National Security Decision
Directive Number 135

LOS ANGELES OLYMPIC GAMES
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY PRECAUTIONS (C)

Issue

The Olympic Games, to be held in Los Angeles this summer, present a number of unique counterintelligence and security concerns. This Directive delineates the counterintelligence and security precautions the United States Government will take with regard to Soviet Aeroflot charter flights for the Soviet "Olympic Family" (i.e., those Soviets, including a reasonable number of spectators, directly involved in the Games) and the port visit of the Soviet vessel GRUZIA at Long Beach Harbor for the duration of the Games. (S)

Objectives

The United States desires the complete success of the 1984 Summer Olympic Games and seeks to ensure the full and equitable participation of all accredited members of the Olympic Family in accordance with Olympic rules and applicable laws of the United States. We will also ensure the safe passage of Soviet Aeroflot flights to and from our country and the visit of the Soviet vessel GRUZIA to the Long Beach Harbor area. In hosting the Games in this manner, it is the United States policy to ensure the establishment of all possible measures to prevent intelligence losses and reduce the vulnerability of national security activities to the hostile intelligence threat resulting from the Soviet flights or ship visit. It is of the utmost importance that US military and national security related facilities; sensitive contractor and industrial activities; weapons systems; and vessels be provided maximum protection against possible Soviet exploitation. (TS)

Agencies should take the following measures and all other appropriate actions to fulfill these policy objectives:

Overflight Security

(1) Charter flights by Soviet Aeroflot commercial aircraft for the Games will be subject to procedures established under the provisions of NSDD-107. (C)
(2) Specific routings of the aircraft will be the responsibility of the Federal Aviation Administration under guidance from the Overflight Security Committee. (S)

(3) These aircraft will be subject to boarding for Customs and other inspections as a condition for entry to the United States. (C)

(4) US Escort crews for each Aeroflot flight will be provided in accordance with existing arrangements and procedures. These crews will ensure Soviet compliance with all US routing procedures. (C)

Port Security

(1) The Port Security Committee will ensure the implementation of all actions required to carry out the policies set forth in this NSDD. (C)

(2) The GRUZIA will be treated as a commercial, Soviet Special Interest Vessel and not as a public vessel. The vessel will be subject to boarding and searches at such times as necessary by the Coast Guard or other authorities. (C)

(3) Waterside security will be the responsibility of the Coast Guard. (U)

(4) Shoreside security will be provided for the vessel while it is in port. (U)

(5) Radio Transmissions from the GRUZIA while it is berthed in Long Beach Harbor will not be permitted. (C)

(6) The Department of Defense, in coordination with the Port Security Committee, will provide contractors and military installations in the vicinity of Long Beach with threat assessments concerning the GRUZIA and provide recommendations to ensure the security (i.e., secure operations, testing, etc.), of these activities. (C)

Communications Security Measures

(1) NSA shall identify and assess the vulnerability of potential intelligence targets for both the charter flights and the GRUZIA. NSA is to use an appropriate means to warn those sensitive entities of the Soviet intelligence threat. (TS)

(2) NSA shall work with appropriate carriers to reroute sensitive communications and to take other appropriate actions to secure those sensitive communications. (TS)
(3) All military commands and agencies shall consider the intelligence threat posed by the visit of the Soviet ship in planning for and conducting military exercises and weapons systems tests in California, New Mexico, and Nevada during the period of the Soviet ship visit, including the possibility of modification or delay, and shall take appropriate countermeasures. (S)

Support for Intelligence

The Director of Central Intelligence will ensure priority intelligence collection on the GRUZIA and provide such information to officials requiring such information to fulfill the provisions of this NSDD. (TS)

Coordination

The Secretary of State, through the Counselor of the Department of State, in coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is responsible for the administration of this NSDD. As appropriate, the Counselor should conduct meetings with those charged with fulfilling specific provisions of this NSDD. (S)

Note

As appropriate, the attached note, "comments concerning the 'Memorandum of discussions between the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee and representatives of the USSR National Olympic Committee'" which has been transmitted from the White House to the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, should be considered in conjunction with the terms of this NSDD in fulfilling the stated policy objectives in this document. (C)
SOVIET CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION (S)

INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union has developed a doctrine of "maskirovka" which calls for the use of camouflage, concealment and deception (CC&D) in defense-related programs and in the conduct of military operations. They define maskirovka as a set of measures to deceive, or mislead, the enemy with respect to Soviet national security capabilities, actions, and intentions. These measures include concealment, simulation, diversionary actions and disinformation. (TS/COMINT)

Integral to development and deployment of strategic and tactical weapons systems, is establishment and execution of a plan for maskirovka. A Soviet Directorate for strategic maskirovka has been established and its directives are carried out by numerous elements of the Soviet government. Additionally, the Soviets have established a program to counter western signal and imagery intelligence collection. The Soviets may be attempting to deceive the West regarding the intent and purpose of basic policies, e.g., arms control. (TS/COMINT)

Several recent discoveries reveal that the Soviet maskirovka program has enjoyed previously unsuspected success and that it is apparently entering a new and improved phase. Many of these discoveries resulted only after concentrated and intensive examination of intelligence accumulated over many years. (TS/TK/COMINT)

DECISION

Although a number of constructive actions have been undertaken by the intelligence community in this area, I have decided that a more aggressive and focused U.S. program is essential to better understand and counter Soviet CC&D activities. Therefore, immediate actions shall be taken to identify, train,
equip and assign adequate resources devoted specifically to detecting, analyzing and, where appropriate, countering Soviet CC&D. It is essential that procedures be established for ensuring that intelligence analysis is focused on the gamut of Soviet CC&D efforts; for ensuring that this analysis is integrated with other intelligence product; and for developing appropriate countermeasures. (TS)

IMPLEMENTATION

To implement the above decision, the Director of Central Intelligence, in cooperation with other Departments and Agencies as appropriate, will:

- Establish a centralized functional unit within the intelligence community with responsibility for coordinating intelligence efforts against foreign CC&D, for ensuring prompt dissemination of CC&D intelligence and its integration into other community analytic products and for developing appropriate countermeasures. At least ten dedicated personnel will be assigned to the unit for this purpose. (TS)

- Establish dedicated full-time teams focused on the Soviet CC&D effort at each collection agency of the intelligence community. (TS)

- Establish recruitment and training programs within each agency of the intelligence community to provide a continuing supply of personnel skilled in discovering and interpreting the full range of foreign CC&D. (TS)

- Implement procedures to ensure dissemination of CC&D information among agencies of the intelligence community. (TS)

The above actions shall be completed and a report submitted to me not later than February 1, 1984. The report shall include, as well, an overall assessment of the purpose and effectiveness of Soviet CC&D and of compromises of information about our intelligence collection systems, along with recommendations for actions to counter Soviet efforts. A progress report will be submitted by December 1, 1983. (TS)
SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

In reporting to the Congress on February 7 of this year on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, I stated that:

"In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less. To do so would undermine the arms control process and damage the chances for establishing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship."  (U)

I further stated that:

"Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future. With regard to the issues analyzed in the January 1984 report, the Soviet Union has thus far not provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective actions sufficient to alleviate our concerns. The United States Government has vigorously pressed, and will continue to press, these compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels."  (U)

The important role of treaty compliance for future arms control was recently recognized by the United Nations. On December 12, 1985, the General Assembly passed by a vote of 131-0 (with 16 abstentions) a resolution on arms control compliance which had been introduced by the United States and other co-sponsors. The resolution urged all parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to comply with their provisions and called upon those parties to consider the implications of noncompliance for international security and stability and for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament.  (U)
At the request of the Congress, I have in the past two years provided three reports to the Congress on Soviet compliance issues. These include the Administration's reports of January 1984 and February 1985 and the report of the independent General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. (U)

Public Law 99-145 requires the Administration to provide on an annual basis by December 1 of each year a classified and unclassified report to the Congress containing the findings of the President and any additional information necessary to keep the Congress informed on Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. (U)

The current report responds to this Congressional requirement. It is the product of months of careful technical and legal analysis by all relevant agencies of the United States Government and represents the Administration's authoritative updated treatment of this important matter. (U)

