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DICKLAND  
FILE

# White House and Congress Chiefs Reach an Accord on Arms Control

By JONATHAN FUERBRINGER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 — On the eve of the American-Soviet meeting in Iceland, the House and Senate leadership and the White House reached an accord on arms control issues today after House leaders backed off from major provisions the President objected to.

In the compromise, the House dropped a proposal to mandate compliance with the unratified 1979 treaty on strategic arms limitations. The Democratic leaders of the House also dropped their proposal for a moratorium on nuclear tests while the President, in Reykjavik, Iceland, said he would take steps to move toward a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty with the Russians.

## O'Neill and Reagan Speak

The agreement was solidified with a telephone call between the House Speaker, Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., and Mr. Reagan, who is in Iceland preparing for his meeting Saturday with Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader. "I'm delighted that now we can go forward united," the President is reported to have said to the House leader.

Although House leaders refused to say they had given in to the President, leaders have been worried this week about the political damage in this election year from appearing to tie the President's hands in his negotiations with Moscow. Since the Iceland meeting was announced the President has sharply criticized the House arms control provisions, saying they would undermine his negotiating efforts.

## 'Not at Bargaining Table'

Mr. O'Neill, who this week said the President's attacks on House Democrats were purely political, acknowledged the bind the House Democrats were in and that they gave a lot more than they got.

"It falls short of a 50-50 arrangement," he said in announcing the agreement in the Capitol's Statuary Hall. "There is a reason for that," he added. "We in the Congress can legislate arms control up to a point. We can use public statements in support of arms control, up to a point. But we cannot sit at the bargaining table in Iceland."

On other arms control issues, the agreement cuts the President's funding request for his space-based missile defense shield by \$1.8 billion, to \$3.5 billion, about half way between the House and Senate-approved levels.

The Senate and the White House agreed to the House-approved ban for the fiscal year 1987, which began Oct. 1, on testing of anti-satellite weapons in space. The ban on testing was also in effect last year. And the House agreed to limited production of new chemical weapons with production of the 155-millimeter artillery shell. But the Senate and the White House agreed to the House ban on production of the main delivery vehicle for new binary chemical weapons, the Bigeye bomb.

Under the agreement, the House drops language requiring adherence to numerical sublimits on weapons in the unratified 1979 treaty on strategic arms limitation and its one-year ban on all but the smallest underground nuclear tests. These were the two provisions that were pressed hardest by the House and opposed most strongly by the White House and the Senate.

Instead, the House accepted "strong" nonbinding language urging continued adherence to the 1979 treaty's weapons limits. This is the concession that was most unpopular among House Democrats and produced warnings of a major confrontation with the Administration if it chooses to violate the treaty's limits between now and next year. The President has indicated his intention to violate the treaties — or "break out" in arms control jargon — by the end of this year.

In exchange, the Administration agreed to ask the Senate for ratification of two old, limited treaties on nuclear testing and, once they are approved with acceptable guarantees of verification, to begin talks with the Russians on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. These negotiations would begin with "interim" or "transitional" accords on nuclear testing.

The two treaties Mr. Reagan said he would ask the Senate to ratify next year are the 1974 treaty banning underground nuclear weapons tests of 150 kilotons or more and the 1976 treaty banning underground peaceful nuclear tests of the same size. Up to now, these treaties have been voluntarily complied with by the United States and the Soviet Union.

In a letter from Reykjavik, Iceland, the President said he would inform Mr. Gorbachev of this agreement this weekend. He said the Russians could agree to acceptable verification procedures before the Senate votes or the treaties could be modified so that they would not go into effect until acceptable procedures were agreed to.

# The Iceland Summit: How Leaders See It

## Excerpts From Summit Remarks by Reagan and Gorbachev

### Mr. Reagan

Following are excerpts from President Reagan's departure address at Keflavik Air Base in Iceland yesterday, as recorded by *The New York Times*:

Thank you very much, Ambassador Ruwe, men and women of our armed forces and my fellow Americans. Thank you all; it's good to feel so at home.

And I want to apologize for being so late. As you know, General Secretary Gorbachev and I were to have concluded our talks at noon after more than seven and a half hours of meetings over the last two days. But when the hour for departure arrived, we both felt that further discussions would be valuable.

