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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Geneva, Switzerland)

For Immediate Release

November 18, 1985

PRESS BRIEFING
BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
ON THE GENEVA SUMMIT

Salle de Bal
Hotel Intercontinental
Geneva, Switzerland

4:17 P.M. (L)

MR. SPEAKES: Let me have your attention, please. We have with us Bud McFarlane, the President's Foreign Policy Adviser, who will brief you on the meeting with the Swiss President, followed by details on tomorrow's meeting which he wishes to describe to you.

Also, I'd like to announce that Bud will be at the Foreign Press Center -- International Press Center -- at 6:30 this evening for a similar briefing.

MR. MCFARLANE: Good afternoon. This afternoon it was the pleasure of the President to meet and exchange views with President Furgler, members of the Cabinet, the Foreign Minister, the State Secretary. The meeting, held in Le Reposoir was extremely cordial, afforded the President an opportunity to express his deep gratitude for all of the support provided by the government of Switzerland in hosting this session with the General Secretary. He expressed his highest regard for the traditional role that Switzerland has played in making possible periodic meetings which, on many occasions, have fostered improved understanding between countries, a better climate, and the resolution of specific problems.

Bilateral issues, as well, were discussed to include civil air matters, technology transfer matters; however, both leaders acknowledged that the state of the relationship is excellent. The President was pleased to hear of Switzerland's introduction -- or making public -- a proposal in the Stockholm Conference where discussions have been underway for over a year on confidence building measures. The President thought this an extremely constructive initiative on the part of Switzerland and looks forward to studying it in the days ahead.

The Swiss president expressed his deep sentiment of support for the objectives both countries coming to this meeting have expressed and hope that it may be an opportunity for a reduction in tensions and the establishment of an improved climate for the resolution of disagreements in the years ahead. It was, in all, an extremely worthwhile meeting typified by cordiality on both sides, gratitude, mutual respect.

We turn now to just a very brief remark on the eve of the meetings with the General Secretary and then I'll take your questions.

On the eve of his meetings with the General Secretary, the President feels a deep sense of responsibility, of challenge and of opportunity. He believes that the meeting has as its central purpose providing an opportunity for each leader to make fundamental presentations on their own countries. For his own part, he intends a comprehensive presentation on the strengths, values, purposes, goals of the United States looking to the end of the century. He will, as

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well, express the views of the United States of the Soviet Union and of its purposes, strengths, and so forth. Thirdly, he will make clear in the opening session that we have concerns regarding patterns of behavior of the Soviet Union in international affairs, looks forward to being explicit in these. But, finally, to propose a framework for U.S.-Soviet relations that will encompass the full agenda of bilateral, regional, human rights and security issues devoted to a sustained dialogue in the interest of the resolution of problems between us.

He has said in coming here that he has come on a mission for peace and he believes that that mission requires frank, forthright discussion of the interrelated elements of peace. As he told the American people last week, he will present his views

on the need to strengthen and stabilize the nuclear balance, to restrain the use of force and subversion, to increase respect for human rights, and to improve communication between both peoples and governments.

The President's goals and specific proposals in each of the four areas I've mentioned are very well known to all of you. They're on the table and he will have more to say in detail about each of them with Mr. Gorbachev. He wants to start solving problems. If the Soviet side is equally committed to practical solutions, there will be progress.

The President approaches these meetings with a strong sense of realism; that means understanding a point that is easily forgotten. In past post-summit headlines, peace isn't based on meetings. It depends, above all, on policies that work and that make clear America's determination to defend her interests and those of her friends and allies. We will seek sound agreements where we can, but we will fulfill our responsibilities where we must. In this way, the President believes that we can better avoid swings between complacency and confrontation. Neither of these extremes have served us very well in the past. In fact, as the historical records shows, the one can all too easily encourage the other.

In the late 1950's the spirit of Geneva gave way to years of crisis over Berlin. In the late 1960's, the spirit of Glassboro was dispelled by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. And in the late '70's, the confidence and hope that efforts at strategic arms control were supposed to bring to Soviet-American relations disappeared. They were undone by a relentless military buildup and by a half decade of Soviet activity in the Third World culminating in the invasion of and continued occupation of Afghanistan.