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE (U)

The Administration's most recent studies support its conclusion that there is a pattern of Soviet noncompliance. Through its noncompliance, the Soviet Union has made military gains in the areas of strategic offensive arms as well as chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. If the yields of Soviet nuclear tests have been substantially above 150 kilotons, then Soviet testing would allow proportionately greater gains in nuclear weapons development than the U.S. could achieve. The possible extent of the Soviet Union's military gains by virtue of its noncompliance in the area of strategic defense also is of increasing importance and serious concern. (U)

In a fundamental sense, all deliberate Soviet violations are equally important. As violations of legal obligations or political commitments, they cause grave concern regarding Soviet commitment to arms control, and they darken the atmosphere in which current negotiations are being conducted in Geneva and elsewhere. (U)

In another sense, Soviet violations are not of equal importance. While some individual violations are of little apparent military significance in their own right, such violations can acquire importance if, left unaddressed, they are permitted to become precedents for future, more threatening violations. Moreover, some issues that individually have little military significance could conceivably become significant when taken in the aggregate. (U)
THE SOVIET RESPONSE (U)

At the same time as the Administration has reported its concerns and findings to the Congress, the United States has had extensive exchanges with the Soviet Union on Soviet noncompliance in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), where SALT-related issues (including ABM issues) are discussed, and through other appropriate diplomatic channels. I expressed my personal concerns directly to General Secretary Gorbachev during my recent meeting with him in Geneva. (S)

All of the violations, probable violations, and ambiguous situations included in this report and previously reported on have been raised with the Soviets, except for two sensitive issues. The Soviet Union has thus far not provided explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns on these issues, nor has the Soviet Union taken actions needed to correct existing violations. Instead, they have continued to assert that they are in complete compliance with their arms control obligations and commitments. (S)

US POLICY (U)

In contrast with the Soviet Union, the United States has fully observed its arms control obligations and commitments, including those under the SALT I and SALT II agreements. As I stated in my message to the Congress on June 10 of this year concerning US interim restraint policy:

"In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Despite my serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II agreement, I took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START.

"Since then, the United States has not taken any action which would undercut existing arms control agreements. The United States has fully kept its part of the bargain. However, the Soviets have not. They have failed to comply with several provisions of SALT II, and we have serious concerns regarding their compliance with the provisions of other accords."
"The pattern of Soviet violations, if left uncorrected, undercuts the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world. The United States will continue to pursue vigorously with the Soviet Union the resolution of our concerns over Soviet noncompliance. We cannot impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance." (U)

On June 10, I invited the Soviet Union to join the United States in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms and to pursue with renewed vigor our top priority of achieving deep reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals in the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. I noted that the U.S. cannot establish such a framework alone and that it would require the Soviet Union to take positive, concrete steps to correct its noncompliance, to resolve our other compliance concerns, to reverse its unparalleled and unwarranted military buildup, and actively to pursue arms reduction agreements in the Geneva negotiations. (U)

In going the extra mile, I have made clear that as an integral part of this policy, we will also take those steps required to assure our national security and that of our Allies that were made necessary by Soviet noncompliance. Thus, as I indicated to the Congress on June 10, "appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to ensure our security, to provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their noncompliance, and to make it clear to Moscow that violations of arms control obligations entail real costs." (U)

As we monitor Soviet actions for evidence of the positive, concrete steps needed on their part to correct these activities, I have directed the Department of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment aimed at identifying specific actions that the United States could take to augment as necessary the U.S. strategic modernization program as a proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of those Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements which the Soviets fail to correct. We will carefully study this report as soon as it has been completed. (U)

As we press for corrective Soviet actions and while keeping open all programmatic options for handling future milestones as new U.S. strategic systems are deployed, we will continue to assess the situation in light of Soviet actions correcting their noncompliance, reversing their military buildup and promoting progress in Geneva. (U)
As we seek to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in negotiating sound arms control agreements, I look forward to continued close consultation with the Congress. (U)

THE FINDINGS (U)

