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## Soviet Objectives and Intentions in Latin America

The immediate Soviet objective in Latin America is to enhance the USSR's influence at the expense of the U.S. To that end, Moscow seeks correct surface relations on the state level with most Latin American governments while working covertly with communist parties and front groups to promote causes compatible with Soviet interests.

At the same time, the USSR works directly and through its Cuban client to strengthen radical regimes and Marxist-Leninist movements, particularly in the Caribbean region. Its ultimate objective is the political transformation of existing regimes to communism.

Recent events in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Grenada, Suriname, and elsewhere clearly attest to active Soviet involvement in supporting totalitarian movements in the region. Expanded trade relationships with major South American countries have meanwhile provided Moscow with new footholds and prospects for expanding influence.

Yet distance from the USSR, awareness of traditional US sensitivity to developments in the Western Hemisphere, and the desire to avoid provoking a confrontation with the US have acted, and may continue to act, as constraints on direct Soviet involvement.

The Soviets may also be constrained by a lack of receptivity to their overtures by Latin Americans. Any impression of US weakness or vacillation, however, could cause small, defenseless states to seek accommodation with the Soviets.

### Background: Paths to Power

Following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Moscow concentrated on strengthening the regime of Fidel Castro through massive injections of military and economic aid, to the point where Cuba became completely dependent on Soviet largesse and eventually a willing accomplice in Soviet political objectives.

Nonetheless, during the 1960's, Moscow apparently opposed supplying arms to the many small untested Latin American leftist or communist groups which took their cue from the Cuban communist takeover. The Soviets also refused to support Cuban adventures in the area, arguing that the various leftist groups were not ready or able to achieve the success the Cubans had.

Moscow opted instead to emphasize the so-called via pacifica or parliamentary path to power, citing as prototype the emerging Marxist-leftist alliance in Chile. With Salvador Allende's overthrow in 1973, however, Moscow reassessed its doctrine and tactics, and gradually began giving greater emphasis to "armed

struggle" as the means for turning the tide in favor of violent revolt, if circumstances were propitious.

Soviet/Cuban military collaboration in bringing Marxists to power in Angola in 1975-1976, and in providing direct military assistance to the Marxist regime in Ethiopia in 1977-1978, set the stage for a revival of the pursuit of government takeovers by violence in the Western Hemisphere.

With the success of the Sandinistas (who had relied heavily on Cuban arms and training) in Nicaragua in 1979, Moscow evidently became convinced that a new communist movement was emerging in Latin America. Soviet media began openly advocating the violent overthrow of regimes in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, as well as of the Pinochet regime in Chile. (Examples of such statements may be found in the Supplement)

### Cuba as Surrogate

An important, if not crucial ingredient in Soviet calculations pertaining to the Western Hemisphere has always been to weigh US reactions carefully at each step along the path. Since the missile confrontation in 1962, the Soviets have proceeded, albeit cautiously, in transforming Cuba into a viable base of operations and in allowing Havana to take the lead in dealing with sympathetic groups in third countries.

Meanwhile, the Soviet presence and stake in the Caribbean, anchored in Cuba, has grown incrementally. Soviet economic aid to Cuba in 1982 amounted to roughly \$4.6 billion, the equivalent to one-fourth of Cuba's GNP.

Aid to Cuba, some of which may be intended for other countries, accounts for over 60% of the USSR's global economic assistance program. An additional \$0.6 to \$1 billion in military aid was also provided last year. (Deliveries in 1982 exceeded those in 1981 by 2,000 metric tons; annual totals of the last two years have been the highest since 1962.)

Some 2,000-2,500 Soviet military and 6,000-8,000 civilian advisers are currently in Cuba, in addition to the Soviet brigade of 2,600-3,000 men. (The number of military advisers increased by 500 last year.)

The Soviet intelligence monitoring/telecommunications facility in Cuba is the largest such Soviet installation outside the USSR and monitors a wide spectrum of US civilian and military telecommunications.

Long range "Bear" bomber aircraft also capable of reconnaissance and anti-submarine actions are deployed on a regular basis to Cuba. Soviet naval combatants regularly stage joint training exercises with the Cubans.

### Nicaragua: Wave of the Future in Central America?

With Cuba serving as a base for operations in all the Caribbean, Moscow sees Nicaragua as a possible door to Central America and clearly hopes to fashion in Managua an instrument with some of the impact, but not the cost, of its Havana surrogate.

To avoid alienating Mexico, Panama, and others in the region, and particularly to avert any US retaliatory actions, the bulk of Soviet assistance to Nicaragua has been channelled mainly through Cuba. (Libya, some members of the communist bloc, and other countries, however, provide some of the Soviet arms arriving in the country.)

Some 6,000 Cuban civilian advisers are in Nicaragua to facilitate the political transformation of Nicaragua to a totalitarian system. They worked to help set up a Nicaraguan secret police system, engage in ideological indoctrination, transforming the educational system into a vehicle of indoctrination, and helped set up a government-controlled state monopoly of broadcast media.

The Cubans also helped administer the literacy campaign which combined basic education with communist indoctrination of peasants whose illiteracy would have made them immune to such indoctrination.

The Cubans also assist in various economic and technical projects. As part of this overall effort, they are engaged in training and developing Nicaraguan cadres which would join the international communist movement in its work in other Latin American countries.

Another 2,000 Cuban security advisers supervise the transfer of arms, and the development, modernization and expansion of military forces and facilities. They are also actively engaged in support of guerrillas operating against governments elsewhere in the region.

The USSR itself has so far sent about 50 advisers overtly and \$125 million in military equipment and supplies to Nicaragua. In addition there are currently 35 East German, 50 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) members, and some Libyan personnel in the country.

Nicaraguan military pilots and crews meanwhile have trained in Bulgaria and other East European locations. Any transfer of MiGs from Cuba, however, would presumably necessitate Soviet and Cuban agreement that the situation warranted such a move despite the risk of US counteraction.

### Grenada: Escalation of the Stakes

The US and Caribbean joint action in Grenada brought the Soviets and Cubans a serious setback in the Caribbean. Moscow's decision to back the Maurice Bishop regime soon after it came to power reflected the then-optimistic communist estimate of revolutionary prospects in the region.