President Reagan believes deeply that we have to do better. This has been the goal of all the policies that he has put in place since 1981. He feels that we can learn and profit from historical experience. He wants to chart a course -- a consistent course -- sustained by strong public support at home, and its aim is simple: to make restraint the most realistic Soviet option.

Perhaps the most frequently asked question of the week is will the meeting be a success or a failure. The President certainly hopes for progress and intends to make as much as is feasible. But a real answer to that question will not be immediately available. He has not come to Geneva to seek two days of atmospheric improvements, but to put down a strong foundation on which future results can be built. It is by such results that the value of this week's meetings, like those of the past, will be judged in the years ahead.

I'll be glad to take your questions now. Helen?

Q Did the President or did his delegation see the Gorbachev arrival and hear his remarks and where he obviously made arms control here in the sky the key element -- and what you have outlined here sounds like a monologue. I mean, is the President going to keep pushing all of these things? Isn't it going to be more of a give-and-take.

MR. MCFARLANE: The question is, did the President see on television Mr. Gorbachev's arrival? Secondly, what I have said sounds to be a monologue and will there be a give-and-take in the days ahead. Is that right?

With regard to the arrival, the President was in a --

Q It's a figment of my imagination.

MR. MCFARLANE: You're in a good mood today, aren't you, Helen? (Laughter.)

The President was in a --

Q -- imagination.

Q Oh, that's great.

Q The spirit of --

Q Answer the question. (Laughter.)

MR. MCFARLANE: The President was in a meeting with foreign policy and national security associates at the time of the arrival. He has seen the arrival statement; he's very conscious of Mr. Gorbachev's objectives here and looks forward to commencement of the meeting. With regard to what I've laid out, this is what the President intends to present from the American side. Surely there will be a corresponding response from the Soviet side and that's very much what we're after here.

Q Mr. McFarlane, when the President was asked today about SDI and Gorbachev's renewal of his insistence that we not pursue it, he said wait until he hears my proposal. What proposal? Is there a new one on SDI? What will the President say to Gorbachev on that?

MR. MCFARLANE: The President's policies on arms control I think are well known. They are founded upon the fundamental objective of reducing the level of offensive nuclear arms at an equitable, verifiable fashion. He will present our most recent proposal in the Geneva talks. More importantly, perhaps, the concept behind it and how we view -- how he views -- deterrence and how the offensive basis for deterrence has been eroded in the past ten years. He will point out that that relates to our SDI program and that there are three fundamental elements or reasons behind it; that is that, from the original premise that offensive balance would assure deterrence, for as long as that balance existed and no defense was developed. What we have seen in practice is the development of an imbalance. Faced with that, the United States had to consider the military problem it faced. Now, if you could not get the Soviet Union to reduce, if you could not or did not wish to increase, you have to compensate. In short, the Soviet Union has driven us to this.

He will go on to say that, in addition, the Soviet Union could not reasonably expect any country to stand by idly and watch a scale -- or an SDI program of the scale that they have. Finally, he'll say -- and that's most important reason -- surely, we ought to be able to find a better way to keep the peace than reliance upon a strategy of threats with nuclear power that is spiraling ever upward.

Now, with regard to SDI, he'll go through these points, expect that Mr. Gorbachev will have his own response. But he hopes that, as a consequence of that exchange, that there can be in the months ahead in Geneva the beginnings of a dialogue between our two countries on the relationship between offense and defense and that, over time, we can explore in a cooperative fashion how a transition from reliance on offense to greater reliance on defense could be carried out.

Q So, I think you may have answered my question. I want to make certain. He will say to the extent that you've outlined it, what is his well-known position on SDI, he was not referring to some new facet of it or proposal that we do not know about?

MR. MCFARLANE: That is correct.

Q Mr. McFarlane, a very conservative British writer -- in fact, he will be on the right wing of the conservative party -- wrote the other day that one disadvantage of SDI is that if this forces the Soviets into economic competition, it would mean less

freedom for the countries of eastern Europe. He made an argument that SDI -- and he's a conservative -- he made an argument that SDI would mean less freedom for eastern Europe. What is your answer to that argument?