A. ABM Treaty (U)

1. The Krasnoyarsk Radar (U)

The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion in the February 1985 report that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Continuing construction and the absence of credible alternative explanations have reinforced our assessment of its purpose. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (S)

2. Mobility of ABM System Components (U)

The U.S. Government judges that the evidence on Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility is ambiguous, but that the U.S.S.R.'s development and testing of components of an ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively limited special-purpose site preparation, represent a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (S)

3. Concurrent Testing of ABM and Air Defense Components (U)

The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgement made in the February 1985 report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations is insufficient fully to assess compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The large number, and consistency over time, of incidents of concurrent
operation of ABM and SAM components, plus Soviet failure to accommodate U.S. concerns, indicate the U.S.S.R. probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In several cases, this may be highly probable. This and other such Soviet ABM-related activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. It should be noted that in June 1985, a Common Understanding was signed relating to certain events of this type that may preclude future concerns if observed. (S)

4. ABM Capabilities of Modern SAM Systems (C)

The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the February 1985 report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to SAM upgrade is insufficient to assess compliance with the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, this and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (S)

5. Rapid Reload of ABM Launchers (C)

The U.S. Government judges, on the basis of the evidence available, that the U.S.S.R.'s actions with respect to the rapid reload of ABM launchers constitute an ambiguous situation as concerns its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty not to develop systems for rapid reload. The Soviet Union's reload capabilities are a serious concern. These and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (S)

6. ABM Territorial Defense (U)

The U.S. Government judges that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions (e.g., radar construction, concurrent testing, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid reload and ABM mobility) suggests that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. (S)

B. SALT II Treaty (U)

1. SS-25 ICBM (U)
   a. Second New Type -- Testing and Deployment: The U.S. Government judges, based on convincing evidence gathered from nearly three years of Soviet testing of the SS-25, that the throw weight of the
Soviet SS-25 ICBM exceeds by more than five percent the throw weight of the Soviet SS-13 ICBM and cannot therefore be considered a permitted modernization of the SS-13 as the Soviets claim. The SS-25 (a derivative of the SS-16 ICBM) is a prohibited second "new type" of ICBM and its testing, in addition to the testing of the SS-X-24 ICBM, thereby is a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to observe the "new type" provision of the SALT Treaty. The deployment of this missile during 1985 constitutes a further violation of the SALT II prohibition on a second "new type" of ICBM. (S)

b. RV-to-Throw-Weight Ratio: The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion of the January 1984 report regarding the SS-25 RV-to-throw-weight ratio. That is, if we were to accept the Soviet argument that the SS-25 is not a prohibited "new type" of ICBM, it would be a violation of their political commitment to observe the SALT II provision which prohibits the testing of such an existing ICBM with a single reentry vehicle whose weight is less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of the ICBM. (S)

c. Encryption: The U.S. Government reaffirms its judgment made in the January 1984 report regarding telemetry encryption during tests of the SS-25. Encryption during tests of this missile is illustrative of the deliberate impeding of verification of compliance in violation of the U.S.S.R.'s political commitment. (S)

Despite U.S. requests for explanations and corrective actions with regard to the SS-25 ICBM-related activities, Soviet actions continue unchanged, and the Soviet Union has proceeded to deployment of these missiles. (S)

2. Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle Limits (C)

The U.S. Government interprets the Soviet commitment to abide by SALT II as including the existence of a cap on SNDVs -- at a level of 2504 existing at the time SALT II was signed. The Soviet Union has deployed SNDVs above the 2504 cap in violation of its political commitment under SALT II. Such activity is indicative of a Soviet policy inconsistent with this political commitment. (S)
3. SS-16 Deployment  (U)

The President's February 1985 Report to Congress, which noted that the evidence is somewhat ambiguous and we cannot reach a definitive conclusion, found the mobile missile activities at Plesetsk in the areas historically associated with the SS-16 to be a probable violation of the U.S.S.R.'s legal obligation and political commitment under SALT II. Soviet activity in the past year at Plesetsk seems to indicate the probable removal of SS-16 equipment and introduction of equipment associated with the SS-25. (S)

