both -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- against third countries that might acquire these missiles, and would insure the free world against Soviet cheating. In response to Soviet concerns, we offered to defer the deployment of strategic defenses for 10 years, this was the period of time suggested by General Secretary Gorbachev, until after all ballistic missiles had been eliminated. And we agreed that during the 10 years in which the disarmament process went forward, we would abide by the terms of the ABM Treaty.

But Mr. Gorbachev demanded more than that. He demanded that we agree to limit research on strategic defenses immediately in a manner that went far beyond the restrictions of the ABM Treaty. This demand could have no other purpose than to force the United States to abandon any hope of successfully developing the defenses that we would require to insure that the disarmament process did not leave us hopelessly vulnerable to cheating as the last of our own ballistic missiles was dismantled.

It would have required that we now abandon meaningful research on strategic defenses without any assurance that the other elements of our proposed agreements would in fact be implemented fully and properly. Again and again, the President asked Mr. Gorbachev what possible objection he could have to the deployment of defenses after ten years, and after having eliminated offensive ballistic missiles. Again and again the President pressed him to explain how defensive systems, wholly ~~lacking in offensive capability,~~ could threaten the Soviet Union. ~~The President never received a~~ satisfactory answer or even a plausible response -- there was no satisfactory answer.

Prior to Reykjavik, the Soviets had been making the argument that a combination of offensive and defensive forces could enable the side that had an effective defense coupled with offenses to launch a first strike. The President sought to settle that issue by combining agreement to defer deployment with agreement to abandon offensive ballistic missiles. And he took the step the Soviet side was asking, that the deployment would follow the elimination of ballistic missiles. Under those circumstances the deployment of defenses could in no way enable the side that had

MORE

them to launch a first strike because the other side would have no missiles that could be intercepted on the retaliatory strike. In other words we accepted in a sense and put forward, a proposal that in my view is logically consistent and recognizes the reality that we have not yet arrived at that point in the U.S.-Soviet relationship where we would be wise to take on trust a Soviet declaration that they had eliminated the last of their ballistic missiles as we would eliminate the last of ours.

You know and I know that if the United States agreed to dismantle all its offensive ballistic missiles we would do so. We wouldn't hold a few back, we wouldn't produce others, but we can have no comparable assurance on the Soviet side. So defenses in that role would be highly stabilizing, protecting the most significant and far reaching disarmament.

My own view is that the Soviets were uncomfortable with the prospect of eliminating all ballistic missiles, but they were conscious of the political and diplomatic implications of having the talks fail on the basis of their unwillingness to do that. So at the last minute they introduced a demand that we confine research to the laboratory, which went beyond any of their previous demands and made it impossible for the President to accept.

Q: This disagreement would have left, after the end of ten years, if implemented in offensive offenses, would have left stealth bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, sea-launched cruise missiles, in some form, whether reduced from present numbers or not, we do not know. Particularly, bombers and air-launched cruise missile, at least right now, are an American strength, we put much more stock in them than the Soviets. When you couple what is an advantage in "air-breathing" leg of the triad with the prospects of a workable SDI, why doesn't that still amount to what the Soviets might see as a first strike advantage for the United States, maybe not a first strike in 30 minutes but a first strike in several hours?

A: Let's be clear about a couple things that are inherent in that question.

First, we were prepared significantly to reduce all legs of the triad so that our remaining bomber capability would have been reduced as we would expect reductions on the Soviet side. But second and more important, the possession of the strategic defense would have no bearing on the balance between us if we each had forces restricted to aircraft and the weapons carried by those aircraft and shorter range, non-ballistic nuclear systems. If that was the Soviet concern then the proper Soviet response was to say, "we can accept your proposition, but we have to work out the terms as they would relate to aircraft."

Now the difference between aircraft and missiles is clear. The world has been living under the shadow of nuclear forces, made up significantly of ballistic missiles that reach their

target in 20 minutes or so, that can't be recalled and give rise to the possibility of a first strike. With aircraft only and shorter range systems for deterrence in Europe, we would return to a situation that once existed in which deterrence was based on systems that take hours to reach their targets, that can be recalled in the event of an accident and the world would be a much safer place if deterrence depended on those systems rather than on ballistic missiles.

Q: I don't follow why you say strategic defense would have no bearing on a world in which both sides only relied on aircraft for long range weapons?