MR. MCFARLANE: Well, there are several parts to it. The question is, a recent article by a British conservative has asserted that U.S. SDI could lead to inducing a massive investment by the Soviet

inducing a massive investment by the Soviet Union which implicitly deprives other accounts from receiving those investments, and in particular would place a burden on the countries of Eastern Europe whose welfare would decline.

Q He meant less freedom. The man who wrote this is Peregrine Worsthorne and you probably know him. What is your answer to that?

MR. MCFARLANE: I think that first of all, the comment ignores the criteria that have been set for any ultimate development of the SDI program, and that is that it wouldn't be pursued at all unless it met the criterion of being cost-effective at the margin, that is, cheaper than the marginal unit of offense required to overcome it.

In addition, second criteria, that it would be invulnerable; consequently, that it would be fruitless to go to an extreme to develop a system to overcome it because it would be by definition infeasible.

Now, against those two criteria, it is reasonable to assume that if we meet those, the Soviet Union would have no incentive to develop offense and to make this massive investment you imply. So if you examine how we are going to conduct this, if indeed it is conducted, the Soviet point that it will invoke this massive offensive investment simply wouldn't be sensible.

Q What about issue of face which is becoming involved here -- "face" in the oriental sense?

MR. MCFARLANE: Well, I think these issues are too important. I may miss the point of face; we're not in the business of worrying about face, we're concerned about reducing nuclear arms here.

Yes.

Q Mr. McFarlane, in addition to the meetings involving the President, will there be smaller meetings involving you or Mr. Shultz and their Soviet counterparts over the next 3 days?

MR. MCFARLANE: Question in the -- in addition to the meeting of principals, the President and the General Secretary, will there be others by subordinates. None are planned. Surely, some will occur just in the normal format of corridor exchanges, and perhaps more formal meetings, but none are now planned.

Q None have taken place so far?

MR. MCFARLANE: No. Lou.

Q Two questions. One is, what do you look for in the first meeting -- the icebreaker meeting, such it is, between the President and the General Secretary, and has there been any signal at all from the Soviets in the last week, the last few days -- that they expect some new progress to be made with the United States at this summit?

MR. MCFARLANE: The question was, what do we expect to be presented in the first session on Tuesday morning, and secondly, has there been anything new come from the Soviet Union. On the first point, the President has prepared his own presentation for tomorrow, and so it will be vintage President Reagan.

I would imagine that it would encompass the 4 points that I've mentioned and quite a lot more -- the 4 points being his sense of the United States and a comprehensive portrayal of us -- values, goals, purposes, strengths -- our view of the Soviet Union -- corresponding elements of how we view them. Thirdly, our own

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interests in the world and how we see our interests being served and threatened. And finally, how we intend to do business in the future with each other.

The President will probably dwell heavily, I would think, upon the United States and its sense of purpose, and he's said many times publicly his wish to dispel Soviet notions of being threatened or of our hostility and to establish a better climate for the relationship. On the second question, no.

Q Mr. McFarlane, there's been a lot of waffle in the press in the last couple of days about the United States being outmaneuvered -- outflanked on the publicity side, on the public relations side. Do you feel outmaneuvered?

MR. MCFARLANE: The question is, in the last couple of days, there's been a lot of reporting about the United States having been outflanked or outmaneuvered in the publicity sense. I think you all have to reach your own judgments on that.

John.

Q Bud, when you mention the framework for U.S.-Soviet relations --

MR. MCFARLANE: Excuse me -- let me follow-up. That comment was made earlier today to the President, and his response was that he isn't here for publicity, he's here to engage in problem-solving, and he believes that our approach to that is a sensible one.

John.

Q You've mentioned a -- the President was going to detail a framework for U.S.- Soviet relations. How specific is he going to be? For example, is he going to spell out to Mr. Gorbachev that if they, in December, provide a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, that that would -- there would be a response to that, that that would in turn permit either -- without linkage, but permit us to look at Soviet behavior in a way that might give them a greater role in other parts of the world?

MR. MCFARLANE: Everybody hear the question?

Q No. (Laughter.)

MR. MCFARLANE: Why did I ask?

Q Just how detailed is he going to be in the framework? Is it going to be a road map that says, if you do "X", there will be a "Y"?