Soviet willingness to supplement political support for the new regime with military assistance over a five-year period attested also to a confidence that the risks involved were few. Nonetheless, Soviet insistence on channeling arms and aid through Cuba demonstrated continuing caution on Moscow's part.

The three secret Soviet-Grenadian treaties recovered in Grenada reveal Soviet willingness, even an eagerness, to be generous with military aid. The agreements, covering the period 1980-1985, provided for delivery of some \$25.8 million in weapons, ammunition, uniforms, trucks, and other logistical equipment -- so long as the regime worked to consolidate its Marxist revolutionary credentials. The treaty stipulated that all arms be shipped through Cuba.

Also in keeping with Soviet practice elsewhere, economic aid was less generous. During Bishop's tenure, the USSR was known to have provided to Grenada some \$10 million in trade credits and economic and technical aid. Included in the known programs were promises for a satellite earth station and for conducting a feasibility study for a deep-water port.

Moscow may also have helped finance the some 700 Cubans on the island, the majority of whom were working on the Point Salines Airport (scaled to accommodate even the largest jet aircraft and which could have been used to facilitate Cuban troop flights to Africa) and constructing a battalion-sized military camp at Caligny.

Other Cubans were attached to almost every Grenadian ministry, handling political indoctrination and economic projects.

Despite the relative newness of their presence in the country, the Soviets had by the end of the Bishop regime made a substantial investment while keeping their involvement with Grenada largely indirect.

Nevertheless, the rescue mission was more important to Moscow's position in Nicaragua and Cuba given the much larger Soviet investment there, than merely the loss of prestige involved in the demise of the pro-Soviet regime in Grenada. The inability (or unwillingness) of the USSR to come to the aid of the pro-Soviet government was only too apparent.

The Soviets thus have tried to exploit what international and domestic US criticism there was of the invasion in part to

deter similar actions against Nicaragua, but more broadly to try to undercut American and international support for what the USSR sees as an increasingly determined US administration.

#### The Caribbean: Future Prospects

Since the Grenadian operation, both Cuba and Nicaragua, presumably at Soviet urging, have been showing extreme caution in their dealings with rebel groups lest they provoke the US. Presumably there have also been new debates about Third World communist doctrine and possible recrimination between Moscow and Havana.

Moscow nonetheless will continue to be on the lookout for opportunities to generate and exploit differences between the US and the countries of the region but is meeting little receptivity.

Suriname, for example, has decided to scale back its Cuban connections. The day after the US/Caribbean action in Grenada, Oscar Osvaldo Cardenas, Cuba's Ambassador to Suriname, was expelled.

#### South America: Trade, Aid and Covert Activity

While the USSR is interested in access to needed South American goods, such as foodstuffs and raw materials, the penetration of regional markets which have historically been dependent on Western suppliers remains an important objective.

The January, 1979 US partial grain embargo stimulated Moscow to greater activity here; trade with Argentina, Brazil and Mexico grew dramatically. Large Latin American trade surpluses, a result of the USSR's inability to provide durable export goods, limit the effectiveness of trade as a tool of influence, however, as do the regional suspicions of Soviet motives.

While, for example, fishing port rights granted in return for technical aid to Ecuador and Peru have led to some increase of Soviet prestige in these countries, evidence that Soviet vessels have engaged in intelligence collection and complaints of overfishing prevent translation of that presence into political leverage.

In Argentina, one of the USSR's major grain suppliers, the Soviets are pressing Buenos Aires to buy more to reduce the \$1.7 billion 1982 trade deficit. Hopes that they could sell military equipment in the aftermath of the South Atlantic conflict have not come to fruition. The Soviets are, however, seeking to expand their planning and construction role in Argentine energy development with more sales of hydropower and other equipment.

Peru purchased aircraft and other military equipment from the USSR during an earlier period of leftist military rule and still hosts between 100-125 Soviet military trainers and technicians. The Soviets would like to make further military sales and are pushing for greater participation in major civilian construction projects involving Soviet goods. Lima has just succeeded in rescheduling its over \$1 billion military debt with Moscow.

The Soviets have not followed the same policy of promoting state-to-state and trade relations with Chile. Since 1981 Moscow has overtly backed the Chilean Communist Party's (PCCH) dual policy of "armed struggle" coupled with attempts to work together with the non-violent opposition to the Pinochet regime. (See Supplement)

A new party line of unity and violence (in fact, a unity molded by combat) was enunciated in December, 1980. In January, 1981, the communists signed a unification agreement with seven other Chilean leftist political organizations. Within two weeks, Moscow began broadcasting PCCH explanations of the new policy and calls for armed insurgency.

Recently, Moscow underscored its endorsement of this tactic by publishing in the Soviet press a new PCCH "Manifesto" which called for Pinochet's violent overthrow.

#### Long-Term Investment: Ideological Penetration of the Intellectual Classes

Perhaps the Soviet program in Latin America with the greatest long term potential is that of educational exchange, i.e. scholarships to third world students to study in the USSR. These are designed to serve as the initial thrust of any Soviet political influence operations in such Third World areas.

The number of Soviet Bloc academic grants offered annually to Latin American students jumped from 400 in the 1960's to over 6,000 today. Seven thousand Cubans were studying in the Soviet Union in 1979. Last year, 700 Nicaraguans were reported to be enrolled there and an additional 300 scholarships were being provided to Managua. There are also smaller groups from many other Latin American countries.

Soviet scholarships include free room, board, tuition, transportation, medical care and a small stipend. Since the programs began in the mid-1960's, some 6,800 Latin American students have utilized them.

About 3,000 Latin American students, including 1,600 Nicaraguans, are also studying in Cuba. Cuba has constructed 17 schools for foreigners, (each reportedly costing about \$2 million) and spends \$600,000 annually to operate them.

This process also includes the systematic effort to recruit Latin Students to serve as Soviet agents. Playing the percentages, the Soviet can always rely on recruiting a small but steady percentage of these students to serve the KGB when they return to their homeland.

Altogether, this investment in "education" indoctrination and recruitment over time succeeds in producing ideologically and politically dedicated cadres which serve as the local spearhead of communist takeovers in the region.