A: Under the agreement, the Soviets would have no missiles for the defense to intercept. Strategic defenses would only impede the plans of the country that retained offensive ballistische missiles and used them.

Q: You're not saying strategic defenses would have been entirely useless against aircraft, are you?

A: With respect to defense against aircraft, the Soviets are so far ahead of the United States in that area, they have an advantage approaching a monopoly.

Q: Richard, put yourself for a moment in the Soviet officials shoes if can make that leap, what would be your objections to SDI?

A: Well, frankly I think the Soviets after more than SDI. I think they are after the whole range of American research and advanced technologies which would help explain why at the last minute in the negotiations they introduced this concept of terminating all space research outside the laboratory, which means terminating all space research. We don't know and I don't think the Soviets know how to define that term in a manner that would be verifiable and that would be restricted to research on strategic defenses. How do you test communications systems? How do you test sensors? How do you *test on* whole panoply of military systems in space if you can only test inside the laboratory. You simply can't do it. So what I think the Soviets were driving at was causing the United States to scuttle virtually all of our activity with respect to space.

Q: Why are they so afraid of that?

A: I have a theory as it relates to strategic defense, and that theory is that the Soviets who have been researching this much longer than we have, there is a period of about a decade in which our own activities were severely limited while theirs were rather abundant. I think they've come to some conclusions about the potential for strategic defense and conceivably, because they lay great emphasis on this, they have also discovered a potential for offensive uses of space that we haven't yet discovered. But they seem concerned that we might somehow in the course of the SDI program stumble upon offensive technologies and they're trying to stop that. My guess is that they have already stumbled upon such technologies.

MORE

Q: We may stumble upon those?

A: It's not the purpose of the SDI program, and if our concern were to develop offensive weapons that utilize space, it would be far more efficient and far more effective to proceed directly to do that, unencumbered by any ABM Treaty restrictions. So the Soviet argument isn't a very logical one.

Q: In terms of the technologies involved, their view on who would win or lose an all-out technological race. What is your view on that?

A: I think their view is that the American, the Western technological base would enable us to field systems the theoretical concept for which they may already understand, but the manufacturing technology for which they may not have.

Q: Would they not be able to buy or steal much of that technology?

A: Well, as you know, they are energetically involved in both, but that's a pretty risky proposition. I think as our efforts to tighten up on the control of militarily relevant technology has proceeded, they've become less certain about their ability to get Western technology.

Q: Is it your view that the Soviets really could not compete?

A: This is a tricky business, this question of high technology. When we got inside the negotiations on Saturday night, they began at 8:00 o'clock and went through until 6:30 the following morning. There was a rather long delay, and the delay was the result of the fact that we had a typewriter and a typist who could produce drafts, but we didn't have a xerox machine at the Hofdi House. The Soviets had a supply of carbon paper. When they produced a draft they could produce it in ten copies. We were unable to produce more than a single copy. So they depended on low technology and they had what they needed. We depended on high technology and we didn't. There may be a lesson in that. We ended up using their carbon paper.

Q: In your chronology of how events unfolded, you said at the last minute the Soviets came in with this notion of restricting SDI to laboratory research and that came after President Reagan had advanced his plan to eliminate all ballistic missiles. So prior to that were they amenable to more research, that beyond the laboratory, and is the implication of what you said that if we hadn't asked for the elimination of all ballistic missiles perhaps they would tolerate more research?

A: I can't prove this. But I think it is at least a plausible explanation that when we proposed the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles and were prepared to agree in conjunction with that to defer deployment for ten years, and to remain within the terms of the ABM Treaty in the conduct of research, development, and testing; that looked at that package, they understood the diplomatic and political implications of rejecting the proposal to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles, decided they couldn't live with that and they needed a device for causing the

MORE

negotiations to fail at that moment but not on the issue of the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. I can't prove it, but prior to that the Soviet side had said that they wanted a ten year delay and they wanted during that ten year period a commitment that we would conduct the SDI program within the terms of the ABM Treaty. That is that for ten years we would not withdraw from the ABM Treaty and we would adhere strictly to it. When we agreed to that, they then added this other demand. I don't know whether they...

Q: You mean agreed to it and also called for the elimination of all missiles?

A: That's right.

Q: So perhaps they're willing to allow more than laboratory research. Prior to that there was the possibility that they would do that.