MR. MCFARLANE: Well, the framework the President intends to present will be a presentation of process -- that is, let's establish mechanisms, channels, ground rules for how we tackle regional bilateral security issues -- human rights. Now, that presentation, as a matter of process, will translate in the Wednesday morning session where we deal with regional issues, for example, to the discussion of the ones you mentioned, such as Afghanistan. I won't today, and I'm sure none -- other spokesmen deal with specific proposals the President will make on those. Those are reserved for the discussions, and any outcome will be briefed following the meetings.

Barry.

Q Bud, you said that tomorrow morning at the opening sessions will be vintage President Reagan. Can you tell us, does he intend to challenge Soviet behavior only, or does he intend to have some of the hard things he's had to say about the Soviet system of

government?

MR. MCFARLANE: The question is, does -- if the President intends to express himself in vintage style, does he intend to --

Q Let him answer the question.

MR. MCFARLANE: Typical -- in harsh terms critical of the regime, or not.

Q Critical of the system and the foundation of their government.

MR. MCFARLANE: Of the system. Well, the President will focus in his view of what we should pursue in the future on the importance of realism. And realism requires that we tell it like it is or as we see it in the United States. Acknowledge that we disagree fundamentally over the form of government and its purposes, vis-a-vis its own people and its sense of authority to expand beyond its borders.

At the same time, he will acknowledge that we don't expect their form of government, their ideology, or their purposes to change, nor do we seek to change their ideology or structure. Thus, we must get along with each other. That implies competition, and

The fundamental U.S. position is that the use of force or subversion by anyone, directly or through surrogates, is intolerable, that we should acknowledge this and that the United States is prepared to resist this by supporting those people being victimized, by offering our assistance, by trying to get at the root causes which may make fertile grounds for foreign ideologies, but that we find it intolerable and that it is against our fundamental interest for this practice to go on and we intend to resist it. And then to get on with specifics of how, in each of these cases, we can talk about it and focusing on getting the internal parties to talk to each other first, as he laid out in the U.N. speech.

Bob.

Q Could you tell us what you anticipate happening at the private meeting tomorrow, the 15-minute to half-an-hour that the President and the General Secretary will spend together? And, also, would you tell us how important that time is in terms of the summit and future relations?

MR. MCFARLANE: The question is would I comment upon the intentions for the small, private meeting that will open the talks tomorrow and -- no. (Laughter.)

Yes.

Q Do you think the Gulf war and developments in the Middle East will be raised, since no mention was made on both issues? Developments in the Middle East and the Gulf war. Are you going to discuss these issues?

MR. MCFARLANE: The question is do we expect that the situation in the Middle East or in the Persian Gulf will come up during the sessions. Yes, I would expect that it would. And the President is very well prepared to discuss those issues.

Q Yes. And the Gulf War as a separate item, or -- the Gulf war.

MR. MCFARLANE: Yes.

Dan.

Q Mr. McFarlane, could you tell us a little bit about the procedure and the mechanics of the way they will meet? As an example, you mentioned that the President had drafted his own statement. Will the President be reading from a statement at the initial stage of each session?

Also, what will the interpretation system? Will it be consecutive or will it be simultaneous? Give a little -- who will speak first in each session? Can you give a little bit of the mechanics of it?

MR. MCFARLANE: Dan Schorr asked for some comments on the mechanics and format of the meetings. For example, I mentioned the President was preparing his remarks. Will that be a written statement read? And beyond that, who will speak first? And beyond that, is it simultaneous translations, so forth.

The President has prepared his own remarks. He will deliver those extemporaneously. He has organized a very comprehensive presentation, but he will deliver that from it extemporaneously.

As the host for the first day's session, the United States will invite the General Secretary to make opening remarks and those would be in simultaneous translation, be held in the Fleur d'Eau Residence in the front room of that. I think you've had a chance to see that. And that session will be for two hours. And a

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two-hour session in the afternoon at which probably the President would open -- since we alternate in sessions on who goes first. And then the next morning, they host and we speak first. Reciprocally in the afternoon, they would speak first and so forth.

Andrea.

MR. MCFARLANE: This will be the last one --

Q Getting back to Chris' question, do you think the fact that in his arrival remarks that Gorbachev emphasized his interest in the ban on Star Wars, what does that make you think? Does that make you think that there is no way to surmount that obstacle?