4. Backfire Bomber Intercontinental Operating Capability  (C)

a. Arctic Staging: The U.S. Government judges that the temporary deployment of Backfires of the Soviet Air Force (SAF) to Arctic bases in 1983, 1984, and 1985, bases used by Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) Backfires since 1975, is cause for concern and continued careful monitoring. By such temporary deployment of SAF Backfires, the Soviet Union acted in a manner inconsistent with its political commitment in the June 1979 Backfire statement not to give Backfire the capability to strike targets on the territory of the United States. (S)

b. Engine Upgrade: Based on the uncertain evidence available, the U.S. Government judges the U.S.S.R.'s actions with respect to possible upgrades of Backfire engines (which would contribute to the Backfire's intercontinental capability) as ambiguous in terms of the Soviet Union's political commitment in the June 1979 Backfire statement not to increase Backfire's radius of action to enable it to strike the United States. (S)

c. Aerial Refueling: The U.S. Government judges that since the Backfire C is not believed to have a refueling probe, and since those on the Backfire B have been removed, only potential refueling capabilities exist at this time. (S)
d. Cruise Missile Capability: The U.S. Government judges that, on the basis of the uncertain evidence available, the U.S.S.R.'s actions with respect to the association of cruise missiles with Backfire are ambiguous as concerns its political commitment under SALT II not to give Backfire an increased radius of action that would enable it to strike the United States. (S)

5. Backfire Bomber Production Rate (C)

The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union is obligated to produce no more than 30 Backfire bomber aircraft per year. There are ambiguities concerning the data. However, there is evidence that the Soviet Backfire production rate was constant at slightly more than 30 per year until January 1, 1984 and decreased since that time to slightly below 30 per year. (S)

6. A Soviet SLBM (S)

This finding is being transmitted separately. (C)

7. Concealment of Missile/Launcher Association (C)

The U.S. Government judges Soviet activities related to the SS-25 to be a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to abide by the SALT II Treaty provision prohibiting concealment of the association between a missile and its launcher during testing. (S)

C. SALT I Interim Agreement (U)

Use of "Remaining Facilities" at Former SS-7 Sites (C)

The U.S. Government judges that Soviet use of former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the SS-25 mobile ICBMs at Yurya and Yoshkar-Ola is in violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement. Should the Soviets use "remaining facilities" in the future at other former SS-7 sites where the SS-25 is now in the process of being deployed, such use will also constitute Soviet violation of its political commitment under the SALT I Interim Agreement. (S)
D. Biological Weapons Convention and 1925 Geneva Protocol (U)

The U.S. Government judges that continued expansion during 1985 at suspect biological and toxin weapon facilities in the Soviet Union, and reports that a Soviet BW program may now include investigation of new classes of BW agents, confirm and strengthen the conclusion of the January 1984 and February 1985 reports that the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. (S)

There have been no confirmed attacks with lethal chemicals or toxins in Kampuchea, Laos, or Afghanistan in 1985 according to our strict standards of evidence. However, there is no basis for amending the February 1985 conclusion that, prior to this time, the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan in violation of its legal obligation under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. (S)

E. Threshold Test Ban Treaty (U)

While ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and verification uncertainties continued in 1985, the U.S. Government reaffirms the February 1985 finding that Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which banned underground nuclear tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons. These Soviet actions continued despite U.S. requests for corrective measures. (S/NF)

F. Limited Test Ban Treaty (U)

The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the February 1985 report that the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices resulted in the venting of radioactive matter on numerous occasions and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of its legal obligation under the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances despite numerous U.S. demarches and requests for corrective action. (S)
G. Helsinki Final Act (U)

The U.S. Government previously judged and continues to find that the Soviet Union in 1981 violated its political commitment to observe provisions of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act by not providing prior notification of exercise "ZAPAD-81." While the U.S.S.R. has generally taken an approach to the confidence-building measures of the Final Act which minimizes the information it provides, Soviet compliance with the exercise-notification provisions was improved in 1983. In 1984 the Soviets returned to a minimalist approach providing only the bare information required under the Final Act. The Soviet Union continued this approach during 1985. (S)