Let me just ask one followup question. When you take the position that we would keep our research within the limits of the treaty, which interpretation of the treaty is this -- the traditional one that we're observing now or the one that the Administration asserts it has a legal right to adopt, the broader one? Which one is it, because they're completely different views of what the treat means.

A: They are indeed different views, and that obviously would have to be a matter for discussion between the sides.

Q: So that was not settled then?

A: That was not settled, because the Soviets went beyond the treaty. I think the Soviets understand very well that a thorough examination of the negotiations that took place between the 20th of November 1969 and the 26th of May 1972 on which date the ABM Treaty was signed, would reveal that throughout the course of those negotiations the Soviets resisted an American proposal that research with respect to defensive systems based on new technologies or other physical principles, which is the term that was then used, would validate the legally correct interpretation that the President has adopted. There has been enough discussion about this so that I think it's clear that the Soviets understand that they have to go beyond the ABM Treaty if they're going to drive a stake through the heart of the SDI program.

Q: What happens now? Where does everything stand when it comes to say the medium range talks, the INF talks? Is all of that out the window?

A: Let's take the intermediate range talks. The Soviets took the position beginning with the Summit in November last year in Geneva that they were prepared to reach an agreement on intermediate range systems, unlinked to the outcome of the negotiations on strategic forces or space and defense. They've repeated that position in every capitol in Europe. Gorbachev on his first travels to Europe, in London and then again in Paris with Mitterrand, reiterated this position. That has been the Soviet position. That's been our view as well, and it was agreed, as I say in Geneva last year.

MORE

I would imagine that the United States in Geneva will table the agreement reached in the course of the discussions between the President and Gorbachev. That is an agreement limiting to 100 on each side, warheads on intermediate missile systems -- the 100 on the American side to be deployed in the United States, and in the Soviet side to be deployed in the eastern portion of the Soviet Union. That agreement also provided for a freeze on shorter range systems and immediate negotiations to reduce shorter range systems.

I don't know what the Soviets will say if and when we do table that proposal, but to revert to their earlier position on the grounds that intermediate nuclear forces are now linked to the American agreement to restrict its research program beyond the terms of the ABM Treaty seems to me on the surface an untenable position and one that entails Soviet repudiation of the position they've had on the table for about a year. So if they do that, I think it will carry a high political price for them in Europe.

Q: Let's go back to the beginning where you said we were prepared to significantly reduce all legs of the triad, were prepared, but did we actually offer that?

A: Let me go back over, and I haven't done it here, what was agreed on the strategic forces. In the discussions between the President and the General Secretary, Mr. Gorbachev said he was prepared to agree to 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive forces. This, you will recall, was previously agreed, it was agreed at Geneva last year. But when the two sides met subsequent to last November's Summit, the Soviet method of calculating 50 percent reductions was invidious with respect to our forces. So we couldn't reach agreement because the Soviets sought to include on our side, but not on theirs, systems of shorter ranges than what had traditionally been regarded as strategic systems -- systems in the range of 5500 kilometers or greater.

It was at that point, an impasse having been arrived at, that the United States proposed a willingness to consider reductions less than 50 percent not because we preferred that but because we wanted to advance the talks. This was done in a letter from the President to the General Secretary.

When we arrived in Reykjavik, Gorbachev indicated a willingness to reduce by 50 percent, a return if you will, to the previous Summit agreement of last year. On the basis of his statement, we convened a group of experts on both sides. Paul Nitze headed the American delegation; Marshal Ostromayev headed the Soviet delegation. And from 8:00 o'clock until 6:30 the next morning we talked about how to implement the Gorbachev proposal.

It became clear in the course of this all-night session, at about 1:30 in the morning, that the Soviets were proposing a 50 percent reduction on both sides from current levels. As you know, the current levels significantly favor the Soviet Union

in almost every category. They have more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, they have more warheads on the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and in particular ballistic missiles, both land-based and sea-based. At 1:30 in the morning, we explained to the Soviets that we could not accept 50 percent reductions that resulted in unequal ceilings, but we could accept 50 percent reductions that led to equal ceilings, and I think we had very much in mind Congressional sentiment on this issue. The importance of preserving the principle of equality, which has long guided these negotiations. So we called a recess. The Soviets returned to their leadership for further instructions; we returned to our leadership for further instructions, and we reconvened at 3:00 a.m.

