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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary  
(Geneva, Switzerland)

For Immediate Release

November 21, 1985

PRESS BRIEFING  
BY  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
GEORGE SHULTZ

Hotel Intercontinental  
Geneva, Switzerland

11:03 A.M. (L)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Will the meeting please come to order? The President came to Geneva with a constructive approach and with an effort to make a fresh start in our relationship with the Soviet Union, and I think he achieved that fresh start.

All of us who have worked in support of the two leaders who met here this week, I think share the view that perhaps we have a process underway that can lead to a more stable and constructive relationship.

Of course, as both men basically emphasize, that remains to be seen. And we will be looking, over the coming months and years, to see what truly happens. But at any rate, we have made a fresh start.

Questions. Helen.

Q Mr. Secretary, is Star Wars more negotiable now as a result of the summit, or is it still where it stood before the President came where he said it would not be any way a bargaining chip?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The subject of strategic defense was discussed in considerable detail and with great intensity on both sides. Insofar as the President is concerned, he feels as strongly as ever that the research program designed to find the answer: is it possible to defend against ballistic missiles? -- is essential. And he insists upon that. There was no give on that at all.

Q Did Gorbachev go along with the research idea at all?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The General Secretary and Soviets will speak for themselves, but I would say their position did not change.

Q Mr. Secretary, what has this two summit -- the two days of summitry done to curb the nuclear arms race?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It has not produced anything by way of a further agreement. It has produced, perhaps, a -- some political impulse to the negotiators in Geneva, which will undoubtedly be reflected in our own discussions in Washington as we consider the next round.

Perhaps more important, it has contributed a relationship between these two leaders based on a lot of substantive discussion between them. So it was just the kind of get-acquainted that we wanted and I believe General Secretary Gorbachev wanted; that is, they got acquainted on the basis of wrestling with difficult substance and it worked well.

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Q Mr. Secretary, did the President give the Soviet leader any assurances that we would not go beyond research in SDI at this point?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President's statements in our meetings were very parallel to statements you've heard him make many times. On the one hand, insisting that we must pursue the research and answer the question. And if the answer to the question is positive, then, as he has said many times, he believes that we should all sit down and share this technology so that we can move into a pattern of deterrence that has a greater defense component to it. And if you had been sitting in the meeting, you would have recognized very clearly the things the President said.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you think it was impulse which you referred to as the prospect of resulting in a new agreement, either in strategic arms or in INF in the coming year?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It remains to be seen. And I think it is at least notable that in the joint statement, the idea of a separate INF agreement is identified. Now, of course, that was emerging in the negotiations as they were taking place, but certainly, the subject came in for considerable discussion.

Q Mr. Secretary, why shouldn't people think that if after two days of such intense talks on all of these complicated questions the two leaders couldn't agree to more than a restatement of what you had achieved last January here in Geneva and what had been emerging in Paris and at the negotiations on the interim INF group. Why shouldn't people think that those problems are intractable that you've actually had setback here because they couldn't get any further than where they'd already been on arms control?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, people will believe whatever they want to believe. The -- I don't know where your reference to Paris comes in. But, actually, I think what we have seen is a process, starting with the agreement last January, the beginning of the negotiations and the tabling of proposals by us and we've seen some counterproposals from the Soviet Union that constituted movement, some counter-counterproposals by us that constituted further movement, and you see that movement identified in this document. So I think there is a process here and if you say what assurance do I have that it will go anywhere, I don't have any assurance.

Q But what you're saying --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can describe it to you.

Q Sir, what you're saying, though, is that this is basically cataloguing the progress that has been move over the past year on these issues, but not advancing them at all.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would say you get a little advanced by this kind of discussion, but certainly there wasn't any definitive movement or decision. In fact, the meetings didn't set themselves up, really, as detailed bargaining sessions on the particulars of these things, but more handled on a general plane. But I think it was quite positive in general.

Jim?