### Conclusion

The Soviets view Latin America as the "strategic rear" of the U.S. Effective projection of American power to Western Europe, the Middle East or the Far East is dependent on a secure southern flank. In the event of a European crisis, a significant number of NATO reinforcements and half the NATO resupply material would originate at Gulf Coast ports.

The Soviets, therefore, can be expected to try to turn Latin America, and especially Central America and the Caribbean, into an area of insecurity for the US. They hope to do this by supporting anti-American movements and then using their support as leverage to turn revolutionary currents in a pro-Soviet direction.

It is a strategy of opportunism, of patience, of indirect attack, and of attrition. Working with Fidel Castro, the Soviets strive to exacerbate existing problems in the Western Hemisphere. In general terms, Moscow seeks to reduce US options incrementally and increase the amount of men, attention, and materiel the US must commit to the Caribbean region. By focusing on the Caribbean, Moscow hopes to bring pressure on the U.S. to change its traditional policy of concentrating on European security.



SUPPLEMENT: SOVIET STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF  
COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Nicaragua

3/17/82 Soviet Ambassador to Mexico Rostislav Sergeev warned that if the situation in Nicaragua gets worse, his government will help the Central American nation politically and diplomatically. (Cited by Mexico City NOTIMEX)

3/25/83 TASS on Andropov/Ortega Meeting:

"Yuriy Andropov noted that the Soviet Union regarded with great sympathies the effort of the friendly Nicaraguan people to ensure economic and social transformation of their country, and rendered to them dream of seeing their motherland free. For the sake of this bright goal and the happiness of their people, they are fully determined to fight on to complete victory."

Chile

6/16/81 Radio Moscow, (in Spanish to Chile):

"Against the entrenched fascism which plans to continue oppressing the people until the end of the twentieth century, the Communist Party advocates the so-called people's holy right to rebellion."

"The rebellion will be woven with violent and nonviolent actions and its main characteristic will be the refusal to accept the legitimacy of fascism and to deny it any right to existence."

6/7/82 Radio Moscow in Spanish to Chile, broadcasting text of Chilean Communist Party Communiqué:

"The Political Committee of the Communist Party of Chile, PCCH, made a study of the current situation in the country and considered the urgent need to develop a mass struggle and common actions by all the forces who are against Pinochet's tyranny."

9/13/82 Radio Moscow in Spanish to Chile, quoting the Proclamation issued by the Chilean Communist Party on September 11:

"Everybody is expecting something to happen. Chileans: We, the Communists, tell you: Don't wait; get organized and fight. Nothing will be achieved without

fighting."

1983/No.21 New Times: A Baryshev: "Pinochet on a Volcano"

"The recent events (May riots in Chile) testify to a new upsurge of the resistance movement against the fascist dictatorship." "All this confirms the conclusion drawn in the Communist Party document circulated in Santiago in April that the conditions have emerged for 1983 to become a year of decisive struggle for the Pinochet."

1983/No.29 New Times: "Igor Rybalkin: "Democracy Now!"

"The Communists are in the vanguard of the fighters for the restoration of democracy in their country. The Communist Party is consistently encouraging the mass struggle against the fascist regime and is working to bring about the unity of the Left forces and of the opposition as a whole for the sake of the common goal -- the overthrow of the dictatorship."

#### Cuba

2/26/81 Brezhnev-Castro bilateral in Moscow:

"In present conditions, when the United States imperialists launched another anti-Cuban campaign, the USSR, as before, is siding with socialist Cuba and expressing full support for its principled policy of peace and friendship between peoples."

2/27/81 The Soviet Ambassador to Mexico:

"We will always support our friends and will never abandon them."

4/7/81 Brezhnev speech to the Czech Party Congress:

Cuba is an "inseparable part" of the socialist community.

9/15/81 Brezhnev in Moscow:

"The Cuban revolutionaries have traversed a long and difficult path. They have encountered and continue to encounter all sorts of challenges and provocations on the part of imperialism. But Cuba has proved that it is able to stand firm in the defense of its interests. Using this occasion, I would like to stress that the Soviet Union has been, is, and will be in solidarity with socialist Cuba."

11/6/81 Marshal Ustinov at the annual revolution ceremony:

"The United States must consider the consequences of its actions against Cuba."

2/9/82 Brezhnev greeting to 10th World Federation of Trade Unions Congress in Havana:

"The people of Cuba know that they have on their side the Soviet Union and the entire international working class, and they have on their side the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community... This solidarity is a reliable guarantee that no imperialist power will be able to throw it (Cuba) from its chosen path."

El Salvador

7/83 International Affairs, V. Krestyaninov: "Quiet Aggression against El Salvador"

"The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, all the forces of peace and progress the world over, side with the people of El Salvador in the struggle and strongly denounce the actions by the imperialists seeking to destabilize the situation and build up tensions in Central America."

Grenada

4/9/82 TASS on Tikhonov message to Bishop on Grenadan national day:

"The Soviet people solidarise (sic) with the people of Grenada waging the struggle for social progress, for the ensurance of independence and sovereignty of their country."

8/1/82 Pravda on USSR-Grenada Communique issued during Prime Minister Bishop's visit to Moscow:

"The Soviet side expressed solidarity with the Grenadan people in their efforts to overcome the grim colonial legacy and develop the country on a free, democratic basis. Support was expressed for the Grenadan people's inalienable right to build their own lives without any outside pressure or interference."

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December 22, 1983

M E M O R A N D U M

TO : S/LPD - Ambassador Reich  
THROUGH: INR - Mr. Bellocchi (14)  
FROM : INR/SEE - Robert Baraz RB  
SUBJECT: Requested Paper on the Soviets in Latin America for  
White House Digest

In response to your request, attached is an unclassified submission on Soviet Objectives and Intentions in Latin America for inclusion in a proposed White House Digest Paper.

Attachment:  
as stated.

Drafted: INR/SEE: RBaraz:bl

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WHITE HOUSE DIGEST PAPER

Soviet Objectives and Intentions in Latin America

The immediate Soviet objective in Latin America is to enhance the USSR's influence at the expense of the US. To that end, Moscow seeks correct surface relations on the state level with most South American governments while working covertly with communist parties and front groups to promote causes compatible with Soviet interests. At the same time, the USSR works directly and through its Cuban client to strengthen radical regimes and revolutionary movements, particularly in the Caribbean region.