MR. MCFARLANE: The question is do I believe that since the General Secretary stressed his interest in a ban on Star Wars is there any way around that looming confrontation?

First of all, if you examine the statement, he didn't say he's insisting on a ban on SDI. Now,

one can surely conclude that from everything else he said. But he didn't in his arrival statement. I don't take that for more than it's worth, but he said, examine the problem of extending the arms race into other spheres.

We have a disagreement. We're going to have to talk it out. And that's what we've been trying to do for six months now in Geneva, to sit down and to start talking about offense and defense. The President looks forward to that.

Q Are you saying you're going to take new -- the President's going to offer new proposals in certain areas such as regional conflicts and so forth? I mean you don't have to specify them because you don't intend to. But will there be new proposals?

MR. MCFARLANE: The President always has imaginative ideas about everything and so it's going to be a very rich exchange with things that I'm sure the General Secretary will not have heard before --

Q Bud, is there anything new on the hostages? We understand Terry Waite is on his back to Beirut.

MR. MCFARLANE: I do not personally have any new information on it as of an hour ago.

Q Do you know why he's going back to Beirut?

Q Mr. McFarlane, is this event a meeting at the summit or a summit meeting? (Laughter.) Which? Well, wait a moment. You lectured us last summer for an hour on the difference. (Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

4:50 P.M. (L)

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Yes.

Q Mr. McFarlane, in addition to the meetings involving the President, will there be smaller meetings involving you or Mr. Shultz and their Soviet counterparts over the next 3 days?

MR. MCFARLANE: Question in the -- in addition to the meeting of principals, the President and the General Secretary, will there be others by subordinates. None are planned. Surely, some will occur just in the normal format of corridor exchanges, and perhaps more formal meetings, but none are now planned.

Q None have taken place so far?

MR. MCFARLANE: No. Lou.

Q Two questions. One is, what do you look for in the first meeting -- the icebreaker meeting, such it is, between the President and the General Secretary, and has there been any signal at all from the Soviets in the last week, the last few days -- that they expect some new progress to be made with the United States at this summit?

MR. MCFARLANE: The question was, what do we expect to be presented in the first session on Tuesday morning, and secondly, has there been anything new come from the Soviet Union. On the first point, the President has prepared his own presentation for tomorrow, and so it will be vintage President Reagan.

I would imagine that it would encompass the 4 points that I've mentioned and quite a lot more -- the 4 points being his sense of the United States and a comprehensive portrayal of us -- values, goals, purposes, strengths -- our view of the Soviet Union -- corresponding elements of how we view them. Thirdly, our own

interests in the world and how we see our interests being served and threatened. And finally, how we intend to do business in the future with each other.

The President will probably dwell heavily, I would think, upon the United States and its sense of purpose, and he's said many times publicly his wish to dispel Soviet notions of being threatened or of our hostility and to establish a better climate for the relationship. On the second question, no.

Q Mr. McFarlane, there's been a lot of waffle in the press in the last couple of days about the United States being outmaneuvered -- outflanked on the publicity side, on the public relations side. Do you feel outmaneuvered?

MR. MCFARLANE: The question is, in the last couple of days, there's been a lot of reporting about the United States having been outflanked or outmaneuvered in the publicity sense. I think you all have to reach your own judgments on that.

John.

Q Bud, when you mention the framework for U.S.-Soviet relations --

MR. MCFARLANE: Excuse me -- let me follow-up. That comment was made earlier today to the President, and his response was that he isn't here for publicity, he's here to engage in problem-solving, and he believes that our approach to that is a sensible one.

John.

Q You've mentioned a -- the President was going to detail a framework for U.S.- Soviet relations. How specific is he going to be? For example, is he going to spell out to Mr. Gorbachev that if they, in December, provide a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, that that would -- there would be a response to that, that that would in turn permit either -- without linkage, but permit us to look at Soviet behavior in a way that might give them a greater role in other parts of the world?

MR. MCFARLANE: Everybody hear the question?

Q No. (Laughter.)

MR. MCFARLANE: Why did I ask?