So I called Nancy and told her I wouldn't be home for dinner. She said she understood. In about six and a half hours I'll find out.

Now, the talks we've just concluded were hard and tough, and yet I have to say extremely useful. We spoke about arms control, human rights and regional conflicts.

And, of course, Mr. Gorbachev and I were frank about our disagreements. We had to be. In several critical areas, we made more progress than we anticipated when we came to Iceland. We moved toward agreement on drastically reduced numbers of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in both Europe and Asia.

#### One Area of Disagreement

We approached agreement on sharply reduced strategic arsenals for both our countries. We made progress in the area of nuclear testing. But there remained at the end of our talks one area of disagreement.

While both sides seek reduction in the number of nuclear missiles and warheads threatening the world, the Soviet Union insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny to me and the future Presidents for 10 years the right to develop, test and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the free world. This we could not and will not do.

So late this afternoon I made to the General Secretary an entirely new proposal: a 10-year delay in deployment of S.D.I. in exchange for the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles from the respective arsenals of both nations.

So long as both the United States and the Soviet Union prove their good faith by destroying nuclear missiles year by year, we would not deploy S.D.I. The General Secretary said he would consider our offer, but only if we restricted all work on S.D.I. to laboratory research, which would have killed our defensive shield.

We came to Iceland to advance the cause of peace, and though we put on the table the most far-reaching arms-control proposal in history, the General Secretary rejected it. However, we made great strides in Iceland in resolving most of our differences, and we're going to continue the effort.

#### Visit to Base

But this brings me to my main reason in coming to Keflavik today: to see you all and express my gratitude, gratitude for a job well done!

I hope you all know the importance of your mission here. Iceland has always held a strategic position in the

Atlantic, commanding, if you will, the sea between the Old World and the New. Since this is Columbus Day I have to be careful of this, but many of those who believe that the Vikings were the first Europeans to discover the Americas hold that the ancient Norse sailors first heard of North America from an Icelander.

And during World War II, Iceland played a crucial role in the battle for freedom. Early in the war, German U-boats began to exact a devastating toll, including the shipping that supplied the British people with food from the United States.

Between March and December 1941, the Germans sank ships totaling more than a million tons. Churchill watched with growing disquiet as his nation was pushed closer and closer to starvation. In April of 1941, the British established bases on this Iceland for escort groups and aircraft. In July, we joined them, with the consent of the Icelandic authorities, with bases of our own.

These operations staged from this very island proved decisive in the balance of the entire struggle. In Churchill's words: "The escort groups became ever more efficient and as their power grew, that of the U-boats declined. Europe was saved to continue the struggle for freedom."

#### Role of Iceland

I cite all this history because if Iceland was crucial to the cause of freedom then, it is even more important today. The U.S. and Iceland are joined together as members of NATO. And here you are, thousands of miles from home, closer indeed to the Soviet naval bases on the Kola Peninsula than to our own East Coast.

And in view of those naval bases and other potential threats, you serve as a vanguard for Iceland, the United States and all the NATO allies. You monitor military air traffic, you track submarines and you monitor shipping

movements in the vital sea lanes between the United States, Iceland and Europe.

You perform all these tasks with efficiency and dedication. In short, with a keen sense of duty. And, ladies and gentlemen of our armed forces, on behalf of a grateful Commander in Chief, I salute you.

#### President and Saluting

I can't resist telling you a little story that I just told the Marine guard at the embassy. The story has to do with saluting. I was a second lieutenant of Horse Cavalry back in the World War II days. As I told the Admiral, I wound up flying a desk for the Army Air Force. So I know all the rules about not saluting in civilian clothes and so forth and when you should or shouldn't.

But then when I got this job and I would be approaching Air Force One and Marine One and those marines would come to a salute, and I knowing that I'm in civilian clothes I would nod and say hello and think they wouldn't drop their hands, and they wouldn't, they just stood there.

So one night over at the commandant's quarters, marine commandant's quarters in Washington, and I was getting a couple of highballs and I didn't know what to do, so I said to the commandant, I said: "Look I know all the rules about saluting in civilian clothes and all, but if I'm the Commander in Chief. There ought to be a regulation that would permit me to return a salute."