Events in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Grenada, Suriname, and elsewhere in recent years clearly attest to active Soviet involvement in supporting revolutionary currents in the region. Expanded trade relationships with major South American countries have meanwhile provided Moscow with new footholds and prospects for expanding influence. Yet distance from the USSR, lack of Latin receptivity, awareness of traditional US sensitivity to developments in the Western Hemisphere, and the desire to avoid provoking a confrontation with the US have acted, and will continue to act, as constraints on Soviet behavior.

Background: Paths to Power

Following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Moscow concentrated on strengthening the Castro regime through massive injections of military and economic aid, to the point where Cuba became completely dependent on Soviet largesse and eventually a willing accomplice in Soviet political objectives. Nonetheless, during the 1960's, Moscow apparently opposed supplying arms to the many small untested Latin American revolutionary groups which took their cue from the Cuban revolution. The Soviets also refused to support Cuban adventures in the area, arguing that the various leftist groups were not ready or able to achieve the success the Cubans had.

Moscow opted instead to emphasize the so-called via pacifica or parliamentary path to power, citing as prototype the emerging Marxist-leftist alliance in Chile. With Allende's overthrow in 1973, however, Moscow reassessed its doctrine and tactics, and gradually began giving greater emphasis to "armed struggle" as the means for turning the tide in favor of revolution, if circumstances were propitious. Soviet/Cuban military collaboration in bringing Marxists to power in Angola in 1975-76, and in providing direct military assistance to the Marxist regime in Ethiopia in 1977-1978, set the stage for a

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revival of the pursuit of revolution by violence in the Western Hemisphere.

With the success of the Sandinistas (who had relied heavily on Cuban arms and training) in Nicaragua in 1979, Moscow evidently became convinced that a new revolutionary tide was emerging in Latin America. Soviet media began openly advocating the violent overthrow of the regimes in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, as well as of the Pinochet regime in Chile.

### Cuba as Surrogate

An important, if not crucial ingredient in Soviet calculations pertaining to the Western Hemisphere has always been to weigh US reactions carefully at each step along the path. Thus, since the missile confrontation in 1962, the Soviets have proceeded cautiously in transforming Cuba into a viable base of operations, and in allowing Havana to take the lead in dealing with revolutionary groups in third countries.

Meanwhile the Soviet presence and stake in the Caribbean, anchored in Cuba, has grown incrementally:

- Soviet economic aid to Cuba in 1982 amounted to roughly \$4.7 billion, the equivalent to one-fourth of Cuba's GNP. Aid to Cuba accounts for over 60% of the USSR's global economic assistance program. An additional \$0.6 to \$1 billion in military aid was also provided last year. (Deliveries in 1982 exceeded those in 1981 by 2,000 metric tons; annual totals of the last two years have been the highest since 1962.)
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- The Soviet intelligence monitoring/telecommunications facility in Cuba is the largest such Soviet installation outside the USSR and monitors a wide spectrum of US civilian and military telecommunications.
- Long-range "Bear" reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft are deployed on a regular basis to Cuba and Soviet naval combatants regularly stage joint training exercises with the Cubans.

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To avoid alienating Mexico, Panama, and others in the region, and particularly to avert any US retaliatory actions, the bulk of Soviet assistance to Nicaragua has been channelled mainly through Cuba. (Libya, some members of the communist bloc, and other countries, however, provide some of the Soviet arms arriving in the country.) Some 6,000 Cuban civilian advisers are formally in Nicaragua to administer economic and technical aid programs; another 2,000 Cuban security advisers supervise the transfer of Soviet arms, and the development, modernization and expansion of military facilities, airfields, and the like. They are also engaged actively in support of guerrillas operating against governments elsewhere in the region.

The USSR itself has so far sent only about 50 advisers overtly and \$125 million in military equipment and supplies. In addition there are currently 35 East German, 50 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) members, and some Libyan personnel in the country. Nicaraguan military pilots and crews meanwhile have trained in Bulgaria and other East European locations. Any transfer of MIGs from Cuba, however, would presumably necessitate Soviet and Cuban agreement that the situation warranted such a move despite the risk of US counteraction.

#### Grenada: Escalation of the Stakes

The US action in Grenada brought the Soviets their first setback in the Caribbean since 1979. Moscow's decision to back the Bishop group soon after it came to power that year reflected the then-prevailing optimistic communist estimate of revolutionary prospects in the region in the wake of the Sandinista success in Nicaragua. Soviet willingness to supplement political support for the new regime with military assistance over a five-year period attested also to a confidence that the risks involved were few. Nonetheless, Soviet insistence on channelling all arms aid through Cuba demonstrated continuing caution on Moscow's part.

Despite the relative newness of their presence in the country, the Soviets had by the end made a not inconsequential investment. Still the Grenadian revolution involved neither Soviet vital interests nor major prestige issues; its demise is more important in terms of Moscow's position in Nicaragua and Cuba than in Grenada itself. The Soviets thus have exploited international and domestic US criticism of the invasion in part to deter similar actions against Nicaragua, but more broadly to undercut American and international support for what the USSR sees as an increasingly hostile US administration.

The three secret Soviet-Grenadian treaties recovered in Grenada reveal Soviet willingness, even an eagerness, to be generous with military aid. The agreements, covering the period 1980-1985, provided for delivery of some \$25.8 million

in weapons ammunition, uniforms, trucks, and other logistical equipment--so long as the regime worked to consolidate its Marxist revolutionary credentials. The treaty stipulation that all arms be shipped through Cuba confirmed a pattern which already had emerged in the distribution of Soviet-origin equipment to Nicaragua.

Also in keeping with Soviet practice elsewhere, economic aid was less generous. During Bishop's tenure, the USSR was known to have provided to Grenada some \$10 million in trade credits and economic and technical aid. Included in the known programs were promises for a satellite earth station and for conducting a feasibility study for a deep-water port. Moscow may also have helped finance the some 700 Cubans on the island, the majority of whom were working on the Point Salines Airport (scaled to accommodate even the largest jet aircraft and which could have been used to facilitate Cuban troop flights to Africa) and constructing a battalion-sized military camp at Caligny. (Other Cubans were attached to almost every Grenadian ministry, handling political indoctrination and economic projects).