U.S. POLICY RESPONSES (U)

U.S. policy responses to activities of the Soviet Union in violation of its arms control obligations and commitments will include the following: (U)

Reports to Congress (U)

In response to Congressional requests, an unclassified report incorporating a number of the above findings is being forwarded to the Congress and made available to the public. In view of its unclassified nature, this report does not contain issues that have not previously been raised with the Soviet Union. (C)

A classified report, also requested by the Congress, is being forwarded to the Congress simultaneously with more detailed supplementary material to follow as appropriate. This report, consisting of an Introduction and detailed findings, will cover all issues analyzed by the Verification Committee, except that issues of special intelligence sensitivity may be briefed to Congress under special existing intelligence arrangements. (C)

The classified report will form the basis for briefings and consultations with the Congress and our Allies. (C)

Improved Security (U)

Existing and potential Soviet noncompliance will continue to be factored into U.S. force modernization plans in strategic and chemical weapons and in planning for the Strategic Defense Initiative research program in terms of proportionate and appropriate responses to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance as required for national and Alliance security. (C)
Diplomatic and Public Affairs Context. (U)

In the appropriate diplomatic channels, to include high-level demarches and discussions, the U.S. will inform the Soviet Union of our conclusions regarding issues included in the unclassified report, and will continue to press for their resolution and for corrective action terminating noncompliance. (C)

This Administration report will be handled in the context of our broader arms control and national security objectives. Compliance will be stressed as essential to the arms control process, and the importance of effective verification and unambiguous provisions in future arms control agreements will be emphasized. In this context, the report shall be made available to the U.S. negotiators in the nuclear arms reduction and space talks in Geneva. (C)

The focus of public, Congressional, and Alliance briefings on compliance issues will be to: build knowledge and understanding about Soviet noncompliance activity; aid in maintaining pressure on the Soviet Union to correct its noncompliance activities; develop support for appropriate responses; and direct attention to the need for more effective verification provisions in future agreements. (S)

ISSUES FOR FURTHER WORK (U)

The Arms Control Verification Committee, working with the U.S. Commissioner to the Standing Consultative Committee (SCC), will assist in developing proposals for raising Soviet noncompliance activities in the SCC. (C)

As directed in NSDD-160, the Arms Control Verification Committee and the appropriate Interdepartmental Groups will support the Senior Arms Control Group in assuring comprehensive assessments of verification issues associated with U.S. negotiating proposals. Such assessments should address the overall effectiveness of verification, U.S. monitoring capability (to include Soviet cheating scenarios), and the possibility of safeguards. As directed in NSDD-121, the Committee's assessments will apply to non-nuclear, as well as nuclear, arms control negotiation proposals. (S)

The Arms Control Verification Committee will prepare a report on the implications of recent studies of changes in the correction used in the formula relating yields and seismic signals of Soviet yields. This report, to be commented on by the Interdepartmental Group on Nuclear Testing Limitations Policy, will report how these changes affect U.S. policy relating to the Threshold Test Ban...
and our judgment about Soviet compliance with that treaty. In addition, the Arms Control Verification Committee shall identify new studies and work they deem necessary to satisfy questions concerning compliance and verification aspects of the treaty. (S)

The Arms Control Verification Committee will undertake additional work to resolve outstanding issues discussed in the current report concerning:

--- The existence of refueling probes on Backfire C bombers.

--- Concurrent operation of:
  (a) ABM radars and ABM missile testing or strategic ballistic missile reentry testing;
  (b) ABM radars and SAM launchers or target flights; and
  (c) SAM radars and ABM radars.

--- The role and function of the PAWN SHOP radar to answer the question whether the PAWN SHOP is a true radar. (S)

The Arms Control Verification Committee will provide an analysis through appropriate intelligence channels of the issue of denial of data impeding verification. (S)

The Arms Control Verification Committee will submit recommendations on additional compliance issues of concern to the Administration and/or raised by the Congress which are to be studied. (S)

The Arms Control Verification Committee will submit no later than February 1 a work program for completing work on above issues. (S)

Ronald Reagan