"And I heard some words of wisdom. He said, 'I think if you did, no one would say anything.'"

If you see me on television and I'm saluting, you know that I've got authority for it now. But you know there are some people here I can't salute of course because they're civilians. But seeing them does bring to mind all the sacrifices that your families make, so

# Mr. Gorbachev

Following are excerpts from the statement by the Soviet leader, Mikhail S Gorbachev, at his news conference yesterday in Reykjavik, Iceland, as recorded by *The New York Times*.

whether your families are here or back home, the next time you see them or write a letter, you tell them for me their President thanks them, and so does all America.

It seems to me we have one more round of applause still to go. The talks that we've concluded could never have been had it not been for the generosity of the people of Iceland.

## Pay Rates for Military

Well, it's time to go now, Nancy's waiting dinner. After all Congress is still in session, and I have to get back and keep an eye on them. Sometimes they get strange ideas about reducing pay rates for the military. But don't worry, I'll never let 'em.

But in closing let me say simply this: You are not here on NATO's front line, you're not making the sacrifice of leaving home and friends so far behind merely to keep the world from getting worse. You're here to make it better, for you're here in the name of liberty.

Yes, the ultimate goal of American foreign policy is not just the prevention of war but the expansion of freedom to see that every nation, every people, every person someday enjoys the blessings of liberty. All that you do has strengthened world peace — the peace in which the flame of freedom can continue to burn and spread its light throughout the world.

I have to tell you that of all the things that I'm proud of in this job, none match the pride that I have in those of you who are wearing the uniform of your country — you young men and women, God bless you.

Many years ago, at the beginning of World War II, Gen. George Marshall was asked what was our secret weapon, and he said then, "Just the best blankety-blank kids in the world." Well, I have to tell you, we still got them — that secret weapon. God bless all of you. Thank you very much.

Our meeting with the President of the United States of America is ended — the meeting with President Reagan.

The meeting lasted a little more than we had expected, had planned. That was because we had business to transact.

Now the meeting has ended. And sometimes they say that when you stand face to face with someone you cannot see his face. So I have just left the place where we've had that meeting, and particularly the last stages of that meeting, the debates were very pointed, and I'm still very much under the impression of those discussions, those debates.

And so I will try even at this first meeting with you, I will try to really sort things out and to tell you what really happened — not just to share my impressions, but to tell you what happened.

## First Impressions

Of course, those will be first impressions, first assessments, first analysis. A time for more analysis will come. This was a major meeting, and you will feel that when I tell you what happened at the meeting, about the substance of the problems that have been examined in a very broad, in a very interested, in a very intense way.

The atmosphere at the meeting was friendly. We could discuss things freely and without limitation, outlining our views as to various problems. And this has made it possible for us to have a more in-depth understanding of many major issues of international politics, bilateral relations and, above all, the urgent problems that really focus the attention of the world, the questions of war and peace, of ending the nuclear arms race and the entire range of problems within that broad topic.

But before I begin to characterize the meeting to you, before I characterize the substance of the discussions and of the proposals of the two sides and of the outcome of this meeting, I would like to say, to explain to you — because I didn't have this opportunity before — why is it that we put forward this initiative to have this meeting.

In June of this year, the states of the Warsaw treaty put forward a large-scale and comprehensive program to achieve a major reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe.

## Problems of a Nuclear Age

We also, based on the lessons we drew from the Chernobyl tragedy, we also made major proposals about the need to convene an urgent session of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, and that meeting did take place and some promising results have been achieved. Now we have an international machinery that makes it possible to resolve many problems in this important area, the important area of the safety of nuclear energy.

Now in other words, for all those years, throughout that time we — and I think I'm not exaggerating in assessing our policy — throughout that time — and I'm speaking about facts,

I'm speaking not just about intentions but about facts — we have been doing everything to help a new thinking to emerge in this nuclear age.

And maybe that will end the list of those specific actions that the Soviet Union has undertaken based on the letter and spirit of the accords reached with President Reagan at Geneva.