At 3:00 a.m. the Soviets said they were prepared to agree to 50 percent reductions resulting in equal ceilings for both sides. We then sought to translate that principle into specific agreed numbers, and much of the rest of the night was spent on that. In the end we agreed that each side would be permitted 1600 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. That contrasts with 2504 in the current Soviet force, and a somewhat smaller number on the American side. A significant reduction down to the 1600 level.

We also agreed that the number of warheads carried by ICBMs, SLBMs, and air-launched cruise missiles would be limited to 6,000 which is a reduction from roughly 10,000 on the two sides now. Significant reductions, the most far-reaching reductions that had ever been proposed or agreed to. And that's where we ended at 6:30 in the morning.

It became clear later in the day that the Soviets were linking those reductions to our agreement on their proposal to go beyond the ABM Treaty and restrict research to the laboratory, and that's where we left it. But I will be surprised if we do not table in Geneva the numbers 1600 and 6,000 because it is clear that that is a basis upon which we can attempt to negotiate limits on strategic forces.

There is a tendency to think that somehow we have to pay for reductions in offenses by an abandonment of our research program as though we were not also constraining American offenses, and the equal ceilings make it clear that we would be accepting the same limitations that we ask of the Soviets.

Q: ...how the bomber weapons is handled. I've heard different accounts from different people. I know it's very technical, but all bombers that carry bombs and SRAMs count as one under 6,000 and maybe there's another refinement there. Can you clarify that?

A: Along about 5:00 in the morning after everything had been agreed, the Russians got a bright idea, I asked Karpov later whether this was a spontaneous idea or he'd planned it all along. I don't remember the details of his answer, but it was clear they'd planned it all along. When we thought everything was wrapped up, and there's some past history here. In previous

MORE

agreements, we have counted heavy bombers in the aggregate total of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, but we have never counted the armaments on those bombers except for long range cruise missiles against a warhead aggregate. At the last minute the Soviet side proposed that a heavy bomber would count as one strategic nuclear delivery vehicle and the weapons, plural, on that heavy bomber, would count as one warhead. So the Soviets were after an additional, if you net out their bombers and ours, they were after an additional 150 warheads, so we gave them 150 warheads.

Q: But if a bomber carries ALCMs and also carries bombs, all those bombs on it still just count as one warhead?

A: That's correct.

Q: Each cruise missile warhead counts as a warhead...

A: That's correct.

Q: So if you've got 20 on it plus bombs, you count 21 warheads?

A: Well, I don't know that we ever nailed down the situation where you have both ALCMs and bombers. I'll have to go back and look at that. But we're talking about a trivial number of weapons one way or the other. It was a little confusing in the small hours. If your readers are interested in that, they're not the people I know.

Q: Can you clarify for me the final Soviet SDI offer. Would that have prohibited anything that currently would be allowed under the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty?

A: Yes, it would have gone far beyond even the narrow interpretation of the treaty. And frankly, I think that a close analysis of that proposal would reveal that it would have forced the abandonment of an effective program of research involving space across the board.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: Well, it's hard to know how you would define and verify the kinds of limitations that they had in mind in proposing that all work on space systems would be confined to the laboratory.

Q: Can you address this question of the criticism that we've heard now about going to zero ballistic missiles, that it was part of a never-never land, it couldn't possibly have happened, you'd have had generals jumping out the windows and all the rest of this. Is it really feasible to talk about going down to zero ballistic missiles in just ten years, leaving British, French forces unconstrained given the advantages the Soviets have in conventional forces and so forth? Just address that larger issue.

A: I'm glad you asked that because I noticed that George Wilson had a piece this morning in which retired generals were jumping out of windows. But they seemed to be under a misapprehension. As I read the article, they seemed to be responding to the question of where would we be with respect to the conventional balance if you eliminated all nuclear weapons, and that wasn't

MORE

the U.S. proposal. We're going to need deterrence for some time to come. I think it's safe to say that we will still need deterrence in 1996, and for that reason the American proposal was focused on...

Q: Nuclear deterrence?