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Mr. Secretary, two questions. Are there some guidelines given to the negotiators in the arms talks that do not appear in the joint statement? And second, on the statement of agreeing not to seek -- not to achieve military superiority, how does that differ from the agreement made in Moscow in 1972 or 1973 -- almost identical language -- which the Soviets then almost immediately violated in Angola and other spots around the world?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the military superiority refers to the respective forces. We have felt that the regional issues which you referred to are a very important component of this total picture and as it has emerged in the course of this meeting, that notion that problems around the world and the distress that they produce is a major part of this problem. That emerged as something that is recognized on both sides and there is set out here indications of an effort to get at it. And I think the notion that people arm themselves because of distrust, not the other way around, is very prominent here. So we have to start with these areas that create the tensions and then, of course, working on arms control, but wanting to see an interplay there.

Q And on this --

Q What does the statement --

Q Mr. Secretary, the --

Q What does the statement in the joint statement mean when they say they agree to accelerate the work at these

negotiations? Does that mean they're going to meet more often, does that mean that both sides have pledged to put new things on the table faster? What are you talking about?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: They're talking about a sense of importance and urgency and a kind of a mutual commitment to give a little heat to those who are going to be doing the negotiating. Now, you asked about guidelines and we discussed various ways of putting what might be said to negotiators. And in the joint statement some things are identified -- 50 percent is in there -- separate INF is in there. But, in the process of discussing the ideas that they have and that we have, I -- perhaps they should have a little clearer idea of the sort of guidelines that we're going to give our negotiators. And, of course, we're going to go back and, under the light of all that's been said, prepare ourselves and our negotiators for the next round.

Q Mr. Secretary?

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Q The President's U.N. speech puts so much emphasis on regional issues and yet, there's only one short sentence in here about it. Was there anything that you would determine was progress on Afghanistan, on Central America. Can you elaborate?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I thought that we had really a very good discussion on the regional issues in the plannery sessions. Afghanistan was treated at some length. Most of

the areas you would think of were referred to. And the idea is in there that we need a process. And, of course, we've been having these regional meetings for the last year, and perhaps you noticed that Foreign Minister meetings will be regularized, so we'll definitely have them set out more often than just in connection with the U.N. General Assembly time and that the meetings of the Foreign Ministers will undoubtedly take as items for the agenda -- and prepared agenda -- certain regional issues. And I think we expect Mr. Shevardnadze and I to get away from the pattern that has been typical where we sort of cover the waterfront every time and say, "All right, let's have a meeting, and this time let's focus on these two topics and not on everything" and go into them in more depth. So I think there is emerging a sense of process, and the President's initiatives at the U.N. have been a definite contributor to that sense of progress.

Q Well, did they see in Mr. Gorbachev's approach any change on Afghanistan? Any willingness to withdraw?

Q Mr. Secretary, in Moscow, you said that you thought you knew 95 percent of what would come out of this summit meeting.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I did?

Q Yes, you did.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q I wonder if you could say whether it turned out much the way you expected or whether there was significant difference.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it's hard to know exactly what to expect in meetings of this kind. But what is set out in the Joint Statement I think represents a first step in the sense that some concrete things were put down and moved along as well as a process started, that interaction.

But I believe the most important thing that happened here is that these two individuals took this over completely. It was very much their meeting, and they spent a lot of time together. It got to be a problem for the schedulers because every time they got together they went much longer than was thought. But that was really what we came here for and was very fruitful. And I think that length of time and the intensity and the frankness and the scope of what was talked about between the two by the fireside really went beyond anything I could have expected, although I felt myself that that kind of pattern was the desirable way to do it.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Mr. Secretary, may I ask you about -- may I ask about human rights, Mr. --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'm being dismissed. The subject of human rights --

Q May I ask you --

Q Yes.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- was --

Q -- if the President was specific -- was the President specific? Did he name names like Sakharov or Scharansky? And did he raise Major Nicholson's name?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President had an extensive discussion on the subject of human rights. And that is all I'm going to say about it.

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