And still, and now I am coming to the motives by which we decided to propose to have this meeting in Reykjavik. The hopes that major changes would take place in the international environment, the hopes that all-of-us entertained after my meeting with President Reagan, I would say, put it this way, rather cautiously, those hopes had begun to vanish, were beginning to vanish and I think, that for some good reason that happened.

And above all, because the Soviet-U.S. negotiations in Geneva at which a lot, a great deal has been said, maybe too much has been said, where as I said to the President yesterday, 50 or 100 various options are being banded about, the options on how to curb the arms race and begin to reduce nuclear arms. And, you know, even that calls into question whether really the discussions there are fruitful.

I would say you would agree that if we had only, the negotiators had only one or two or three options, that would mean that the debate has been narrowed down and that the surge is now on for specific accords in important areas.

But nothing of that kind is happening in Geneva at the main forum of international politics at this time.

The arms race has not been halted. Our initiatives, which I have mentioned earlier, have been evoking a broad response internationally but they have not been duly understood by the U.S. Administration. So the situation was deteriorating. The concern in the world felt by people throughout the world, was increasing and I think I am not exaggerating.

I think you are here representing the people of the world and you know that the world is in turmoil. The world is concerned. The world demands that leaders of the great powers, the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States display political will, display determination to stop the trends that are leading towards dangerous and unpredictable consequences.

I was not setting conditions, I was expressing the understanding of our responsibility, the responsibility of myself and of the President to approach our meeting in Washington with a view to reaching results.

And I said to the President in my letters, and I said to the President during this meeting, that we should not allow, Mr. President, a failure of our meeting in Washington. And that is why I proposed an urgent meeting here because we had something to propose, we had constructive proposals that could bring agreements, that could bring serious proposals, serious solutions in Washington. And I cannot really imagine for one minute that if we had met in Washington that meeting should have been a failure.

And that was why I proposed to have this working meeting in Iceland, in Reykjavik, in order to have a businesslike discussion here, in order to listen to each other carefully and try to find points of convergence, try to find common approaches consistent with the interests of our two countries, with the interests of our allies, with the interests of the world, of the peoples of the world.

Well, I must say that the Americans came — have — came to this meeting empty-handed, with the entire set of mothballed — of mothballed proposals that are making the situation so bad, so stuffy at the Geneva negotiations. So in order to end that bad situation, to open up the road to a new stage, to resolve the questions, we put forward certain proposals and I have now related to you what has happened. So what should we do?

**'Pile-Up of Problems'**

This summer I had a meeting with former President Nixon and he said to me based on my great political experience and on my whole life, I can say, that the search for that ghost of superiority has taken us too far. And it is really very difficult now to end the pile-up of problems that has been created by those nuclear arsenals and this makes the situation in the world very dangerous.

I think, nevertheless, that all that has happened, and really what has happened is accords, agreements, that we have not been able to really materialize because our proposals were presented as a package. I think you understand why. But anyway the roads we have traveled towards these major agreements, major accords on the reduction of nuclear arms, gives us substantial experience, gives us substantial gain here in Reykjavik.

I think both the President of the United States and ourselves should reflect on the entire situation that has evolved here at the meeting and once again to come back and to try to step over that difference between us. We have reached agreement on a great deal of things. We have traveled a long road.

I feel the President probably would have to seek the advice of Congress, of American political leaders, of the American public. Let America think. We are waiting. We are not withdrawing the proposals that we have put forward and I would say the proposals on which, substantially, we have agreed.

Now secondly, I think that all realistically minded forces in the world should now begin to act.

# Reagan: 'Made Great Strides'

Associated Press

*Transcript of President Reagan's comments about his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev:*

It's good to feel so at home. And I want to apologize for being so late. As you know, General Secretary Gorbachev and I were to have concluded our talks at noon after more than 7½ hours of meetings over the last two days. But when the hour for departure arrived, we both felt that further discussions would be valuable. So I called Nancy and told her I wouldn't be home for dinner. She said she understood. In about 6½ hours I'll find out.

But the talks we just concluded were hard and tough and, I would have to say, extremely useful. We spoke about arms control, human rights and regional conflicts. And of course Mr. Gorbachev and I were frank about our disagreements. We had to be.