A: Nuclear deterrence. The American proposal was focused on offensive ballistic missiles. So one would still have had tactical nuclear forces other than ballistic missiles in order to deter Soviet attack in Europe, and one would have bomber forces in order to maintain an overall deterrence. But it would be a much more stable relationship if we could get rid of the ballistic missiles. We think it's in our interest to do it and we think it's in the Soviet interest as well. Ten years is a short time in which to accomplish something of that magnitude, but I think that the President was determined to go as far as we could go, even if it means a radical restructuring of our deterrent forces in order to eliminate the weapons that he believes are the principle source of instability.

Q: This issue of the one-eyed man in the land of the blind king, the British force and Chinese systems would become, they'd become the super powers. How would you handle that?

A: We'd have to talk to the British and the French and the Chinese. The British and French have always said that in the context of radical reductions on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union they would be prepared to play their part. The Chinese have made similar statements. They tend to put it in the negative, that they're not going to limit their forces while the super powers are building up theirs. I frankly think it would be difficult for any government to insist on retaining ballistic missiles if the United States and the Soviet Union were in the process of eliminating them.

Q: Richard, how much damage do you think a full bore Soviet competition with the U.S. over the SDI would do to the Soviet economy? Is that one of the things we're striving to accomplish?

A: The Soviets have said that they are not going to follow the United States in developing strategic defenses. That may be because they're in fact are leading us in the development of strategic defenses. What they have said is that they will counter the defenses rather than deploy defenses of their own. I think they are probably working on all fronts.

But what we are doing, what the President is determined not to abandon is a research program that we sought to associate with the elimination of the ballistic missiles so as to allay the concerns the Soviets had expressed to us. And when we had exhausted their concerns by responding to each of them, they came up with a new concern.

Q: Considering that most analysts of the Kremlin agree that Gorbachev has a lot on the line in terms of being able to redirect resources, to enhancing the Soviet economy, is there an effort by the Reagan Administration to make that even more difficult for them?

A: No, not at all.

MORE

Q: You're not trying to engage them in "break the bank"?

A: On the contrary, the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles, together with the other reductions down to levels that was discussed in Geneva, would relieve the burden on the Soviets -- to continue to invest funds in strategic weapons. We would seek to finance SDI out of the funds that would be saved by abandoning offensive ballistic missiles at which we invest very considerable sums. One has to ask why the Soviets would require an extensive anti-ballistic missile defense if we had no ballistic missiles. As a matter of fact, the system around Moscow, the principle limitation of which is that it has only 100 interceptors, at least as far as we know, would be pretty effective against zero ballistic missiles. So there is no reason to believe that there would be an urgent requirement on the part of the Soviets to develop an elaborate defense in the absence of an offense to counter.

Q: Apparently, Gorbachev said that he did not believe President Reagan that we would share the benefits of SDI. He said you don't share the benefits of oil and gas technology, why would you do SDI? You know a little bit about export controls. How would we actually share the benefits, would we turn over blueprints? What would we do?

A: We didn't get into a detailed discussion of that because Gorbachev categorically rejected it. He said he wasn't interested.

Q: But we said we'd do it. How would we do it? What would we give them?

Q: And we used to talk about sharing technology, so what's the distinction between sharing benefits and sharing research?

A: I think at this point it's pointless to elaborate on what we might have been prepared to propose since the Soviets were not prepared even to discuss it and the negotiations are not complete. Maybe they'll change their mind.

Q: You must have some idea, though of what's...

A: I do. I just don't want to share it with you now.

Q: What would you give the Russians on...

A: Let's be clear about one thing. The argument that because we're not prepared to give oil and gas technology to the Soviets, therefore, the President's offer is disingenuous misses a couple of important points. The first is that we do indeed sell oil and gas technology to the Soviet Union. The willingness to do that has been limited originally as a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for political reasons, and more recently it has been associated with human rights. Nevertheless, we have been approving a very large number of licenses for oil and gas technology.

But it is fair to say that we attempt to restrict the sale of militarily relevant technology to the Soviet Union under current circumstances in which they are massively armed against the United States. In a world in which offensive ballistic missiles have been eliminated, the sharing of defensive technology would be irrelevant to the strategic balance conserved to protect us both against third countries and against cheating, and that's

a very different situation. I think we could go quite far into those circumstances. But the precise modalities...

Q: Would that still not be hostage to other Afghanistans or other immigration cases? I mean, might the Soviets believe that this sharing might not take place because of our objections to their actions?