#### The Caribbean: Future Prospects

In the wake of Grenada, Cuba and Nicaragua, presumably at Soviet urging, have been showing extreme caution in their dealings with revolutionary groups lest they provoke the US. Presumably there have also been new debates about revolutionary doctrine and possible recrimination between Moscow and Havana. Moscow nonetheless will continue to be on the lookout for opportunities to generate and exploit differences between the US and the countries of the region. At the moment, only the regime in Guyana appears to be attempting to improve ties with Moscow and Havana; Suriname, on the other hand, has decided to scale back its connections there.

#### South America: Trade, Aid and Covert Activity

While the USSR's priority concern in South America is access to needed goods and raw materials, penetration of regional markets which have historically been dependent on Western suppliers remains an important objective. The January 1979 US partial grain embargo stimulated Moscow to greater activity here; trade with Argentina, Brazil and Mexico grew dramatically as a result. Large Latin American trade surpluses, a result of the USSR's inability to provide desirable export goods, limit the effectiveness of trade as a tool of influence, however, as do the regional suspicions of Soviet motives. While, for example, fishing port rights granted in return for technical aid to Ecuador and Peru have lead to increased Soviet presence in those countries, evidence that Soviet vessels have engaged in intelligence collection and complaints of overfishing prevent translation of that presence into political leverage.



- In Argentina, one of the USSR's major grain suppliers, the Soviets are pressing Buenos Aires to buy more to reduce the \$1.7 billion 1982 trade deficit. Military equipment is one item being pushed. They also seek to expand their planning and construction role in Argentine energy development with more sales of hydropower and other equipment.
- Peru has purchased aircraft and other military equipment from the USSR and currently hosts between 125-150 Soviet military trainers and technicians. The Soviets are pressing for further military sales and for greater participation in major civilian construction projects involving Soviet goods. Lima has just succeeded in rescheduling its over \$1 billion military debt with Moscow.

One major exception to this general Soviet promotion of state-to-state and trade relations is Chile. Since 1981 Moscow has overtly backed the Chilean Communist Party's (PCCH) dual policy of "armed struggle" coupled with attempts to work together with the nonviolent opposition to the Pinochet regime. A new party line of unity and violence (in fact, a unity molded by combat) was enunciated in December 1980. In January 1981, the communists signed a unification agreement with seven other Chilean leftist political organizations. Within two weeks, Moscow began broadcasting PCCH explanations of the new policy and calls for armed insurgency. Recently, Moscow underscored its endorsement of this tactic by publishing in the Soviet press a new PCCH "Manifesto" which called for Pinochet's violent overthrow.

#### Long-Term Investment

Perhaps the one Soviet program in Latin America with the greatest long term potential is that of educational exchange, i.e. scholarships to third world students to study in the USSR. The number of Soviet Bloc academic grants offered annually to Latin American students jumped from 400 in the 1960's to about 7,000 today. 7,000 Cubans were studying in the Soviet Union in 1979. Last year, 700 Nicaraguans were reported to be enrolled there and an additional 300 scholarships were being provided Managua. There are also smaller groups from many other Latin American countries. Soviet scholarships include free room, board, tuition, transportation, medical care and a small stipend. Since the programs began in the mid 1960's, some 6,800 Latin American students have utilized them.

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## SOVIET STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA

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"Yuriy Andropov noted that the Soviet Union regarded with great sympathies the effort of the friendly Nicaraguan people to ensure economic and social transformation of their country, and rendered to them political support and material assistance in that."

"Yuriy Andropov expressed the conviction that Nicaragua will be able to uphold its freedom and independence and declared the sincere solidarity of the Soviet Union, of all Soviet people with the Nicaraguan people in their just cause."

10/25/83 Government Statement on Nicaragua:

"The Government of the USSR resolutely condemns the aggressive U.S. course with respect to Nicaragua and declares invariable solidarity of the Soviet people with the just struggle of the Nicaraguan people for independent and free development at their own choice. Interference in the affairs of Nicaragua must be stopped."

11/29/83 Soviet Ambassador to Nicaragua German Shlyapnikov (Cited by Panama City ACAN):

"Shlyapnikov explained that the USSR maintains a policy of solidarity with the Sandinist revolution, and that it supports the peace efforts that the Nicaraguan Government and the Contadora Group are engaging in to prevent a war in Central America."

Guatemala

6/26/83 Moscow Selskaya Zhiszn on Guatemalan Solidarity Day:

"No repressions can stifle the Guatemalan people's struggle for freedom. The insurgents' detachments are being reinforced increasingly with new fighters who dream of seeing their motherland free. For the sake of this bright goal and the happiness of their people, they are fully determined to fight on to complete victory."

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6/16/81

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2/26/81

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2/27/81

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"We will always support our friends and will never abandon them."

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Brezhnev in Moscow:

"The Cuban revolutionaries have traversed a long and difficult path. They have encountered and continue to encounter all sorts of challenges and provocations on the part of imperialism. But Cuba has proved that it is able to stand firm in defense of its interests. Using this occasion, I would like to stress that the Soviet Union has been, is, and will be in solidarity with socialist Cuba."

11/6/81

Marshal Ustinov at the annual revolution ceremony:

"The United States must consider the consequences of its actions against Cuba."

11/3/81

Foreign Minister Gromyko at the swearing in ceremony of new Cuban Ambassador:

2/9/82

Brezhnev greeting to 10th World Federation of Trade Unions Congress in Havana:

"The people of Cuba know that they have on their side the Soviet Union and the entire international working class, and they have on their side the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community... This solidarity is a reliable guarantee that no imperialist power will be able to throw it (Cuba) from its chosen path."

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7/83

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"The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, all the forces of peace and progress the world over, side with the people of El Salvador in the struggle and strongly denounce the actions by the imperialists seeking to destabilize the situation and build up tensions in Central America."