In several critical areas, we made more progress than we anticipated when we came to Iceland. We moved toward agreement on drastically reduced numbers of intermediate-range missiles in both Europe and Asia. We approached agreement on sharply

reduced strategic arsenals for both our countries. We made progress in the area of nuclear testing, but there was remaining at the end of our talks one area of disagreement.

While both sides seek reduction in the number of nuclear missiles and warheads threatening the world, the Soviet Union insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny to me and future presidents for 10 years the right to develop, test and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the free world. This we could not and will not do.

'So late this afternoon I made to the general secretary an entirely new proposal, a 10-year delay in deployment of SDI in exchange for the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles from the respective arsenals of both nations. So long as both the United States and the Soviet Union prove their good faith by destroying nuclear missiles year by year, we would not deploy SDI.

The general secretary said he would consider our offer only if we restricted all work on SDI to laboratory research, which would have killed our defensive shield.

{ We came to Iceland to advance the cause of peace, and though we put on the table the most far-reaching arms control proposal in history, the general secretary rejected it. However, we made great strides in Iceland in resolving most of our differences, and we're going to continue the effort.

# Donald Regan: 'SDI Is Our Strong Card'

*Transcript of yesterday's news conference with White House chief of staff Donald T. Regan shortly before he left Iceland:*

## 'The President Stood Firm'

**Did the president get the chance for big reductions in strategic missiles leading to the complete elimination in 10 years by trading deployment of 'Star Wars'?**

The president had promised the American people that he would not give away SDI, nor trade it away. He did not trade it away. The president stood firm. SDI is one of the main reasons that we're here. It's quite obvious this is one of the things the Soviets fear, our getting SDI. It is our strong card. We shouldn't give it away.

**But look how much he gave up. He gave up what could have been a comprehensive agreement on medium-range missiles, long-range missiles, a new forum to discuss human rights. Didn't he give up a lot of major security issues in order to preserve the option on SDI?**

There's still a chance to get those, but in the meantime, suppose there had been cheating, or suppose some other country developed these weapons. What SDI is, is a shield against all of these weapons that might come in the hands of other people. Let me give you an example. After World War I, we did away with gas and it was outlawed. Yet we kept our gas masks and soldiers everywhere kept gas masks. Today in the Iran-Iraq war they're using gas again. We had to guard against that. We have to be able to try to find a shield against ballistic missiles.

## 'Everything Was on the Table'

**You're certainly going to come under some pressure from other people to whom Mr. Reagan made promises, on human rights, on humanitarian issues, on other weapons issues, nuclear testing and so on. The president gave up those opportunities. He traded those away.**

No, he did not give up those, he didn't trade them away. The Soviets didn't trade them. The Soviets wouldn't trade those. The Soviets were the demander here. President Reagan was the one who volunteered that we would give up all of these weapons. We made the proposition, not the Soviets. We said to the Soviets, we will do away with all nuclear weapons—nuclear bombs, nuclear shells for field artillery. Everything was on

the table. We'll give it away if you will agree to let us continue our search for this defense. And for 10 years, we won't deploy that system—10 years, mind you, we wouldn't deploy that system. And yet they refused to do it.

## Soviets 'Refused to Make Deal'

**Will there be another summit?**

No, there will not be another summit in the near future that I can see at this time. The Soviets are the ones that refused to make the deal. It shows them up for what they are. The Soviets finally showed their hand. They're not really interested in getting away with these things. If they had, they could see and oversee all of the testing we were doing. We agreed to allow them to watch our tests. They refused to agree to do that. They are the ones who caused this whole scene to happen.

**Is this a complete bust?**

No, it's not a bust. We got very far. It's like going 99 yards and not scoring on the last yard.

**You didn't score.**

But wait a minute. We'll get the ball back. Every time a team gets the ball they don't score. The Soviets didn't score either. Why didn't the Soviets do this? They're the ones that fumbled the ball.

**Will the arms talks get going again?**

That system will start. This isn't the last of it. It has to start all over again.