A: I think our record of keeping our treaty commitments is a pretty good one. We were never bound by treaty to provide oil and gas technology and so we felt perfectly free to restrict that in response to Afghanistan. We would be bound by treaty and we honor our treaty commitments, no matter how inconvenient they may be.

Q: But you made three references to Soviet cheating. Isn't that the basis, your basis, the President's basis, for staying...

A: How could it be otherwise? We're talking about very significant disarmament. We're talking about agreements that could not be verified to the degree that would leave us certain that the Soviets had not hidden or subsequently produced ballistic missiles. These things are not very large these days, and they're highly mobile. No American President in my view is going to accept a situation in which if the Soviets cheat on an agreement that can't be fully verified the strategic balance between us changes dramatically overnight, and they alone would have the ability in a very short period of time to attack and destroy targets in the United States.

Q: The bottom line is really that, you just don't trust them.

A: Of course we don't trust them. We have good reason not to trust them. But we're prepared to enter into agreements as long as we can ensure those agreements in the absence of the kind of trust that exists say between ourselves and the Canadians.

Q: Did you raise those violations, and if so, was there any new response? Anything you hadn't heard before.?

A: The violations were raised and there was no new response.

Q: Is it your judgment that they are playing hardball to get the best deal they can on SDI, or that their aim is to kill SDI? In other words, is there in your judgment, the possibility of a compromise deal on SDI or not?

A: I think there's the possibility of a compromise. Indeed we put a compromise on the table. But the President will not kill the SDI program. He's prepared to limit research, development, and testing to that which is permitted under the ABM Treaty. He was prepared to defer deployment for ten years. But he is not prepared to terminate our research program.

Q: Will they settle for less than killing in your view?

A: They wouldn't settle for less in Reykjavik, but this is one meeting in a long process.

Q: Are we prepared to offer more?

A: I think they now know that they are dealing with a

MORE

President who is willing to say yes to an agreement that is acceptable, but is also willing to say no to an agreement that isn't. It's conceivable that Gorbachev is under the mistaken impression that this was a President who would not say no.

Q: Some of your critics are saying, and were saying before you got back on the ground, that you went to Reykjavic with one mission in mind, to make sure that Ronald Reagan did not sign off on a new arms control deal. Can you address that?

A: I don't want to get into the details of what advice was given to the President and when, but I think the entire American delegation, myself included, worked very hard to find proposals that satisfied Soviet concerns, and the drafting that was done on the spot I think will speak for itself.

Q: So you deny that you went there to wreck the deal?

A: Of course. And I think the ideas that we came up with collectively would establish that fact.

Q: What were they willing to agree to on verification?

A: We didn't get far enough into the details on verification. They have been saying that they are prepared for on-site inspection.

Q: Is this INF or both?

A: In general. And we have been saying that we're glad to hear that because national technical means are not sufficient to verify things like refire missiles for SS-20s and the numbers of mobile ICBMs and so forth. We didn't get into the details.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: The SS-20s are highly mobile.

Q: But you got into mobile ICBMs?

A: We didn't get into mobile ICBMs.

Q: Can I get a clarification? You mentioned on this whole thing of turning the technology of SDI over to the Soviets. There has obviously been a lot of skepticism to that. You're saying we're willing to write that into a treaty, in negotiating part of a treaty, that we would turn that over at the end of this ten years?

A: We were prepared in our earlier proposals to share technology with the Soviets. When the General Secretary said, "I'm not interested in sharing, forget about it." We then proceeded to attempt to put together a compromise that at that point did not contain a commitment on sharing.

Q: But we're willing to firmly commit to that...

A: We are prepared to go quite far in sharing. People wonder how we can do this, and all I can say to you is that the notion of sharing was the President's own idea. It's not a conventional idea, but this is not a conventional President.

Q: You left open a question before, you said the President put forward an offer and they rejected it, and you left open the question of can we go further in any concessions that were already

MORE

made. Is that the final offer? Is it dead after that? After the one we made?

A: We're going to return to the negotiations in Geneva, I think they resume tomorrow. And we're prepared to explore with the Soviets any ideas they might have. But we believe that the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles together with a deferral on SDI deployment and strict adherence to the ABM Treaty in doing the research, development, and testing that is permitted by the treaty, should be of interest to the Soviet Union.