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"The Soviet people solidarise (sic) with the people of Grenada waging the struggle for social progress, for the ensurance of independence and sovereignty of their country."
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UNCLASSIFIED

- 10 -

Drafter: INR/SEE: BBenedict x29212  
                    AFriedt

Clearance: INR/IAA: GGallucci  
            INR/IAA: JBuchanan  
            INR/IAA: WLOfstrom  
            INR/IAA: HDavis  
            INR/IAA: JDavis  
            INR/PMA: JPeterson  
            INR/PMA: LHuffman

Wang #0940A (INR/IS)

UNCLASSIFIED

## Soviet Objectives and Intentions in Latin America

The immediate Soviet objective in Latin America is to enhance the USSR's influence at the expense of the U.S. To that end, Moscow seeks correct surface relations on the state level with most Latin American governments while working covertly with communist parties and front groups to promote causes compatible with Soviet interests.

At the same time, the USSR works directly and through its Cuban client to strengthen radical regimes and revolutionary movements, particularly in the Caribbean region.

Recent events in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Grenada, Suriname, and elsewhere clearly attest to active Soviet involvement in supporting revolutionary currents in the region. Expanded trade relationships with major South American countries have meanwhile provided Moscow with new footholds and prospects for expanding influence.

Yet distance from the USSR, awareness of traditional US sensitivity to developments in the Western Hemisphere, and the desire to avoid provoking a confrontation with the US have acted, and may continue to act, as constraints on Soviet behavior.

The Soviets may also be constrained by a lack of receptivity to their overtures by Latin Americans. Any impression of US weakness or vacillation, however, could cause small, defenseless states to seek accommodation with the Soviets.

### Background: Paths to Power

Following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Moscow concentrated on strengthening the regime of Fidel Castro through massive injections of military and economic aid, to the point where Cuba became completely dependent on Soviet largesse and eventually a willing accomplice in Soviet political objectives.

Nonetheless, during the 1960's, Moscow apparently opposed supplying arms to the many small untested Latin American revolutionary groups which took their cue from the Cuban revolution. The Soviets also refused to support Cuban adventures in the area, arguing that the various leftist groups were not ready or able to achieve the success the Cubans had.

Moscow opted instead to emphasize the so-called via pacifica or parliamentary path to power, citing as prototype the emerging Marxist-leftist alliance in Chile. With Salvador Allende's overthrow in 1973, however, Moscow reassessed its doctrine and tactics, and gradually began giving greater emphasis to "armed struggle" as the means for turning the tide in favor of revolution, if circumstances were propitious.

Soviet/Cuban military collaboration in bringing Marxists to power in Angola in 1975-1976, and in providing direct military assistance to the Marxist regime in Ethiopia in 1977-1978, set the stage for a revival of the pursuit of revolution by violence in the Western Hemisphere.

With the success of the Sandinistas (who had relied heavily on Cuban arms and training) in Nicaragua in 1979, Moscow evidently became convinced that a new revolutionary tide was emerging in Latin America. Soviet media began openly advocating the violent overthrow of regimes in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, as well as of the Pinochet regime in Chile. (Examples of such statements may be found in the Supplement)

### Cuba as Surrogate

An important, if not crucial ingredient in Soviet calculations pertaining to the Western Hemisphere has always been to weigh US reactions carefully at each step along the path. Since the missile confrontation in 1962, the Soviets have proceeded, albeit cautiously, in transforming Cuba into a viable base of operations and in allowing Havana to take the lead in dealing with revolutionary groups in third countries.

Meanwhile, the Soviet presence and stake in the Caribbean, anchored in Cuba, has grown incrementally. Soviet economic aid to Cuba in 1982 amounted to roughly \$4.6 billion, the equivalent to one-fourth of Cuba's GNP.

Aid to Cuba, some of which may be intended for other countries, accounts for over 60% of the USSR's global economic assistance program. An additional \$0.6 to \$1 billion in military aid was also provided last year. (Deliveries in 1982 exceeded those in 1981 by 2,000 metric tons; annual totals of the last two years have been the highest since 1962.)

Some 2,000-2,500 Soviet military and 6,000-8,000 civilian advisers are currently in Cuba, in addition to the Soviet brigade of 2,600-3,000 men. (The number of military advisers increased by 500 last year.)

The Soviet intelligence monitoring/telecommunications facility in Cuba is the largest such Soviet installation outside the USSR and monitors a wide spectrum of US civilian and military telecommunications.

Long range "Bear" reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft are deployed on a regular basis to Cuba. Soviet naval combatants regularly stage joint training exercises with the Cubans.

### Nicaragua: Wave of the Future in Central America?

With Cuba serving as a base for operations in all the Caribbean, Moscow sees Nicaragua as a possible door to Central



America and clearly hopes to fashion in Managua an instrument with some of the impact, but not the cost, of its Havana surrogate.

To avoid alienating Mexico, Panama, and others in the region, and particularly to avert any US retaliatory actions, the bulk of Soviet assistance to Nicaragua has been channelled mainly through Cuba. (Libya, some members of the communist bloc, and other countries, however, provide some of the Soviet arms arriving in the country.)

Some 6,000 Cuban civilian advisers are in Nicaragua to administer economic and technical aid programs; another 2,000 Cuban security advisers supervise the transfer of arms, and the development, modernization and expansion of military forces and facilities. They are also actively engaged in support of guerrillas operating against governments elsewhere in the region.

The USSR itself has so far sent about 50 advisers overtly and \$125 million in military equipment and supplies to Nicaragua. In addition there are currently 35 East German, 50 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) members, and some Libyan personnel in the country.

Nicaraguan military pilots and crews meanwhile have trained in Bulgaria and other East European locations. Any transfer of MiGs from Cuba, however, would presumably necessitate Soviet and Cuban agreement that the situation warranted such a move despite the risk of US counteraction.

#### Grenada: Escalation of the Stakes

The US and Caribbean joint action in Grenada brought the Soviets and Cubans a serious setback in the Caribbean. Moscow's decision to back the Maurice Bishop regime soon after it came to power reflected the then-optimistic communist estimate of revolutionary prospects in the region.

Soviet willingness to supplement political support for the new regime with military assistance over a five-year period attested also to a confidence that the risks involved were few. Nonetheless, Soviet insistence on channeling arms and aid through Cuba demonstrated continuing caution on Moscow's part.