**Doesn't this in fact set it back? People will perceive that the president refused to trade something for a great deal of progress.**

No, no. The Soviets refused to trade. Would you please get it straight? The president didn't refuse to trade. The Soviets refused the president's offer to do away with nuclear weapons. They insisted upon getting everything. They wouldn't give up anything.

**I have a statement here from Mr. Gorbachev that was made at a news conference a little while ago. He said we can clearly see we are approaching a point of no return and it's clear the United States has not duly understood our initiatives and the situation is deteriorating. What's your reaction?**

Naturally that's what he is going to say. All he had to do to get this entire agreement and put the world at peace was to say, yes you can continue your research [on SDI] as long as you don't deploy for 10 years and in the meantime we talk about it. And he absolutely refused to do that.

## **'We'll Have to Try Again'**

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**Why is this not a major setback for relations between the two superpowers?**

Well, because the two of us know we have to live together and we'll have to try again to see whether it's possible. It's a setback in that sense of the word. It is disappointing. The president is disappointed that he wasn't able to do it. But the road to success is never a smooth one and it's not easy.

**Doesn't it seem that we've relinked SDI to progress on anything else?**

The Soviets linked it. We were on the table, willing to do any of these pieces. We had put all of our things on the table, individually or what have you, and at the end they gave in on everything and then they linked it to SDI. We didn't.



# ICELAND DEBRIEF

1400, 14 OCT 86

## - UNCLASSIFIED DISCUSSION OF EVENTS


- JACK MARANUK
- BOB LINHARD
- PAT BUEANON
- President Reagan

## - MARANUK



- purpose of these "Summit" discussions is to close gaps to give negotiators good starting points
- based on above meeting was a success
- Regional Issues, Human rights, Bilateral Relationship

## - LINHARD

President's  
25 July  
offer



new offer  
of Iceland  
By U.S.



SOVIET  
COUNTER

- ✓ BOTH SIDES NOT EXERCISE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FOR 10 YR
- ✓ ONLY LABORATORY WORK ON SPARE COMPONENTS OF A MISSILE DEFENSE
- ✓ "eliminate strategic forces on both sides" ??

- Bismarck

- put on a political twist & upstaged the President
- Sec State "FOR OF FAILURE" DEBRIEF
- Shultz was punctuated, named (JAS)
- Break through history
- Soviets and Russians plan to keep up the negotiations

- The President

- This meeting set the stage for advances in reductions
  - 100 IRM WARHEADS (in Asia)
  - 50% cut in Strategic Nuclear Forces
  - new talks on nuclear testing
  - completely eliminating OBMs by 1996
- "GS is ready for serious arms reduction" - R<sup>2</sup>
- "I offered a 10yr period of redeployment coupled with elimination of OBMs and the GS could not accept he wanted to tighten up the ABM Treaty"
- "I won't settle for anything that is against American interest or security"
- "I won't accept arms reduction agreements with deep holes - it's dangerous"
- "Let's get ready for the next round" - Iceland was a base camp
- president feels he has made progress

ICELAND TALKING POINTS

→ Iceland Summit

- U.S. went to Iceland in order to narrow differences, where possible, between US and Soviet positions and lay groundwork for more productive negotiations.
- By that measure, meeting a success. Achieved significant movement on START, INF, Nuclear Testing; even aspects of ABM/SDI, though latter obviously remains formidable obstacle. Specifically:
  - START: Agreement on 50% offensive warhead reduction, to be implemented by reductions to 1600 SDNVs, 6000 warheads; important advances in counting rules; Soviet recognition of requirement for "significant cuts" in heavy ICBMs.
  - INF: 100 global warhead limit (zero in Europe) a major advance (over 90% reduction for Soviets); freeze on short-range INF, pending negotiation of reductions.
  - Nuclear Testing: Plan for US ratification of TTB/PNE treaties (contingent on adequate verification), to be followed by negotiations on further testing limitations in phase with nuclear weapons reductions.
  - ABM/SDI: Both sides moved on minimum time sides should limit themselves to research, development and testing of strategic defenses (US from 7 1/2 years to 10, contingent on adequate verification, and coupled with plan for 50% reduction in strategic forces in 5 years, elimination of all ballistic missiles in 10. Soviets moved from 15 years to 10; though very significant differences remain on overall approach.)
- Significant headway as well on other pillars of the relationship:
  - On human rights, U.S. stressed crucial importance of this issue; Soviets agreed to regularize discussions.
  - On regional conflicts, two sides had vigorous discussions of Afghanistan, Central America, Angola, Cambodia, Middle East, and Iran-Iraq; U.S. laid down important markers concerning Soviet behavior.
  - On bilateral exchanges, sides agreed on a work plan to accelerate negotiations in a number of areas including consulates, space cooperation, nuclear safety.
- In arms control we intend to build on Iceland results to seek further progress at Geneva.
  - Gorbachev has said that Iceland proposals are still on the table.
  - Ball now in Soviet court to assure continuation of Iceland momentum.