Q: Wouldn't an insurance policy, as the President wants, if the Soviets accepted a verification procedure that you wrote, Richard Perle wrote, would that be a good enough insurance policy?

A: No. I don't know how to write a verification regime that would enable you to be confident that in the whole of Soviet territory there was not some where, some quantity of offensive ballistic missiles. It's just too difficult. They don't have to be deployed, they can be stored.

But let me come back to the critical point. What harm would the defensive shield do to the Soviets or to anyone else as a way of reinforcing the elimination of ballistic missiles?

Q: The harm at the moment would be stopping any kind of arms reduction. That's what the critics say.

A: I understand the Soviet position, but as I said at the outset, they have failed to give us a convincing reason for their objection to our proposal. They may have fears they're not expressing. They may be based, as I suggested earlier, on things they know that we don't yet know. I don't know how to explain their view. But until they explain more persuasively why our proposal is unacceptable and what it is that concerns them, we can't even begin to think creatively about how to respond to those concerns. We responded in Reykjavik to every concern the Soviets had previously expressed, and I believe to every concern they made intelligible in Reykjavik. If there are other fears that don't know about we can't very well craft a proposal to deal with it.

Q: You're talking about the defensive shield as though the shield were...going to be put in place at some date in the future though uncertain. Isn't it still a pig in the poke scientifically?

A: Well, I wouldn't call it a pig in a poke.

Q: What have you got?

A: We have a research program, and that's all we insisted upon is a research program, and the right, should the research program succeed, and after the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles, to deploy that insurance policy. If we don't have it, we don't have it. Then you have a period in which there are some obvious risks, but the President is prepared to take some risks. He wasn't prepared to kill the program now.

Q: If you think about it, this is actually a potentially very dangerous proposal. You say you can't know if in fact they've eliminated all their missiles, verification isn't good enough. We don't know if we'd really have a shield up after

MORE

11 years or 12 years or 13 years. Under your proposal there would be this period of uncertainty in which they could have missiles and we could have none, and we'd be at that peril.

A: Bear in mind that the scope and nature of the defense bears an obvious relationship to the offense. A defense adequate against a presumably relatively small number of clandestine ICBMs is much less demanding than a defense against massive offenses. So we are pretty confident that over the ten year period we could move to deploy a defense sufficient to buy us some insurance.

Q: Can you tell us what that defense is?

A: No, I can't. It's too soon in the research program. Obviously, we would look for an efficient defense that met at least our minimum requirements, and if it did better than that, so much the better.

Q: Was the President's proposal to go to zero ballistic missiles in ten years run through the JCS, and how did they respond?

A: General Moellering (Lt. Gen. John H. Moellering, USA, Asst. to the Chairman, JCS) was there. I don't think it had been the subject of the usual sort of JCS analysis, although it has been a feature of Presidential proposals in the past. What was new at Reykjavik was that the President accepted Gorbachev's proposal that we not withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years and that we adhere strictly to it over that ten year period.

Q: You mean we had offered to go to zero in ten years before?

A: Not in ten years.

Q: But this was not run through the JCS before it was offered?

A: The President had previously proposed the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles, but we hadn't specified the timeframe in which that would be accomplished.

Q: If I could go back to the question of why the Soviets are opposed to the SDI. You suggested that in the context of the proposals there they were concerned about not having offensive missiles at the time. The President questioned the Soviets' motives last night in saying why they would be opposed to strategic defense. I'm still not clear on why you feel the Soviets made this proposal and why they're so opposed to SDI, at least within the context of the negotiations.

A: I'm not clear in my own mind. That's why I said that repeatedly the President attempted to elicit from Gorbachev a statement that we could work with as to why he was concerned about the deployment of defenses in the aftermath of the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles and he didn't get that. I offer just a hypothesis, that the Soviets may believe that the SDI program will produce technologies that will give the United States some decisive military advantage, and it is at least conceivable to me that they think that because they themselves have gone rather far, at least in the theoretical work that they've been doing these many years. The Soviets are awfully

MORE

good theorists, and they're good scientists. Where they have difficulty is in translating even quite imaginative concepts into manufactured hardware with high reliability and high technology. So they may know something we don't know, but they're not saying what it is.

Q: Is that why the President suggested as was reported that Gorbachev wasn't interested in an agreement?