The three secret Soviet-Grenadian treaties recovered in Grenada reveal Soviet willingness, even an eagerness, to be generous with military aid. The agreements, covering the period 1980-1985, provided for delivery of some \$25.8 million in weapons, ammunition, uniforms, trucks, and other logistical equipment -- so long as the regime worked to consolidate its Marxist revolutionary credentials. The treaty stipulated that all arms be shipped through Cuba.

Also in keeping with Soviet practice elsewhere, economic aid was less generous. During Bishop's tenure, the USSR was known to have provided to Grenada some \$10 million in trade credits and economic and technical aid. Included in the known programs were promises for a satellite earth station and for conducting a feasibility study for a deep-water port.

Moscow may also have helped finance the some 700 Cubans on the island, the majority of whom were working on the Point Salines Airport (scaled to accommodate even the largest jet aircraft and which could have been used to facilitate Cuban troop flights to Africa) and constructing a battalion-sized military camp at Caligny.

Other Cubans were attached to almost every Grenadian ministry, handling political indoctrination and economic projects.

Despite the relative newness of their presence in the country, the Soviets had by the end of the Bishop regime made a substantial investment while keeping their involvement with Grenada largely indirect.

Nevertheless, the rescue mission was more important to Moscow's position in Nicaragua and Cuba given the much larger Soviet investment there, than merely the loss of prestige involved in the demise of the leftist regime in Grenada. The inability (or unwillingness) of the USSR to come to the aid of the pro-Soviet government was only too apparent.

The Soviets thus have tried to exploit what international and domestic US criticism there was of the invasion in part to deter similar actions against Nicaragua, but more broadly to try to undercut American and international support for what the USSR sees as an increasingly determined US administration.

### The Caribbean: Future Prospects

Since the Grenadian operation, both Cuba and Nicaragua, presumably at Soviet urging, have been showing extreme caution in their dealings with revolutionary groups lest they provoke the US. Presumably there have also been new debates about revolutionary doctrine and possible recrimination between Moscow and Havana.

Moscow nonetheless will continue to be on the lookout for opportunities to generate and exploit differences between the US and the countries of the region but is meeting little receptivity.

Suriname, for example, has decided to scale back its Cuban connections. The day after the US/Caribbean action in Grenada, Oscar Osvaldo Cardenas, Cuba's Ambassador to Suriname, was expelled.

## South America: Trade, Aid and Covert Activity

While the USSR is interested in access to needed South American goods, such as foodstuffs and raw materials, the penetration of regional markets which have historically been dependent on Western suppliers remains an important objective.

The January, 1979 US partial grain embargo stimulated Moscow to greater activity here; trade with Argentina, Brazil and Mexico grew dramatically. Large Latin American trade surpluses, a result of the USSR's inability to provide durable export goods, limit the effectiveness of trade as a tool of influence, however, as do the regional suspicions of Soviet motives.

While, for example, fishing port rights granted in return for technical aid to Ecuador and Peru have led to some increase of Soviet prestige in these countries, evidence that Soviet vessels have engaged in intelligence collection and complaints of overfishing prevent translation of that presence into political leverage.

In Argentina, one of the USSR's major grain suppliers, the Soviets are pressing Buenos Aires to buy more to reduce the \$1.7 billion 1982 trade deficit. Hopes that they could sell military equipment in the aftermath of the South Atlantic conflict have not come to fruition. The Soviets are, however, seeking to expand their planning and construction role in Argentine energy development with more sales of hydropower and other equipment.

Peru purchased aircraft and other military equipment from the USSR during an earlier period of leftist military rule and still hosts between 100-125 Soviet military trainers and technicians. The Soviets would like to make further military sales and are pushing for greater participation in major civilian construction projects involving Soviet goods. Lima has just succeeded in rescheduling its over \$1 billion military debt with Moscow.

The Soviets have not followed the same policy of promoting state-to-state and trade relations with Chile. Since 1981 Moscow has overtly backed the Chilean Communist Party's (PCCH) dual policy of "armed struggle" coupled with attempts to work together with the non-violent opposition to the Pinochet regime. (See Supplement)

A new party line of unity and violence (in fact, a unity molded by combat) was enunciated in December, 1980. In January, 1981, the communists signed a unification agreement with seven other Chilean leftist political organizations. Within two weeks, Moscow began broadcasting PCCH explanations of the new policy and calls for armed insurgency.

Recently, Moscow underscored its endorsement of this tactic by publishing in the Soviet press a new PCCH "Manifesto" which called for Pinochet's violent overthrow.

### Long-Term Investment

Perhaps the Soviet program in Latin America with the greatest long term potential is that of educational exchange, i.e. scholarships to third world students to study in the USSR.

The number of Soviet Bloc academic grants offered annually to Latin American students jumped from 400 in the 1960's to over 6,000 today. Seven thousand Cubans were studying in the Soviet Union in 1979. Last year, 700 Nicaraguans were reported to be enrolled there and an additional 300 scholarships were being provided to Managua. There are also smaller groups from many other Latin American countries.

Soviet scholarships include free room, board, tuition, transportation, medical care and a small stipend. Since the programs began in the mid-1960's, some 6,800 Latin American students have utilized them.

About 3,000 Latin American students, including 1,600 Nicaraguans, are also studying in Cuba. Cuba has constructed 17 schools for foreigners, (each reportedly costing about \$2 million) and spends \$600,000 annually to operate them.

### Conclusion

The Soviets view Latin America as the "strategic rear" of the U.S. Effective projection of American power to Western Europe, the Middle East or the Far East is dependent on a secure southern flank. In the event of a European crisis, a significant number of NATO reinforcements and half the NATO resupply material would originate at Gulf Coast ports.

The Soviets, therefore, can be expected to try to turn Latin America, and especially Central America and the Caribbean, into an area of insecurity for the US. They hope to do this by supporting anti-American revolutionary movements and then using their support as leverage to turn revolutionary currents in a pro-Soviet direction.