Q Just how detailed is he going to be in the framework? Is it going to be a road map that says, if you do "X", there will be a "Y"?

MR. MCFARLANE: Well, the framework the President intends to present will be a presentation of process -- that is, let's establish mechanisms, channels, ground rules for how we tackle regional bilateral security issues -- human rights. Now, that presentation, as a matter of process, will translate in the Wednesday morning session where we deal with regional issues, for example, to the discussion of the ones you mentioned, such as Afghanistan. I won't today, and I'm sure none -- other spokesmen deal with specific proposals the President will make on those. Those are reserved for the discussions, and any outcome will be briefed following the meetings.

Barry.

Q Bud, you said that tomorrow morning at the opening sessions will be vintage President Reagan. Can you tell us, does he intend to challenge Soviet behavior only, or does he intend to have some of the hard things he's had to say about the Soviet system of

government?

MR. MCFARLANE: The question is, does -- if the President intends to express himself in vintage style, does he intend to --

Q Let him answer the question.

MR. MCFARLANE: Typical -- in harsh terms critical of the regime, or not.

Q Critical of the system and the foundation of their government.

MR. MCFARLANE: Of the system. Well, the President will focus in his view of what we should pursue in the future on the importance of realism. And realism requires that we tell it like it is or as we see it in the United States. Acknowledge that we disagree fundamentally over the form of government and its purposes, vis-a-vis its own people and its sense of authority to expand beyond its borders.

At the same time, he will acknowledge that we don't expect their form of government, their ideology, or their purposes to change, nor do we seek to change their ideology or structure. Thus, we must get along with each other. That implies competition, and

the issue is, how can we make it peaceful. And he will then go to his ideas for how to do that. Now the President isn't given to excessive rhetoric and it will be a serious, sober conversation, I am sure.

Q Recent discussions with the Soviets last month on Central America -- do you expect any complete results of the summit?

MR. MCFARLANE: We welcome any that can be reached. We've had no new proposals from their side on that score, but we're certainly open to trying to find some solutions there.

Q Do I sense something directly from your opening statement that there is some new U.S. concern about the possibility of the Soviets abusing or misusing the summit? You talked about the Geneva -- spirit of Geneva from years back and the spirit of Glassboro following which the Soviets undertook some military adventures and the relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were worsened. I mean, are you concerned anew that this might be some kind of a trick and that the summit will be misused?

MR. MCFARLANE: The question is, are we concerned that the Soviet approach to this meeting expresses deception or an intention to establish an artificial spirit, if you will, that would lead soon after to turmoil? No. The point made in my opening remarks was that the concept of having a summit ought not be evaluated as something that inevitably leads to something good, especially if what comes from it is this notion that the meeting itself and the spirit, as it's been called in many of the past, has an intrinsic quality that supercedes the self-interest of each party. It doesn't. But if you acknowledge that and enter this meeting with that absorption of history and accept that the Soviet Union intends, as it says, to come here in good faith and try to solve problems, we'll try to do that. We're just acknowledging that there are lessons from the past.

Q When Gorbachev arrived today he said that one of his top priorities is to stop the arms race and especially the spreading of that arms race into space. The President, when he was asked about that, said that one of the ways to stop the arms race is by a space defense. Aren't the two men headed for a confrontation on SDI?

MR. MCFARLANE: Chris commented upon the Gorbachev arrival remarks which expressed concern about the spread of the arms into space. Actually that's not accurate. He said, "into other spheres," which is kind of interesting. But I don't pretend that he doesn't have SDI on the mind. I think he probably does. Doesn't that imply then, in the question, confrontation? There's obviously a disagreement here. That's why this meeting is worthwhile, to enable both leaders to express his concept of how deterrence is best preserved -- the Soviets implicitly calling for the continuation of assured destruction and of offensive systems -- the United States believing we should move away from that exclusive offensive foundation to greater reliance on defense.

Q Mr. McFarlane, on regional issues, Cuban troops are in three of the five places that our President --. How is he going to deal with the Cuban behavior when he talks to Mr. Gorbachev? -- the Soviet Union as the United States, or --

MR. MCFARLANE: The question is, acknowledging that there are Cuban troops in three of the five countries that are on our agenda, at least, how does the President intend to deal with this presence of outside powers in developing countries and solve this kind of problem?