A: I think the President was troubled by the fact that when we met the Soviet, remember, this is a dynamic situation. They're putting out proposals, we're putting out proposals. They said ten years, we agreed ten years. They said stay within the ABM Treaty, we said we'll stay within the ABM Treaty. And then having responded positively, when we added the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles, they then came back and said you've got to stop in effect all SDI research. So this raises the question of what the Soviets were really after.

As I say, my own belief, which I can't prove, is that the sticking point was not really defensive research. The sticking point was the elimination of ballistic missiles. But since Gorbachev had previously talked about eliminating all nuclear weapons from the world and so forth, he did not want the talks to fail on that point, so he made a new and we think unreasonable and unexpected demand with respect to limitations on research and development in the hope that the Summit would be seen to have failed not on the elimination of ballistic missiles, but on SDI.

Q: For the sake of public relations you mean, for public opinion?

A: Yes.

Q: That brings the question of why didn't we just stick with 1600 or 6,000? Why did we go all the way down? Were we just raising our own self-fulfilling prophecy saying we know he can't accept this so let's do it?

A: We didn't know that they couldn't accept it, and in fact they had previously indicated a willingness to eliminate all nuclear weapons. So we thought we had a responsibility to make proposals that would realize those objectives if they were prepared to go along with them, but...

Q: ...at 1600 to over 6,000. What happened in the next five hours...

A: I believe that the turning point came in the afternoon session on Sunday, when following a discussion between Secretary Schultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in which Shevardnadze asked for ten years and adherence to the ABM Treaty and we said yes, provided we continue the reductions past the five years that we had in mind in getting down to 6,000 and 1600 and went on to eliminate the remaining offensive ballistic missiles. The Secretary said he was offering that proposal and would have to clear it with the President. I think they were taken aback by the proposal. They didn't reject it on the spot. The two sides adjourned and met with the leaders, and then when they took it up with the President and Secretary Shultz; Gorbachev and Foreign

MORE

Minister Shevardnadze, there was a great deal of bargaining back and forth on language that would express this agreement, and it was in the course of one of the iterations of that language that the confinement to the laboratory appeared. That's where we ran into trouble.

Q: ...proposed it first before the President proposed it, and then had to get the President's approval to do it?

A: The Secretary explored ad referendum to the President a possible compromise. This is common in negotiations of this sort.

Q: This isn't a compromise. This is going to zero from 50 percent.

A: No, the President had previously proposed going to zero. So it was within the framework of the earlier proposal that the President had made in his letter to Gorbachev. What was new in the American position was that acceded to Gorbachev's proposal that we stay within the ABM Treaty for ten years and not exercise our right to withdraw.

To summarize it, I think the Soviets laid out a position, possibly believing that we wouldn't accept it, and when we accepted it, they discovered that they didn't like it.

Q: Let me be clear on this. In the Sunday afternoon discussions, after Shevardnadze asked for ten years, Schultz said yes, but let's go down to zero ballistic missiles in ten years. Then you said, "Schultz made the offer and he'd have to clear it with the President." Was that the first time the Russians had heard that offer?

A: No, the Russians were well aware that we were proposing the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles.

Q: Then why did he have to clear it with the President?

A: Because it was the first time that the whole package that was laid on the table had been presented to them. I think Secretary Shultz had been in constant communication with the President, and I think he understood the President's thinking. But we asked them to consider this proposal prior to the meeting between principles when it resumed.

Q: Did all of these details catch us by surprise? In other words, were we prepared for all of these proposals that the Soviets had brought on? We expected that those proposals would come up later in a real meeting between...a later meeting.

A: I don't think you travel to a Summit without being prepared for every contingency. I had two salamis with me for the all-night session, which fell out of my window on the fourth floor of the ...hotel and were immediately set upon by Icelandic security guards and smashed to smithereens.

Q: Is it your suspicion that the Soviets went to Reykjavik to posture and propagandize and not to make a deal?

A: I don't want to speculate on why they went to Reykjavik. I think there was a lot of give and take back and forth. We want to believe that it might have been possible to conclude an

MORE

agreement. I think they went beyond what we could accept in the proposal to limit research to the laboratory, unverifiable. If the question is did they go there knowing that there was no way they were going to reach an agreement, I wouldn't say that.

Q: Did you get salmon back for the salami?

A: I did get some salmon back.

END