It is a strategy of opportunism. Working with Fidel Castro, the Soviets strive to exacerbate existing problems in the Western Hemisphere. In general terms, Moscow seeks to reduce US options incrementally and increase the amount of men, attention, and materiel the US must commit to the Caribbean region. By focusing on the Caribbean, Moscow hopes to bring pressure on the U.S. to change its traditional policy of concentrating on European security.

SUPPLEMENT: SOVIET STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF  
REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA

Nicaragua

3/17/82 Soviet Ambassador to Mexico Rostislav Sergeyev warned that if the situation in Nicaragua gets worse, his government will help the Central American nation politically and diplomatically. (Cited by Mexico City NOTIMEX)

3/25/83 TASS on Andropov/Ortega Meeting:

"Yuriy Andropov noted that the Soviet Union regarded with great sympathies the effort of the friendly Nicaraguan people to ensure economic and social transformation of their country, and rendered to them political support and material assistance in that."

Yuriy Andropov expressed the conviction that Nicaragua will be able to uphold its freedom and independence and declared the sincere solidarity of the Soviet Union, of all Soviet people with the Nicaraguan people in their just cause."

10/25/83 Government Statement on Nicaragua:

"The Government of the USSR resolutely condemns the aggressive US course with respect to Nicaragua and declares invariable solidarity of the Soviet people with the just struggle of the Nicaraguan people for independent and free development at their own choice. Interference in the affairs of Nicaragua must be stopped."

11/29/83 Soviet Ambassador to Nicaragua German Shlyapnikov (Cited by Panama City ACAN):

Shlyapnikov explained that the USSR maintains a policy of solidarity with the Sandinist revolution, and that it supports the peace efforts that the Nicaraguan Government and the Contadora Group are engaging in to prevent a war in Central America."

Guatemala

6/26/83 Moscow Selskaya Zhiszn on Guatemalan Solidarity Day:

"No repressions can stifle the Guatemalan people's struggle for freedom. The insurgents' detachments are being reinforced increasingly with new fighters who

dream of seeing their motherland free. For the sake of this bright goal and the happiness of their people, they are fully determined to fight on to complete victory."

Chile

6/16/81 Radio Moscow, (in Spanish to Chile):

"Against the entrenched fascism which plans to continue oppressing the people until the end of the twentieth century, the Communist Party advocates the so-called people's holy right to rebellion."

"The rebellion will be woven with violent and nonviolent actions and its main characteristic will be the refusal to accept the legitimacy of fascism and to deny it any right to existence."

6/7/82 Radio Moscow in Spanish to Chile, broadcasting text of Chilean Communist Party Communique:

"The Political Committee of the Communist Party of Chile, PCCH, made a study of the current situation in the country and considered the urgent need to develop a mass struggle and common actions by all the forces who are against Pinochet's tyranny."

9/13/82 Radio Moscow in Spanish to Chile, quoting the Proclamation issued by the Chilean Communist Party on September 11:

"Everybody is expecting something to happen. Chileans: We, the Communists, tell you: Don't wait; get organized and fight. Nothing will be achieved without fighting."

1983/No.21 New Times: A Baryshev: "Pinochet on a Volcano"

"The recent events (May riots in Chile) testify to a new upsurge of the resistance movement against the fascist dictatorship." "All this confirms the conclusion drawn in the Communist Party document circulated in Santiago in April that the conditions have emerged for 1983 to become a year of decisive struggle for the Pinochet."

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"In present conditions, when the United States imperialists launched another anti-Cuban campaign, the USSR, as before, is siding with socialist Cuba and expressing full support for its principled policy of peace and friendship between peoples."

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 16, 1984

TO: CONSTANTINE C. MENGES

FROM: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY *FRW*

SUBJECT: Draft Paper on "Soviet Objectives and Intentions  
in Latin America"

The attached paper was submitted to me for release as a White House DIGEST by the Department of State.

This paper will be of utmost importance in informing the American people of the impact of our policies in Central America on the economy of the United States.

Anything you can do to expedite its clearance and return to me will be very much appreciated.

Attachment:  
Draft Paper on "Soviet Objectives and Intentions in Latin America"

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

EL.

February 22, 1984

TO: RICHARD G. DARMAN  
FROM: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY *FRW*  
SUBJECT: White House DIGESTS

The following draft DIGESTS are send for your approval:

1. The Strategic and Economic Importance  
of the Caribbean Sea Lanes
2. Soviet Objectives and Intentions in Latin  
America
3. Nicaraguan Repression of Miskito Indians

These papers have been cleared informally by the appropriate agencies. I would appreciate whatever you can do to expedite the formal clearance. Many thanks.

Attachments (3)

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 16, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ED LYNCH

FROM:

JACKIE TILLMAN 

SUBJECT:

White House Digests on Caribbean Sea Lanes/Soviet Objectives in Latin America/Nicaraguan Repression of Miskito Indians

These three White House Digests have been through the second round of review/clearance by CIA, State and Defense. They also were reviewed by relevant NSC staffers. All comments are written into the attached drafts for redrafting. Once I receive from you the drafts incorporating comments from this second round, I will transmit to Kimmitt at NSC Executive Secretariat for formal transmittal to Amb. Whittlesey and Richard Darman.

Attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 1, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN LENCZOWSKI  
FROM: Edward A. Lynch *EL*  
SUBJECT: Contact for DIGEST on Soviet Intentions

Please find attached the request from Mike Baroody for a contact person for additional information on the White House DIGEST entitled "Soviet Intentions in Central and South America."

As I said in our conversation this morning, the paper cannot be finally cleared without the name of a contact person. Perhaps you and either Constantine or Jackie would prefer to share the responsibility since the paper deals with both areas.

When you have decided, please let me know and I will tell Mike Baroody.

Thank you.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 30, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ED LYNCH

FROM: MIKE BAROODY *MB*  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
AND DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: WHITE HOUSE DIGEST CONTACTS

As always, I would prefer a contact name for placement on White House Digests. Generally, the contact is the appropriate person from State, sometimes NSC.

I believe this is all the more desirable in the case of this specific Digest currently being finalized (Soviet Objectives and Intentions in Latin America). The number of factual assertions contained within will undoubtedly prompt inquiries from people wanting more information.

Therefore, could you please provide a contact person's name and phone number for inclusion on the Digest.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

cc: F. Donatelli