The fundamental U.S. position is that the use of force or subversion by anyone, directly or through surrogates, is intolerable, that we should acknowledge this and that the United States is prepared to resist this by supporting those people being victimized, by offering our assistance, by trying to get at the root causes which may make fertile grounds for foreign ideologies, but that we find it intolerable and that it is against our fundamental interest for this practice to go on and we intend to resist it. And then to get on with specifics of how, in each of these cases, we can talk about it and focusing on getting the internal parties to talk to each other first, as he laid out in the U.N. speech.

Bob.

Q Could you tell us what you anticipate happening at the private meeting tomorrow, the 15-minute to half-an-hour that the President and the General Secretary will spend together? And, also, would you tell us how important that time is in terms of the summit and future relations?

MR. MCFARLANE: The question is would I comment upon the intentions for the small, private meeting that will open the talks tomorrow and -- no. (Laughter.)

Yes.

Q Do you think the Gulf war and developments in the Middle East will be raised, since no mention was made on both issues? Developments in the Middle East and the Gulf war. Are you going to discuss these issues?

MR. MCFARLANE: The question is do we expect that the situation in the Middle East or in the Persian Gulf will come up during the sessions. Yes, I would expect that it would. And the President is very well prepared to discuss those issues.

Q Yes. And the Gulf War as a separate item, or -- the Gulf war.

MR. MCFARLANE: Yes.

Dan.

Q Mr. McFarlane, could you tell us a little bit about the procedure and the mechanics of the way they will meet? As an example, you mentioned that the President had drafted his own statement. Will the President be reading from a statement at the initial stage of each session?

Also, what will the interpretation system? Will it be consecutive or will it be simultaneous? Give a little -- who will speak first in each session? Can you give a little bit of the mechanics of it?

MR. MCFARLANE: Dan Schorr asked for some comments on the mechanics and format of the meetings. For example, I mentioned the President was preparing his remarks. Will that be a written statement read? And beyond that, who will speak first? And beyond that, is it simultaneous translations, so forth.

The President has prepared his own remarks. He will deliver those extemporaneously. He has organized a very comprehensive presentation, but he will deliver that from it extemporaneously.

As the host for the first day's session, the United States will invite the General Secretary to make opening remarks and those would be in simultaneous translation, be held in the Fleur d'Eau Residence in the front room of that. I think you've had a chance to see that. And that session will be for two hours. And a

two-hour session in the afternoon at which probably the President would open -- since we alternate in sessions on who goes first. And then the next morning, they host and we speak first. Reciprocally in the afternoon, they would speak first and so forth.

Andrea.

MR. MCFARLANE: This will be the last one --

Q Getting back to Chris' question, do you think the fact that in his arrival remarks that Gorbachev emphasized his interest in the ban on Star Wars, what does that make you think? Does that make you think that there is no way to surmount that obstacle?

MR. MCFARLANE: The question is do I believe that since the General Secretary stressed his interest in a ban on Star Wars is there any way around that looming confrontation?

First of all, if you examine the statement, he didn't say he's insisting on a ban on SDI. Now,

one can surely conclude that from everything else he said. But he didn't in his arrival statement. I don't take that for more than it's worth, but he said, examine the problem of extending the arms race into other spheres.

We have a disagreement. We're going to have to talk it out. And that's what we've been trying to do for six months now in Geneva, to sit down and to start talking about offense and defense. The President looks forward to that.

Q Are you saying you're going to take new -- the President's going to offer new proposals in certain areas such as regional conflicts and so forth? I mean you don't have to specify them because you don't intend to. But will there be new proposals?

MR. MCFARLANE: The President always has imaginative ideas about everything and so it's going to be a very rich exchange with things that I'm sure the General Secretary will not have heard before --

Q Bud, is there anything new on the hostages? We understand Terry Waite is on his back to Beirut.

MR. MCFARLANE: I do not personally have any new information on it as of an hour ago.

Q Do you know why he's going back to Beirut?

Q Mr. McFarlane, is this event a meeting at the summit or a summit meeting? (Laughter.) Which? Well, wait a moment. You lectured us last summer for an hour on the difference. (Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

4:50 P.M. (L)