- Soviet attempt at Iceland to hold progress in all areas of arms control hostage to acceptance of Soviet views on ABM/SDI an unconstructive and unfortunate position; retrogression from Gorbachev's Geneva summit agreement to move forward in areas of common ground.

-- Historic opportunity to reach agreements in other key arms control areas demands responsible Soviet behavior; if opportunity lost, world will clearly understand where blame lies.

-- U.S. ready now to proceed, as matter of highest priority, to reach agreements on START, INF, Nuclear Testing along lines discussed at Reykjavik.

- ABM/SDI issue requires further work to reconcile fundamental US/USSR differences.

-- Soviets sought to kill by ban on essential testing outside the laboratories.

- Important for Soviets to understand SDI not a bargaining chip but a key element of US approach to more secure world for all.

- Case for transition from offense to defense-based systems a compelling one; in both countries' interests.

-- Only realistic hope to eliminate nuclear "balance of terror," threat of massive annihilation.

-- Wholly non-threatening to Soviet Union; no significant offensive potential in SDI systems (Soviet specialists understand this).

-- U.S. offer to share benefits of strategic defense a generous one; belies Soviet allegations of U.S. intent to exploit technological lead to Soviet disadvantage.

- SDI essential to U.S. even with agreement on reduction and ultimate elimination of ballistic missiles, in order to hedge against abrogation, cheating, and third country threats; provide continuing incentive for offensive reductions; and offer stability during critical transition period and insurance thereafter.

-- Scale of deployment will depend, in part, on scope of threat.

- Hope sober reflection will lead Soviets to recognize that SDI is not a threat to be killed through negotiation, but a key element of our mutual transition to a safer and more secure world.

-- We will be working to lay the logic of this position before the Soviets at Geneva, while trying to move them to proceed now to lock up agreements in other areas where major progress recorded at Reykjavik.

- In short, Reykjavik was worthwhile; no second thoughts about wisdom of acceding to Gorbachev's request for pre-summit discussions.

-- Road to agreement with Soviets is never smooth; ideological differences, distrust, divergent strategic outlooks and force structures complicate progress.

-- Reykjavik represents an important chapter in ongoing arms control dialogue between two countries.

-- Clear understanding of others' positions and motivations necessary for productive negotiation; progress achieved on that score as well as substantively in key areas.

-- We emerged having narrowed differences, and with clear appreciation that Soviets' obsession with SDI represents the most significant obstacle to be overcome at this point.

- Opportunities created by Iceland discussions too important to let languish. U.S. hopes for further near-term progress based on:

-- Essential balance, fairness, and mutual benefit of those agreements which were shown by discussions in Reykjavik to be achievable.

-- Soviets' capability to assess the negotiating climate realistically, and recognize when time has come to deal.

-- President's strong and unwavering position on essentiality of developing, testing, and ultimately deploying SDI.

-- Soviets' understanding that historic opportunities may well be forfeited if it does not reach agreement in time remaining to this US administration.

- Strong support of U.S. public has been and will continue to be essential to US success in complex task of reaching comprehensive and enduring settlements with Soviets.

-- Patience, persistence, and supportive Congress vital as well.

-- Renewed economic dynamism, refurbished U.S. military strength, and Allied cohesion also play critical roles.

... Gorbachev's challenge at this point is to rise to occasion in statesmanlike manner and collaborate with us in reaching agreements which will lay foundation for stable long-term strategic relationship between the two countries, leading to ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.